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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This study examines the crusading movement during the reign of Pope Gregory X in 
the latter part of the thirteenth century, before the Latin presence in the Levant came to an 
end. It seeks to demonstrate the important position of this little-known pope, who formed the 
bridge between what can now be seen as two separate eras in the crusading period, namely, 
the era of the traditional passagium generale, and the ‘new’ era of the passagium particulare. 
To do this, it will study Western and Muslim sources to understand the condition of the Holy 
Land during Gregory’s pontificate to see the effect it had on the manner in which he 
organised his crusade, using both traditional and ‘new’ methods. By drawing on sources from 
crusading in Iberia, it will show that Gregory approached the crusade flexibly, and was not, 
as commonly described by historians, wholly obsessed with the Holy Land. It also seeks to 
dispel one of the more popular myths surrounding Gregory, which is that he wanted to 
change the government of the kingdom of Jerusalem by putting Charles of Anjou in charge 
there. A study of the Angevin chancery records – little used by crusade historians – will 
demonstrate that it was not Gregory’s idea, but rather Charles’ own. Finally, using Gregory’s 
papal registers and chronicle evidence, this study will attempt to imagine the crusade that 
would have occurred had Gregory not died prematurely. This includes a discussion of the 
unprecedented scope of its recruitment as evidence of Gregory’s exceptional ability as a 
crusade organiser, as well as the evidence and reasons for a dramatic change in direction 
away from Egypt.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
  
 Pope Gregory X’s papal tenure (September 1271 – January 1276) stood at the very 
centre of the crusading movement in the later thirteenth century. Gregory was the last pope to 
come close to launching a traditional passagium generale to the Holy Land, and the first pope 
to use the passagium particulare, which would come to be the common crusading form after 
his death. Gregory’s crusading efforts came at a time when the Christians had never been in a 
worse situation since the disaster of 1187, when Saladin had succeeded in conquering 
essentially all the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem except Tyre, with Tripoli and Antioch 
remaining to the north. By Gregory’s time, the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, now long-since 
based in Acre, was left with only a few cities and fortresses along the littoral. Tripoli 
remained – barely – but the principality of Antioch had been completely overrun. St Louis’ 
second crusade had been the last attempt at a general passage to rescue the Latin East in 
1270, but it had ended in disaster with Louis’ own death in Tunis, far away from the Holy 
Land. The small remnants of this crusade, led by Lord Edward of England, could do very 
little to restore Latin power in the Holy Land. Thus, Gregory’s own general passage would 
have been the first to reach the Holy Land since Louis’ first crusade ended in the 1250s. The 
long intervening years had led, particularly in the later 1260s, to widespread Muslim 
conquest.  
 The nature of crusading in the thirteenth century was quite different from that in the 
twelfth. As is well-known, the very first crusaders to the Holy Land were faced with a strong, 
but disunited enemy, and they focused their efforts on northern Syria and Palestine. Muslim 
unity after the First Crusade made an already formidable enemy even stronger. After the 
Third Crusade had succeeded in restoring Acre, but not Jerusalem, the target of subsequent 
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crusades to the Holy Land shifted to Egypt, in the belief that Jerusalem could only be kept 
securely in Christian hands if it were not facing an enemy on both sides. Since Egypt was the 
main source of Muslim power, the Fifth Crusade and the first crusade of St Louis aimed to 
cut off the head to kill the body. Though this strategy had met with initial success, with both 
of these crusades capturing Damietta, neither was able to capitalise on this and both ended in 
failure. Egypt remained very much a Muslim possession. Gregory would have been faced 
with this poor record when he set about planning his own crusade. 
Gregory’s crusade would also have had to confront the famed Mamluk Sultan 
Baybars, who had ruled from Egypt since 1260, and who was responsible for much of the 
conquest of the Latin East after his predecessor Qutuz’s great victory against the Mongols at 
Ain Jalut in that year. The end of Louis’ first crusade had seen the rise to power of these 
Mamluk sultans. The Mamluk conquests of the Latin East were impressive, but it is 
interesting to note that while the Mamluks were in power, they were never actually tested by 
the vast Christian army that could have come from a general passage. Certainly, small 
crusades (such as that of the bastard sons of James of Aragon, and that of Lord Edward) had 
confronted the Muslim army when it was under a Mamluk sultanate, but never the combined 
forces of Christendom. Gregory’s planned crusade would have been perhaps the greatest test 
of Baybars’ skill as a leader and general. Baybars would have had to confront almost all the 
Christian kings of the West, well-funded and very likely with suitably large contingents, 
instead of the small remnants of eastern Franks who were chronically short of manpower and 
supplies. With the addition of a possible Christian alliance with the Ilkhanate Mongols, this 
would have been a formidable opponent for Baybars. But of course, that crusade never 
happened. 
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Historiographical Overview 
 
The fact that Gregory’s crusade never happened after his death should not discourage 
an investigation into the planning and preparation that went into it. It is the objective of this 
thesis to use a study of Gregory’s crusading efforts to reveal the changing nature of the 
crusading movement at this time. Since Gregory’s reign did indeed sit on the border of what 
can now be seen as two different eras in crusading history, the very middle of his papal tenure 
(1274) has been used by historians as an alternative to the fall of Acre in 1291 to date the 
change in the nature of crusade planning. This was the date at which Gregory held the Second 
Council of Lyons, whose goals were to heal the schism with the Greek Church, reform 
morals, and most importantly, plan the crusade. At the council, the need for smaller groups of 
professional soldiers to safeguard the Latin presence in the Holy Land was raised and 
endorsed: the passagium particulare. As a result, it was Sylvia Schein who first spearheaded 
the view of 1274 as the date in which ‘the beginning of a new period in crusade planning has 
to be placed.’1 This was taken up enthusiastically by Louise and Jonathan Riley-Smith, who 
were ‘persuaded by recent research that the significance of 1291 has been overstressed and 
that a real change in thinking had occurred some years earlier.’2 They thus ended their 
collection of crusade documents at 1274. Norman Housley picked up where the Riley-Smiths 
left off, and started his collection of documents on the later crusades at 1274.
3
 Elizabeth 
Siberry also used 1274 to mark the end of her study, in the belief that ‘in modern thought 
1274 is a watershed, more important than the fall of Acre in 1291.’4 In his work The Later 
                                                 
1
 This was first posited in her 1980 PhD thesis, and subsequently developed into her book: Sylvia Schein, 
Fideles Crucis: the Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274-1314 (Oxford, 1991), p. 50. For 
the thesis, see: Sylvia Schein, The West and the Crusades: Attitudes and Attempts, 1291-1312, PhD Thesis 
(University of Cambridge, 1980).  
2
 Louise and Jonathan Riley-Smith, trans. & ed., The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095-1274 (London, 1981), p. 
35. 
3
 Norman Housley, trans. & ed., Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580 (Houndmills & London, 1996). 
4
 Elizabeth Siberry, Criticism of Crusading 1095-1274 (Oxford, 1985), p. 1. 
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Crusades, Housley again adopted 1274 as a convenient starting date, because ‘the council 
adopted strategic and financial approaches which established or systematized a new pattern in 
crusading practice.’5 Antony Leopold acknowledged the trend in placing significance on 
1274, but since his work was on recovery treatises, his focus remained heavily on memoirs 
after 1291. He argued that ‘the style of these memoirs [before 1291] differs greatly from 
those written after the fall of Acre.’6 This should not be seen as a denial of the shift to 1274, 
since Leopold also acknowledged that ‘it was Gregory X who provided the true inspiration 
for the theorists when he called for written advice to be submitted to the church council of 
Lyons in 1274.’7 It is thus clear that 1274 has gained wide currency among historians of the 
crusading movement. 
Contrary to this trend, this thesis will argue that using 1274 as the date in which 
crusade planning changed is problematic. Firstly, an exploration of Gregory’s pontificate 
demonstrates that the policy of using small groups of professional soldiers was taken up by 
Gregory from the very beginning of his incumbency, more than two years before the Second 
Council of Lyons. Thus more credit should be given to Gregory himself for this shift, rather 
than to discussions at the general council. This practice also had some precedent two decades 
earlier with the permanent garrison St Louis left in the Holy Land after his first crusade. To 
be clear, this thesis does not argue that Gregory’s papal reign saw no change in the nature of 
crusade planning – indeed it was a turning point – but, it must be made clear that Gregory’s 
incumbency did not mark the end of the traditional way of crusade planning. Certainly, 
Gregory endorsed the new passagium particulare, but more importantly, Gregory never 
actually moved away from the old way, that is, the passagium generale. Just because his 
general passage never happened should not lead historians to use Gregory’s papal tenure as 
                                                 
5
 Norman Housley, The Later Crusades: from Lyons to Alcazar, 1274-1580 (Oxford, 1992), p. 5. 
6
 Antony Leopold, How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early 
Fourteenth Centuries (Aldershot, 2000), p. 4 & 14. 
7
 Leopold, How to Recover, p. 203. 
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the time when the old methods were abandoned. It is clear that the traditional general passage 
was still widely endorsed in Gregory’s time, since enlistment in this crusade was very 
extensive during his reign, and continued after his death as well. Of course, a question then 
immediately comes to mind: if the general passage were widely endorsed, why did it not 
happen after Gregory’s death? This is intimately connected with a question of leadership and 
internal problems in the West, which will be discussed presently. 
One wonders whether, had Gregory’s general passage actually launched, 1274 would 
still be used to differentiate the two eras: probably not. To borrow from the title of Louise and 
Jonathan Riley-Smith’s book, this is the difference between the idea and the reality of the 
crusade. Schein was clear to point out that the fall of Acre ‘was regarded as a sad but 
ephemeral episode, a temporary setback.’8 It is only with retrospect that the historian can see 
the reality of the fall of Acre as the end of the Latin presence in the Holy Land. It certainly 
was not seen this way by contemporaries, and ideas of reconquest abounded in advice 
treatises, as has been made very clear in Leopold’s work. In the same vein, though in reality 
the historian can see that no general passage reached the Holy Land after the failure of Louis’ 
first crusade, this does not mean that the idea was abandoned, even after the failure of Louis’ 
second crusade. It is clear that Gregory, and the many kings who signed up to his crusade, 
continued to endorse the general passage. Thus, Gregory’s reign should be looked at in its 
entirety (and not just in 1274) as the time when a dual crusading policy was taken up by the 
papacy with the special cooperation of the king of France, Philip III. Gregory’s reign still 
marks a period of change in crusade planning, but rather one which adopted new policies 
without giving up on the old ones. Housley has pointed to this in The Later Crusades, yet he 
still placed the beginning of his work in 1274 in the belief that the systematisation of the 
                                                 
8
 Schein, Fideles, p. 1. 
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practice at the general council was the key aspect.
9
 This does not give enough credit to 
Gregory himself for initiating this practice, based on the information he had gathered while in 
the Holy Land. While acknowledging that Housley first posited what he called a two stage 
enterprise for the crusade in Gregory’s time, the present study will give a detailed 
examination of what this actually meant in practice for Gregory’s crusade plans, so that this 
important period in the crusading movement can be better understood. 
Although 1274 has been widely accepted as a convenient date for when the nature of 
crusade planning changed, the actual reign of Pope Gregory X during which this change took 
place has remained largely uninvestigated. Perhaps the best-known study of Gregory X was 
Palmer Throop’s 1940 work on crusade criticism.10 Although Throop’s work focused on 
Gregory’s papal reign, the author’s narrow goal to root out evidence for hostility to the 
crusade in the later thirteenth century meant that he did not take a broad look at the crusading 
world in which Gregory found himself. Instead, Throop focused for the most part on the 
advice treatises given at the general council; this has led to some very suspect conclusions. 
This point has already been well made in Elizabeth Siberry’s work, which was intended as a 
direct refutation of Throop’s crusade hostility thesis. The present analysis of Gregory’s 
pontificate will confirm Siberry’s thesis. She wrote: ‘admittedly Gregory X’s carefully laid 
plans for a crusade came to nothing, but this should not be attributed, as some historians have 
suggested, to unfavourable or even hostile public opinion and criticism of the crusading 
movement.’11 In terms of the more recent scholarship on Gregory, Schein devoted a chapter 
of her monograph on crusading from 1274-1314 to Gregory’s reign from 1274-1276.12 Yet, 
she focused once again too much on the advice treatises that Gregory commissioned as well 
as on the general council to explain the shift in crusade planning. She did not adequately flesh 
                                                 
9
 Housley, Later Crusades, p. 13. 
10
 Palmer Throop, Criticism of the Crusade: A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda (Amsterdam, 
1940). 
11
 Siberry, Criticism, p. 220. 
12
 Schein, Fideles, p. 15-50. 
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out the milieu in which Gregory planned his crusade, especially the situation in the Holy 
Land itself, which would have aided her in explaining the practical reasons for the shift in 
crusade planning. While not ignoring the advices treatises, this thesis will shift some of the 
focus to the more practical reasons behind the change in crusade planning by looking at the 
condition of the Holy Land around the time of Gregory’s papal tenure. In this respect, 
Schein’s study was severely hampered by her starting date of 1274, halfway through 
Gregory’s reign. 
By far the closest study of the general council of 1274 was published in 1990 in 
German by Burkhard Roberg.
13
 His work examined all aspects of the council, so only one 
chapter was devoted to crusade planning.
14
  Roberg published his work one year before 
Schein released Fideles Crucis, and he made no reference to the new wave in thinking about 
the significance of 1274 to crusade planning. In fact, the crusade historiography he referenced 
was quite limited and dated, even for 1990: Throop and Prutz were his most common 
citations. This was probably because the crusade was only of tangential interest to Roberg, 
whose real concern, of course, was the general council itself. Since Roberg worked in 
isolation from the new wave in thinking about the significance of 1274 to crusade planning, it 
is interesting to see the conclusions to which he came. One must keep in mind that Roberg 
only studied the crusade at the general council, so this seriously limited his understanding of 
crusade planning as a whole at this time; nevertheless, from his study, Roberg seemingly ran 
counter to Schein by concluding that Gregory’s crusade planning was very traditional. Yet 
this difference only arose because they were interested in different elements. Roberg believed 
it was traditional in the sense that Gregory’s crusade decree, Zelus fidei, was essentially a 
reworking of decrees from Innocent III and Innocent IV about money collection and the 
                                                 
13
 Burkhard Roberg, Das Zweite Konzil von Lyon [1274] (Paderborn, 1990). 
14
 Roberg, Das Zweite, p. 171-217. 
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crusade indulgence.
15
 When presented with the question of the general passage or smaller 
bands of professional soldiers for the Holy Land, in which Schein was interested for her 
study, Roberg was unable to see any real significance. Thus, while he pointed out that at the 
general council the Templar master had not mentioned the passagium generale, and instead 
recommended temporary relief for the Holy Land in the form of 300 knights and 500 
footmen, Roberg drew no conclusions about what this meant for crusade planning as a 
whole.
16
 He only noted that: 
Such a foreshortened view of the issues at question – limited to local help instead of a 
general crusade – was characteristic of the perspective of the speaker and the forces he 
represented: the efforts of the military orders appear before and during the council only 
very secondarily to the defense of Holy Land (as far as the meagre sources relate).
17
  
An investigation into Gregory’s papal reign as a whole, and not just the general council in 
1274, reveals that Roberg’s impression of the military orders as being only secondarily 
interested in the defense of the Holy Land is not correct; indeed, they were one of its 
strongest remaining defenders, even though they were prone to internal squabbling. Roberg’s 
failure to explore (or, to be fair, his lack of interest in) the changing nature of crusade 
planning shows the real limitation of his work to those studying the crusade movement, and 
not ecumenical councils.   
After Schein paved the way for acceptance of 1274 as crucial to the crusading 
movement, one would expect that works written since then would have given appropriate 
space for Gregory’s papal reign. Yet, he tends to be relegated to passing mention, or even 
worse, is not mentioned at all in the general histories of the Crusades – even those written 
after Schein put forward her thesis.
18
 Besides the obvious exception of Schein herself (whose 
                                                 
15
 Ibid, p. 206-7. 
16
 Ibid, p. 185-6. 
17
 Ibid, p. 186. 
18
 Gregory X was mentioned only in passing by Asbridge, Tyerman, Riley-Smith, Mayer, and Runciman: 
Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land (London, 2010), p. 649; Christopher Tyerman, 
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work was not a general history), Jean Richard and Kenneth Setton’s works are the only 
exceptions.
19
 Richard clearly understood the importance of Gregory’s reign, and he devoted a 
section entitled ‘the Crusade of Pope Gregory X’ in his general history to it. Richard’s short 
section is actually one of the best modern treatments of Gregory’s crusading efforts in the 
general histories, but at only eight pages, that is not saying much. He did raise the issue of the 
importance of cooperation with the Mongols for the new crusade in the Holy Land, but on 
balance he tended to rely on Palmer Throop’s dated monograph on criticism of the crusade.20 
This has led Richard to write, like Schein, mostly on the advice treatises and the general 
council, without giving much depth to Gregory’s wider crusade efforts. Setton devoted a 
large chapter entitled ‘the Papal Interregnum, Gregory X, and the Second Council of Lyons 
(1268-1274)’ to his work on the papacy and the Crusades, but he then bizarrely skipped the 
latter part of Gregory’s reign, to begin his next chapter in 1276.21 Unlike Schein, Setton did a 
decent job of setting the background for his discussion of Gregory’s pontificate. The fact that 
he started his chapter in 1268 was wise in this respect, irrespective of his decision to end it 
prematurely in 1274. Yet, given the early date of Setton’s work, there was not yet a clear 
understanding of the importance of this period to the changing nature of crusade planning. 
Setton also placed, once again, too much focus on the general council itself. He was 
especially interested in the work to reunify the Greek and Latin churches. This is useful in 
itself, of course, but it does not get to the heart of Gregory’s crusade planning. 
                                                                                                                                                        
God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (London, 2006), p. 812-16; Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A 
History, 2
nd
 Edition (London & New York, 2005), p. 212-13; Hans Eberhard Mayer, The Crusades, trans. John 
Gillingham, 2
nd
 Edition (Oxford, 1988), p. 282; Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades Volume III: The 
Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades (Cambridge, 1954), p. 338-42. Gregory and his period in crusading 
history were not mentioned at all by Phillips and Housley, and had a treatment that amounted to nothing in the 
relevant volume of Setton’s multi-volume history of the Crusades: Jonathan Phillips, Holy Warriors: A Modern 
History of the Crusades (London, 2009); Norman Housley, Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land 
(New Haven & London, 2008); Kenneth Setton, ed., A History of the Crusades, Volume II: The Later Crusades 
1189-1311 (Philadelphia, 1962). 
19
 Jean Richard, The Crusades, c. 1071-c. 1291, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge, 1999), p. 434-41; Kenneth 
Setton, The Papacy in the Levant, 1204-1571, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1976), p. 106-122. 
20
 Throop, Criticism. 
21
 Setton, Papacy, p. 106-22 & 123-39. 
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The lack of focus on Gregory in the general texts would seem to suggest that his 
influence on the crusading movement as a whole was not significant enough to warrant space, 
which is certainly a mistake. There is a clear gap in the scholarship on Gregory’s reign, and 
one which needs to be filled if the trend to place the changing nature of the crusade in his 
time is to have a firm foundation. This gap is likely what has led to the misunderstanding of 
the nature of Gregory’s crusading planning, which has led to an over-emphasis on the general 
council of 1274. To date, if one discounts Throop’s work on crusade criticism, the only 
monograph in the truest sense on Gregory’s pontificate was written in 1959 in Italian by 
Ludovico Gatto.
22
 He studied not only Gregory’s crusading efforts, but also his early life, the 
council of Lyons, the coronation of Rudolph of Habsburg, and Gregory’s Italian politics. 
Though broad-ranging, Gatto’s work is not without fault. Gatto wrote while Palmer Throop’s 
work on crusade criticism still held currency; thus, he accepted that Gregory was working at a 
time of hostility to the crusade, and argued that in this time the ideal of the crusade had its 
‘sunset.’23 He came to the conclusion that Gregory turned a blind eye to the difficulties of 
launching a crusade, ignoring the concerns of his contemporaries in the belief that there 
would be a happy outcome.
24
 Even though he believed that Gregory subordinated every other 
program in favour of the crusade, he argued that the pope did nothing during his reign to 
remove the obstacles to its successful launch.
25
 How he could reach this conclusion is hard to 
fathom, since it was Gregory who had healed the schism of the churches, instituted the six-
year tenth tax on ecclesiastical revenue to fund the crusade, and established a working peace 
in the West. Gatto almost suggested that Gregory lacked political capacity, but decided 
instead to conclude that Gregory’s interests were essentially different from the other powerful 
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 Ludovico Gatto, Il Pontificato di Gregorio X (1271-1276) (Rome, 1959). 
23
 Gatto, Pontificato, p. 67-8 & 73. 
24
 Ibid, p. 75. 
25
 Ibid, p. 80. 
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figures of his time, since he failed to force the monarchs to realise the crusading enterprise.
26
 
This is rather unfair, since it would have been difficult for Gregory to convince them to leave 
for the Holy Land from the grave! Gregory had, after all, done his part in their enlistment. 
Gatto’s misguided conclusions leave plenty of room for a new study of Gregory’s papal 
reign, especially one which can take into consideration more recent trends in the scholarship. 
Finally, to return to the question of why Gregory’s general passage failed to launch if 
the idea had been so widely endorsed. For Throop, it was ‘bitterly hostile public opinion’ that 
was to blame, and while ‘at the end of 1275 the chances for the success of Gregory’s plan 
seemed excellent,’ in the end, ‘Gregory X stands revealed as a pathetic anachronism striving 
vainly against the current of the times.’27 As noted, this dated view has been thoroughly 
dismissed by Siberry, who rightly pointed to ‘dissension and internal problems in the West’ 
as the key reason for the failure to launch another major crusade.
28
 But old habits die hard, 
and even as recently as 2006, Tyerman hearkened back somewhat to the old view by writing 
that the failure of Gregory’s crusade showed ‘how politically and emotionally incapable 
[papal leadership] was to move the hearts of politicians and people.’29 Yet, Schein was 
correct to use Gregory X as an example to show that ‘even in the second half of the thirteenth 
century, an energetic pope who was willing to sacrifice at least a part of his European 
interests for the sake of Outremer could successfully pacify Europe and unite its conflicting 
forces.’30 Housley placed the possibility of success for the crusade on the personality of 
Gregory himself: ‘had Gregory X lived, the pope might have exerted enough pressure on the 
pliable Philip III and his Angevin uncle, and collected enough of the sexenniel tenth, to 
secure action on a significant scale.’31 
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 Housley, Later Crusades, p. 15. 
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 This thesis will argue that, while Siberry was right to point to dissension and internal 
problems getting in the way of the crusade, there was something more to it than that in the 
case of Gregory’s crusade. These problems could, as Schein pointed out, be overcome. 
Housley wrote that a comparison of the failure of Gregory’s crusade to launch after his death 
to the successful launch of the Fifth Crusade after Innocent III’s death ‘is not really fair, [...] 
since it overlooks the tremendous growth in the importance of secular leadership in crusading 
matters which occurred between the early and late thirteenth century.’32 Indeed, secular 
leadership was crucially important in the case of St Louis’ second crusade, since it launched 
when Pope Clement IV had been long-since dead, and there was no pope to take a leadership 
role. Leopold wrote that ‘after the death of Louis in Tunisia, there was no longer a European 
prince with the stature or willingness to organise a new crusade, so this task devolved upon 
the papacy.’33 This points to the additional reason for the failure of a major crusade in 
Gregory’s time: too much papal control. 
The notion that there was no king willing to take on a leadership role needs to be re-
examined. As this thesis will argue, there is reasonable evidence that King Philip III of 
France was willing to go on crusade to the Holy Land as early as 1272, since he had not 
completed his vow from Louis’ second crusade. Thus, Gregory was caught in a dilemma: he 
could have encouraged Philip’s leadership initiative to go on crusade in 1272 (or soon after) 
with what probably would have been a reasonably sized force, given Philip’s position as king 
of France. One can also imagine some sort of aid for this crusade from Philip’s uncle, Charles 
of Anjou, since he had not completed his earlier vow either. It seems reasonable to believe 
that this crusade would have been big enough to have the potential to accomplish more than 
Edward of England’s small crusade. In fact, R. Stephen Humphreys has pointed out that the 
smaller expeditions in the thirteenth century ‘achieved far more than the two big 
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expeditions.’34 However, the other option for Gregory was to take control of crusade 
organisation like no other pope had since Innocent III. Indeed, Housley named Gregory’s 
crusade as the last in the mould of Innocent III, that is, ‘as an expression of papal supremacy 
in temporal matters.’35 In this latter option, Gregory would use the formidable force of his 
own personality to organise a crusade of almost unprecedented size after a longer period of 
preparation. The decisive element in this latter option would have been Gregory himself, 
since it was he who stabilised Europe, and who commanded the respect of the kings willing 
to crusade.  
It is well-known that Gregory chose the latter option, though he and the king of 
France did send smaller detachments of troops to the Holy Land in the interim. Gregory 
chose the latter course in the hope that victory would come from a longer preparation period, 
which would allow for the combined forces of western and eastern Christendom, allied with 
the Ilkhanate Mongols, to assemble in the Holy Land against the forces of Sultan Baybars. 
This gamble did not pay off, since his premature death, and the rapid succession of three 
popes afterwards, reopened the field for the kings of Europe to turn once again to their 
internal problems. With their own houses in disorder, the kings would be unable to crusade, 
even though they had showed that they were still interested. Thus, it was partly Gregory’s 
decision to take sole papal control of organising the crusade that contributed to the failure to 
launch a major crusade in his time, since it meant that King Philip’s (admittedly smaller) 
crusade was not allowed to launch earlier, while the conditions had still been right for him. 
After Gregory’s death, his sole papal control of organising the crusade (along with the rapid 
succession of popes) also meant that no one else had been closely involved enough to 
continuing carrying it out, like St Louis had after Pope Clement IV’s death. 
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 R. Stephen Humphreys, ‘Ayyubids, Mamluks, and the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century,’ Mamluk Studies 
Review, vol. 2 (1998), p. 3. 
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 The Main Sources 
 
 The most important sources for this study are the papal registers of Pope Gregory X, 
which have been edited by Jean Guiraud.
36
 However, Guiraud’s edition is not without fault; 
thus, wherever possible, the citations from Registra Vaticana 37 and 29A are given alongside 
in the footnotes, with the differences noted.
37
 Beyond checking for Guiraud’s typographical 
errors, it has been necessary to use the original manuscript copies because Guiraud did not 
always print the register letters in full, often contenting himself with only a brief summary 
that highlighted what he thought were the key points. The choice of what to print in full and 
what to summarise is very subjective, thus in several cases recourse to the original was not 
only wise, but essential. Odoricus Raynaldus, the seventeenth-century continuator of 
Baronius’ Annales Ecclesiastici, has also been useful for additional verification of some of 
Gregory’s letters, since he reproduced some of them from direct access to the Vatican 
library.
38
 
 Since this thesis aims to move away from a dependence on the advice treatises to 
explain the reasons for a shift in crusade strategy, it was vital to look at both Frankish and 
Muslim sources that discuss the condition of the Holy Land in this time. On the Frankish 
side, the Estoire de Eracles has been particularly useful.
39
 Janet Shirley has published a 
translation of part of this text up to 1261.
40
 As she has noted, one of the redactions of this text 
carries the chronicle to 1277.
41
  This later section (book 34) is where the Eracles has been 
useful for the present study, even though Shirley believed this section to be ‘frankly dull, an 
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annal consisting of shorter and shorter notes, some of them confused.’42 Dull though they 
may be, they do give useful information on troop movements to the Holy Land during 
Gregory’s papacy. The earliest manuscripts of this text were written in Acre, thus the authors 
must have been close contemporaries to Gregory X, since Acre was lost in 1291.
43
 This study 
will also depend upon the Gestes des Chiprois, which was named by its modern translator, 
Paul Crawford, as ‘the single most important surviving account of the last days of the 
mainland crusader states.’44 Crawford noted that the author of this chronicle clearly had an 
association with the Templar master William of Beaujeu.
45
 This makes the author a close 
contemporary of Pope Gregory X, under whose reign William became master. 
On the Muslim side, this thesis relies heavily upon the fourteenth-century chronicle of 
Ibn al-Furāt, for which a partial English translation is available.46 What survives of the Sirat 
al-Malik al-Zahir of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir (a contemporary of Baybars), translated by Syedah 
Fatima Sadeque, ends before Gregory’s pontificate, so cannot serve as a useful source for the 
present study.
47
 However, another Sirat al-Malik al-Zahir, this one by Ali Ibn Shaddad, 
would have been an invaluable source given that the author was also a contemporary of 
Baybars, and the surviving piece of this chronicle covers the last five years of Baybars’ life 
(and thus almost exactly Gregory’s papal reign). Unfortunately, there has been no translation 
of this from Arabic into a western European language. Sadeque, in a summary of this work, 
has noted that Ibn Shaddad gave ‘details of [Baybars’] administration, his relations with 
Anatolia and with the Mongols, in the form of a chronologically arranged account.’48 Thus, 
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there is room for further analysis by someone with an understanding of the original text, or if 
this source should become available in a new translation. However, given that Ibn al-Furāt 
(according to Sadeque) ‘borrowed extensively from Ibn al-Zahir and Ibn Shaddad,’ the 
present reliance on Ibn al-Furāt, in the absence of available texts from these other historians, 
is likely not a serious flaw.
49
  
To be clear, information from the advice treatises is still essential to a full 
understanding of the reasons for the changing nature of crusade planning, but they should be 
seen as sources complementary to chronicles, not more important than them. Throop gave an 
extensive treatment of these advice treatises in his work on crusade criticism, but since he 
was focused on finding hostility to the crusade, he failed to see what these treatises could tell 
about the condition of the Holy Land in Gregory’s time. William of Tripoli’s De Statu 
Saracenorum has been a particularly useful source, given that he lived in the Holy Land and 
met Pope Gregory X in Acre.
50
 He thus had firsthand knowledge of what was happening in 
the Holy Land at this time. Humbert of Romans’ Opusculum Tripartitum (often called Opus 
Tripartitum) has also proven useful for understanding western perceptions of crusading.
51
 
Humbert’s treatise, which was presented at the general council, has also been especially 
valuable for information on what Gregory and his contemporaries knew about past crusades. 
Through this, one can draw conclusions about how the memory of past crusades informed 
decisions about the new crusade.  
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 Thesis Overview 
 
 As the title of this thesis suggests, its focus is on Gregory’s crusading efforts. Besides 
his zeal for the crusade, Gregory is perhaps most widely known as the pope who healed the 
schism with the Greek Church in 1274 at the general council. Yet, this study will not dwell 
on this aspect of his papal reign. Where healing the schism impacted on Gregory’s crusading 
efforts will of course be examined, but it will not waste time duplicating the admirable work 
that has already been done on the topic of church union.
52
 However, a small detour from a 
focus solely on the crusade has been necessary in chapter one to give an explanation for 
Gregory’s election to the papacy, since he was, after all, only an archdeacon. Chapter one 
will thus discuss his early life, spent in Italy, France, the Low Countries, England, and the 
Holy Land. It was especially his time in the Holy Land that laid the foundation for Gregory’s 
reign as a crusader pope, but even the time before this gave Gregory valuable contacts and 
experience in Europe that he could utilise as pope. 
 Chapter two will lay a foundation of another sort. This will be an examination of the 
condition of the Holy Land around the time of Gregory’s papal tenure. Such a detailed study 
will present new, practical reasons for the decisions that Gregory made about the crusade, 
especially considering that he had firsthand experience in the Holy Land from his crusade 
there. The first part of this chapter will demonstrate the effect that the recent peace treaty had 
on crusading in this time. It will argue that, while Linda Ross demonstrated that past popes 
had timed crusades to coincide with the expiry of a truce, in Gregory’s time the truce between 
Sultan Baybars and King Hugh of Jerusalem would not have had an impact on the planned 
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crusade.
53
 It will then confront Leopold’s argument that ‘there is no evidence to suggest that 
crusaders usually took pains to inform themselves of conditions in the East before they left 
Europe,’ with clear evidence to the contrary, since not only was Gregory seeking information, 
but so too was King Philip.
54
  Valuable information was also sent by letter from residents of 
the Holy Land to the West. Through these sources, as well as the advice treatises and 
Frankish and Muslim chronicles, this chapter will paint a picture of the fragile condition of 
the Holy Land in Gregory’s time. 
 The first part of Gregory’s dual crusading policy was the sending of small bands of 
professional troops to safeguard the Latin East, which will be named in this thesis the 
‘interim crusade,’ since this was only meant to be a temporary stopgap before the general 
passage could launch. It is in this context that King Philip’s desire to go on crusade in 1272 
will be discussed, which Gregory rejected in favour of an even larger general passage. 
Chapter three presents the organisational structure of the interim crusade planning, which was 
spearheaded by Gregory, but carried out with the help of the king of France. It will also 
examine the nature of these small bands of professional troops, who were mercenaries and 
technically not crusaders, though they were performing a similar role. It will consider the 
problems that arose from using such people, which Gregory himself had to deal with, and 
which was also discussed theoretically by Humbert of Romans. 
 A study of Pope Gregory X’s crusading efforts has provided an ideal opportunity to 
examine the role that Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily, played in the Holy Land at this time, 
since the two worked closely together. Indeed, Gregory has even been accused of 
encouraging Charles to take up Maria of Antioch’s claim to the throne of Jerusalem, since the 
government in the Holy Land was fragile after the long absence of a king. This accusation 
has no grounds, and thus chapter four will thoroughly disprove this popular theory. At the 
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same time, such a topic allows for an investigation into how Gregory dealt with the 
government of the Holy Land (especially through his legate, the patriarch of Jerusalem), 
while the general passage was prepared, and the interim mercenaries were sent there.  
Given the focus on crusading, this thesis will not look heavily at Gregory’s domestic 
policy, except where it relates to his crusade. Thus, chapter five (and part of chapter six) will 
give an extensive examination of the conflict over the throne of king of the Romans and 
ultimately the imperial title, since bringing about peace in the West was a necessity for 
launching the crusade. In addition, the eventual winner in this conflict, Rudolph of Habsburg, 
was to be one of the leading figures in Gregory’s crusade. The fact that the loser of this 
struggle, King Alfonso X of Castile, was a key player in the crusade in Iberia has allowed the 
chance to demonstrate that Gregory’s crusading policy was not as narrowly focused on 
crusading to the Holy Land as has been previously thought. Instead, Gregory’s vision of the 
crusade included that against the Muslims of Iberia and North Africa, as this chapter will 
show. Chapter five seeks to put into practice the pluralist notion that crusades were not only 
those that went to the Holy Land. Contrary to the common practice among historians of the 
crusade to present these two theatres separately, this thesis will present them together, and 
show that crusading in Iberia and North Africa formed a complementary part of Gregory’s 
crusade plans for the Holy Land. 
Finally, as a companion to chapter three in Gregory’s dual crusading policy, chapter 
six will present what Gregory’s general passage would have looked like. This will not be the 
work of an overactive imagination, but rather a work based solely on the evidence available. 
This chapter will begin by presenting the evidence for the unprecedented scale of recruitment 
for Gregory’s crusade, which would have included almost all the kings of the West, as well as 
the Byzantine emperor, and the Ilkhanate Mongols. It will also address the question of who 
would have led this crusade given that so many kings had joined it, and especially 
27 
 
  
considering that Gregory himself hoped to go with them. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the timing of Gregory’s crusade, which has been widely disputed. It will show 
that, while Gregory desired a longer preparation period for the general passage than would 
have happened if King Philip had gone to the Holy Land in 1272, the pope’s plan to launch 
the crusade in 1276 meant that he was still operating faster than his predecessors. This 
chapter will end by overturning any idea that Gregory’s crusade would have followed the 
thirteenth century’s traditional route to Egypt, by presenting compelling evidence that this 
crusade would have taken the land route through Turkey to northern Syria, and thence to 
Palestine. 
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THE EARLY LIFE OF POPE GREGORY X 
 
Chapter One 
 
 
  
 Introduction 
 
 Pope Gregory X, formerly Tedaldo Visconti,
1
 was born near the beginning of the 
thirteenth century, though, as is often the case, a more precise date of birth is not known.
2
 As 
his anonymous biographer related, Tedaldo was born to a noble family of Piacenza, but more 
importantly, his nobility of birth was surpassed by his nobility of character.
3
 This particular 
form of nobility would come to mark the life and career of Tedaldo, and help propel the 
unordained archdeacon to the height of ecclesiastical power in the West. Indeed, even the 
Greek historian George Pachymeres remarked upon the renown of his virtuous character 
when he wrote of Tedaldo’s election to the papacy.4 Though Tedaldo was part of several 
important events in his earlier life, Ludovico Gatto’s out-of-date chapter on Tedaldo’s life 
from birth to papal election, and Burkhard Roberg’s more recent chapter, are two of the only 
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 There are two sources which did not name him ‘Tedaldo’ or some like form. They instead named him 
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 Vita Gregorii Papae Decimi Patria Placentini, ed. Pietro Maria Campi, Dell’Historia Ecclesiastica di 
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pointed out that the author called Louis only ‘a vessel of virtue, and mirror of the Faith’ (‘virtutum vas, Fidei 
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342. 
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works that address his early life, and certainly the only ones that do so at length.
5
 This is not 
surprising, given that, outside of Gatto’s Italian scholarship, many historians have neglected 
even the pontificate of Gregory X, relegating his reign to mere passing comments in general 
texts.  
Before his papal election, Tedaldo was party to some of the most formative events of 
the thirteenth century, and knew some of the most important figures of his time in both 
western Europe and the Holy Land. This gave him the diplomatic experience, organisational 
ability, high contacts, and experience in the Holy Land he would need to be a suitable 
candidate for not just for the papacy in general, but more importantly for the papal role as 
head of the struggling crusading movement. These elements have formed the general 
consensus among historians to explain Tedaldo’s election, and an investigation into 
Tedaldo’s early life supports this.6 The best evidence for such skills comes from 
Bartholomew of Lucca, Tedaldo’s contemporary, who wrote that ‘[Pope Gregory X] was 
uncommonly experienced in secular affairs, although modest in learning, and he did not exert 
for the gain of money, except for alms for the poor.’7 Roberg has also highlighted the 
differences between Tedaldo and his predecessors as pope. He wrote that with his election, 
there was ‘neither a scholar nor a lawyer-pope, like some of his predecessors and successors 
in the thirteenth century.’8 His election was a marked difference in the type of person elected 
to the papacy in the thirteenth century, but one that must have been deemed necessary by the 
cardinals. Daniel Waley wrote that Tedaldo’s election ‘brought to the papal throne a man 
who had no experience of the problems of the Papal State and whose dearest projects were 
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concerned with the Holy Land.’9 Waley himself was more interested in the Papal State, so 
can be excused for his criticism of Tedaldo’s priorities. Raynaldus, however, has reprinted 
the letter that the cardinals sent to Tedaldo on his election. They noted that he was 
unanimously selected as a compromise candidate, and they pointed especially to his 
experience gained while in the Holy Land as a crucial asset in aiding the crusade there.
10
 No 
other reason for his election was noted by the cardinals that would indicate any other agenda 
that they were hoping this candidate would take up. Thus, interest in carrying out the crusade 
must have been a priority even in the College of Cardinals at the time for them to make such 
a selection. Now that Charles of Anjou was established in Italy, and the Hohenstaufen threat 
was gone, the Church had an opportunity to devote more of its energy to the Holy Land. With 
his personal experience on crusade, Tedaldo was one of the men best placed to understand the 
needs of Holy Land, so that he could then fulfil them as pope.  
This chapter does not seek to disprove the general consensus among scholars for the 
reasons behind Tedaldo’s election as pope as it relates to his diplomatic experience and 
organisational ability. Indeed, the notion that Tedaldo was selected as pope because of his 
experience in the Holy Land is not a new one. Nevertheless, it is necessary to paint a 
complete picture in any study focusing so closely on one figure, so that the foundation for 
Gregory’s influence on crusading during his papal reign is established. Thus, this chapter will 
first examine Tedaldo’s election in 1271, before stepping back to his earlier life in the retinue 
of the influential cardinal-bishop, James of Palestrina. His time with James gave the young 
Tedaldo experience in the difficulties of conflict between the Church and the Empire, and 
likely gave the young man his first contact with the French royal family, with whom he 
became close. It will then look at his time as canon of Lyons and his assistance at the First 
Council of Lyons, which could not but have had an influence on the Second Council of 
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Lyons, which Pope Gregory X himself chaired. It will also explore Tedaldo’s time as 
archdeacon of Liège and his mission to England, which gave him further diplomatic 
experience and wide-ranging political contacts. Finally, this chapter will close by examining 
Tedaldo’s time on crusade in the Holy Land with Lord Edward, which set the stage for a 
pontificate focused very closely on rescuing the Holy Land.  
 
An End to the Longest Papal Interregnum: The Unusual Papal Election of 1271 
 
Tedaldo was elected to the papal throne on 1 September 1271, ending almost three 
years of papal interregnum – the longest in history. After the death of his predecessor, 
Clement IV, in November 1268, discord within the College of Cardinals, fuelled in part by 
Charles of Anjou, prevented the speedy election of a successor. The College of Cardinals was 
divided between opposing factions to such a degree that the two-thirds majority necessary to 
elect a new pope could not be reached. The Angevin faction was in favour of an ultramontane 
pope, especially one with French interests at heart, while the imperial faction looked for an 
Italian pope, and a suitable contender for the imperial vacancy.
11
 Unlike his pious brother St 
Louis, Charles of Anjou seemed happy to see the papacy remain vacant, or at least have only 
the election of an ultramontane pope. The vacancy allowed Charles to continue unhindered in 
his schemes to conquer the Byzantine Empire. During his rule, Pope Clement IV had been 
interested in union between the Eastern and Western Churches, which effectively forced 
Charles to rein in his desire for the conquest of Byzantium. After all, it would be harder 
(though demonstrably not impossible, given the results of the Fourth Crusade) to rationalize 
conflict with a brother Christian than it would be with a schismatic. Ultimately, the election 
of Tedaldo meant that Charles was yet again frustrated in his attempts on Byzantium; as 
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pope, Gregory was to take the same conciliatory line with the Eastern Church as Clement had 
taken before him, and even enact a union of the churches. 
If one follows Runciman’s view, it was Charles and his nephew, King Philip III of 
France, who helped push for the College of Cardinals finally to come to a decision on the 
election of Tedaldo. Runciman wrote that although Charles and Philip made efforts to 
convince the cardinals to choose a pope, their efforts ‘came to nothing at the time, but they 
seem to have persuaded both parties in the College that a compromise was essential.’12 
Perhaps he has given Philip and Charles too much credit. Ciacconio wrote that ‘in the 
meantime, kings Philip of France and Charles of Naples came to the Roman Curia at Viterbo, 
asking the College for the swift and timely creation of a pope. They accomplished very little, 
and abandoned it unfinished.’13 Similarly, the annals of Genoa noted that the two kings 
stayed for some time at Viterbo, and asked the cardinals to come to a decision about the 
election of a new pope. When the kings saw that no progress was being made, however, they 
left.
14
 That Charles and Philip encouraged the cardinals to come to a decision is closer to the 
truth than that they ‘persuaded’ them. But given that Tedaldo was well-known to the French 
royal family, and that he was elected soon after Charles and Philip had this meeting with the 
cardinals, perhaps the two kings had actually suggested Tedaldo for the role.
15
 To be sure, 
this does not mean that Gregory was part of the Angevin faction, but perhaps even Charles 
was ready for a compromise by this time. It will never be known for sure. Ultimately, the 
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necessity of filling the papal vacancy led the cardinals to choose a subcommittee of six of 
their members to elect a new pope.
16
 
 Tedaldo’s anonymous biographer wrote that the electoral decision was reached 
harmoniously with the aid of a divine wind of inspiration.
17
 That divine wind might have 
been Bonaventure, but the anonymous author made no mention of him. This is surprising, 
given Bonaventure’s widespread reputation, as well as the fact that he would later be made a 
cardinal by Gregory, and would play a large role in the Second Council of Lyons. The Nova 
Additio Augustini Oldoini in Ciacconio’s work, however, took up the chance to discuss 
Bonaventure and his potential role.
18
 He wrote:  
The absent Tedaldo is announced as Roman pontiff by the recommendation, as some 
relate, of St Bonaventure, minister general of the order of St Francis. Nevertheless, 
whether truly in the presence of the cardinals or absent, Bonaventure as the originator 
was uncertain when, after so long, almost three years, the assembly announced Tedaldo 
as pontiff.
19
 
Although the reality is uncertain, a recommendation from the famous Bonaventure would 
carry significant weight. He had been at the University of Paris at the same time as Tedaldo, 
and Pietro Maria Campi said they knew each other well.
20
 Considering that Gregory 
convinced Bonaventure to take up the position of cardinal, this was probably true. It is, in 
addition, unclear how well-known Tedaldo was among the Electoral College. Ottobono 
Fieschi, cardinal-deacon of St Adriano, and Henry of Susa, cardinal-bishop of Ostia, certainly 
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knew Visconti, since they worked together on diplomatic missions, but remarks from the 
anonymous biographer cast some doubt on Tedaldo’s repute.21  
In a curious contradiction from the anonymous biographer, who seemed eager only to 
laud the reputation of Tedaldo, he wrote on Tedaldo’s election that:  
Many were astounded – the man a pilgrim, the man entirely unknown by certain 
members of the cardinals, and about whose death or life the truth was uncertain. In such 
a manner the cardinals had chosen, not waiting, because where the spirit wills and 
breathes is unfamiliar – from where it may come, or to where it may go.
22
 
Even more telling about Tedaldo’s election and potential reputation, the anonymous author 
wrote that ‘many of the cardinals were opposed to him.’23 When Tedaldo came to be vested 
with the papal mantle, however, they acquiesced. The notion that Tedaldo was unknown to 
some of the cardinals seemingly contradicts reports of his widespread repute.
24
 Likely, his 
biographer was simply trying to inflate the importance of the event of Tedaldo’s election by 
magnifying the discussion surrounding it, but it does raise an important question, beyond the 
rather simple rationalization of ‘compromise:’ why was Tedaldo Visconti, a man not even 
ordained as a priest, chosen to be pope?  
 Franciscus Pipinus, the translator of Marco Polo’s Il Milione from the Italian into 
Latin, wrote of rumours that Tedaldo was chosen because the cardinals were actually hoping 
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that he had already died in Acre.
25
 It would take time for word of his election to reach the 
Holy Land, and for word of his possible death to return. At least in that time, the cardinals 
could escape the deadlock that had been plaguing the election of a new pope without having 
to worry about the repercussions of electing a partisan pope. Pipinus’ theory is clever, but it 
does not give Tedaldo his due. After all, there was only a chance that the man was, indeed, 
dead. If he were alive – and as it turns out, he was – he was to be pope. It would be he who 
would have to take the reins of the Roman Church, which had been plagued in the thirteenth 
century by conflict with Frederick II and his various successors; plagued by a fickle, 
powerful, and partisan population of Rome; plagued by the increasingly consistent failures of 
the crusades to the East; and plagued by struggles for control of northern, central and 
southern Italy. With a reasonable chance that Tedaldo was, in fact, alive, the cardinals would 
have been unwise to elect someone who would be incapable of managing the Church amid 
the struggles of the thirteenth century. Thus, Tedaldo must have had qualities that made him 
an eligible candidate. His organisational ability, diplomatic experience, and high political 
contacts gained from years spent in Italy, France, the Low Countries, and England, as well as 
his experience in the Holy Land, made him a suitable candidate. It is to these experiences that 
this chapter now turns. 
   
 The Early Education of a Diplomat: In the Entourage of James of Palestrina 
 
 Tedaldo gained his formative experience in high politics while in the entourage of 
Cardinal-bishop James of Palestrina. In fact, Tedaldo’s anonymous biographer made little 
mention of his life before he joined James. For the anonymous biographer, the start of his text 
was seemingly driven by a wish to establish a sterling reputation for Tedaldo; thus, it was 
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sufficient to link Tedaldo to the Visconti of Piacenza, from whom, he wrote, Tedaldo derived 
his cleanliness of life and charming character.
26
 After quickly outlining an education in the 
liberal arts and canon law, the anonymous biographer proceeded to the more documented 
period of Tedaldo’s life. 27 There was, however, something more to his early life. 
 Tedaldo’s career options, typical of young men born to noble families in his time, 
were to enter into a military life, or a spiritual one. Tedaldo devoted himself to the Church, 
perhaps having had his calling near the church of St Sylvester, where, in the seventeenth 
century, Pietro Campi reported an inscription reading: ‘this little shrine was dedicated to the 
divine faith and richly endowed from its foundation by the magnificent Visconti from 
Piacenza.’28 It is likely that Tedaldo later became a canon in the collegiate church of San 
Antonino in Piacenza. Campi, himself a canon in Piacenza in the seventeenth century, wrote 
that Tedaldo was a canon of San Antonino, and even held this position later in his career, 
after he had been made an archdeacon of Liège.
29
  
 Tedaldo’s presence in the entourage of James of Palestrina, whom Pope Gregory IX 
made cardinal-bishop in 1231, brought him into the heart of politics. The anonymous 
biographer wrote that Tedaldo had heard of the sanctity of James, and wanted to join him.
30
 
James himself was from Piacenza. It is not known if this link in origin meant that James was 
already familiar with Tedaldo, but it seems very likely that at least he would be familiar with 
the Visconti family. The Visconti family had filled important local positions; indeed, it was 
Oberto Visconti who filled the role of podestà of Piacenza in 1234, which was just before 
Tedaldo joined James’ entourage. Gatto goes so far as to conjecture that this Oberto was 
Tedaldo’s father, although this cannot be substantiated.31 It would, however, help to explain 
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the powerful legate taking Tedaldo into his entourage. It certainly would not hurt to have 
eminent local citizens on his side, considering that James was sent to Lombardy, and 
Piacenza specifically, to settle disputes among the city factions of Ghibellines and Guelfs. 
James was also supposed to disrupt the influence of Emperor Frederick II and to ensure that 
Frederick’s intended Diet of Piacenza never happened 32  
 Tedaldo did not immediately go with James, although he was by then connected to the 
cardinal-bishop. Instead, he stayed in Piacenza until 1239, when he then joined James en 
route to France, by way of Genoa. The anonymous biographer related that Gregory IX had 
sent James to France in order to gather aid against the ‘wickedness’ of Frederick.33 The 
arrival of Frederick into the narrative slowed the pace of the anonymous life, and much more 
detail of this formative period emerged than did in Tedaldo’s earlier life. Giving Frederick, 
and his conflict with the papacy, such a place of prominence in this text shows how important 
these events would be to forming Tedaldo’s character in the eyes of his anonymous 
biographer. 
James and Tedaldo came to Aix-en-Provence in 1239, where Count Raymond-
Berengar IV
34
 gave his formal support in the conflict with Frederick II.
35
 They later went to 
Lyons, where Tedaldo was made a canon. Although when he became pope, Tedaldo reflected 
in two letters on his earlier time as a canon in Lyons, this position was passed over by the 
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anonymous biographer.
36
 This is curious, considering the position that Lyons played both in 
Tedaldo’s life before becoming pope, and of course, with his Second Council of Lyons after 
he had become pope.
 
Perhaps the anonymous biographer aimed to centre Tedaldo’s identity 
on the position of archdeacon, which complimented the organisational and administrative 
ability, as well as the moral discipline, that he said made up Tedaldo’s character. If this were 
the case, it is not surprising that the biographer would come to call Tedaldo ‘archdeacon’ so 
early in his history – even earlier than was chronologically accurate – and proceed repeatedly 
to identify Tedaldo up until his election to the papacy not as ‘Tedaldo,’ but as 
‘archidiaconus.’ 
 Around the time Tedaldo became a canon in Lyons, 1239, it has been said that he 
became archdeacon of Hainaut, in Liège, and perhaps also a canon of Liège. This was not the 
case. Roberg pointed out that there has been confusion over when Tedaldo was made 
archdeacon, but he offered no solution.
37
 Certainly, Tedaldo was to become an archdeacon of 
Liège – but not yet. The anonymous biographer did his part to fuel the misconception about 
the archdeaconate, but even so, he at least did not give James any credit for getting Tedaldo 
the job, as Gatto had done: ‘we must conclude that James of Palestrina held Tedaldo Visconti 
in great esteem to entrust him with a post of so much responsibility.’38 In reality, Tedaldo did 
not gain the archdeaconate of Hainaut until 19 November 1246, when Pope Innocent IV gave 
it to him.
39 
James had died in June 1244, so he could not have procured the position for 
Tedaldo, as Gatto alleged. 
 
Gatto was not helped by the fact that the anonymous biographer 
was never terribly concerned about dates, contenting himself to outline a narrative of events 
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whose dating was nothing more detailed than that one thing inevitably came after another. 
Even with this loose structure, however, the position of Tedaldo gaining his archdeaconate 
was out of place.  
The anonymous life related, immediately after telling of Tedaldo gaining the 
archdeaconate, that Tedaldo had fallen ill and had to remain in France when James left for a 
1240 council that had been called by Gregory IX.
40
 James of Palestrina and several other 
church officials were then famously captured in the waters off Genoa by agents of Frederick 
II. Frederick imprisoned James until the 1243 conclave, which elected Pope Innocent IV. 
Tedaldo, presumably after he had recovered from his illness in France, travelled to the 
Roman Curia to do what he could to agitate for the release of James.
41
 After his release, the 
anonymous biographer asserted that Pope Innocent IV, on the advice of James, offered 
Tedaldo the position of bishop of Piacenza. In a move evidently motivated by the virtue that 
was said to form part of his character, Tedaldo turned it down, concerned that people would 
believe he had something to do with the removal of Giacomo of Castellarquato – his friend – 
from the position.
42
 Later, the anonymous life stated that, when James of Palestrina died, 
many other cardinals hoped that Tedaldo would join their retinues. Tedaldo’s reputation 
clearly seemed to be growing. His experience with James gave him his first taste of life in the 
high political sphere, and certainly would have put him into contact with the top political 
figures of his day, though probably not in any great capacity. These experiences would serve 
as a useful foundation as Tedaldo proceeded further into high politics. 
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 The Development of an Organiser: The First Council of Lyons  
 
 Before Tedaldo received his archdeaconate at Liège, he participated in the First 
Council of Lyons, convened by Pope Innocent IV in 1245. Tedaldo’s time at this council 
likely gave him insight into the decrees enacted there; in fact, as Pope Gregory X, Tedaldo 
held the Second Council of Lyons and drew upon Innocent IV’s earlier work at the First 
Council of Lyons.
43
 The newly elected archbishop of Lyons during the first council, Philip of 
Savoy, was a friend of Tedaldo.
44
 The anonymous life recounted how Tedaldo returned to 
Lyons in order to obtain assurance about his status there (this was presumably after the 
Piacentine bishopric affair).
45
 Tedaldo’s arrival could not have come at a more opportune 
time for Philip, who was, according to the anonymous life, so happy to have Tedaldo there 
that he said: ‘O blessed Jesus, I thank you, because you sent to me a man following my own 
heart, through whose providence, just as with the pope and cardinals coming here with me for 
celebrating the council, I ought to manage and I will be able to be informed.’46 The 
anonymous life portrayed the archbishop as practically begging Tedaldo to stay and help with 
the organization of the council, with Tedaldo finally condescending to aid the archbishop 
because he believed that God could be served in such a way.
47
 The anonymous author was in 
the business of praising Tedaldo’s ability – of that there is no doubt – but he overstated his 
case to the point of incredulity by stating that with Tedaldo’s help, and ‘through whose 
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direction and counsel, the whole curia, as much in the head as in the limbs, obtained a 
peaceful state and rest.’48  
 While it is not likely that the whole of the Roman Curia depended upon the 
organizational ability of Tedaldo for their states of mind, it does seem to be true, based on the 
anonymous biography, that Tedaldo helped Philip to organise the council. Unfortunately, 
further details are lacking. Tedaldo’s experience in this and as canon of Lyons no doubt 
helped him choose his familiar Lyons as a place to hold council when he became pope, 
although Lyons is also a central and fairly secure location. If Tedaldo were indeed useful at 
the council, as the anonymous biographer asserted, then his work there might have shown 
that he was the right man to tackle the job of archdeacon of Hainaut, which became available 
in the following year.  
There had been trouble at Hainaut. When Margaret of Flanders inherited the county of 
Flanders in 1244 after the death of her childless older sister, there were disputes over which 
of her sons would succeed her in Flanders and Hainaut. She had had two marriages: the first 
with Bouchard of Avesnes, with whom she had John; the second marriage was to William of 
Dampierre, with whom she had William and Guy. The stepbrothers, John and William, both 
contested the territory. The conflict between them, and with their mother, would become 
known as the ‘War of the Succession of Flanders and Hainaut.’ The disputes over Hainaut led 
the archbishop of Cologne to write to the pope in February 1246 to ask that he uphold the 
rights of the bishop of Liège in the county.
49
 At the same time, the archbishop of Trier wrote 
the pope to remind him that the laws of the empire stated that a fief must return to the 
suzerain (i.e. the bishop of Liège) if the vassal dies without a male heir.
50
 The county of 
Hainaut was briefly in the possession of Charles of Anjou in the early 1250s, after Margaret 
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of Flanders presented it to him as a reward for his support against her son John. King Louis 
IX later unilaterally gave the county back to John. There is no direct evidence that Tedaldo 
and Charles had an early encounter at Hainaut, which could have formed a basis for their 
relationship in the 1270s, but as one of the main ecclesiastical administrators, Tedaldo would 
certainly have been aware of Charles.   
With the ongoing conflict in Hainaut in mind, Innocent IV would have been wise to 
find a way to appoint a very capable administrator for the archdeaconate. It was actually 
typical for an archdeacon to be appointed by the bishop, so the fact that the pope intervened 
to take control of the appointment shows how serious the situation was, and how great 
Tedaldo’s reputation had become.51 Innocent appointed Tedaldo on 19 November 1246 as 
archdeacon of Hainaut, in Liège. The anonymous biographer believed: ‘Lest a man with so 
much eminent merit, pleasing to God, acceptable to men, would lack a title of ecclesiastical 
dignity, he graciously conferred on him an archdeaconate then vacant in the church of Liège, 
and he arranged to invest him with it.’52 This appointment is a good indication that Tedaldo 
was gaining recognition for his abilities. 
 
 Negotiating Politics and Personalities: The Archdeacon of Liège 
 
 Being an archdeacon of Liège was a great administrative responsibility, but in itself, it 
did not give Tedaldo the credentials he would need to be a contender for the papal throne. 
The important contributing factor to being archdeacon of Liège was the position it gave 
Tedaldo relative to forthcoming events in Europe, and the powerful people with whom it put 
him into contact, as this section will demonstrate. The history of the prince-bishopric of Liège 
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is worth telling in its own right, but for the sake of brevity, a short overview must suffice. In 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Liège was connected to the imperial church.
53
 The 
emperors of the period thought that they could extend their influence by giving bishops and 
abbots vast territories to rule both as spiritual and temporal lords. The election of the prince-
bishop was influenced by the emperor, but by the time of Otto IV and Frederick II, the policy 
of intruding on the election of the prince-bishop was abandoned, and the cathedral chapter 
came progressively to have much more control over elections.
54
 The cathedral chapter did not 
maintain its influence for long, however, because Liège was too important a city, and too 
much of a flashpoint for papal-imperial conflict for the election of its bishop to be ignored by 
a papacy seeking to extend its influence. Alain Marchandisse made a case for the importance 
of Liège not only for the history of the Low Countries, but also for ‘the European 
chessboard.’55 He placed the election of a new bishop into the ‘high spheres of international 
politics.’56 The most relevant case in point was the election of Henry of Guelders on 26 
September 1247 – not long after Tedaldo had been made an archdeacon there. 
 The election of Henry of Guelders came shortly after the First Council of Lyons. 
After Frederick II’s deposition and excommunication at the council, a succession of new 
kings of the Romans were crowned by Innocent IV, in opposition to Frederick and his son 
Conrad IV. The first was Henry Raspe, a former supporter of Frederick II. His tenure did not 
last long, since he died within a year of his instalment. More important for Liège was the 
election of William II of Holland as German anti-king in 1247. He would reign until his death 
in 1256. William II of Holland was the cousin of Henry of Guelders through the marriage of 
his father, Floris IV, count of Holland, to Matilda of Brabant, sister of Henry’s mother, 
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Marguerite of Brabant, who married Gerald IV of Guelders.
57
 Both were daughters of Henry I 
of Brabant and Matilda of Boulogne. Henry I and Matilda also had a son, Henry II of 
Brabant, who would be instrumental in helping install William II as anti-king.
58
 To 
complicate matters still more, Henry II had been married to Marie of Hohenstaufen – 
daughter of Philip of Swabia, Frederick II’s uncle – until her death.59 William was also the 
brother-in-law of the count of Hainaut, John of Avesnes. 
 Henry of Guelders was elected bishop of Liège and William of Holland was elected 
anti-king of the Romans, both in 1247. This was not a coincidence. Innocent IV sent cardinal-
deacon Pierre Capocci to find a successor both to Henry Raspe and to Robert of Thourotte.
60
 
The positions of power were kept within a tight circle of powerful families in the region. 
Henry of Guelders replaced Robert, whose mother was a Dampierre, sister of William of 
Dampierre’s father (the same William who was the second husband of Margaret of Flanders). 
Amidst the struggle of the papacy against Frederick II, Henry and William, as well as their 
relations in power in Brabant, Hainaut, and Flanders, would be able to provide a united front 
against the deposed emperor in the region. Tedaldo would not, however, have time for too 
many personal encounters with the new bishop. From about 1248 to 1252 Gatto believed that 
Tedaldo was at the Paris school, continuing his studies.
61
 He was unable to substantiate this 
assertion, having cited only a document from St Lambert in Liège dated 20 December 1252 
to prove that Tedaldo was at Liège at that time, but not that he had been elsewhere before 
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then.
62
 All that Tedaldo’s anonymous biographer gave in support of this notion was that 
Tedaldo was studying at Paris sometime after having fulfilled his role in the First Council of 
Lyons, although Gatto quite wrongly cited the anonymous biographer for Tedaldo’s time at 
Paris.
63
 Placing Tedaldo at the University of Paris around the time that Gatto believed has a 
lot of appeal; after all, it was at that time that Bonaventure was at Paris, as well as near the 
time that Thomas Aquinas was there. The notion that Bonaventure suggested Tedaldo for the 
position of pope is made more plausible if the two had this opportunity to become more 
familiar with each other. Gatto also asserted without substantiation that Tedaldo met both 
Peter of Tarentaise (Pope Innocent V) and Guy Foulques (Pope Clement IV) at this time, or 
at the First Council of Lyons.
64
 His assumption, however, has some merit, given that both 
Guy and Peter would play a role in Tedaldo’s later life. Without this earlier connection, it 
would be unusual for Clement IV to place so much trust in Tedaldo (as will be shown with 
the England mission below), and for Tedaldo to place so much trust in Peter by making him a 
cardinal, and holding the Second Council of Lyons in his archiepiscopal see.
65
 If Tedaldo and 
Guy were indeed friends, then this friendship would prove its worth the soonest for the 
archdeacon, when he came to need shelter from his volatile bishop. It was also the 
repercussions of his bishop’s volatility that have come to prove, at last, that Tedaldo was in 
Paris at the time that Gatto posited, as will be shown below. 
 It is apparent that Tedaldo’s reputation for honesty and sanctity did not make for a 
good working relationship with Bishop Henry, who had, himself, a reputation for corruption 
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and immorality.
66
 In a curious omission, Tedaldo’s anonymous biographer failed to mention 
the conflict that arose between Tedaldo and Henry over the role of the archdeacon. The 
conflict was certainly a central reason for Tedaldo leaving his archdeaconate to join the 
entourage of Ottobono Fieschi (nephew of Pope Innocent IV, and himself later to become 
Pope Hadrian V) on his diplomatic mission to England – and this mission played a large role 
in the anonymous biography. Instead, in the lead-up to Tedaldo’s mission to England, the 
anonymous biographer focused on building up the connection between King Louis IX and 
Tedaldo, writing:  
Also at that time, King Louis of France, most Christian prince, vessel of virtue, mirror of 
the faith, and fine example of all the good works of the Holy Spirit, was truly esteeming 
the archdeacon [Tedaldo], and was venerating him, such that many were amazed that this 
most excellent king would devote so much honour, and would exhibit so much reverence 
to one clergyman, [who was] not in a position of high standing.
67
  
No doubt, it was much more effective to write about the connection between Tedaldo and the 
praiseworthy crusader Louis in a work devoted to extolling the life of Tedaldo.
68
 The less 
flattering alternative was to write about the fierce conflict between Tedaldo and Henry of 
Guelders, which would ultimately be resolved with Pope Gregory X ‘requesting’ at the 
Second Council of Lyons that Henry step down from the prince-bishopric of Liège. Indeed, 
the anonymous biographer had even chosen not to write about what amounted to Gregory X’s 
deposition of Henry later in his history. 
 The conflict between Tedaldo and Henry started early. In 1250, during the time in 
which Gatto thought that Tedaldo was at Paris, Innocent IV sent Cardinal Peter of Albano as 
legate into the region. He was to act as arbiter in Liège, and to outline the regime that should 
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be followed in the operation of the prince-bishopric.
69
 In the only part of the statute drawn up 
by Peter that discusses the role of the archdeacon, there is no doubt that the matters discussed 
arose from conflict between Tedaldo and Henry. It was decided that ‘neither in the sanctuary 
nor the chapter may archdeacons hold an appropriate position of dignity while they have 
appointed deacons.’70 The archdeacon should not try to rule his archdeaconry while he was 
away. Long absences could be a problem, and the well-travelled Tedaldo was not without 
blame. Thus, the legate mandated that archdeacons ‘will reside for part of a year in the 
church, and may swear to this, unless, by chance, they may be absent with liberty from the 
bishop.’71 Nevertheless, if the archdeacon had a good reason for his absence, he was not to be 
blamed: ‘If, indeed, it happens that the archdeacons wish to pilgrimage or to go to school, the 
bishop cannot deny them the liberty’ [my italics].72 This was the very time that Tedaldo was 
at the University of Paris. Since he was at Paris, Tedaldo would not be able to negotiate 
directly with Henry or Peter. Thus, earlier in 1250, before Peter of Albano drew up his 
statute, Tedaldo had negotiated with Henry via the intermediary of Godfrey of Guelders, 
nephew of Henry. The agreement to which they came was then approved by Peter in Liège.
73
 
Tedaldo was within his right to be at school in Paris, as the legate allowed, but Tedaldo’s 
reputation should not remain quite as spotless as his anonymous biographer and Gatto would 
have everyone believe. Tedaldo wanted not only to go to school, but to rule his archdeaconate 
at the same time. Perhaps this was due to Tedaldo wanting to keep pace with the 
abovementioned difficulties over the succession to the counties of Flanders and Hainaut. Yet, 
as capable an administrator as Tedaldo may have been, it simply did not make sense to have 
someone out of physical contact add an extra layer of administration when deacons had been 
appointed, and the time it took to communicate between Paris and Liège would cause delays.  
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 With the arbitration of Peter of Albano in November 1250, one might suppose that the 
conflict was over between Tedaldo and Henry, but in fact it was not. According to the additio 
of Ciacconio, Henry ‘had severely irritated some of the noble sons of Liège, who had hitherto 
adhered to the Church with great faith. In a public assembly of the canons he was accused of 
a shameful crime.’74 Henry was disgracing his position, and the virtuous Tedaldo, ‘who little 
feared the present leader, had dared to chastise the vices of the bishop with a grave and 
fearless speech in the public assembly.’75 The additio to Ciacconio then reported that Henry 
was so angry that he actually struck Tedaldo.
76
 John of Hocsem did not go quite so far, and 
stated only that Henry threatened to strike Tedaldo.
77
 It is unusual that Hocsem would not 
take the opportunity to impugn Henry as much as possible, since he used the history of Henry 
and his reign as bishop as a means to criticise his contemporary bishop of Liège. Indeed, 
Hocsem went so far as to include a fabricated letter written by Pope Gregory X to Henry, 
accusing him in no uncertain terms of his abuse of power and moral depravity; with this in 
mind, whether Henry only threatened to strike Tedaldo, or actually did, seems a small matter 
in which to stretch the truth.
78
 At any rate, this episode once again showed the high moral 
character that Tedaldo was said to have possessed, and which helped to make him a suitable 
candidate for the papacy later on in his life.  
 After Henry threatened to hit Tedaldo, the archdeacon left Liège once again. This was 
how he came to be found with Pope Clement IV when the mission to England was being 
organized.
79
 The additio to Ciacconio noted that after the last incident with Henry, Tedaldo 
had given up trying to restrain Henry’s shamelessness, so he left Liège to go on a pilgrimage 
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to the Holy Land.
80
 It is worth noting that Tedaldo took up the cross at this time: recall that 
the cardinal-legate Peter of Albano had stated that freedom for an archdeacon from his charge 
was permitted in cases where the archdeacon was going to school, or going on a pilgrimage. 
Ever the stickler for rules, taking up the cross gave Tedaldo the justification he needed to be 
away from Liège, when perhaps a more immediate reason was simply to escape his bishop! 
Tedaldo’s anonymous biographer, however, simply placed Tedaldo in the right place at the 
right time, as it were, without explaining his departure from his archdeaconate. To explain his 
departure would be to mention the conflict with Henry, and this might tarnish the reputation 
that the anonymous biographer was working so hard to polish. Instead, Tedaldo’s anonymous 
biographer emphasised that Tedaldo took up the cross with King Louis IX, as well as Louis’ 
sons, the king of Navarre, and many barons and knights.
81
  
 
 In the Heart of High Politics: The England Mission 
 
 Before Tedaldo left on his crusade, he assisted Legate Ottobono Fieschi in England. 
Tedaldo’s time there increased his high contacts in Europe, introducing him to the English 
royal family. To continue avoiding the immediate reason for Tedaldo’s departure from Liège, 
and to continue to polish Tedaldo’s reputation, his anonymous biographer wrote of Tedaldo’s 
mission to England: ‘Indeed, the archdeacon himself was as a lover of peace and a promoter 
of concord in so much, that if he hoped he could make calm and peace among the 
disagreements and discords – not having been invited or even sought – he offered himself 
voluntarily.’82 A man looking to find an avenue of escape might certainly volunteer for a 
mission across the channel. But more than volunteering, Pope Clement IV had apparently 
suggested to Fieschi:  
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That he might keep the archdeacon with him and utilise his counsels [because the 
archdeacon was] certainly a man of sound counsel, and beloved by King [Henry III], 
Count [Simon of Montfort], and also the bishops and the barons of England, and by 
whose words, and the merit of his honesty, inviting his loyalty was not doubtful.
83
 
Tedaldo, whether he was using the mission as a means to escape from Liège or not, was not 
simply excess baggage in Fieschi’s entourage. In fact, Tedaldo’s diplomatic experience with 
James of Palestrina, as well as the contacts that he had made at the First Council of Lyons 
and as archdeacon of the important centre of Liège, made him anything but superfluous. 
 England at this time was fraught with internal strife. The history is well-known; for 
the sake of brevity, only a short overview of the conflict must suffice.
84
 Under the leadership 
of Simon of Montfort (son of the Simon of Montfort of Albigensian Crusade fame), a 
powerful faction of English barons sought to devolve power from the king into a small 
council of barons, which would be periodically assessed by a larger parliament. The 
Provisions of Oxford, to which King Henry III was forced to agree in 1258, was the written 
culmination of baronial desire to take a strong hand in controlling the operation of the 
kingdom, and is generally accepted as the first written constitution of England. Henry III was 
later able to receive a papal bull that freed him from the restrictions of the provisions; civil 
war ensued. Even at this early stage, Tedaldo was very much party to the conflict. Indeed, 
Tedaldo acted as a personal messenger of King Henry III to the papacy, and thus was 
intimately connected with these formative events of his age. There is no indication how this 
came about, but perhaps because Tedaldo had become close to King Louis IX as this time, he 
was acting as a messenger for peace between the two kings. In a letter dated 28 December 
1259, Henry III wrote to Pope Alexander IV to discuss the peace between himself and King 
Louis IX, which he said he had publically supported at the feast of the nativity that year in 
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Paris.
85
 He recommended Tedaldo, along with the archbishop of Embrun
86
 and William 
Bonqueor, as messengers to Alexander IV to prove that he had made the profession at Paris. 
Thus, Tedaldo must have been at Paris at this time – yet another trip away from his 
archdeaconate. Again, on 18 January 1260, Henry III wrote to Alexander IV to lament the 
trouble that his half-brother, Aymer of Valence, bishop-elect of Winchester, was causing him, 
and to ask for his removal.
87
 He recommended the same three messengers to the pope as 
proof of his professions. Also mentioned in this letter was the cardinal-deacon of St Adriano, 
Ottobono Fieschi. Fieschi was noted to have been among the cardinals who met with Henry 
to draft the letter. It is clear, then, that Fieschi actually knew of Tedaldo even before Pope 
Clement IV recommended him for the mission to England. 
 Fieschi’s mission to England lasted from 1265 to 1268, but Tedaldo could not have 
joined the legate’s retinue in person until 1267, as Gatto has rightly pointed out.88 Since the 
anonymous biographer wrote that Tedaldo had taken the cross with King Louis IX, he would 
have been in France on 25 March 1267. When Tedaldo did catch up with Fieschi, he joined 
Benedict Caetani, the future Pope Boniface VIII, who was part of Fieschi’s entourage as well. 
Tedaldo’s anonymous biographer had said that King Henry III’s, as well as Simon of 
Montfort’s respect for Tedaldo had made his presence useful for the mission. In fact, Simon 
of Montfort had already been killed by the time that Fieschi arrived, let alone the tardy 
Tedaldo.
89
 Since the worst part of the war was already over when the legatine mission 
arrived, the focus of the mission was on dealing with the disinherited, the remaining rebels in 
London, the disputes with the Welsh, and the threat of Simon of Montfort’s son, yet another 
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Simon, invading from Normandy. Tedaldo’s anonymous biographer again blatantly 
overinflated the efforts of Tedaldo, when he wrote that the rebellion was ended, and the king 
liberated, as much by the authority of the legate as the foresight of the archdeacon.
90
 More 
importantly for Tedaldo’s future, however, the mission embarked upon a crusade preaching 
tour, and guided ecclesiastical reform – two things close to the heart of Tedaldo when he 
became pope, and which he would place at the forefront of his Second Council of Lyons 
agenda. Fieschi began preaching the cross in 1267 (the same time that the recently cruce 
signatus Tedaldo arrived), and signed Lords Edward and Edmund, as well as other noblemen 
of England. The stage was now set for crusade. 
 
 Educating a Crusader Pope: The Holy Land Experience 
 
 The crusade that Tedaldo Visconti joined was that of King Louis IX – the French 
king’s second. It is noteworthy that this crusade was able to be launched successfully even 
with the papacy vacant. There is no doubt that this was due to the extraordinary reputation 
and influence of Louis, and his personal desire to crusade. But most importantly, this crusade 
shows that it was, in fact, possible to launch a crusade without the presence of a strong pope, 
indeed, any pope. The fact that his crusade did launch would come to be important in later 
years with the death of Pope Gregory X, and the subsequent failure of his planned crusade, 
even though he had garnered significant support. In the present case, Louis could not help but 
recall his disastrous first outing. He had kept up his support of the Holy Land, paying for a 
permanent garrison of troops at Acre under Geoffrey of Sargines. His failure during his first 
crusade was a mark on his otherwise outstanding record, and he was hoping to set it right. 
Although Louis’ brother, Charles of Anjou (who by this time had become king of Sicily) and 
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Lord Edward joined the crusade as well, they did so under Louis’ leadership. Tedaldo had 
taken the cross with Louis, and so was to join him on his crusade. First, however, Tedaldo 
returned to his archdeaconate, presumably to set his affairs in order before his crusade. 
 It was perhaps a very fortunate decision for Tedaldo to brave the return to Liège, even 
if it did mean that he would have to see Bishop Henry once again. With this delay, King 
Louis left for his crusade without the accompaniment of Tedaldo. This may have saved 
Tedaldo from sickness or even death, since Louis’ crusade took him to Tunis, where disease 
claimed the life of the king, and many other crusaders as well. Tunis was not, of course, the 
usual destination for a crusade. The Life of Saint Louis, by Guillaume de Nangis, tells of the 
king hearing that the emir was open to conversion to Christianity.
91
 There were also rumours 
that the change from the usual crusading direction came about because Charles of Anjou, 
now king of Sicily, was looking to find a way to turn the crusade to his own benefit. Charles 
was an ambitious man, and eager to expand his influence beyond Sicily. Tunis, however, 
would have been a detour for Charles, who was intensely focused on Byzantium at this time, 
before Louis distracted him with a new crusade. Whoever convinced Louis to go to Tunis, in 
the end, Charles and Genoa did very well out of it. They each received a portion of the money 
that the emir of Tunis agreed to give in tribute when the short-lived crusade ended.
92
 Some of 
this money also went to the king of France, and it was later used for the crusade.
93
 
 In the event, Tedaldo heard of the death of King Louis before he had been able to set 
out to join him. There has been some confusion over the time that Tedaldo actually set out to 
the Holy Land. Gatto wrote that both the annals of Genoa and the Eracles continuation of 
William of Tyre placed Tedaldo in the Holy Land even before the arrival of Lord Edward.
94
 
In fact, the annals of Genoa made no direct mention of Tedaldo leaving for the Holy Land 
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where Gatto indicated, and only wrote of him by name when he learned that he had become 
pope.
95
 The Eracles, however, placed Tedaldo in the Holy Land at the same time as Lord 
Edward, and said that they were on pilgrimage together.
96
 While Gatto did misinterpret those 
sources, nevertheless, he quite rightly pointed out on this issue that Tedaldo must have heard 
of Louis’ death before his departure (Louis having died in August 1270), and he could not 
have arrived at Acre before Lord Edward, since there is evidence that Tedaldo was still at 
Liège as late as 8 March 1271.
97
 Following the anonymous biographer’s account, Tedaldo 
reached Brindisi and readied himself to depart. While there, he heard of the death of King 
Louis. Although the death affected him profoundly, he set sail for Acre to complete his vow, 
where he met up with Lord Edward and his sister Beatrice, who had already arrived in Acre.
98
 
It is this last chronology which seems most likely. 
 Very little is known about Tedaldo’s time in the Holy Land. One thing, however, is 
certain: he held no official position of authority on his crusade, although according to a single 
chronicle ‘he was a chaplain in the passage.’99 If this were actually the case, he was serving 
as such without being ordained, since the same chronicle went on to state that Tedaldo was 
ordained in March 1272.
100
 Throop went further and posited that Tedaldo was papal legate in 
Acre, but based this on the rather tenuous notion that Tedaldo must have been ‘something 
more than an archdeacon’ to have William of Tripoli’s De Statu Saracenorum dedicated to 
him. He also based this on the evidence of Marco Polo, but admitted even then that there was 
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no confirmation to support Polo’s assertion that Tedaldo was papal legate in Syria.101 
Laurent, Geanakoplos, and Langlois also have wrongly named Tedaldo as legate.
102
 In fact, 
there was actually no pope alive at the time to make him legate. Nor was Tedaldo the 
patriarch of Jerusalem, as Dunbabin and Tyerman made him.
103
 And finally, he was not the 
archbishop of Liège, as Runciman and Barber made him.
104
 He was still just an archdeacon. 
The additio to Ciacconio was the most vociferous in denying that Tedaldo was a legate, 
having written that the idea of Tedaldo being a legate contradicted ‘Piacentine history, 
pontifical diaries, all ancient accounts, and writers everywhere, nay more, the sequence of 
history itself.’105 The confusion around the patriarchate likely stemmed from the striking 
similarities in the backgrounds of Tedaldo and one of his predecessors as pope, James 
Pantaléon (Urban IV). He, like Tedaldo, had been an archdeacon of Liège. James had also 
spent time in the Holy Land when he was made patriarch of Jerusalem. As Pope Urban IV, he 
called Charles of Anjou into Sicily to fight against one of the heirs of Frederick II, Manfred – 
the consequences of which would resonate into Tedaldo’s tenure as pope. Given the 
similarities between the two popes, it is likely that historians have confused Tedaldo with 
James Pantaléon when they placed him in the lofty position of patriarch of Jerusalem. 
 While in the Holy Land, it is clear that Tedaldo met the Dominican William of 
Tripoli.
106
 He also met the Polos, but the main source of evidence for this is the Il Milione of 
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Marco Polo, which must be looked at with discretion, since it wrongly named Tedaldo as 
papal legate ‘for the whole kingdom of Egypt’ in 1269.107 Not only was he never the papal 
legate, but he was not actually in the Holy Land at that time. Instead, Marco (who was not 
present for the 1269 events he described) likely confused Tedaldo with William of Agen, 
who had been made papal legate by Urban IV in 1263, and who died in Acre in 1270, as 
Gatto rightly pointed out.
108
 Nevertheless, Marco did give a useful look at the events in which 
he did take part – and while Tedaldo was, in fact, in the Holy Land. This was when the 
Mongols entered into the diplomatic efforts of Tedaldo (not for the last time), and in which 
William of Tripoli was supposed to have played a central role. The Polos had met with 
Tedaldo before either they or he had any knowledge that a pope had been elected. As a figure 
of some prominence, they sought advice from Tedaldo on the mission to the Mongols. 
Tedaldo bid them well, and wrote them a letter to present to the Great Khan in which he 
testified that the Polos had honestly sought out the pope to treat for the Mongols, but that 
there was, in fact, no pope available.
109
 The Polos departed, but upon learning of the election 
of Tedaldo to the papal throne, they returned to get a more definite reply for the Great Khan, 
though unfortunately the contents of Tedaldo’s letter to the Great Khan are not known. Now, 
with papal authority, Tedaldo appointed two Dominicans, Nicolas of Vicenza and William of 
Tripoli to go with the Polos as official representatives of the pope, and they took gifts with 
them for the Great Khan.
110
 
 While en route once again to the Great Khan, there was renewed hostility from Sultan 
Baybars, which so frightened the two Dominicans that they handed over their orders to the 
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Polos and returned to Acre with the master of the Temple.
111
 His own part in this episode 
gave Tedaldo perhaps his best look into the current political situation in the Latin East, in 
which the Mongols were very much a part of the political milieu. They had to be taken into 
consideration. Indeed, while Lord Edward was in the Holy Land, he even treated with the 
Mongols to try to arrange for joint action against the Mamluks.
112
 In addition, to develop a 
better understanding of the situation in the East, Tedaldo had commissioned William of 
Tripoli to write a report on the Muslims in the Holy Land. The result was William of 
Tripoli’s De Statu Saracenorum. These experiences in the Holy Land positioned Tedaldo 
well for his time as a crusader pope. They were so important to his papacy that this thesis will 
devote chapter two to a full investigation of the repercussions of Tedaldo’s time in the Holy 
Land. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 Before Tedaldo embarked for the West for his papal coronation, he famously quoted 
Psalm 137: ‘If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. If I do not 
remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem to my 
chief joy.’113 He would not forget. Indeed, he would devote the rest of his life to the cause of 
crusading. With Tedaldo’s election, there was a pope who could understand the situation in 
the East, and not from stories, letters, and embassies, but from the danger of a voyage by sea, 
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and from the uneasy feeling of living in a land consumed by the seemingly unstoppable 
victories of the Muslim armies, which will be discussed in chapter two. He took ship on 10 
November 1271, and reached Brindisi in early January.
114
 Charles of Anjou met with him at 
Benevento, en route to Viterbo, where he was to meet with the cardinals. Before he arrived at 
Viterbo, however, ‘many of the cardinals, who had resisted him, at that very instant came 
upon him; with the cardinals escorting, he arrived at Viterbo.’115 Tedaldo’s election had made 
any potential resistance to him fruitless. Moreover, it is clear that Tedaldo’s experiences in 
the Holy Land, England, Liège, at the First Council of Lyons, and as a companion of James 
of Palestrina had made him suitable for the job. He had the diplomatic and organisational 
skills, as well as the understanding of the Holy Land that would be needed to organise a new 
crusade, which was evidently the desire of the cardinals who elected him. At Viterbo, 
Tedaldo was vested with the papal mantle and asked where he wished to receive the papal 
crown.
116
 He insisted on going to Rome for his coronation, instead of having it done at 
Viterbo. On 27 March 1272 Tedaldo Visconti – the diplomat, the archdeacon, the crusader – 
was crowned Pope Gregory X.
117
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‘WE SAW WITH OUR EYES AND FELT WITH OUR VERY OWN 
HAND’: THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONDITION OF THE HOLY LAND 
 
Chapter Two 
 
 
 
 Introduction  
 
Upon returning to Italy after hearing of his papal election, Gregory immediately set 
about the task of organising relief for the Holy Land. Whatever the direction of the next 
crusade, its organisation required that the Franks were well acquainted with the condition of 
the Holy Land, and of Egypt, so that they could be appropriately prepared. Gregory X and 
Pope Urban IV stand alone as the only popes to have been to the Holy Land themselves in the 
time of the Crusades. Urban’s experience as patriarch of Jerusalem had made him, as Jean 
Richard has pointed out, ‘well informed about the situation in the East.’1 Both of these popes, 
not surprisingly, believed that their personal experience in the Holy Land gave them a special 
interest in it.
2
 This chapter will examine how Gregory used his personal experience in the 
Holy Land to understand what was needed there, and to encourage crusade participation. He 
believed that through understanding the desperate situation in the Holy Land, especially from 
personal experience, people would be more likely to give themselves up once more to the 
struggle of a new crusade. Thus, Gregory wrote to the English cleric Anthony Bek, who had 
crusaded with King Edward: ‘truly, you are one who has observed the needs of that land with 
your very own eyes: on account of that, you ought to support it.’3 Similarly, this chapter will 
examine the letters sent from the Holy Land to potential crusaders in the West during 
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Gregory’s reign that gave details on its condition in the hope of eliciting their help. It will 
also examine the understanding of the conditions in the Holy Land apparent from the advice 
treatises commissioned by Gregory. 
Antony Leopold has written that the example of the barons and clergy of the Holy 
Land sending Theobald of Champagne advice for his crusade ‘seems to be the only record of 
advice being sent to Europe in this way, and there is no evidence to suggest that crusaders 
usually took pains to inform themselves of conditions in the East before they left Europe.’4 
Leopold noted that ‘most crusaders took counsel when they arrived in the East, an option not 
available for the papacy.’5 This was, in fact, not the case during Gregory X’s time, nor even 
in the time of Gregory’s near-predecessor, Urban IV. To his credit, Leopold did soon mention 
that Gregory and King Philip sent some men ‘to the Holy Land to report on conditions there,’ 
but he was in fact contradicting his earlier statement.
6
 Urban IV had been receiving 
information from the bishops, military orders, and captains in the Holy Land, which led him 
to believe, like Gregory, that a ‘quick and suitable’ remedy had to be found.7 The difference 
between Gregory and Urban was that Gregory was actually interested in putting that ‘quick 
and suitable’ remedy for the Holy Land into action through a crusade, while the information 
that Urban had gathered led him to create a tax to collect money for the Holy Land due to the 
threat from the Mongols, but not to launch a crusade there in the near future.
8
 Urban was 
more interested in the kingdom of Sicily, as well as in Constantinople (which had just been 
retaken by Michael Palaeologus before Urban became pope).
9
 Moreover, the clergy had 
resisted even Urban’s economic measure, ‘pointing out that the Holy Land was covered by 
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the truce concluded with the Saracens.’10 The rupture of the truce with the Mamluks in 1263 
and Baybars’ impressive gains removed this excuse, and Urban IV was convinced that the 
one-hundredth that had been set aside for the threat by the Mongols to the Holy Land could 
now be used for the Mamluk threat.
11
 It was, however, Urban’s successor Pope Clement IV 
that called for a crusade to the Holy Land, which was later (as is well-known) taken over by 
St Louis. 
 The notion that truces in the Holy Land had an effect on the launching of a crusade 
will also be examined in this chapter as part of the conditions in the Holy Land. Linda Ross 
has discussed how truces affected the timing of crusades in her thorough treatment of 
relations between the Latin East and western Europe.
12
 She went so far as to argue that Pope 
Innocent III had a policy of only summoning crusades to the Holy Land when they coincided 
with the expiry of a truce.
13
 In addition, she argued that Pope Gregory IX’s crusade call 
Rachel suum videns in 1234 was in anticipation of the expiry of a truce, though this was still 
five years away, in 1239. As proof, she cited the presence of the patriarch of Jerusalem and 
Antioch at the conference in Rieti, and the reference made in the bull to the end of the truce.
14
 
Innocent III, in fact, had even encouraged King John of Brienne in 1212 to make a treaty with 
Sultan al-Adil while the pope himself was busy organising a new crusade, which was 
supposed to launch in 1217, when the treaty would expire.
15
 Ludovico Gatto has argued that 
Gregory X ‘was convinced that despite the ceasefire in place between Baybars and the 
Christians of Syria, to save the Holy Land it was necessary to take up arms as soon as he had 
arranged matters in Europe.’16 Building on this point, this chapter will argue that truces were 
treated differently, and in a more nuanced way, in Gregory X’s time. Unlike the clergy in 
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Urban IV’s time, who had used the existence of a truce as an excuse not to lend support to the 
Holy Land, in Gregory’s time, the truce that was recently re-established was actually used as 
an opportunity to aid the Holy Land and prepare a crusade. Moreover, and crucially, the truce 
would not have had to expire before Gregory would launch his crusade, since the pope and 
the western crusaders had not signed up to it, and were not bound by it. 
 
The Formation of Peace Treaties in the Holy Land 
 
 Convincing Christians and their leaders of the pressing need for a new crusade was 
not an easy task, seeing that there had been so many peace treaties made recently. With 
Charles of Anjou negotiating, the remnants of Louis’ crusade had made peace with the emir 
of Tunis, though Edward had continued eastward to fight in the Holy Land. When they had 
felt threatened, John of Montfort, lord of Tyre, and Bohemond, count of Tripoli and titular 
prince of Antioch had both sought out truces with Sultan Baybars in 1271, to which the sultan 
had agreed.
17
 Even the Templars and Hospitallers had sought out peace treaties with the 
sultan to cover Tortosa and Margat.
18
 These had been done before Gregory came to the papal 
throne, but even after he became pope, Gregory did not take on the same role in treaty 
formation as Innocent III had in his time. In fact, it does not seem like Gregory had any 
involvement at all in the treaty eventually sealed between Sultan Baybars and King Hugh – 
but this could have been to his advantage, if it could free his own hands in organising a new 
crusade. The treaty of ten years, ten months, ten days, and ten hours between King Hugh of 
Cyprus and Jerusalem and Sultan Baybars had been agreed to on 21 or 22 April 1272, while 
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Edward was still in the Holy Land, but Gregory was already back in Italy. This treaty 
seemingly included the military orders, since at the time Baybars ‘made the commanders of 
the Houses swear a separate oath.’19  
There is some indication that a peace treaty had been in the works for some time, 
although spearheaded not by King Hugh, but by Charles of Anjou. The Eracles, Ibn al-Furāt, 
and the Angevin chancery records all note exchanges of messengers between Charles of 
Anjou and Baybars.
20
 Riley-Smith argued that this exchange of embassies was an indication 
of Charles’ ‘growing interest in the Holy Land.’21 That may be the case; however, it should 
be noted that it is clear from both Ibn al-Furāt and the Angevin chancery records that Baybars 
initiated the exchange. This was as early as December 1270, no doubt to gather information 
about the ongoing crusade. Surprisingly, the messengers that Baybars had sent to Sicily left 
port for their return to Alexandria or even to Acre in April 1271, at about the same time as 
Edward was heading to Acre. There could be no element of surprise to Edward’s crusade. 
Baybars, then, was seemingly well-informed of the timing of western troop movements, and 
the crusaders perhaps even travelled together with his messengers, given the similar timing. 
Charles’ embassy to Baybars was reported by Ibn al-Furāt to be making ‘intercessions for the 
inhabitants of Acre.’22 According to the Eracles and Marino Sanuto, Charles was trying to 
make a truce between the Christians and Baybars.
23
 Baybars was said to have responded that 
the Christians were having trouble even taking the fortress of Qaqun (which the crusaders had 
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just besieged without success), so they would not have a chance of taking the kingdom of 
Jerusalem.
24
 Charles’ embassy does not seem to have been the deciding factor in forming the 
peace treaty, and the truce that was ultimately made did not include Charles. At the least, this 
episode shows that Christian policy was not cohesive at the time. Charles was trying to form 
this treaty while Edward himself was beginning his crusade in the Holy Land. 
 The truce between King Hugh and Sultan Baybars was made under more equal 
conditions than the truces with Tyre, Tripoli, Tortosa, and Margat. Hugh was actually able to 
gain some concessions from Baybars, including a grant of Le Saffron, with Scandalion 
allowed as a condominium.
25
 In this case, Baybars had ‘heard news that the Tartars were 
moving,’ and it must be remembered that Lord Edward’s crusade was still in the Holy Land 
to pose a threat (even if it were a small one).
26
 Although the Mongols of the Golden Horde 
were still a threat to the Christians, Edward had been in contact with the forces of the Ilkhan 
Abagha in the hopes of a joint attack, and they stayed in contact even when Edward returned 
to the West.
27
 Baybars was worried about this increasing contact between his enemies.
28
 
Thus, the truce with Hugh at this time was an early indication of Baybars’ preoccupation 
more with the Mongol threat than with the Christians. This was a turning of the tables from 
the time of Pope Urban IV, when the pope was more concerned about the Mongols than he 
was about the Mamluks. This is not to say that Baybars did not worry about a new crusade, 
but in the last several years, his string of conquests had made the Christians much less of a 
threat. There was, however, a new Mongol attack on Baybars’ territory later in November 
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1272, though Baybars scored a victory against them in the following December.
29
 Moreover, 
Baybars’ incursion into Armenia in 1275 has been seen by Peter Thorau as a prelude to a 
campaign against Seljuk-Mongol Anatolia.
30
 This preliminary campaign took place even 
though Gregory was planning a crusade, and Baybars had at least in 1272 and 1273 thought 
that the Christians were planning an attack on Egypt.
31
 By making treaties with the remnants 
of the Christians in the East, Baybars could turn his mind more fully to the Mongols, with 
whom no treaty had been made, and who posed a more direct threat to him than a potential 
crusade from the West. 
Linda Ross has pointed out that ‘Baybars had heightened the fragmented character of 
the Christian territories in the East by concluding separate agreements with the Frankish 
lords.’32 She is right, but whether this was a deliberate policy on the part of Baybars is not 
easy to tell. Even if Baybars signed a treaty with Hugh, the de facto king of Jerusalem, the 
king did not have the power to enforce it on the military orders, or on the other powerful 
magnates in the crusader territories. Thus, it may simply have been that Baybars had to sign 
separate treaties if he wanted all parties to take part, and not that he was doing it actively to 
fragment Frankish cohesiveness. For Edward’s part, the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Furāt had 
noted that ‘King Edward, who was one of the Frankish kings, [...] was not pleased when 
peace was made between the sultan and the Franks and he did not become a party to it.’33 
Similarly, the Eracles and Marino Sanuto noted that ‘the truce was made between the king of 
Jerusalem and of Cyprus, Hugh of Lusignan, and Sultan Baybars, and in it, the truce had no 
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more than the plain of Acre, and the road of Nazareth.’34 They set the date at 22 April 1272, a 
day later than Ibn al-Furāt.35  
Only one chronicle, the Annals of Salzburg, noted that Edward – and indeed ‘the 
whole church overseas’ – signed the truce with Baybars.36 This source should not be treated 
as accurate, since not only did it change the length of the crusade from both the earlier 
Muslim and Christian sources (adding ten weeks), but more importantly, the actions of both 
Edward and Gregory prove against it, as will become clear. Edward’s departure from the 
Holy Land after the truce was formed should also not be taken as an indication that he was 
party to the truce, since there is evidence that Edward had received advice from the three 
main military orders that he simply did not have a big enough army to confront Baybars at 
that time.
37
 This is corroborated by the annals of Piacenza, which noted that Edward had 
returned to the West because the power of the sultan was too great.
38
 The small size of his 
army would have been made worse after the truce was made, which meant that Hugh’s troops 
and the military orders could no longer work with it. In addition, his potential Mongols allies 
had become occupied in internal rivalries.
39
 Finally, Michael Prestwich has pointed to a 1275 
letter from the Hospitaller master, Hugh Revel, as a possible indication that Edward was part 
of the truce, but Prestwich was right also to point out that ‘the wording [...] is scarcely 
conclusive.’40 In fact, if the ‘vos’ is treated as the object and not the subject, then even this 
source shows Edward was not the instigator of the truce.
41
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The Effect of Peace Treaties on Crusading 
 
It is not likely that Gregory had encouraged Hugh to form a truce with Baybars, 
although the effect of its formation might not have had a negative effect on his plans for 
crusade. Instead, it could have given him the time he needed to organise a crusade without 
having to worry so much about a fresh attack on Acre. It could also have given Gregory the 
flexibility to launch a crusade before the truce had expired, since neither he nor the leaders of 
the West were signatories to it. Indeed, there is an earlier example in which the inhabitants of 
the Holy Land had even encouraged Theobald of Champagne to ignore a truce at the time of 
his crusade.
42
 More significantly, the truce that Hugh formed in 1272 had been a long time in 
the making, and there is proof from Ibn al-Furāt that in Hugh’s earlier attempt in 1268 to 
make peace, he had taken into consideration a potential separate policy for western rulers. 
The 1268 peace treaty, which was not signed, was first supposed to have lasted ‘for ten years, 
unaffected by foreign invasion or the arrival of any king from overseas.’43 Agreement to this 
was said to have been reached between Baybars and Hugh.
44
 Nevertheless, when Hugh was 
pressed actually to sign the treaty, he instead requested that Cyprus get a separate deal, and 
also that ‘the peace should last as long as there was no foreign invasion and no king from 
abroad appeared.’45 The treaty was not signed, apparently because King Hugh was afraid of 
King Charles.
46
 Gabrieli noted on this point that Charles was already starting to assert his 
rights to the crown of Jerusalem through Maria of Antioch, but it was in fact a bit too early 
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for Hugh’s fear of Charles to stem from a threat to the throne.47 Perhaps (although it is 
speculation), the explanation for this change in Hugh was that he had recently heard that King 
Louis IX was planning a crusade. Given the maritime position of Charles’ kingdom, it is 
credible to believe that Hugh could have heard this news from the Sicilian king. But more 
simply, Ibn al-Furāt could have been indulging himself anachronistically by taking into 
consideration Charles’ later claim to the throne. 
Proof that Gregory had not been involved in the truce (nor perhaps that he even 
initially desired it) comes from that fact that, fresh from his election while in Acre, and with 
the state of the Latin East unavoidably on his mind, Gregory had quickly returned to the West 
in order to procure more aid for Edward’s crusade. In his first surviving letter to Edward after 
the papal election, and less than a month before the truce was formed, Gregory wrote from 
the Lateran that he had arrived safely, and was working with his fellow clergymen to send aid 
to Edward. He asked Edward: ‘carrying the yoke of the burden for the love of His name, may 
you be vigilant and labour with care around the custody and defence of the [Holy] Land.’48 
Gregory told him that he was trying to convince King Philip of France to send knights and 
galleys, or at least knights. Failing that, Gregory told Edward that he was still looking for 
other ways to send aid quickly to the Holy Land.
49
 Gregory wrote the same to Edward’s 
brother Edmund, and to John II of Brittany (who were both crusading with Edward), but 
apparently not to King Hugh, who was also in Acre at this time. Hugh’s name was not 
mentioned at the end of the letter to Edward, while Edmund and John were listed as having 
had the same letter sent to them. These were hardly the preparations of a pope planning an 
imminent truce, or if he knew of the upcoming truce, it is clear that it was not affecting his 
own plans. Hugh was very likely acting independently at this time when he made peace with 
the Mamluks. Thus Baybars, probably thinking of the threat of the Mongols combining with 
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Edward, took up Hugh’s offer in order to lessen the threat. At this early stage, it seems that 
Gregory still held out hope that reinforcements would give Edward’s crusade new vigour. At 
the same time, however, he was aware that Edward’s crusade could not, alone, provide the 
remedy for the Holy Land, thus he told Edward that he was planning a general council to 
provide for the perpetual aid of the Holy Land.
50
 
It was, perhaps, these planned galleys and knights (arriving in the Holy Land near the 
end of 1272 with Patriarch Thomas), which led the Muslim chronicler Qirtay al-Khaznadārī 
to report that in late 1271 or early 1272, Baybars had heard of an impending crusade called 
by the pope, after the Mamluk navy had broken up on the Cypriot coast. This coincided, in 
fact, with Gregory’s papal election and coronation. Qirtay said that Baybars ‘was frightened 
for himself, for Egypt, for Syria and for his armies. He said to himself, “If the Franks come to 
me by way of Alexandria, Damietta and Acre, I am afraid that the Mongols will attack me 
from the East. My position will be too weak to deal with these two parties.”’51 This confirms 
Baybars’ fear of an alliance between the Franks and the Mongols, but Reuven Amitai-Preiss 
and Robert Irwin have called this crusade apocryphal.
52
 Irwin argued that Qirtay’s story could 
not be believed, because it noted that Baybars sent an envoy to the king of England, who had 
a brother who was also king. He based his argument on a face-value agreement with Qirtay’s 
chronology. That was a mistake. Nevertheless, he said that if the chronology were right, this 
king would be Henry III, and his brother Richard (king of the Romans). He also noted that 
‘there is no record in English sources of a Mamluk embassy to England in the 1270s or at any 
other time.’53 There is also no record of the gifts of an elephant and giraffe, which Qirtay had 
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recounted. Also, it must be noted that Gregory died several years later, in January 1276, not 
in 1272 or 1273 as would have been the case with a tight adherence to Qirtay’s chronology. 
Even so, Irwin and Amitai-Preiss failed to mention the fact that at the very time that Baybars 
is reputed by Qirtay to ‘have won over [Edward’s] friendship,’ and prevented his 
participation in the new crusade, he actually tried to have him assassinated.
54
 It would 
actually have strengthened their case for Qirtay’s inaccuracy.  
Nevertheless, Irwin and Amitai-Preiss could be wrong altogether, not least in Irwin’s 
decision to agree with Qirtay’s chronology. Irwin argued that one should conclude that ‘this 
amateur historian [Qirtay], whether panicking at his ignorance or faintly bored, settled down 
to tell lies at this point in his chronicle.’55 Irwin could simply have misinterpreted the source. 
The king and his brother, who was also a king, could just as easily have been Edward and 
Edmund, who were both in the Holy Land at this time. It was not uncommon for a high-
ranking nobleman to be called a king.
56
 This would explain the absence of records of the 
embassy in England, although would not, admittedly, explain why Qirtay had said that the 
envoy was sent to England. Nevertheless, Qirtay could still have been ‘settling down to tell 
lies’ to a certain extent, since the ‘embassy’ sent to Edward at this time which can be 
corroborated in the Eracles, Gestes des Chiprois, and Ibn al-Furāt, actually took the form of 
an assassination attempt. It is conjectural, but perhaps upon seeing the unflattering 
representation of the Muslim leader in the assassination attempt (and a failed attempt, at that), 
Qirtay decided to put the embassy in a better and more benevolent light. Be that as it may, 
what is more certain is that even though Gregory did not issue a new crusade call around the 
time of his election (other than the call to the general council), the arrival of a sizeable 
contingent of reinforcements from the West could certainly appear to Baybars as the 
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harbinger of a new crusade. After all, Ibn al-Furāt had also reported that in 1272 or 1273 
‘news kept coming in that the Franks were intending to attack the frontiers of Egypt.’57 If, 
before he left Acre, Gregory had already told Edward that he would send additional 
reinforcements to him (as seems reasonable), then it is not surprising that Edward expressed 
his anger at Hugh for making peace with Baybars so soon. He and Gregory still wanted to 
carry out the crusade. 
Edward was not part of the peace treaty, and was perhaps still prepared to cause 
trouble for Baybars with the arrival of Gregory’s reinforcements. If Qirtay were, in fact, right, 
then Baybars knew all of this, and wanted to do away with the threat that Edward would have 
posed by allying with the Mongols. This would give a reasonable explanation for Baybars’ 
attempted assassination of Edward after the peace treaty had already been signed with Hugh. 
Ibn al-Furāt gave no indication that Baybars had any qualms about making this assassination 
attempt, although earlier Baybars had expressed embarrassment about the disguising of the 
ships he had sent against Cyprus as Frankish vessels (an expression that only occurred after 
they had broken up on the shore).
58
 According to Ibn al-Furāt, Baybars had the governor of 
Ramla, Ibn Shāwar, feign defection to Edward. In late May or June 1272, Ibn Shāwar was 
able to send men to Edward, one of whom had the opportunity to be alone with Edward. He 
‘leaped at him and struck him in five places.’59 Edward survived the wounds, perhaps with 
the aid of an antidote from the Hospitallers, and the assassin was killed.
60
 In Christian 
sources, the Gestes des Chiprois discussed the assassination attempt at greater length than the 
Eracles. The Gestes, however, had not made any mention of the peace treaty that Hugh had 
made with Baybars, but noted that Hugh had come from Cyprus to Acre and had done honour 
to Edward. The two men, along with the Templars and Hospitallers, had then made joint 
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military action against Baybars. More importantly, the Gestes noted that the assassin was a 
Muslim who came to be baptized, and had been serving Edward as a spy, giving him 
information about ‘the Saracens to find out where one might do them harm.’61 This is further 
proof that Edward was still looking to act against Baybars, regardless of the truce which King 
Hugh had made with the sultan.  
Understandably, Hugh’s truce must have mattered even less to Edward and his men 
after the assassination attempt, and ‘the western Franks rode out and killed a small number of 
Muslims.’62 That even the Muslim source noted that they were western Franks proves that the 
crusaders were not then working as closely with the eastern Franks, though Edward and Hugh 
had been working together before the truce. The attack on Edward in territory included in the 
truce is further evidence that he and the western Franks were not party to the treaty, or that 
Baybars looked on the truce flexibly. Perhaps he simply disregarded it in this case because he 
had the power to do so. The eastern Franks had feared the breaching of truces before, and 
Ross has noted that ‘the infringement of truces and periodic raids by the Muslims [had] 
inspired a number of pleas to western Europe for military support.’63 In the current case, this 
almost instant infringement was likely to have fuelled fears that Baybars would not leave 
Acre secure if he suddenly decided to launch an attack. This was all the more reason for 
reinforcements to be sent.   
Edward was not the only one not to feel bound by the truce. A group of Marseillais 
sailors ‘who formed one of the armies of the Franks’ seized a ship carrying envoys from 
Khan Mengu-Temur of the Golden Horde, as well as an interpreter that Baybars had sent to 
him.
64
 Riley-Smith, in his notes to Lyons’ edition of Ibn al-Furāt, noted that these Marseillais 
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could have been merchants in Acre, or they could have been ‘a force from Marseilles serving 
in the East, perhaps on behalf of Charles of Anjou.’65 Alternatively, though this is conjecture, 
they could be something of a response to the patriarch of Jerusalem’s request of Charles in 
1267 to keep six galleys around Syria for privateering against Egypt and ensuring Latin sea 
mastery.
66
 Showing Baybars’ fear of Frankish alliance with the Ilkhanate Mongols, Ibn al-
Furāt reported that Baybars feared ‘that the Franks would use these men in order to ingratiate 
themselves’ with Ilkhan Abagha.67 Baybars asked for their return, and only his interpreter 
was released. Crucially, the Franks ‘excused themselves from freeing the rest by saying that 
they [the captured Mongols] were not the Sultan’s subjects; they had not been captured in the 
lands covered by the peace, and they had been taken by the servants of King Charles.’68  
At one and the same time, the Marseillais formed an objection based both on a 
recognition of the peace that Hugh had formed with Baybars (and the territorial limitations of 
it), as well as an assertion that King Charles and his subjects were not bound by it. The 
implications of this are considerable. If kings such as Edward and Charles (whom Gregory 
hoped would formed a large part of his new crusade) did not consider themselves bound by 
the peace treaty formed between King Hugh and Sultan Baybars, then a new crusade would 
not have to wait for the treaty to expire, which would not have been until around 3 or 4 
March 1283. It is thus clear that truce making was not centralized in this time either in the 
person of the king, or the pope. In addition, it is clear that a truce made by the apparent king 
of Jerusalem did not necessarily bind western crusaders (nor, for that matter, the military 
orders or the other leading nobles of the Frankish East, who were making treaties of their 
own). At the same time, the territorial designations on the truce (which only included the 
plain of Acre and the road to Nazareth), meant that a crusade to Egypt, or indeed, to one of 
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the other diminished Latin territories in the Levant, could still be possible. Indeed, even a 
crusade around the lands of Acre could still be possible, if the truce were simply ignored by 
the West when it suited them, or if the 1268 stipulation between King Hugh and Baybars 
about separate treatment for foreign crusaders had also been included in the 1272 truce. 
 
 Gregory’s Use of His Personal Experience in the Holy Land 
 
The fractured state of truce making in this time, along with an apparent disregard on 
the part of Edward and Charles for Hugh’s truce with Baybars, enabled Gregory to plan his 
new crusade with a certain flexibility. The plain of Acre and the road to Nazareth would still 
theoretically be safe while Gregory could send smaller detachments of reinforcements 
leading up to his passagium generale. Convincing the powers of western Christendom to 
send those troops, and deciding how they were to be used, however, would require an 
intimate and accurate knowledge of the condition of the Holy Land. That knowledge also had 
to be kept up-to-date at a time when the conditions were changing rapidly. Gregory was 
acutely aware of this. In the first couple of years of Gregory’s papal tenure, he made clear 
reference to how his own time spent in the Holy Land had given him valuable insight into its 
condition, and into what was needed for it. Gregory’s belief in the effect that personal 
experience in the Holy Land had is made clear in several letters, not least his 31 March 1272 
bull to call the general council, Salvator noster in.
69
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 In Salvator noster in, which was issued generally, Gregory pointed out that ‘knowing 
the harm itself’ of lax morals, the schism with the Greeks, and the trouble in the Holy Land, 
‘and prudently dreading it, may raise the remedy of cooperation for men to good effect.’70 
This statement might not seem of much consequence, until it is placed among the myriad 
other examples where Gregory noted that personal experience and knowledge would have an 
effect on action, especially as it related to the condition of the Holy Land. Indeed, in the same 
bull, Gregory told his fellow clergy members that he grieved and suffered bitterly ‘because, 
as it were, we not only heard in Outremer, but we saw with our eyes, and our hands felt – oh 
the anguish! – more detestable than usual, the name of Christ is blasphemed among the 
people.’71 Gregory’s repeated reference to ‘seeing with his eyes’ and ‘feeling with his hands’ 
is probably written in reference to Isaiah, chapter 59. This chapter begins with what would 
have been familiar to crusaders after the Second Crusade: the theme of peccatis exigentibus. 
It reads: ‘Behold, the Lord’s hand is not shortened, that it cannot save; neither his ear heavy, 
that it cannot hear: But your iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your 
sins have hid his face from you, that he will not hear.’72 Taking up this theme, Gregory has 
more directly responded to verses nine and ten: ‘Therefore is judgment far from us, neither 
doth justice overtake us: we wait for light, but behold obscurity; for brightness, but we walk 
in darkness. We grope for the wall like the blind, and we grope as if we had no eyes: we 
stumble at noon day as in the night; we are in desolate places as dead men.’73 Gregory’s 
insistence that he had indeed ‘seen’ and ‘felt’ what was going on in the Holy Land was 
probably meant to indicate that he had overcome the problems discussed in Isaiah. Had he not 
been to the Holy Land himself, it is difficult to see how he could have made such a statement 
seem credible. 
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Even before he issued Salvator noster in, Gregory had been writing to the king of 
France and others along the same lines, with the goal of eliciting aid for the Holy Land. 
Gregory had been chosen by the College of Cardinals as a compromise candidate, and 
particularly as one whose experience in the Holy Land could aid the crusade.
74
 To this end, 
Gregory used these credentials in his letters to request help for the Holy Land. He opened a 
letter to the Templars and Hospitallers of France on 4 March 1272 with some of the same 
words that he later included in his council invitation: ‘horrible and intolerable oppressions of 
the Holy Land, which once we saw with bodily eyes and we felt with our very own hand in a 
minor office of appointment.’75 Gregory’s oft-cited reference to seeing with his eyes and 
feeling with his hands must have had an effect, because Marino Sanuto quoted Gregory on 
this point in 1321.
76
 After Gregory’s credentials had been proven, as it were, he continued his 
letter by requesting that the military orders give him a loan if King Philip failed to do so. 
Through this organisation, Gregory was turning himself to the ‘handling’ or management 
(manutenendam) of the Holy Land.
77
 To reinforce the knowledge gained from his experience, 
he told Philip that he had discussed the management of the Holy Land ‘face-to-face with the 
leaders of the Christian army, and also with the Templars and Hospitallers, and other 
magnates of those places when [he was] there.’78  
Gregory must have heard of the rebuilding of Baybars’ fleet after its destruction in 
Cyprus, since he told Philip that with the advice he had received, he had decided that a 
contingent of galleys, as well as knights, would be needed immediately, while further 
preparations were made at a general council for more substantial aid.
79
 Given Ibn al-Furāt’s 
indication that Charles of Anjou’s messengers had been startled to see shipbuilding just 
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outside of Cairo when they came to treat with Baybars, it seems likely that this information 
was generally known among the crusaders.
80
 Gregory showed that he was aware of, and 
responsive to, recent developments. He was also aware of the need to maintain naval mastery. 
He used this information to try to convince Philip, the Venetians, the Genoese, and the 
Marseillais to send galleys not simply for transport, but for maritime defence in the Holy 
Land.
81
 Ultimately, there is only an indication that Charles did this, and even in this case it is 
only certain that Charles agreed to supply transport ships for the new patriarch and his 
mercenaries, not patrol vessels.
82
 
 It may also have been the rebuilding of Baybars’ fleet (along with, of course, his 
string of recent conquests), which led Gregory to tell the archbishop of Rouen and the bishop 
of Langres that he sensed that the Holy Land ‘is more and more exposed to the cost of 
desolation by the increasing treachery of the enemy.’83 Gregory also wrote on this day to his 
old friend Count Philip of Savoy, with whom he had served when Philip had been archbishop 
of Lyons at the time of the First Council of Lyons.
84
 He told all of them that he had sent the 
archbishop of Carinthia to King Philip, and he asked them to trust the archbishop, and to aid 
him. There is no doubt that Gregory singled these men out because of the service he believed 
they could render him and the crusade. The archbishop of Rouen and the bishop of Langres 
had both taken the cross with St Louis and accompanied him on his Tunis crusade, thus they 
had personal experience in crusading.
85
 In fact, the archbishop of Rouen, Eudes Rigaud, had 
been one of the executors of a codicil which Louis wrote while en route to Tunis.
86
 The 
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bishop of Langres, Guy of Geneva, was later solicited by the king of France in 1272 to send 
him a military contingent, to which the king later gave exemption.
87
 It is unclear why King 
Philip needed this, but possibly it was because Gregory had requested in his letter to Guy that 
he help in the business that the archbishop of Carinthia was undertaking with the king of 
France. That business was the Holy Land. Perhaps Guy had been asked for this contingent by 
Philip in order to send it to the Holy Land. When Gregory turned down Philip’s offer in the 
same year to lead a crusade to the Holy Land right away, the contingent would no longer 
have been needed. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.  
 
 Additional Sources of Information on the Condition of the Holy Land 
 
 The letters in which Gregory made reference to his own experience in the Holy Land 
ended at the time of the Second Council of Lyons, though he did include his oft-repeated 
reference to his experience in the Holy Land in his council crusading decree, Constitutiones 
pro Zelo Fidei.
88
 As the time passed from his return to the West, Gregory must have been 
aware that the changing nature of condition in the Holy Land was making his own experience 
there obsolete. To remedy this, Gregory sought information from elsewhere. The best sources 
of information on the condition of the Holy Land that would have been available to him came 
from a variety of sources. First was the return of Edward from his crusade, and his audience 
with Gregory in April 1273.
89
 This was quickly followed by a late-1273 exploratory mission 
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to the Holy Land by messengers from King Philip.
90
 After this, there were delegations from 
the Holy Land at the general council in 1274, of which our records are limited to the boastful 
recountings of King James of Aragon, who was present at the council.
91
 Gregory had also 
commissioned advice treatises on the crusade (as well as on the schism with the Greeks and 
the reform of morals) which were to be ready for the general council. Of these, four are 
extant: the Collectio de Scandalis Ecclesiae perhaps written by Gilbert of Tournay, the 
memoir of Bruno of Olomouc, the Opusculum Tripartitum by Humbert of Romans, and the 
De Statu Saracenorum by William of Tripoli.
92
 It is true that Palmer Throop has given these a 
detailed examination, but this was in the context of his search for criticism of the crusade.
93
 
This chapter, on the contrary, will examine these treatises for the information that they 
provide on the condition of the Holy Land. With this accomplished, the degree to which 
Gregory followed their advice, and the reasons for his actions will become clear in 
subsequent chapters. Unfortunately, the Collectio has nothing to offer on the condition of the 
Holy Land. Bruno of Olomouc gives some insight on the perception of the Mongols in 
eastern Europe, but like the Collectio, his work is not very useful for understanding the 
condition of the Holy Land.
94
 Humbert of Romans and William of Tripoli, however, give 
crucial insight into how much the Christians in Gregory’s time remembered the experience of 
past crusaders, with William giving particular insight into the current condition of the Holy 
Land. Finally, Gregory was also planning to discuss the general passage with Michael 
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Palaeologus in 1276 before the pope’s premature death prevented it, but Gregory still had 
obtained information on conditions in Turkey from Michael’s messengers in late 1275.95 
The result of Gregory and Edward’s audience in April 1273 confirmed what the pope 
already knew: ships were desperately needed in the Holy Land. The Christians had to 
maintain what was in fact the only advantage that they had remaining, which was naval 
superiority. Edward reported ‘that a crisis remains to threaten Christianity concerning the 
[Holy Land], unless something, especially ships, were quickly being sent to aid.’96 Edward 
had derived this information ‘from the council of the inhabitants.’97 As noted above, Gregory 
had probably heard of Baybars’ shipbuilding through Charles of Anjou, but it seems hard to 
believe that the merchants of Genoa, Marseilles, and Venice would not also have had some 
indication of Baybars’ strengthening, especially of the Egyptian port cities which they would 
have frequented.
98
 The Venetians had even been to Alexandria while Edward was crusading. 
Presumably they had been there for trade, since Edward had been indignant towards them for 
it.
99
 Nevertheless, even the letters in which Gregory asked the naval powers for ships to aid 
the Holy Land gave no indication he was seeking information about the state of affairs in 
Egypt or the Holy Land.
100
 They could not but have known, however, that in 1272 Baybars 
had strengthened the fortifications of Alexandria with 100 mangonels on its walls in 
anticipation of an attack there.
101
 The evidence would have been as plain as the eye could see. 
The reasons for this apparent mistake on Gregory’s part may be explained by letters simply 
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not having survived, but perhaps the maritime powers would have been unwilling to divulge 
this kind of information, for fear of upsetting their lucrative trade with Egypt.
102
 
With Edward’s recent arrival with news from the Holy Land, it is unclear why there 
was a need to send another survey mission to the Holy Land so soon. Yet, King Philip had 
decided by August 1273 to send ‘suitable men having experience of arms’ to the Holy Land 
to determine its condition.
103
 Gregory was pleased that Philip was doing this, but there is no 
indication that it was at the pope’s request. The rapid sequence of these events, however, 
underscores the perceived need to be kept updated constantly on the condition of the Holy 
Land. It is unfortunate that the identity of these messengers, and any report that they might 
have made, is not known for certain, although perhaps they were Gilles of Santi and Peter of 
Amiens, who went to the Holy Land for Philip shortly after the letter had been written.
104
 It 
would have made sense for the messengers to return before the general council assembled, 
which was to plan for the crusade to the Holy Land. Yet, the only messengers from the Holy 
Land for whom there is evidence at the general council are the archbishop of Tyre, the bishop 
of Paphos, John of Grailly, William of Corceles (a Hospitaller), James Vidal, and Enguerrand 
of Jorni – all messengers for King Hugh.105 Erard of Valery acted as King Philip’s 
representative at the council, but he had not gone to the Holy Land at the time in question.
106
  
Marino Sanuto noted that ‘messengers took part in that council for the princes, and 
other inhabitants of the Holy Land, explaining with careful reasoning the condition and 
business of the said land.’107 Unfortunately, the only information that remains about their 
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crusade advice given at the general council is what the colourful King James of Aragon 
included in his autobiography. In this case, James only mentioned the advice that came from 
the Templars, who were not representing King Hugh at the council, since they had sided with 
Maria of Antioch in the struggle for the crown of Jerusalem.
108
 This was in addition to what 
James mentioned of the advice of Erard of Valery, who was coming from the king of France, 
not the Holy Land. The Templars could have been acting for some of the other ‘princes’ and 
inhabitants of the Holy Land that Sanuto mentioned, but there were also several other people 
from the Holy Land at the council who could have offered advice, though none of it is extant. 
Of course it is well-known that Maria of Antioch was present at the council, though she was 
there to make her claim to the throne, not to give advice on what was needed for the Holy 
Land. The others were the aforementioned messengers from King Hugh, including the 
archbishop of Tyre. The archbishop of Tyre probably gave his own advice at the council, 
since Gregory wrote to King Edward that he was sending the archbishop to him about this, 
and other things. Gregory told him that the archbishop was ‘one of the messengers from the 
inhabitants of that land recently sent.’ He asked that Edward would ‘indulgently hear these 
things, which [the archbishop] has considered putting forth to the advantage of the same 
land.’109 The archbishop of Tyre had been one of Gregory’s trusted contacts in the Holy Land 
before the arrival of the higher-ranking patriarch of Jerusalem. In the patriarch’s absence, 
Gregory had directed the archbishop of Tyre (along with the bishop of Tortosa) to receive 
some money that had been willed to the Holy Land by the bishop of Albano.
110
 He also 
directed the maritime powers to coordinate with the same archbishop (or the military orders, 
or captain of the pilgrims) if the patriarch of Jerusalem died.
111
 Gregory probably considered 
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the archbishop to be an important source of information. It is unfortunate that none of his 
advice remains. 
The information that remains from the general council about the condition of the Holy 
Land is given, as it were, third-hand from the mouth of the new Templar master, William of 
Beaujeu, through King James’ autobiography. Although the evidence is not direct, it at least 
confirmed what was already known. William is said to have told the council that help was 
needed in the Holy Land ‘of every kind – arms, provisions, and still more, of troops, for there 
were not any there. And also people, as there were not so many there as were needed.’112 
There was, of course, nothing surprising about this. And indeed, since William had not 
recently been in the Holy Land, he was probably only reiterating what was already well-
known, or what he had been told from those who had, in fact, recently come from the Holy 
Land. William was perhaps aware of the shortcomings of his knowledge on the matter, and 
had actually tried to defer to an elderly Templar also present at the council, John of Carcella. 
But John is said to have declined to speak, in favour of the new master of the order.
113
 More 
usefully, William responded to Gregory’s inquiry on the condition of Baybars’ navy. Gregory 
was clearly still concerned that naval superiority could become a problem, given Baybars’ 
recent attempts on Cyprus, and his apparent shipbuilding efforts. William is said to have 
replied, ‘I have heard that [Baybars] was trying to arm his vessels and wished to besiege 
Acre, and he could not arm more than 17 vessels, among galleys and other craft.’114 Again, 
William showed his lack of personal experience in acknowledging that he only ‘heard’ of 
what he told. But Gregory’s reply that Christendom would need as many ships, or more, 
indicates a strong naval contingent to his planned crusade efforts at this time.
115
 James’ reply 
that they really only needed ten ships to take on an Egyptian navy twice its size is boastful, 
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but also contains some grain of truth.
116
 Although Gregory was concerned about the Egyptian 
naval build-up, the Christians were still the better seamen – at least for the time. The 
disastrous Egyptian expedition to Cyprus goes some way to underscoring that, and it is 
reinforced by Humbert of Romans, who wrote that Muslim sea power was nothing compared 
to that of the Christians.
117
 
 Also at the time of the general council, Gregory received advice treatises on the 
crusade. Humbert of Romans and William of Tripoli give the best insight into what was 
known about the experience of past crusaders, though on these points their ‘advice’ treatises 
read more as simple histories rather than an explanation of what to do, or not to do, based on 
past crusades. William of Tripoli is an especially important source for the condition of the 
Holy Land, but he has been underutilised for this kind of information. William lived in the 
Holy Land and had knowledge of the relative strength of the Christians and Muslims. He 
pointed out that the power of Baybars was so great that the sultan would easily be able to take 
Sidon, Beirut, Jubail,
118
 Tortosa, and Margat. William said that if Baybars pressed hard, he 
might even be able to take Tyre and Tripoli, but the sultan was holding back because ‘he says 
that he does not want to overthrow the Christians, howevermuch he is able, although they 
may deserve it.’119 But Baybars’ true desire was said to be the capture of Acre.120 
Unfortunately, William gave no indication of how easy this might be, but given its absence 
from the list, it was probably seen to be more secure than Tyre and Tripoli. No doubt the 
recent peace treaty for Acre added to this sense of security there; however, William indicated 
the opinion of ‘several’ that Baybars was only pretending to be friendly with the Christians so 
that he could capture Acre later.
121
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William’s depiction of Baybars’ great power stands in contrast to his assertion in the 
same treatise that the sultan had attempted to assassinate Lord Edward because he could not 
overcome him by arms.
122
 Obviously, this contradiction was simply a matter of William 
overinflating Edward’s power, since other Christian sources, as noted, pointed to the 
insufficiency of Edward’s army. But even though William depicted Baybars as very powerful 
– as courageous as Julius Caesar, but as hateful as Nero – he still named Saladin as the most 
powerful sultan that there had been, since it was noted that he had taken all the Christian 
lands that had been acquired since the time of Godfrey of Bouillon except Tyre, Tripoli, and 
Antioch.
123
 Humbert of Romans, too, pointed out that it was under Saladin especially (but 
also ‘other Muslims afterwards’) that the land the Christians had gained from the time of 
Godfrey of Bouillon was seized.
124
 Humbert’s work did not specifically discuss Baybars at 
all, and thus is not as useful as William of Tripoli for information on the actual condition of 
the Holy Land in the 1270s, though it still provides useful information on the memory of the 
crusades. 
Besides King Louis IX, Godfrey and Saladin were the most widely mentioned figures 
from the crusading period in both William and Humbert’s works. The authors did, however, 
demonstrate some grasp of the rest of the crusading period, but not in a way that would have 
given advice on how to carry out the crusade. Both William and Humbert pointed to the 
examples of Charlemagne and Charles Martel fighting against the Muslims.
125
 As a date for 
the beginning of the current ‘business,’ Humbert noted the work of Pope Alexander II against 
the Muslims in Iberia in the eleventh century, and then (out of chronological order) Pope Leo 
IV’s work in Italy, which had been in the ninth century.126 He also drew attention to the 
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success of Peter the Hermit in rousing crusading enthusiasm along with Pope Urban II as a 
way of shaming contemporary Christians for their relative inaction.
127
 For the time between 
the First Crusade and the Third Crusade, however, no mention was made in either of the 
treatises. Thus, no lessons seem to have been drawn from the failure of the Second Crusade. 
It is clear, however, that the drowning death of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa was still 
remembered. Humbert pointed to it not as an example of the emperor’s unfamiliarity with 
conditions in the East, but rather as an example that the crusade might not be the will of God 
(which he later refuted).
128
 Humbert was also able to point out Pope Gregory VIII’s call to 
crusade after the fall of Jerusalem, his quick death and replacement by Pope Clement III, and 
King Philip II of France and King Richard I of England’s successful reconquest of Acre.129 
Yet no mention was made of the internal struggles between these two kings – though the 
Collectio had noted that contention among princes was widespread without naming an actual 
time period.
130
 Again, no lessons were drawn about how to carry out the crusade. Humbert 
seemingly just marked the work of Philip and Richard as a success story, without going into 
any details. 
 Besides noting Pope Innocent III’s crusade decrees (which were well-known to 
Gregory X already since he modeled his own on them), the treatises moved forward from the 
Third Crusade directly to the first crusade of King Louis IX.
131
 The fourth and fifth crusades 
received no mention, and Emperor Frederick II’s crusade was not mentioned either, though 
he was said by William of Tripoli to have been a friend of the Muslims, and perhaps even a 
Muslim himself.
132
 Thus, no lessons were drawn from the Fifth Crusade’s attack on Egypt, 
nor from Frederick II’s negotiations which had successfully returned Jerusalem. 
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Understandably, more emphasis was placed on the crusades of King Louis IX, since their 
memory would still have been quite fresh. 
 William of Tripoli showed knowledge of the course of Louis’ first crusade, and 
detailed knowledge of the course of events which had brought Baybars to power. William 
had an entire section entitled ‘the state of the Saracens after the destruction of Damietta.’133 
In what was likely a retelling of very familiar events, William and Humbert both pointed out 
that Louis and his army had been captured in Egypt.
134
 Unfortunately, neither gave any 
details on how this came about, or any lessons to draw from it. Instead, William went on to 
demonstrate the course of succession among the Muslims after that crusade. He wrote that 
this had led to leadership passing from the Arabs to the Turks, and coming finally to Baybars 
at the same time that Thomas Agni of Lentini, the new patriarch of Jerusalem, had been 
bishop of Bethlehem and papal legate.
135
 William used the rise of Baybars as another 
example of the sultan’s treachery. According to William, after the Mamluk victory against 
the Mongols at Ain Jalut in 1260, Baybars had encouraged Qutuz to attack Acre. When 
Qutuz hesitated to break faith with the Christians, Baybars murdered him and took power.
136
 
Although this particular episode could have served as a warning against trusting Baybars to 
keep the new truce, William drew no other lessons from Louis’ crusade. Humbert pointed out 
Louis’ death on his second crusade, but again it was simple narrative and not instruction.137 
In sum, it is clear from the advice treatises that although there was some knowledge of past 
crusades from the very beginning of the movement, one cannot say based on the evidence 
that these were used to inform the way that the crusade was being prepared in Gregory’s 
time. In terms of the current situation in the Holy Land, the only useful information from 
extant advice treatises came from William of Tripoli. 
                                                 
133
 Ibid, p. 585-6. 
134
 Ibid, p. 586. Humbert of Romans, Opusculum Tripartitum, p. 197. 
135
 William of Tripoli, De Statu, p. 586. 
136
 Ibid, p. 586. 
137
 Humbert of Romans, Opusculum Tripartitum, p. 197. 
88 
 
  
Finally, closer to the time that Gregory was going to launch his crusade, he was also 
getting advice from messengers of Michael Palaeologus. One of Michael’s messengers, 
George Metochites, recalled that in autumn 1275 Gregory ‘wanted to know what, exactly, 
was this “Turkey,” and he also inquired about the people who were the master of it and the 
religion they professed. He requested information on the extent and nature of the country that 
they held.’138 Gregory was at this time considering the land passage, which will be discussed 
in full in chapter six. George replied to Gregory’s request: 
I thus put into light the extent of the country and the nature of its soil; I pointed out that 
these regions originally belonged to our empire, and that the Turks have held them to our 
frustration. I spoke of their impious religion, of the reputation of the great cities that are 
there and the excellence of their episcopal seats. I cited Greater Caesarea and Iconium.
139
 
The interest in the ‘nature of the soil,’ which could be interpreted as an interest in its climate, 
may give some indication that Gregory was worried about the effect that this had on 
crusaders. Humbert of Romans’ treatise had briefly mentioned how the unfamiliar climate 
and food of the East were a detriment to crusaders.
140
 Gregory thus seemed to be aware of the 
dangers posed by a climate to which the western crusaders were not accustomed, and was 
making further inquiries about it. George Metochites also noted that Gregory and Michael 
were supposed to meet in Easter 1276 in Brindisi or (if the situation were not secure for 
Michael to come there) across the short stretch of the Adriatic Sea in Vlorë.
141
 There Gregory 
and Michael would have discussed the crusade further.
142
 Unfortunately, Gregory died before 
this could happen. 
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Letters from the Holy Land 
 
Although no letters to Gregory from the Holy Land survive, there are several that 
were written to other leading figures in the West that give information on the condition of the 
Holy Land. There was word in 1273 from Hugh Revel to Guy Dampierre, count of Flanders. 
It is safe to assume that his information was also known by Gregory, since it detailed funds 
sent by him.
143
 It was perhaps this petition which helped lead Guy to take up the cross in late 
1276.
144
 There are also several extant letters written throughout 1275 that give some of the 
most detailed first-hand analysis of the condition of the Holy Land from those who knew it 
best. Thomas, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and Balian, the constable of Jerusalem, as well as 
King Hugh, and the Templar master William of Beaujeu all wrote to King Rudolph from the 
Holy Land in 1275.
145
 There are also two letters which the Hospitaller master Hugh Revel 
and William of Beaujeu, sent to King Edward.
146
  
These letters were not sent to Gregory, but it strains credulity to think he did not 
receive the same information from Patriarch Thomas as was being sent to Rudolph, since 
Thomas was Gregory’s legate in the region. It seems safe, then, to assume that if these letters 
were written early enough in 1275 for them to reach the West before Gregory’s death in early 
January 1276, then the information which Rudolph was receiving was also known to 
Gregory, even though no extant letters exist to prove it. The two letters to Edward, however, 
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have been reasonably dated to 30 September and 2 October 1275, by Kohler and Langlois.
147
 
William of Beaujeu’s letter to Rudolph was dated 27 September 1275. Perhaps it is pushing 
the boundary too far to expect that Gregory would have received the news contained in these 
letters before his death, especially considering that William of Beaujeu had only recently 
arrived in Acre and would only have been able to assess the situation at that time. He could 
not, therefore, have sent Gregory any information earlier than this. Nevertheless, these letters 
form a part of the information gathering on the condition of the Holy Land which Gregory 
and the other potential crusaders had been undertaking for several years. It is therefore 
justifiable to discuss them as part of the long-term and ongoing condition of the Holy Land. 
The letters directed to Rudolph from the patriarch, the constable, and the king must be 
read with an awareness that they were looking for help. As a result, the truth may have been 
stretched somewhat to make the situation in some ways seem worse than it actually was 
(although it certainly was bad at any rate). This was the case, for example, in a letter by 
Patriarch Thomas which was probably written in the first half of 1275, given Baybars’ 
movements. Thomas recounted: 
The Egyptian enemy, with his vast army, has very recently left from the borders of 
Babylon, and advanced up to places nearby to us, and with his usual cunning, is 
wandering now toward Armenia, now toward Tripoli, and but now around Tyre and 
Acre, and other places of ours.
148
  
Muslim evidence, as well as the Eracles and Gestes des Chiprois, has pointed towards Tripoli 
and Armenia as Baybars’ targets in this time, but Thomas is careful with his language.149 He 
wrote only that the enemy was ‘around’ Acre and Tyre, yet they were moving ‘toward’ 
Tripoli and Armenia. Perhaps Thomas hoped to elicit more sympathy by drawing the threat 
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closer to home, as it were, in Acre and Tyre. To his credit, Thomas admitted to Rudolph that 
he was ‘ignorant of what a future day may produce, in which of the strongholds of his 
depravity [Baybars] exerts [his power], or which of the aforesaid things may be about to be 
discharged.’150  
Narrative sources have confirmed Baybars’ preoccupation in the north. Although he 
was leaving Acre alone, he was still pushing his conquest in Tripoli, Armenia, and the 
remnants of the principality of Antioch. This new offensive was likely given impetus by the 
March 1275 death of Bohemond VI, count of Tripoli and titular prince of Antioch. His death 
brought the fourteen-year old Bohemond VII to the throne. King Hugh came to try to exercise 
the regency, but it went instead to Bohemond’s mother Sibylla, with the bishop of Tortosa 
acting as bailli. Bohemond went into Armenia to serve with his uncle, King Leo II.
151
 At the 
same time, Baybars sent a letter to the young Bohemond, telling him of the Muslim claim on 
Latakia. After this, ‘envoys arrived from the king of Acre who was interceding with the 
sultan for the continuance of the peace.’152 With his fear of the Mongols, Baybars was 
probably more interested at the time in Armenia and what was left of the lands around 
Antioch, so he stood down on the issue, and a peace treaty between him and Tripoli was 
signed in July 1275.
153
 Peace turned out to be a wise decision for Tripoli at this time, since, in 
light of the death of the elder Bohemond, factions in the city started fighting against each 
other. Both the Eracles and Marino Sanuto note that in 1275 disputes arose between the 
‘Roman’ faction, led by the bishop of Tripoli and the Templars, and the ‘Armenian’ faction, 
led by young Bohemond’s bailli, the bishop of Tortosa. It is outside the scope of this study to 
discuss it at length, but this dispute arose in part because the sway of the ‘Roman’ faction had 
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been greater before the death of the elder Bohemond. From 1277, this conflict erupted into 
outright civil war for the county, and ‘wicked things were increased in the land.’154 
 The treaty with Tripoli had freed Baybars’ hands even more (if he even needed to be 
freer), and in the same year, 1275, Baybars ‘ranged about and destroyed things and put 
everyone he encountered to the sword’ in Armenia.155 According to the early fourteenth-
century chronicle of St Peter of Erfurt, Baybars actually broke a truce with the Armenians 
when he attacked them, and ‘he did not hold faith to the Armenians, as he promised.’156 The 
troubles that Armenia was suffering from did not go unnoticed amid the concurrent troubles 
of the crusader states. Marino Sanuto wrote that surviving merchants, and other people from 
Armenia who were able, took ship for Acre to get away from the danger in Armenia.
157
 
Perhaps it was this influx of people which had prompted Patriarch Thomas to write to King 
Rudolph asking for aid, specifically bringing to his attention this desolation in Armenia.
158
 
Baybars would have had to travel past Acre and Tyre on his way up to the northern 
territories, so it may have appeared to Thomas that he was threatening them. Yet, a 
September 1275 letter from the Hospitaller master Hugh Revel to King Edward indicated that 
the truce between Acre and Baybars was still holding at that time, so perhaps the threat was 
not quite as grave as Thomas made it out to be.
159
 Hugh indicated to Edward that the truce 
was still holding ‘because Baybars held to what he wanted of the truce, and no more than 
that.’160 Probably Hugh meant that Baybars was sticking very closely to the wording of the 
truce, which only protected the territory around Acre, and a path to Nazareth. He thus 
considered himself free to make incursions into the Christian territories in the north. The 
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Christians – or, at least, the Templar master William of Beaujeu – had the impression that 
Baybars wanted to make those incursions while he still had the opportunity to do so, before 
the arrival of the Mongols would force him to deal with their evidently greater threat instead. 
 William of Beaujeu wrote to Edward in October 1275 that Baybars was staying 
‘around the borders of Damascus with his vast army, through which the Christians on this 
side of the sea discern greater dangers ahead to appear for them once more.’161 He must have 
been there for the whole summer, since Ibn al-Furāt wrote that in June 1275, Baybars had 
indeed returned to Damascus with his army, but he had then dispersed it ‘in an attempt to 
keep down costs and prices.’162 Admittedly, this was not a disbanding of his army, but at the 
same time he was not ready for immediate action, since ‘one company was stationed at 
Bāniyās, another in ‘Ajlūn and another in Nawā, and (others) elsewhere, while the emirs 
remained in attendance on him in Damascus.’163 William, however, had feared that:  
Although credible rumour grows about the arrival of the Tartars, [...] a greater rumour 
flourishes about the aforesaid sultan, not that the enemy may desire [the Tartars’] arrival, 
but that perhaps through preconceived wickedness in the places which have remained, he 
may inflict some injury on the Christians, especially since at present, greater certainty 
about their arrival is believed to be held by many people.
164
 
Baybars, then, was not as active against the Christians in the latter part of 1275 as they feared 
he would be, likely because he was more concerned about keeping his army prepared for the 
Mongol threat. He did, however, send some of his emirs in November 1275 to take the 
patriarchal castle of Cursat, in the former territory of Antioch.
165
 
The Hospitaller master, Hugh Revel, had likewise written to Edward that he believed 
that the Mongols were coming. He cited three reasons why this was true: first, Abagha had 
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just seen the great khan, Kublai, who had ordered war; two, Baybars had just attacked 
Armenia (implying that the Mongols had to aid their allies); last, and most importantly, that 
after ransacking Armenia, Baybars’ army had become sick, and a great number of men and 
animals had died, thus the time was ripe for an attack.
166
 Instead of trying to keep costs down 
at the time as Ibn al-Furāt had said, Baybars was actually licking his wounds and enjoying the 
gains from his northern conquests and ransackings. His army would have to recover if it were 
to be ready for the Mongol threat. Had the general passage been able to get off the ground at 
this time, the crusaders could have used this to their advantage; as it was, Baybars’ need to 
recover his army’s strength at least gave the crusader territories a temporary respite. Though 
William of Beaujeu did not know it, he need not have feared, as James had at the general 
council, that when Baybars heard of the oncoming crusade, he would make his move before 
his enemies could muster their forces.
167
 In the event, his army’s exhaustion and the Mongol 
threat meant that Baybars did not act. 
Baybars’ failure to act may also indicate that his intelligence gathering was not as 
effective at this time as it had been when Louis’ and Edward’s crusades had been launched. 
Thus, perhaps Schein’s theory that Gregory was trying to keep his crusade plans secret was 
not only right, but the plan itself seems to have been effective.
168
 After the news of an 
oncoming crusade in 1273, Ibn al-Furāt made no further mention of another one. Given the 
paucity of reinforcements to the Holy Land between the arrival of Peter of Amiens in early 
1274, and the arrival of William of Roussillon in October 1275, there would have been no 
firm indication of this sort to Baybars of an oncoming crusade at that time.
169
 Instead of 
launching a pre-emptive attack, as the Christians feared, Baybars actually made a new peace 
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with the county of Tripoli in July 1275, although at a price that was very favourable to the 
sultan.
170
 Likely, as mentioned, Baybars was interested in the peace in order to do away with 
any potential alliance with the Mongols, whose arrival was rumoured in this year, and with 
whom it seems that Baybars was more concerned. The Christians, however, were not only 
overwhelmed by Baybars’ superior power, but, as William’s letter to Rudolph indicated a few 
months later, ‘from the desolation of the land by the power of the pagans, and because they 
are hindered by the atmosphere of the fall of rains, starvation presses the whole land.’171 The 
Christians were still in no position to fight. 
 Baybars’ inaction in Acre and Tyre would have given the Christians time to make the 
preparations that they said were needed. The best evidence on what was needed for the Holy 
Land near the end of Gregory’s reign has come from Patriarch Thomas and Balian, constable 
of the kingdom of Jerusalem. As previously mentioned, it would be almost inconceivable for 
Gregory not to have been informed by his legate, Thomas, of the same things that were 
written to Rudolph. From Thomas and Balian’s letter to Rudolph, it is clear that the 
inhabitants of the Holy Land were presented with, first and foremost, a shortage of money. 
Rudolph was told of ‘the extreme poverty of the patriarch of Jerusalem and all the members 
of a religious order.’172 A shortage of money would inevitably cause a shortage of a great 
many other things. Thomas and Balian said that they had a shortage of defenders, as well as 
of the money necessary to pay wages to those defenders, and for other essentials.
173
 
According to Thomas and Balian, ‘our safeguarding of the Holy Land would require great 
fortifications of walls, and plenty of siege engines, watch-towers, galleys, and military 
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equipment.’174 For the most part, these would be supplies for an army on the defensive, which 
is not surprising, given the great successes of Baybars.  
Intriguingly, Thomas and Balian did not ask Rudolph for more men. If King Hugh’s 
letter to Rudolph were written at the same time, as appears likely given the similar nature of 
their letters, then the absence of a request for more men may have been due to the expected 
general passage. Indeed, King Hugh’s letter to Rudolph enquires eagerly for information on 
Rudolph’s arrival to the Holy Land.175 Likewise, William of Beaujeu’s letter to King Edward 
made no request for more men, only the more vague request that he would ‘lend support with 
suitable aid.’176 Since this request came after William strongly lamented that the Templars 
had never before been poorer, he was likely asking for money.
177
 The Templars (and other 
military orders) had much of the burden of fortification in the Holy Land on their shoulders.  
Malcolm Barber has pointed out that ‘during the thirteenth century it became evident 
that only the military orders had the resources even to maintain existing defences, while local 
secular lords could not hope to undertake new building on any scale.’178 However, he also 
noted that ‘between 1265 and 1271 Baybars had dismantled the whole basis of the Templar 
establishment in the east, which the Order had so painstakingly and expensively 
reconstructed since the debacle of 1187-8.’179 Thus, it is not surprising that William told 
Edward that ‘the returns to us from overseas are not sufficient for a living, and we are 
required to make countless expenses in the defense of the Holy Land, and in the fortifications 
of castles which remain to the Christians on this side of the sea.’180 To protect himself from 
any blame, the Templar master wrote: 
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We fear lest we must fail, and give up the Holy Land to desolation; and therefore in this 
way we report our worn-out excuse to Your Royal Majesty, so that through it some 
beneficial remedy may be applied, lest if such an inauspicious failure comes to happen, it 
cannot be attributed to us in the future.
181
 
The military orders had lost much to Baybars, and had made treaties with him in which part 
of their revenues would be given over to the sultan.
182
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
Contrary to Leopold’s assertion that ‘there is no evidence to suggest that crusaders 
usually took pains to inform themselves of conditions in the East before they left Europe,’ the 
information available during Gregory’s reign proves that they did, and through a number of 
different channels.
183
 Throughout his reign, Gregory kept himself steadily updated on the 
condition of the Holy Land in order to understand its needs in preparation for the crusade. 
Only once those needs were understood, could they be filled. Gregory’s facility for 
organisation – perhaps gained in part from his time helping to organise the First Council of 
Lyons, and as an archdeacon of Liège – meant that he undertook his crusade planning with 
painstaking attention to detail. His crusade was not to be one launched willy-nilly onto the 
shores of the Holy Land, in the expectation that God would do the rest. Instead, Gregory (and 
those who considered crusading with him) took time to understand what was happening in the 
Holy Land, and also what was needed there. As it turned out, almost everything was in short 
supply, not least money. 
The evidence paints a picture of the Christians on the edge of survival, readily taking 
up peace treaties with Baybars that could prolong their fragile existence. A rapid response 
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from the West was clearly known to be needed. For his part, Baybars had succeeded in his 
conquests against the Christians to such an extent that they were (without a major crusade 
from the West) no longer a real threat to him. He made treaties with the weakened Christians 
of Acre, Tyre, and Tripoli at this time in order to free himself up for taking action against 
what it seems he saw as the greater threat, the Mongols (and thus their allies in Armenia and 
the former Antioch). The only advantage that the Christians still maintained – naval 
superiority – was still seen by the crusaders as essential to maintain. This was not only for 
military transport, but very likely also to ensure that food supplies from Sicily could continue 
to reach the Holy Land, whose inhabitants, as William of Beaujeu pointed out, were 
starving.
184
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INTERIM CRUSADE PLANNING 
 
Chapter Three 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
Gregory’s own experience in the Holy Land, and the information that he gathered 
about it from others, made him acutely aware of Outremer’s needs. Once he was aware of 
them, the choice remained of what to do. It is clear that Gregory knew that the response to 
those needs had to be swift, although organising a crusade was not a quick affair. Linda Ross 
has given a mixed message on how Gregory dealt with his crusade organisation. She rightly 
argued that Gregory followed the thirteenth century’s conciliar approach, but she unfairly 
added that he did not ‘take the initiative and personally launch a crusade.’1 She noted that the 
disadvantage to this was that ‘the time that elapsed between the summons [to the council] and 
the assembly inevitably delayed the advent of a new crusade, because, from 1215, encyclicals 
were drawn up only after conciliar deliberation.’2 Later in her work, however, she noted that 
Gregory ‘also organised more immediate, long-term, professional military support.’3 The 
council was only to arrange for the general passage. Gregory’s initial efforts, however, should 
not be discounted. Indeed, those initial efforts were his way of taking initiative for the 
crusade, since the smaller troop movements were made directly for the sake of preserving the 
Holy Land until the general passage. Unlike the case of Louis’ second crusade, where a 
smaller passagium particulare that had been planned earlier by Clement IV was abandoned 
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in favour of a passagium generale when St Louis took the cross, Gregory X wanted to do 
both.
4
 
On the issue of using smaller armies versus a general passage, Throop has written that 
‘the old idea of a crusader fighting for the cross and then returning home had been 
undermined by the end of the thirteenth century by the many failures of immense and 
transitory armies in the Holy Land.’5 He continued: ‘the Collectio, like many others, had lost 
all confidence in a “general passage.”’6 Finally, Throop wrongly believed that ‘the support of 
a large body of professional soldiers in the Holy Land would mean in effect the 
disappearance of the crusades entirely.’7 On this issue, Gatto has also written: 
It is necessary first to object that the stationing of a standing army in the Holy Land was 
already absurd in that it was an army of volunteers. Since it was difficult to collect a 
sufficient number of mercenaries for a limited period, it would be impossible to find an 
adequate number of volunteers willing to stay in the East possibly for life.
8
  
Based on this, and the difficulties of financing, Gatto concluded that: ‘in fact, we stand in 
front of such limited sensitivity to such important issues, to such poor adherence to concrete 
political reality and even absurd projects, that we can rightly say that the ideal of the 
Crusades would turn to dusk.’9 Both Throop and Gatto have seen what they wanted in order 
to paint their picture of the end of the Crusades. This chapter will demonstrate that they have 
both seriously misrepresented the way that the crusade was being planned in Gregory’s time. 
Gregory had not lost confidence in the general passage at all, and as will be seen in chapter 
six, he gained significant support across western Europe for the general passage. But Throop 
was right to point to the repeated failures of general passages in the thirteenth century. This 
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could not but have had an effect on Gregory, since he had just been a part of Louis IX’s 
second failed general passage. Yet Gregory’s solution was not to do away with the general 
passage in favour of a long-term professional army, but rather to use short-term armies as 
garrisons in the interim, while a general passage was organised to rescue the Holy Land. This 
was his dual crusade policy. 
Gregory’s policy of sending small bands of troops to garrison the Holy Land was not 
completely new, since it was predated in some respects by the mercenaries which Louis IX 
kept stationed in the Holy Land.
10
 The key difference was that Gregory’s contingents were 
placed on a short-term, interim basis, while those of Louis were long-term. Gregory’s use of 
small bands of garrison troops was the first time the papacy had taken up this policy. This 
chapter will make it clear that Gregory’s key role in this policy underscores the need to place 
the beginning of his papal reign as the time that crusade planning shifted, and not 1274, as 
has been popularly endorsed.
11
 Gregory’s policy on mercenaries was not based on the advice 
of James of Aragon and the Templar master at the general council, as Antony Leopold has 
suggested, but based on information that Gregory had already gathered during his time in the 
Holy Land.
12
 The dual nature of Gregory’s crusading efforts is in need of detailed study, 
since Gregory’s pontificate was at the centre of what can now be seen, with retrospect, as two 
different periods in crusading. Gregory stands as the last pope to come close to launching a 
passagium generale in the traditional form, while at the same time, he was the first pope to 
give considerable effort to keeping comparably smaller bands of professional soldiers in the 
Holy Land on an interim basis. Indeed, in this respect he predates the efforts of the 
subsequent popes, who mustered these smaller bands of reinforcements, but did not come 
close to launching a passagium generale. For example, after Tripoli fell in 1289, Pope 
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Nicholas IV sent 20 galleys with some 1,500 soldiers to aid Acre.
13
 At the time, Acre had 
made a two year truce, and the troops came ‘against the desire of the citizens [of Acre].’14 
Since they broke the truce, causing reprisals, the citizens were probably the wiser in this case. 
Nicholas IV mentioned this aid in a letter to the patriarch of Jerusalem in language that 
indicated it was temporary. The troops were ‘equipped for one year.’15 Building on this 
interim aid (perhaps on the Gregorian model), Nicholas in the next year had asked King 
Philip IV of France to go to the Holy Land personally for five years with 500 knights.
16
 
Nevertheless, no general passage occurred (if one can even call 500 knights a general 
passage), and when Acre fell in 1291, Nicholas had to send another smaller detachment of 20 
galleys to Cyprus.
17
  
One of Gregory’s earliest letters, which was directed to Lord Edward on 31 March 
1272, set the tone for his method of crusade planning.
18
 This was a full two years before the 
Second Council of Lyons. For a papal reign that only lasted about four years, half of that time 
is a significant amount. In that letter, Gregory wrote that he, along with his brother clergy, 
was able to provide for the condition of the Holy Land.
19
 Gregory told Edward that ‘to this 
[business of the Holy Land] alone we have turned our devotion with vigilant contemplation, 
so that the aid of defence and of government would come forth to the land which we have left 
behind placed in a time of extreme necessity.’20 Setting the stage for his pontificate, Gregory 
wrote: 
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Truly because the full satisfaction of our vows would not be reached unless we managed 
to serve up counsel concerning the perpetual aid
21
 which must be supplied to the [Holy] 
Land, we have proclaimed, (since otherwise it is not able to come about agreeably), the 
celebration of a general council at a fixed term, with divine mercy assisting.
22
  
Gregory engaged both in interim crusade planning (telling Edward that he had ‘immediately’ 
sent the archbishop of Carinthia to King Philip to seek soldiers and galleys to ‘swiftly’ aid the 
Holy Land), and in the planning of a passagium generale at the general council.
23
 
The reason behind Gregory’s desire for the interim aid of small bands of professional 
soldiers leading up to his later passagium generale is made clear by Gregory himself in the 
above letter. Gregory was aware of a lack of leadership and organisation for the crusade in 
the Holy Land, as well as the dire situation for the Latin Christians there.
24
 He believed that 
what little was left for the Christians in the Holy Land would not survive if there were any 
delay in sending aid, and indeed, that aid must be perpetual. It was not enough to have a large 
crusade, which could make great gains, if the Christian presence in the Holy Land were 
wiped out before the main body of crusaders even made it there. Thus there had to be a 
constant supply of resources, both monetary and military. Stressing again the need for quick 
action, on 4 March 1272, he had told the Templars and Hospitallers in France that he sought 
‘the ways and the modes by which one may prevail to help [the Holy Land], since it is feared 
and, as it were, evidently appears that it has been scarcely able to survive without its 
condition completely falling into ruin, unless one quickly helps it.’25 Gregory’s target to 
obtain this aid was first and foremost the king of France. As the son of Gregory’s friend, the 
crusader king St Louis, this was no surprise. 
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In sum, this chapter will examine the organisation of interim crusading efforts during 
Gregory’s reign, undertaken largely by France and the Church, but with Gregory’s overall 
leadership. This will include an examination of the command structure for the mercenaries 
serving in the Holy Land, which was based on service not to the permanent government in 
Outremer, but rather to captains from the West. It will also examine the efforts of the other 
major powers of western Christendom in order to understand the reasons behind interim 
crusade participation in this period, which focused mainly on France. This chapter will then 
discuss the nature of these mercenaries garrisoning the Holy Land; in other words, were these 
actually ‘crusading’ efforts at all? In the sense that they were meant to aid an eventual 
crusade, they were; however, it must be kept firmly in mind that these interim efforts were 
largely based on finding the funding to send paid mercenaries to the Holy Land, and not 
‘crusaders’ in the strictest sense. Nevertheless, a greater flexibility since the time of Pope 
Innocent III over who received the crusader’s indulgence meant that at least some of the 
benefits of a crusader were given to these mercenaries, as will be shown. It will then be for 
chapter six to discuss the other aspect to Gregory’s dual crusading plans, namely, the 
passagium generale.  
 
The Question of French or Papal Control of Crusade Planning 
 
  This thesis argues that the person who controlled crusade planning was also a key 
element to its ultimate failure to launch. Gregory’s sole control left little room for other 
efforts, particularly, as will be seen, those of the king of France. Taking control, Gregory 
wasted no time in seeking to procure aid for the Holy Land upon his return to the West. The 
embassy of the archbishop of Carinthia to France marked the beginning of Gregory’s reliance 
on the French, first and foremost, for carrying out the interim crusade, though under papal 
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control. Gregory had told Edward that he would try to find other ways to procure aid for the 
Holy Land if the king of France responded unfavourably, but it is clear that he still wanted to 
try to get the French secular arm to take on the burden first of all. The dependence upon 
France was certainly not a new reality for the crusading movement, as it had been France to 
whom the papacy had turned from the very beginning at Clermont. In the absence of an 
emperor with good relations with the papacy in the mid-to-late thirteenth century, it had been 
Louis IX of France who had spearheaded the crusade. In addition, Gregory himself, even 
though he was Italian, had long been close to the French royal family, which no doubt aided 
him in his relations with them as pope. These close relations by no means meant that Gregory 
was part of the French or Angevin faction that caused problems in papal elections, but 
Gregory had taken the cross with Louis IX, and had a close association with the French royal 
family, as discussed in chapter one. This close association likely contributed to Gregory 
turning to the French most of all. 
 Even though the French were the traditional targets for the popes’ crusading efforts, 
Philip was a particularly easy one. After his father Louis had died at Tunis, Philip returned to 
France. Gregory did not hesitate to remind Philip that he had not completed his crusading 
vow, and the penalty for this was excommunication. But it would be difficult to carry out this 
threat, if not outright unwise, since Gregory depended upon the French for his crusade. Thus, 
Gregory was very clear to point out to Philip and his chaplains that he could not be 
excommunicated, nor his kingdom put under interdict, without express papal approval.
26
 That 
approval was never given, but the threat may have provided some leverage to convince Philip 
to send a fairly regular stream of mercenaries to the Holy Land to make sure that it was kept 
supplied in the interim, and first to sign for a loan to the papacy for supplies there. In a good 
indication of how much Gregory believed that speed was of the essence for saving the Holy 
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Land, he started soliciting Philip for this loan on 4 March 1272, even before his papal 
coronation.
27
 Gregory told Philip that ‘through the said knights, the land itself, placed in the 
frontiers of the enemy, will be able to be handled in the meantime, and through the galleys, it 
will be able to be defended by another way, which consists in maritime places.’28 Writing 
also to the Templars and Hospitallers in France at the same time, Gregory informed them that 
he had sought a loan of 25,000 marks of silver from King Philip for aid of the Holy Land. He 
entreated them that if the king did not do what he asked, ‘as the nature of the business and 
urgent necessity will demand,’ then he would like them to raise the loan, ‘through which, the 
prompt aid which must be sent can be rendered to the [Holy] Land in soldiers and galleys 
without the expense of slowness.’29 Even though Gregory wanted to plan a general passage, 
the language that he presented here shows that he was also fully aware of the necessity for a 
rapid response to solve the problems of the Holy Land, and he attempted to make the 
Templars and Hospitallers of France similarly aware. By taking such close control of 
organisation, Gregory was trying to ensure that quick action was taken. In pursuit of this 
early aid from Philip, Gregory used his pre-existing contacts by asking the queen of France to 
help convince Philip to send aid, as well as telling his old friend the count of Savoy, and other 
notable clergy, that he had sent the archbishop of Carinthia to treat with Philip about this.
30
  
In the event, Philip did provide monetary support to Gregory, and quickly. The speed 
with which Gregory went about organising aid may indicate that he had actually anticipated a 
favourable response from Philip, or that he felt assured that he could cover the cost of the 
loan by other means, such as the Templars and Hospitallers. In either case, it is clear that fast 
action was crucial. Gregory wrote only a few weeks later, on 31 March, to the Genoese, 
Venetians, and Marseillais (and not to the Pisans, since they were under interdict at the time). 
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He told them, as he had told Philip, that he had experience in the Holy Land, and that he had 
spoken with the leaders of the Christian army, the Templars, the Hospitallers, and other 
(unnamed) magnates about what was needed there. He asked the naval powers to supply three 
galleys each, ‘to be strengthened as much in arms as in other supplies.’31 Even at this early 
stage, he optimistically told them that King Philip ‘will assent in the assistance of knights.’32 
As it happened, it seems that the naval powers did not comply at this time nor any time 
during Gregory’s reign, based on extant records. It was Charles of Anjou that Gregory 
thanked for supplying the three galleys that transported the new patriarch to Acre.
33
 What is 
more, contrary to Gregory’s optimism, Philip did not assent in the assistance of knights in 
1272. The reason, however, was not because Philip was unwilling to help, but because he 
wanted to do more than Gregory wanted at that time. 
There is reasonable evidence that King Philip was ready to go on crusade himself in 
1272, or shortly after. The problems that surfaced for Philip later that prevented the crusade 
had yet to arise, so the conditions were right for him: Prince Fernando of Castile, married to 
Philip’s sister, was still alive and the heir to Castile; Henry of Navarre and Champagne was 
still king in Navarre, so there was no succession issue there to poison Philip’s relations with 
Castile; the Sicilian Vespers that were to lead to war with Aragon had yet to occur too. It was 
perhaps rumours of Philip’s crusade interest in this time which led Ibn al-Furāt to report that 
in 1272 or 1273 ‘news kept coming in that the Franks were intending to attack the frontiers of 
Egypt.’34 The evidence for Philip’s crusade desire comes from a letter from Gregory in 1272. 
He wrote to Philip concerning the report of the king’s butler John (son of the famous John of 
Brienne). John had conveyed to Gregory some of Philip’s petitions about carrying out the 
business of the Holy Land, but Gregory told Philip not to worry that he was not granting 
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those petitions for the time being.
35
 It is likely that this was a reference to Philip’s desire to 
complete his vow and go to the Holy Land, since Gregory assured Philip that he was not 
giving him permission at the time because ‘more usefully, out of this kind of suspension, we 
seek by various means the ability of strengthening the business of preparing it and the useful 
execution of it, on par with our desire.’36 Gregory told him that ‘with the long preparation of 
war, one may become accustomed to produce a swift victory.’37 This is the clearest indication 
that Gregory was from the beginning of his papal reign devoted to a dual crusade plan, in 
which papal control was clear. He could have assented to Philip’s wish and allowed the 
French king to go the Holy Land with what would undoubtedly have been a reasonably-sized 
contingent, and so removed the need for interim aid or a general passage in the near future. 
Instead, Gregory wanted not just the substantial contingent that could be gained from French 
support at that time, but also that which could be gained from as much of western Europe as 
possible through a longer preparation period. Thus, although the pope urged Philip to follow 
in the footsteps of his famous ancestors because the Holy Land required his ‘singular 
protection,’ he did not want Philip to go to the Holy Land himself until all the papal 
preparations had been made.
38
  
It seems that Gregory was discouraging Philip from flying headlong into a business 
which the young king now hoped to control himself. This would have disrupted Gregory’s 
larger plans, which the pope clearly wanted to see through himself. With Philip leading, there 
would be a substantial French contingent, but with Gregory leading, there was a chance to get 
an even larger, pan-western European crusade. Thus, Gregory told Philip:  
For, dearest son, it would not become us or our brothers to allow so great a business 
(strengthened by everything) to be undertaken less than prudently, nor (as much as it is 
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in us) undoubtedly would we personally allow you especially to leap forward to such 
great things particularly in the auspices of your control and youth, in any other way than 
becomes Your Royal Excellency.
39
  
Now that Philip was actually prepared to complete his vow, Gregory reined him back in. The 
pope wanted everything in place before the general passage was to set off, though he still 
encouraged the king to help the Holy Land in the meantime, so that it would be easier for the 
general passage to succeed.
40
 But more importantly, this shows that even when the French 
king made an effort to lead – as King Louis his father had done before him – Gregory would 
not allow absolute control to pass out of his own hands. In this way, the pope was affirming 
papal control of the crusade. Only with retrospect can one say that, since Gregory died before 
his general passage began, and then his crusade never came to anything, this strategy may 
have been the wrong one. If he had allowed King Philip to take more initiative in the 
planning, or even have shared the burden more evenly, then perhaps a crusade could have 
launched at this time. But Gregory took his particular course of action because he believed 
that an even larger crusade, with longer preparation, would have a better chance of success.  
 
Organising the Supply of an Interim Garrison in the Holy Land 
 
With the question of leadership settled, leaving Gregory in charge, the pope set about 
procuring the interim garrison for the Holy Land. Though Philip did not get his wish to 
crusade, he did give Gregory the loan that the pope wanted for supplying the Holy Land in 
the interim. On 21 April 1272, Gregory wrote about it to Philip, telling him that he had 
already taken a loan of 25,000 marks of silver from merchants from Piacenza, Florence, and 
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Lucca.
41
 He then asked Philip to satisfy these merchants. He sent the abbot of Monte Cassino, 
Bernard Ayglier, to tell Philip more about the loan.
42
 This rapid response shows that Gregory 
was wasting no time, which helped him to achieve so much in his relatively short reign as 
pope. Gregory used this money to fund sending 500 mercenaries to the Holy Land. The 
Eracles is clear to point out that these mercenaries came in the pay of the Church, not Philip, 
but it seems likely that the original source of the funding was the loan that was secured in 
Philip’s name.43  
To pay back this loan, Gregory wanted Philip to give some of the money from the 
Tunisian Crusade. Thus, Gregory also wrote a joint letter to Erard of Valery, chamberlain of 
France, Humbert of Beaujeu, constable of France, Theobald Casteignier, and Guiraud of 
Marbay, to tell them the same, and to ask them to make good on the money from Tunis, 
which had been assigned to them for safekeeping.
44
 Evidently this was a share that had not 
gone to King Charles and the Genoese. There is no indication that Gregory asked Charles and 
the Genoese to give up some of their shares – further evidence of a dependence upon the 
French king for aid. Although Philip quickly signed for Gregory’s loan, it seems that he was 
not immediately forthcoming with the money from Tunis to repay it. More than a year after 
he got the loan, Gregory sent his chaplain William of Mâcon to Philip in August 1273 to 
arrange for further aid for the Holy Land, since the loan had run out. This is confirmed also 
by a letter from Hugh Revel, master of the Hospitallers, to Guy of Dampierre, count of 
Flanders. He wrote in May 1273 that ‘the money that the lord king of France ordered for the 
lord pope for the aid of the land is also gone.’45 Gregory instructed his chaplain William to 
investigate the money ‘received from the king of Tunis, assigned in aid of the Holy Land by a 
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specified law or rule, and entrusted, it is said, with certain nobles.’46 These nobles, doubtless 
those to whom Gregory had already written, had sworn an oath when they were entrusted 
with this money, but Gregory directed William to do what was necessary, to relax any laws or 
oaths, so that the money could be sent ahead for the Holy Land.
47
 Gregory wrote again to 
Erard of Valery and Humbert of Beaujeu at the same time, to ask them to help in this.
48
 
Finding money for the crusade was a problem, and this episode no doubt contributed to 
Gregory’s decision at the Second Council of Lyons to institute a six-year tax of one-tenth on 
the churches. 
These requests to Philip for funding show that payment for these professional soldiers 
(as well as other supplies) required a steady stream of money – money which Gregory could 
not supply on his own. With the death of King Louis, who had taken a direct hand in paying 
for his garrison, Gregory had to find a way to get the money to pay his own mercenaries by 
convincing Philip to provide the funds, or else providing it himself. Keeping with the idea 
that interim aid needed to be constantly maintained until the general passage, when Gregory 
sent William to Philip in August, he told the king that unless the aid to the Holy Land were 
made continuous, or the king came up with another idea, then the expenses that had already 
been made would be for nothing.
49
 If Philip were to be joining the passagium generale when 
the time came, then it would not make sense to shirk the kind of preparations and safeguards 
which would make that passage easier. It would certainly be much more difficult to carry out 
a crusade in the Holy Land if the crusaders had to start again from scratch, with no cities or 
castles remaining. But large sums of money were involved, and there must have been concern 
that it was being wasted, since Gregory reassured Philip that he had sent a reliable merchant 
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to the Holy Land to take account of expenses.
50
 He then challenged the king to take notice 
that the loan he had taken out earlier had already been exhausted by the patriarch of 
Jerusalem. He wrote:  
Look! The reckoning of expenses made around the aid of the [Holy Land], which we 
send to you openly through the aforesaid chaplain, will indicate how much the 
management of the same (having been useful in the [Holy] Land with the 
aforementioned patriarch having gone across) has exhausted the said amount, or how 
much may be left over from that.
51
 
This confirmed the earlier letter of the Hospitaller master about the drain on funds.  
By the time of Gregory’s August letter to Philip, the original loan of 25,000 marks 
would have paid for Patriarch Thomas’ autumn 1272 passage and the 500 mercenaries (foot 
soldiers and horsemen) that went with him, aided by ships from King Charles. It would also 
have paid for the spring 1273 passage of Oliver of Termes with his contingent, which 
Gregory had been arranging. The Eracles noted that Oliver arrived in April 1273 with 25 
horsemen and 100 crossbowmen ‘paid for by the king of France.’52 The funds that went to 
Oliver of Termes to pay for his contingent had actually been from the loan that Gregory had 
secured through Philip, which he hoped to pay back through the money from Tunis.
53
 
According to the records of King Charles, Oliver and his men had gone aboard three galleys 
and one ship, which had been registered in San Germano on 26 January.
54
 Finally, the loan 
would also have paid for an unspecified amount of money sometime in 1273 which Gregory, 
upon request from King Hugh, instructed Patriarch Thomas to give to the seneschal of 
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Jerusalem, John of Grailly.
55
 Given the strain of all these expenses, it seems that Philip must 
have granted Gregory’s wish for more funding. By December 1273, when Gregory wrote to 
Philip asking him to provide more for the Holy Land (in general terms), he no longer 
mentioned any loan, or the money from Tunis, but he did tell him he could communicate still 
through William of Mâcon.
56
 
Not long after Oliver’s arrival, Philip also decided in August 1273 to send ‘suitable 
men having experience of arms’ as messengers to the Holy Land in the next passage to 
determine the condition of the Holy Land.
57
 When he had heard back from them, he would 
send soldiers in the next March passage, which would have fallen in 1274.
58
 In the same 
month, Gregory wrote another letter to Philip without mentioning the soldiers, but instead 
asking him to send naval aid.
59
 This must have been in response to Edward’s recent report 
that ships were desperately needed in the Holy Land.
60
 The chronicles do not mention an 
individual naval contingent – or indeed any at all – but it could have been part of the transport 
that sent Philip’s two new waves of reinforcements, which likely included his messengers. 
These two waves were probably those which the Eracles listed as arriving first under Gilles 
of Santi, and then under Peter of Amiens, paid for by the king of France and the Church.
61
 
The Eracles does not give a specific date, but the first wave with Gilles included 400 
crossbowmen, and must have arrived in the latter part of 1273 if the second wave were to 
come in the March passage. The second wave under Peter came presumably after an initial 
report had been made, but the Eracles only said that this contingent followed the first, and 
totalled 300 crossbowman.   
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It was likely at about the same time that Philip was discussing sending messengers to 
the Holy Land (August 1273), but at least before the general council, that Gregory wrote to 
Charles of Anjou that he would also like him ‘to consider how much it may be expedient to 
hold anxiously, by an armed force, the remnants of the aforesaid land that have remained to 
Christianity, moving forward towards the prompt recovery of the whole.’62 In one of the few 
cases where Gregory looked to someone other than King Philip for direct aid, he told King 
Charles ‘that the aforesaid remains cannot be defended, nor be directed to the noble recovery, 
without the copious provisions which Your Royal Excellency may provide to its defenders.’63 
With the exception of Charles’ assistance to Patriarch Thomas on the provision of 
mercenaries, there is no indication that Charles personally provided any interim troops for the 
Holy Land at this time, like his nephew the king of France had. But from his position in 
Sicily, Charles was at the forefront of transporting both those troops and foodstuffs to the 
Holy Land, as will be discussed in depth in chapter four.  
The celebration of the council of Lyons, with its goal of organising a passagium 
generale, by no means meant the end of the supply of mercenaries to the Holy Land in the 
interim, since the general passage would not have happened immediately after the council. 
Gregory continued his plan to provide small contingents of troops to the Holy Land leading 
up the general passage. Unfortunately, there is no indication whether the waves of troops that 
were sent to the Holy Land were cumulative, or if they served by rotation. At any rate, 
writing to his legate Simon of Brie
64
 on 1 August 1274, Gregory’s depiction of the situation 
in the Holy Land makes it clear that even if these troops were cumulative, they were still not 
enough. Certainly, they could form a garrison for what was left of the Holy Land, but they 
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could not hope to expand the boundaries of the kingdom of Jerusalem to its glory days of the 
twelfth century. Gregory therefore returned to the theme of immediacy:  
Thus, with all the cities and fortifications almost ruined, and nearly all their faithful 
people slaughtered at the mouth of the sword, with few of the faithful remaining, the one 
far place of the [Holy] Land, namely the city of Acre, and two others
65
 can scarcely be 
maintained for the protection of life, with the remnants [of the faithful], in view of their 
smallness, by no means sufficient to defend the cities, nor in a position to await 
protracted aid still longer, and indeed they are scarcely allowed the time to take breath.
66
  
The day before, Gregory had written to King Philip on the same note, asking him again to 
provide expenses for the Holy Land, informing him that he would receive the money from the 
Lyons tenth in France, and urging him to retain Oliver of Termes in the Holy Land.
67
 He 
asked former crusader Erard of Valery, who had attended the general council as Philip’s 
representative, to insist to the king that he help the Holy Land.
68
 
The council had been set for planning the general passage, but for historians, it should 
only mark that the interim strategy that Gregory had already adopted was one that was 
popularly endorsed by other leading figures.
69
 The sources for this are Humbert of Romans, 
the Collectio, as well as the autobiography of James of Aragon. Humbert noted ‘the common 
opinion of men’ that believed that the people in Outremer had to be apt for battle, and that 
many more fighters (both knights and footmen) had to be sent there. He wrote that there also 
had to be a continuous army presence in the Holy Land to prevail against the Muslims on 
every occasion.
70
 This did not rule out a crusade as well, but the Collectio actually did go 
further and endorse using paid soldiers alone. The author of the Collectio – who was critical 
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of the crusade – wanted the Holy Land to be defended by mercenaries paid through a general 
collection.
71
 
In his autobiography, James wrote that Erard of Valery, acting for the king of France, 
had embarrassingly stayed silent after James’ boastful offer of help for the Holy Land.72 
Erard then said later that ‘though many men have gone there over such a long time, they have 
never been able to take it.’73 Erard was not being cowardly, but rather realistic. He had not 
given up, since he later took up the cross for Gregory’s crusade. But the strategy that Erard 
believed in was clear: it was the same as that Gregory had already been undertaking toward 
the general passage. Erard said that he agreed with what the new master of the Templars, 
William of Beaujeu, suggested: help was needed in ‘arms, provisions, and still more, of 
troops, for there were not any there. And also people, as there were not so many there as were 
needed. Furthermore, he advised that at that time some 250 to 300 knights were needed, and 
500 footmen.’74 Schein marked this advice at the general council as the point in which 
crusade planning changed, but as has been demonstrated, the planning advice that William 
gave at the general council was what Gregory had been doing from the very beginning of his 
reign in 1272.
75
 More emphasis should thus be placed on Gregory’s own initiative. 
After the general council, Gregory’s request of the king of France for continued aid 
likely manifested in the arrival of William of Roussillon. The Eracles gave the date of 
William’s arrival as 1275, but this cannot be taken at face value, since it also gave the date of 
Baybars’ death as 1275, and this actually occurred in 1277.76 To confuse matters more, the 
Templar of Tyre gave the date of William’s arrival as October 1276, and told of the death of 
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Gregory after this, but said that it occurred in the same year (Gregory died in January 1276).
77
 
Putting these sources together, it seems more likely that William had arrived in October 1275. 
This is corroborated by the Annales, Raynaldus, and Marino Sanuto, which also placed his 
arrival in 1275.
78
 It also would have roughly coincided with the arrival of the Templar master 
William of Beaujeu; thus, they could have travelled together.
79
 To have delayed until October 
1276 would have meant that the mercenaries in the Holy Land would have been without their 
captain for two years after the August 1274 death of Oliver of Termes.
80
 Given Gregory’s 
concern for their management which he had shown earlier in letters to Oliver of Termes and 
Patriarch Thomas, it is unlikely that he would have waited so long to send a replacement.
81
 In 
addition, the Eracles and Marino Sanuto noted that William and his contingent (numbering 
40 knights, 60 mounted sergeants, and 400 crossbowmen), came ‘in the pay of the Church.’82 
If this had been October 1276, it could perhaps have been more difficult (though not 
impossible) for the Church to arrange the logistics of this, considering the papal vacancy 
between the death of Hadrian V on August 18, and the election of John XXI on September 
13. On the contrary, the Templar of Tyre wrote that this contingent came ‘from the king of 
France,’83 so Philip could have made the arrangements instead. At any rate, the incongruity of 
the texts about the source of this contingent was no doubt simply a manifestation of the close 
cooperation between the Church and the crown of France for the interim garrisoning of the 
Holy Land, though it is clear that Gregory took overall control of organisation. 
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The Command Structure of the Interim Garrison 
 
Gregory wrote to King Charles in 1272 to tell him of the loan that Philip had given 
him. Gregory informed him that the money for the Holy Land was being given to the new 
patriarch, Thomas Agni of Lentini – an associate of King Charles.84 Thomas was given at 
least some, but perhaps the entire loan that Gregory had secured through Philip, so that he 
could use it to aid the Holy Land. He was told to consult with Charles about how to spend it 
before he took ship for his new post.
85
 Thomas had already started to use this money, at least 
in part, to provide the mercenaries to defend the remaining Christians holdings, because 
Gregory told Charles that he wanted him to provide supplies to Thomas for his passage to 
Acre with his escort and mercenaries.
86
 Very quickly, however, Gregory rethought his plan of 
having Thomas coordinate with Charles to arrange for mercenaries. Perhaps (though it is 
supposition) this was because he did not want the mercenaries to be too much under the 
thumb of the king of Sicily, who would later come to assert his right to the kingdom of 
Jerusalem through Maria of Antioch’s claim.87 Whatever the other motives, what is clear is 
that Gregory had been looking for military support primarily from France, which had already 
formed a strong presence in the Holy Land from King Louis’ long-standing garrison. Thus, 
when Oliver of Termes became available, Gregory turned instead to him, since he was a 
seasoned crusader and vassal of the French king. 
Even before commissioning Thomas and Charles to arrange the mercenaries and 
supplies, it is clear from Gregory’s letter to Oliver that his first preference had been for King 
Philip himself to send the supplies and soldiers for the Holy Land. He told Oliver about his 
earlier request to King Philip to rescue the Holy Land, expressing his hope that Philip ‘would 
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himself support especially the burden of sending the people there and perhaps would remit 
the concern for us of preparing the aforesaid naval relief,’ or ‘if the opportunity would not 
appear to him on account of other occupations, at least he would mark out for us a certain 
amount of the money of Tunis.’88 Gregory told Oliver that Philip had opted for the latter, and 
sent the money. When Gregory learned in the summer of 1272 that Oliver of Termes had 
offered himself to go to the Holy Land, Gregory wrote to Thomas and Charles to tell them to 
stop hiring mercenaries, and out of the ones that they had already hired, if there were any 
who were not suitable, not to worry if they did not report for duty.
89
 Gregory told Oliver that 
Thomas and Charles were also to report to the pope on how much money was left over from 
what they had already spent for mercenaries and supplies. Instead of allowing Thomas and 
Charles to coordinate, Gregory wanted Oliver of Termes to arrange for his own mercenaries 
to accompany him with whatever remained of the loan, thus reinforcing French interim 
involvement.
90
 
Oliver of Termes was not part of the permanent leadership in the Latin East. 
Gregory’s relationship with the permanent leadership there (namely, King Hugh) will be 
discussed in detail in chapter four. Nevertheless, for the interim preparations, it is clear that 
Gregory was relying on French captains from the West to take command. As noted above, 
Gregory had written to King Philip to let him know how the money was being used, so Philip 
must have had some concern about money being wasted. Philip’s more direct involvement in 
supplying the garrison for the Holy Land came when Oliver of Termes arrived, and followed 
with each successive wave. With his vassal Oliver of Termes in charge of the mercenaries, 
perhaps Philip had more confidence in the administration, leading him to send more troops 
there. 
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Gregory wanted Oliver of Termes in the Holy Land to take command of the 
mercenaries upon his arrival.
91
 These men would presumably have been the 500 mercenaries 
who travelled to the Holy Land with Thomas in October 1272, as long as they were not 
serving by rotation. But this could also be an indication that there was, in fact, still a French 
contingent in the Holy Land from what had been steadily supplied by Louis IX, though Riley-
Smith believed that the appointment of John of Grailly as seneschal in 1272, with support 
from Gregory, ‘suggests that the French force had left and that there was a need for 
alternative provision.’92 Similarly, Christopher Marshall wrote that the lack of information on 
the French force in the period between Louis’ second crusade and the 1272 appearance of 
John of Grailly may indicate that during this time the force ‘went into temporary abeyance.’93 
However, proof that a French contingent might still have been in the Holy Land is supported 
by the fact that the marshal of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1272 was the Frenchman William 
of Canet, named by the Eracles as the nephew of Oliver of Termes, who likely had been a 
part of Oliver’s previous trip to the Holy Land.94 He was presumably the son of Oliver’s 
unnamed brother, who had died on crusade in 1269.
95
 The duty of the marshal included the 
command of mercenaries, but even with his close links to Oliver of Termes, there is no 
indication that William was given command of the mercenaries that Gregory arranged. If 
William were one of the nephews of Oliver who had been captured by the sultan’s forces in 
1269 and had later died in prison, as the Templar of Tyre reported, then it is little wonder that 
he could not have commanded the mercenaries.
96
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The existing troops in the Holy Land might also have comprised troops left behind by 
Edward.
97
 Like King Louis IX had done before, Edward was said to have left behind a 
contingent of soldiers in the Holy Land after he returned to the West. Perhaps this contingent 
was itself an interim measure, and an indication that Edward intended to return to the Holy 
Land again, but this cannot be known for certain. Its numbers are also not known, but it likely 
stayed behind with John of Grailly. Becoming King Hugh’s seneschal in 1272, the Savoyard 
John of Grailly had crusaded with Lord Edward, and remained in the Holy Land after Edward 
returned in order to serve in that position for the kingdom. John was certainly in Gregory’s 
good graces, as was clear from the pope’s support for his presence in the Holy Land. A letter 
from Pope John XXI in October 1276 noted to John of Grailly that when John of Grailly and 
Gregory were in the Holy Land together, Gregory:  
Was able to cause your delay in those places. He had enjoined you in person, so that you 
would remain in that very place for the support and protection of the Holy Land, 
observing his promise that he would provide for you, by his position and occasion, in the 
necessary expenses.
98
 
John of Grailly was not, however, in Edward’s good graces, due to accusations of 
corruption.
99
 If John fell out of favour with Edward before he decided to stay in the Holy 
Land, it could have actually been an incentive for his taking the position of seneschal.  
Gregory later wrote to Edward to entreat him to return John to his favour, which 
evidently he had not done after Gregory had asked him before.
100
 The letter is undated, but 
must have been written around the time of general council, since Gregory sent to Edward the 
archbishop of Tyre (who had arrived from the Holy Land with John of Grailly for the 
council) to discuss returning John to his favour.
101
 Sometime later, Edward assented. He 
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restored John’s lands, and his favour.102 It does not seem, however, that John of Grailly had a 
role in commanding the mercenaries sent by Gregory once he became pope. Gregory did 
point out to Thomas when he told him to put the mercenaries under Oliver’s control that if 
there were anyone on hand who it would be inappropriate to be placed under Oliver’s 
command, that man should instead serve as captain.
103
 Since John and Oliver were there at 
the same time (that is, until John left for the general council), it is clear that Gregory 
considered Oliver to be the more suitable man to be in charge. 
Oliver had been a close ally of Louis IX, and had served in both of his crusades. He 
had been to the Holy Land and North Africa for about 13 years in total.
104
 It is likely that a 
man of Oliver’s standing was seen as more appropriate to lead than the seneschal of the 
kingdom (whose function normally entailed duty in the high court), but it could also indicate 
a preference for keeping the administration of the Holy Land in the hands of those closer to 
the papacy, or at least the West, since John of Grailly had come close into the trust of King 
Hugh, and was representing him against Maria of Antioch at the council.
105
 Hugh was never 
given responsibility for aiding the Holy Land beyond that revealed in a single extant letter, in 
which Gregory exhorted him in general terms to do what he could to help.
106
 It was in this 
letter that Hugh looked to Gregory to give John funding. John was called in this letter the 
marshal of the kingdom of Jerusalem, but it is clear that this was simply a clerical error, since 
in Gregory’s letter written to Thomas at the same time, John was named the seneschal, and 
this was confirmed by the Eracles.
 107
 Gregory assured Hugh that Thomas would supply 
funding to John, and that he was hoping the king of France would help the Holy Land.
108
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Making good on his word, Gregory instructed Thomas to give John funding, but there is no 
indication that he was ever given charge of the mercenaries, even before Oliver’s arrival.109 
After Oliver’s death in August 1274, Gregory continued the policy of keeping the 
mercenaries under the control of a western captain, with William of Roussillon coming to 
take command in October 1275. 
 
Missed Opportunities? The Underutilisation of the Rest of Europe 
 
The sources for the interim aid of the Holy Land paint a picture of Gregory relying 
heavily on France, with some help from Sicily (which, of course, was also under French 
leadership). This begs the question: what of the rest of Europe? Put simply, out of the major 
powers, Gregory could not rely on German or Castilian support in the interim, since King 
Alfonso X of Castile was busy contesting his claim for the king of the Romans, and the 
Germans were busy electing a replacement for the same crown after the death of Richard of 
Cornwall. This will be discussed extensively in chapter five. As for King Edward, the 
fulfilment of his crusade vow left little room for Gregory to ask him to make another effort so 
soon. Gregory did, however, ask the Englishman Anthony Bek, as well as the queen of 
England (Eleanor of Castile), to do what they could for the service of the Holy Land.
110
 
Gregory had undoubtedly met Anthony while they were in Acre with Edward’s crusade, and 
the pope called particular attention to how this personal experience should incite Bek to 
action. But these general pleas for aid from the English were not equal to the very specific 
pleas that Gregory made to the French king for sending troops. The Savoyard John of Grailly 
was one of Edward’s men, but there is no indication that Gregory sought to send more 
English mercenaries to garrison the Holy Land in the interim. 
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Edward had incurred a great deal of expenses on his recent crusade. This was likely 
due in part to provisioning his retinue of soldiers, but also because he undertook the 
construction of a tower in Acre while in the Holy Land. This tower was not completed until 
1278, when it was handed over to the Order of St. Edward of Acre.
111
 Thus, instead of 
encouraging Edward to give interim aid, Gregory sought to procure money for Edward and 
his brother Edmund for their past crusading expenses. Even while he was in the Holy Land, 
Edward had been trying to take care of the debts that he had been incurring. From an April 
1272 letter to the archbishop of York, Edward made it clear that he had borrowed 5,000 
marks from various creditors and merchants with the master and convent of the Hospitallers 
as guarantors.
112
 Edward told him that he was anxious to pay it back, so that his reputation 
would not suffer. Thus, he asked the archbishop to transfer the money. This may not have 
been done, since on 30 September 1272, Gregory wrote to the bishop of Winchester, as well 
as the archbishop of York, so that they would give Edward and Edmund money from 
ecclesiastical returns for their crusade expenses.
113
 He quickly followed this up on 7 October 
1272 by writing to his agents, the chaplain Raymond of Noger and the canon Peter of 
Auxonne, that they were to collect a tenth of all ecclesiastical returns, proceeds, and incomes 
from England from the archbishops and bishops for two years, which was for Edward and 
Edmund’s ‘serious burden’ of crusade expenses. The Templars, Hospitallers, and Cistercians 
were exempted.
114
 This money became a cause of contention between Edward and Edmund. 
Gregory had to write in November 1273 to Edward to ensure that Edmund received his 
portion, and to their mother, the dowager queen, to ensure that this dispute did not break the 
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peace between her sons.
115
 Ultimately, Edward’s recent crusade and the expenses he 
undertook for it meant that it was not fair to target him for further aid in the interim. 
 Unlike the Castilians, Germans, and English, King James of Aragon seems like he 
should have been a good target for Gregory’s pleas for interim aid. After all, like Philip, he 
had shown a previous willingness to aid the Holy Land, yet had not completed his earlier vow 
(although admittedly James had sent two of his illegitimate sons to the Holy Land instead).
116
 
Unlike potential crusaders from the kingdom of Castile, Gregory gave no indication that he 
wanted James to stay in Iberia to carry out the crusade there first, rather than go to the Holy 
Land.
117
 James also had links with the stalwart crusader Oliver of Termes, who was certainly 
a favourite of Gregory’s, as was attested by his desire to keep Oliver in the Holy Land 
longer.
118
 By the time Oliver was in the Holy Land for Gregory, he was under the French 
crown, but he had been James’ vassal until Termes had passed to the French.119 Under James, 
Oliver had served during the Aragonese conquest of Majorca in 1229.
120
 Even after Termes 
fell under French suzerainty, Oliver maintained close ties with the Aragonese royal family, 
acting as witness for Prince Peter of Aragon’s marriage, and as a witness for James at his 
peace with King Louis IX.
121
 There is, however, no indication that Gregory sought to use 
these ties to advantage by soliciting James to assist Oliver in aid to the Holy Land. 
Like Charles of Anjou, James had ties with the military orders. The Templars and 
Hospitallers of Aragon both formed a part of James’ own aborted crusade. There are many 
examples of Charles and the military orders working closely together, encouraged by 
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Gregory, to supply victuals for the Holy Land.
122
 The small contingent of Aragonese which 
had arrived in Acre in 1269 had brought many provisions, which had been well received 
there.
123
 Yet, there are no examples of Gregory asking James to continue to do this.  Nor did 
Gregory seek to use James’ ties (however tenuous) with the Greeks and the Mongols, which 
had been made before James’ aborted crusade. Both had offered James assistance if he were 
to crusade in Asia.
124
 James duly set off for the East before storms turned him back, although 
his port of call was to be Acre, not Greek lands.
125
 Given Gregory’s desire to make peace and 
work with the Greeks under Michael Palaeologus, and given the potential for cooperation 
between Edward and the Mongols, perhaps this was an underutilisation on Gregory’s part. On 
the other hand, if French involvement in the interim were Gregory’s priority, particularly as it 
related to Charles of Anjou in this case, then any ties that James had with the Greeks may 
have precluded him from involvement in aid to the Holy Land beyond a general passage in 
which all the major players would be present, and peace with the Greeks would already be 
made. Gregory’s desire to keep the delicate balance between Charles and the Greeks from 
tipping to war was in fact so strong, that at one time he even asked the Venetians not to 
prolong or renew a truce with the Greeks. He believed that the timing was not expedient 
because it could lead to war among Christendom.
126
   
Outside of Gregory’s desire for all of the major magnates of Christendom to 
participate in the general passage for aid of the Holy Land, the only example of a request for 
James’ help for the crusade was Gregory’s request for his presence at the general council, 
which was to plan the general passage anyway.
127
 If the Aragonese navy was even half as 
good as James boasted at the general council, then why did Gregory turn only to the 
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Venetians, Genoese, Marseillais, French, and Charles of Anjou when he sought ships and 
transport for the patriarch and other supplies to the Holy Land?
128
 Indeed, although James’ 
account of his own history is full of exaggerated self-praise, and must be taken with more 
than a pinch of salt, he was the only king willing to offer his service for the Holy Land at the 
general council.
129
 Perhaps the bad blood which had been brewing between James’ sons and 
Charles of Anjou contributed, and meant that they could not effectively work together.
130
 
Charles was also holding prisoner the brother of James’ son-in-law, King Alfonso X of 
Castile, whom James requested of the pope to ask Charles to set free.
131
 But these matters 
should not have precluded the assistance of James himself, who had risen above his 
disappointment over the loss of Provence to Charles, and other territories to Louis IX, in 
favour of maintaining peace among the Christian kings.
132
 Thus, it may have been purely the 
logistics which led to the absence of a request for aid from James, rather than trouble between 
him and the French. Since the Italian and Southern French naval powers were geographically 
situated in the traditional route of the supply of provisions and troops to the Holy Land, they 
may simply have been more readily at hand for Gregory’s plans.  
Another reason for the lack of Aragonese involvement in the interim supply of the 
Holy Land appeared in Gregory’s July 1275 letter to James even after he had promised to join 
the general passage. In one of his most strongly worded and castigating letters, Gregory first 
praised James for offering his aid to the Holy Land, but then rounded on him with repeated 
criticism of his lascivious behaviour, and asked him:  
Do you not dread that the horrible crime of adultery to an advocate of matrimonial union, 
horrible to men, severs their affection? They are not those preparations to the journey of 
your pilgrimage into that land, which you have offered so laudably and so publicly. 
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Surely it does not escape your notice that it is necessary to cleanse the stains of crimes, 
so that one may be devoted acceptably to God?
133
  
James wrote that at the general council Gregory had forgiven him his sins with no penance 
other than to do no more evil.
134
 Since James went back to his old ways, perhaps the 
morality-minded pope had thought James unworthy to aid the Holy Land until he had stopped 
his bad behaviour. After all, Pope Clement IV had years before similarly told James that he 
was morally unfit for a crusade to the Holy Land.
135
 
 
The Problem of Unsuitable Mercenaries 
 
Gregory’s initial delegation to Patriarch Thomas and Charles of Anjou of the job of 
hiring interim mercenaries had led to problems. Thomas, with the advice of Charles, must not 
have been getting the kind of mercenaries that Gregory wanted, which no doubt led Gregory 
to hand the matter over to Oliver of Termes. Since the mercenaries were going to the Holy 
Land because they were being paid, instead of because they had taken a crusader vow, 
perhaps one cannot but expect some troublemakers. It seemed, however, that Gregory was at 
first uninformed of the nature of the recruits that Thomas had been getting. He wrote to 
Thomas that ‘we are ignorant of how many mercenaries you have admitted already, and of 
what sort, and how many remain to be admitted.’136 After Oliver was to take control, Gregory 
was clear to point out to him that he was to surround himself with mercenaries who were 
useful, and not voluptuous, pompous, or disorderly.
137
  
It is clear that unsuitable mercenaries were a known problem, since Humbert of 
Romans had pointed out that there were three types of people who were unsuitable for 
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business of the crusade: the inexperienced, the involuntary, and the wicked.
138
 Humbert had 
warned that those who were involuntary (in other words, those who were compelled or who 
went for money) ‘did not have the business to heart.’139 Wicked men ‘did not have the spirit 
of God in them,’ so they would not have the right counsel.140 Gregory had written about the 
issue of unsuitable mercenaries to Patriarch Thomas as he was about to leave for Acre in late 
summer 1272. This was at the same time that Gregory handed over the task of hiring 
mercenaries to Oliver. Gregory wrote to Thomas that, while he was waiting for more 
mercenaries, he should use economy in making his expenses, so that it might not be said of 
him that he was doing wrong.
141
 Gregory wrote of murmurings by some people that things 
were going wrong on this count. People were ‘not lacking who may murmur, who may 
detract, who may depreciate your acts, asserting that you take in mercenaries who are 
difficult to handle, indeed, who are entirely useless and worthless.’142 ‘If the facts agreed with 
the stories,’ Gregory wrote to Thomas, then he would no doubt be ‘in want of reproaches’ 
and he would be acting at ‘serious cost to the Holy Land.’143 60,000 livres tournois had been 
assigned to the Holy Land by King Louis IX. Gregory warned that ‘the carelessness144 of the 
ministers turned this money not to the advantage of the Holy Land but, as it were, entirely 
ruined it.’ This failing ‘may have weakened the souls of many people, subsequently, for 
exerting themselves in the defence of the Holy Land and may have diverted them, in this 
way, from the prosecution of its defence.’145 If this type of negligence continued, then there 
was no doubt that, ‘hearts would be weakened to the defence of the Holy Land’ and people 
‘perhaps will thoroughly despair.’146 Gregory, therefore, warned Thomas that after he had 
                                                 
138
 Humbert of Romans, Opusculum Tripartitum, p. 204. 
139
 ‘Qui enim non habent negotium cordi.’ Ibid. 
140
 ‘Ipsi enim non habent in se spiritum Dei.’ Ibid. 
141
 RGX, n. 797 (RV29A, f. 160r). See Appendix A, 3:141. 
142
 Ibid. 
143
 Ibid. 
144
 This has been seen this as a euphemism for ‘corruption.’ Riley-Smith, ‘Crown,’ p. 49. 
145
 RGX, n. 797 (RV29A, f. 160r). See Appendix A, 3:145. 
146
 Ibid. 
130 
 
  
arrived in the Holy Land, he should take council with King Hugh, as well as the bishop of 
Tortosa, the masters of the Hospitallers, Templars, and Teutonic Knights, and the captains of 
the pilgrims, about how to use the resources assigned to him.
147
 Oliver of Termes came to the 
Holy Land only a few months after Thomas, and, importantly, Gregory sent a letter to the 
patriarch to tell him to put the mercenaries under the command of Oliver, who it seems was 
more trusted by Gregory, and indeed by King Philip, who had been worried about his money 
being wasted.
148
 While Gregory acknowledged the pitfalls of the use of mercenaries, he still 
continued to use them for the interim crusade. 
 
 The Availability of Indulgences for Mercenaries to the Holy Land 
 
It appears likely, given the timing, that the first wave of troops that the Eracles 
mentioned coming under Gilles of Santi were the messengers from King Philip, who were 
said to be ‘suitable men having experience of arms.’149 Gregory told William of Mâcon that 
these men could be given an indulgence for their sins.
150
 This was, thus, a case where 
mercenaries were actually being given an indulgence like a crusader. Throop said that ‘one 
may well hesitate to call professional mercenaries crusaders, even if they fight for the Holy 
Land.’151 Yet, the line between crusader and mercenary was becoming more blurred. 
Maureen Purcell has written about the ‘dangerous precedent’ which had been set by ‘the fact 
that the indulgence was gained in the pursuit of everyday duties which were connected with 
crusade only at a few removes.’152 If officials who were carrying out duties only loosely 
related to the crusade were getting a full indulgence without having to become crusaders, it 
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seems like a small step for some spiritual reward to be offered to the mercenaries actually 
doing service normally done by crusaders. Indeed, Purcell was unsure if Philip’s envoys 
received the indulgence ‘because they were envoys of a king, crucesignatus, or because their 
journey was to the Holy Land, or because their journey was particularly hazardous at the 
time.’153 On the point of Philip’s crusader status, it must be remembered that he was still 
under an unfulfilled vow, and had not yet at this time taken up the cross again. But more 
importantly, the fact that these messengers (unspecified in number, but ‘having experience of 
arms’) were likely part of the contingent of mercenaries which arrived under Gilles of Santi, 
is evidence of an extension of the indulgence. It is not clear how many messengers there 
were, but clearly there was more than one. Nor, therefore, is it clear how many of this wave 
of reinforcements actually received the indulgence. No doubt the messengers themselves, 
whatever their number, would have needed martial experience in order to size up the situation 
in the East, but if this description of the messengers were actually used to refer to the whole 
group of men sent to the Holy Land, then all the mercenaries were receiving a crusade 
indulgence. In either case, the indulgence was being extended to those who had not actually 
taken up the cross, but who were participating in the interim crusade. 
These men were being paid for their service as mercenaries, but were fulfilling the 
role of crusaders in a much more obvious way than the stay-at-home officials of crusaders, 
who did receive an indulgence.
154
 The distinction between the practical duty of crusaders and 
mercenaries was negligible. The overall leader of these mercenaries, Oliver of Termes, was 
thought by Riley-Smith to be ‘serving in the same voluntary manner as had Geoffrey [of 
Sargines].’155 Given that Oliver had offered himself to Gregory for service in the Holy Land, 
Riley-Smith is probably right, though Gregory told Oliver: ‘we should desire exceedingly and 
we decreed with firm intention that you may personally approach the land itself with a decent 
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escort, which the remainder of the aforesaid amount [of money from Tunis and the loan from 
Philip] will permit.’156 Though Oliver was a volunteer, he was still getting paid for expenses. 
Similarly, Geoffrey of Sargines, though a volunteer, had his expenses paid for him. Gregory 
wrote to King Philip in April 1275 asking him to make good on the promise of Pope Clement 
IV to pay 3,000 livres tournois from a crusader tenth in France. Clement had told Simon of 
Brie about this, but it had not yet been done. Gregory asked Philip to pay, because he was 
concerned that Geoffrey’s (unnamed) female heiress had been burdened with these debts.157 
Crusaders having their expenses paid for them was certainly not new, and the six-year tenth 
at the Second Council of Lyons was decreed as a way of paying for the crusade; however, it 
was often the case of the retinue of a wealthy lord who would receive pay. Philip’s 
mercenaries, and those of his father Louis before him, were being paid while their lord was 
not actually on crusade with them. If a crusader who received an indulgence could still be 
paid for expenses, then vice versa, it does not seem like a large leap that these groups of 
mercenaries who were paid for doing much the same duty could receive an indulgence. 
According to Purcell’s classification, they would fall under the ‘third type’ of crusader: those 
‘who acted as a substitute for someone unable to fulfil his own vow, or for someone who had 
taken a vow with the full intention of providing substitutes according to his means.’158 King 
Philip had certainly taken the cross, and at Gregory’s behest, he was providing mercenaries as 
interim substitutes before the general passage. It would not be surprising, then, if Philip’s 
messengers with experience of arms, who were to receive the indulgence from William of 
Mâcon, included the whole contingent of mercenaries. 
Giving mercenaries the same indulgence as a crusader could have been counter-
productive to the recruitment of crusaders. A key difference however, was that there was no 
indication that these mercenaries were falling under the papal protection of someone who had 
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taken up the cross. Purcell wrote that ‘[crusaders-by-proxy], like those who redeemed their 
vows, were not eligible for the material rewards promised to those intent on fulfilling their 
vows.’159 Gregory outlined these rewards in his preaching instructions to his legate, Simon of 
Brie, telling him:  
May you not allow all the crusaders or those who need to crusade for aid of the [Holy] 
Land, whom we support under our protection and that of the said see, to be troubled by 
any debts, [which are] contrary to the immunities and privileges conceded by the 
aforesaid see to crusaders.
160
  
Gregory also did not concede the protection of the pope, and of the blessed Peter, to those 
who produced ships and goods which supported the crusaders in the crusade in Iberia, for 
example, but they did receive a suitable indulgence.
161
 This availability of indulgence for 
those providing ships was also included in the crusading decree at the general council, 
Constitutiones pro Zelo Fidei.
162
 Likewise, an indulgence for mercenaries could be included 
within Gregory’s decree that ‘to those who, similarly, go in their own persons but at the 
expense of others, we grant full forgiveness of their sins.’163 Since the immunities and 
privileges of a crusader were also an attractive part of taking up the cross, the giving of an 
indulgence to mercenaries, without the same privileges, would not have completely 
counteracted the recruitment of crusaders. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
Unfortunately, there is no clear indication of what role these interim reinforcements 
played beyond that of a simple garrison, even after the arrival of Oliver of Termes. Each 
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contingent of mercenaries certainly started their stints in the Holy Land by landing at Acre. 
Since Acre was covered under the truce between King Hugh and Baybars, which was still 
holding even to the end of 1275, they were not likely undertaking any military operations 
there. The most likely task for these mercenaries was simply as a garrison for Acre in the 
event that the truce broke before the arrival of the general passage. This, in fact, was what 
James of Aragon wrote in his autobiography that they should do there.
164
 Yet, the presence of 
Oliver of Termes had not passed unnoticed by Baybars, who, though holding to the truce, 
must have been keeping watch on the arrival of reinforcements. Indeed, reports of the death 
of Oliver of Termes in August 1274 had reached Baybars; Oliver was noted by the sultan’s 
court to have earlier ‘come to Acre with a large contingent.’165 There was, nevertheless, 
plenty that these reinforcements could have been doing elsewhere, not least in what was left 
of the crusader territories to the north, and in Armenia. In one of the only indications of a 
potential Frankish military move, Ibn al-Furāt wrote that ‘when the Franks heard [of the 
Muslim claim on Latakia], they strengthened the tower.’166 At a stretch, perhaps this meant 
additional garrisoning, but it could have simply been some sort of construction reinforcement. 
If the strengthening of the tower had actually meant that some of the mercenaries were sent 
this way, then the Franks were still not confident that even this was enough to hold Latakia, 
since a peace treaty was made.  
It is clear that the interim measures in Gregory’s dual crusade policy had been 
facilitated largely by France, and the mercenaries sent to the Holy Land were placed under 
French captains. Nevertheless, Gregory played a key role in organising these troops from the 
beginning of his reign, more than two years before the popular date of 1274 for setting this 
strategic change. The five waves of reinforcements that went to the Holy Land throughout 
Gregory’s papal tenure show the genuine commitment that the pope had to this interim 
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strategy, and also the willingness of the French king to continue aiding the Holy Land under 
papal direction. Given the negligible difference in the role of these mercenaries and crusaders 
proper, these mercenaries likely were receiving some form of crusade indulgence. During the 
time that Gregory was alive and sending these mercenaries to Acre in the interim, that 
territory suffered no loss. Of course this had much to do with the truce that had been signed, 
and for Baybars’ preoccupation in the north. However, given that Baybars was aware of the 
strengthening of Acre, and yet he did not act to curb it, the sending of reinforcements may 
have given teeth to the truce made there. In this respect, it was a wise policy, and it had 
succeeded for the time. 
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A PROBLEM OF GOVERNANCE?  
POPE GREGORY X, CHARLES OF ANJOU,  
& THE LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM 
 
Chapter Four
1
 
 
 
  
 Introduction 
 
Gregory’s time spent in the Holy Land did not simply give him an attachment to the 
place, which would lead him to launch a new crusade to reclaim it for the Christians. His time 
there also enabled him to see the manner in which the remaining crusader territories were 
being run. He could not have been pleased with what he saw, and this very likely contributed 
to the interim troops being placed under western captains, rather than under the permanent 
secular leaders of the East. That there were problems was indisputable. The Latin kingdom 
was chronically losing territory to the powerful Mamluk sultan, Baybars. Apportioning the 
blame for this troubled time, however, is more difficult. Criticism of the state of the Latin 
kingdom and the way in which it was run in the thirteenth century is widespread, and has 
been discussed by several historians. Christopher Tyerman has noted that the appointment of 
Geoffrey of Sargines as commander of the troops Louis IX kept in the Holy Land ‘exposed 
the serial inadequacy and failure of the indigenous politicians.’2 Maureen Purcell argued that 
in the later thirteenth century, the ‘Syrian Franks [had] been driven far from any notion of 
corporate crusading purpose and existence’ and ‘the Eastern Christian States had themselves 
become so absorbed in the exigencies of day to day survival as to have lost any sense of a 
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raison d’être which transcended that of any other kingdom.’3 Indeed, Norman Housley has 
written that the situation in the Holy Land at the time of Gregory’s election was the worst it 
had been since the 1187 disaster at Hattin before the Third Crusade. He argued that Latin 
Syria was entirely dependent upon western help.
4
  
Due, it seems, to the poor government in the Latin East, it has been alleged that Pope 
Gregory X colluded with Charles of Anjou to unseat Hugh of Lusignan, de facto king of 
Jerusalem, to place Charles in his stead by buying Maria of Antioch’s claim to the throne. 
Charles did not buy Maria’s claim until 1277, after Gregory had died. Nevertheless, this has 
not prevented historians from placing Gregory right in the very heart of the matter, with this 
notion being sustained, quite incredibly, with no solid evidence whatsoever. Sylvia Schein 
has written that it was Gregory who ‘encouraged Maria to sell her claims to Charles I of 
Anjou as he wished him to take a more active interest in the fate of the crusader state, not 
only for its own welfare but also to divert Charles from his ambitions in Byzantium.’5 Steven 
Runciman has done much to give birth to this notion, quite wrongly saying that ‘Gregory 
while he was in the East may have shown the disappointed princess some sympathy, so that 
she felt it worthwhile to come to the council of Lyons.’6 This is patently wrong, since Maria 
had left the Holy Land before Gregory had even arrived there.
7
 Runciman also said much the 
same as Schein: that Maria ‘continued to enjoy the pope’s favour, and he suggested that, as 
she was unlikely to establish herself at Acre, she should sell her rights to Charles of Anjou.’8  
The notion that Gregory needed Charles to have the throne in order to convince him 
to help the Holy Land is wrong, and Schein had actually gone some way to proving this 
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already. She pointed out that ‘ironically it was during the period 1269-1280, most of which 
fell before he became the king of Jerusalem, that Charles took a vivid and active interest in 
the welfare of the crusader state.’9 Charles had been supplying food, war materials, and 
transport to the Holy Land even before Gregory became pope, as demonstrated in the 
Angevin chancery records. Schein herself has pointed this out, though without understanding 
the significance. The Angevin chancery records remain an underutilized source among 
historians of the Crusades. Jean Dunbabin’s work on Charles of Anjou has gone a long way 
to opening up the discussion of Charles’ rule in Italy, but his rule of the Latin kingdom in the 
Holy Land remains, as Jonathan Riley-Smith has more recently pointed out, largely 
unexplored.
10
 While this chapter does not seek to give that much-needed detailed study of 
Charles’ rule of the Latin kingdom, it will demonstrate through the chancery records that 
Charles already had a strong interest, and indeed powerful influence, in the Holy Land, and 
thus it was not ‘the result of general lack of interest’ which led Charles to take up a claim to 
the throne of Jerusalem.
11
 Gregory did not need to invest Charles with the rule of the 
kingdom in order to encourage his interest there, since he already had that interest. 
Furthermore, Gregory was able to convince the kings of France and the Romans to go on 
crusade without having to invest them with rule of the kingdom. Why should Charles be any 
different? 
Dunbabin has continued to propagate the idea of Gregory’s involvement, and went 
even further by suggesting that ‘the initiative lay wholly with the pope; Charles merely 
acquiesced and continued the negotiations to their successful conclusion after Gregory’s 
death.’12 Charles of Anjou has not always been viewed in the best of light by historians.13 
Dunbabin was trying to give Charles a fairer treatment, but on this point she has gone too far. 
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It is inconceivable that a man of Charles’ stature would simply acquiesce to the pope in a 
matter of such importance, even if that pope – Gregory X – was as able a diplomat as his 
biographers would have one believe. Even so, Jonathan Riley-Smith has picked up 
Dunbabin’s idea, and wrote that ‘although the evidence is circumstantial she is probably 
right.’14 It is not the job of the historian to engage in conspiracy theories, thus it is the 
purpose of this chapter to argue only as much as documentary evidence will allow. Runciman 
was patently wrong, and engaged in what was clearly a creation of his imagination. Although 
Schein laid out good evidence against the notion that it was Gregory’s idea, she never saw the 
connection, and thus came to the wrong conclusion. Dunbabin, furthermore, never sourced 
evidence for her assertion that the idea for Charles to buy Maria of Antioch’s claim to the 
throne of Jerusalem was entirely Gregory’s, and Riley-Smith conceded that the evidence was 
lacking. It seems likely that Dunbabin based her argument for Gregory’s involvement on his 
two letters to Maria of Antioch and the archbishop of Nazareth, in which he both assured 
Maria that he was not taking sides in her dispute with Hugh, and set about an investigation of 
the competing claims for the throne.
15
 With this in mind, an analysis of Gregory’s letters to 
and about Hugh of Lusignan throughout his reign, and especially after the competing parties 
presented their claims at the Second Council of Lyons must, at face value, make it clear that 
Gregory treated Hugh as the king of Jerusalem, even after there had been plenty of time to 
evaluate the evidence for Hugh or Maria. Moreover, as will be shown, Gregory even actively 
discouraged Charles of Anjou from upsetting Hugh’s claim in Cyprus in the paramount 
interest of keeping peace in Christendom. 
To be clear, although this chapter seeks to vindicate Gregory on the question of 
Charles of Anjou’s acquisition of the throne of Jerusalem, it does not argue that Gregory felt 
there were no problems with the governance of the Latin East. Thus, in part, this chapter will 
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investigate the governing role of Gregory’s newly appointed patriarch of Jerusalem, Thomas 
Agni of Lentini. It will argue that Gregory sent Thomas to the Holy Land not simply to fill 
the vacancy in the patriarchal seat, but also to fill a governing role in the Latin East in 
general, which was lacking due to the longstanding absence of the Hohenstaufen kings, 
followed by the weak position of the Cyprus-based Hugh of Lusignan. 
An examination of Gregory’s papal registers and the Angevin chancery records 
demonstrates both Charles’ pre-existing interest in the Holy Land, as well as a pattern of 
behaviour that shows how Gregory and Charles interacted with the people in the Latin East. 
These records are striking not so much for what they have, as for what they lack. There are 
significantly few exchanges between the permanent secular leadership in the Latin kingdom 
and either the court of Gregory or of Charles. So few, in fact, that they are almost negligible. 
When Gregory or Charles made contact with the Latin kingdom in the Holy Land, it was 
chiefly not to the permanent secular leadership that they turned, but to the patriarch of 
Jerusalem, the military orders, or to representatives from the West who were temporarily 
stationed there. In all of Gregory’s extant letters in his papal registers, very few mentioned – 
and even fewer were directed to – Hugh of Lusignan, king of Cyprus and de facto king of 
Jerusalem. As has been seen in chapter three, Gregory depended entirely upon western 
captains to lead his mercenaries in the Holy Land. Likewise, in the Angevin chancery 
records, Charles’ extensive dealings with the Holy Land were directed almost exclusively to 
the military orders. There was only one extant case of correspondence with Hugh of 
Lusignan. Such evidence points to a lack of confidence in the permanent secular leadership in 
the Holy Land on the part of both Gregory and Charles. The implications of this lack of 
confidence are another matter. Although Charles sought a regime change in the Holy Land 
that put himself on the throne, this was not Gregory’s idea, nor did he support it to its fullest 
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extent, since it would have upset the peaceful conditions that he considered crucial to the 
success of the crusade.  
 
 The Succession Dispute before Gregory’s Time as Seen in the Historiography 
 
Peter Edbury has done much to explain the internal conflicts and the complicated 
dynastic disputes of the kingdoms of Cyprus and Jerusalem that give the background for 
Maria of Antioch’s claim to the throne.16 The histories of Cyprus and the mainland crusader 
kingdom were linked with the conquest of the island by Richard I of England during the 
Third Crusade. They became even more intertwined when the kings of Cyprus held the 
regency of the kingdom of Jerusalem, culminating at last with Conradin’s death and the 
ascension of Hugh of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, to the throne of Jerusalem. Hugh was not, 
however, the only one to claim the throne of Jerusalem. His aunt, Maria of Antioch – whom 
René Grousset wrongly called Hugh’s ‘old insignificant cousin’ – also asserted her right.17 As 
Edbury has argued, Maria was not so insignificant. Edbury wrote that ‘the genealogical 
information on which her case rested was stated accurately, and her speech, which had 
evidently been carefully prepared, is a model of lucidity.’18 But to understand the whole 
story, and events which would unfold when Gregory was on the papal throne, it must also be 
known that before the struggle between Hugh of Lusignan and Maria of Antioch for the 
throne of Jerusalem, the same Hugh had disputed with Hugh of Brienne over the kingship of 
Cyprus. From an interpretation based strictly on primogeniture, Hugh of Brienne had the 
stronger claim, since he was descended from the elder branch. But primogeniture (or 
‘successoral representation,’ as Edbury has called it) was not the deciding factor in 
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inheritance in the Holy Land, and had, in fact, been ‘rejected in the Latin East’ as the ‘custom 
governing the inheritance to fiefs,’ as Edbury has pointed out.19 And indeed, although both of 
the men were from the same generation, and Hugh of Brienne from the elder branch, Hugh of 
Lusignan was actually older than him.
20
   
 After the 1267 death of King Henry I of Cyprus’ only child, King Hugh II of Cyprus, 
the throne of Cyprus was to pass to the offspring of Henry’s older sisters. Hugh of Brienne 
was the son of Marie, the eldest, who had married Walter IV of Brienne. The younger sister 
was Isabella, who had married Henry of Antioch.
21
 Their son, Hugh of Lusignan, prevailed as 
King Hugh III of Cyprus, since the high court sided with the son from the younger branch, 
but who was older and from the powerful Ibelin family. Hugh of Brienne had also not 
initially made a claim to the throne of Cyprus.
22
 However, if Hugh of Brienne’s claim based 
on successoral representation (however much rejected in the Latin East as a legal form) had 
been upheld in the kingdom of Cyprus, as he had desired, then so too could it have been in 
the kingdom of Jerusalem after the death of Conradin. Not enough has been made of Hugh of 
Brienne’s claim by historians. Hugh pushed his claim for the throne of Jerusalem, but failed 
in favour of Hugh of Lusignan, who was already holding the regency. After this dispute, 
Hugh of Brienne left for the Brienne lands of France and Sicily, serving – it must be well 
noted – Charles of Anjou.23 More on this connection will be discussed below. 
 At the time Gregory travelled to the Holy Land on crusade in 1271, the dispute 
between Hugh of Lusignan and Maria of Antioch over the throne of Jerusalem was far from 
being resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. This conflict has been addressed by La Monte, 
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Riley-Smith, and the aforementioned Edbury.
24
 Maria of Antioch received crucial support 
from the Templars, but the high court of Jerusalem sided with Hugh of Lusignan, and he was 
crowned king of Jerusalem under the protest of Maria’s representatives. Maria had left for the 
West to make her claim known to the papal court.
25
 It comes as no surprise that the high court 
sided with Hugh, whom Edbury portrayed as a very active ruler, who made painstaking 
efforts not only to protect Cyprus, but also the mainland territories.
26
 Perceptions of Hugh 
and his abilities have varied among historians. With more flair than proof, Grousset wrote 
that ‘in reality, Hugh III, who appears to have been very wise politician, worthy of better 
times, sought on the contrary to put an end to the old divisions to unite against Baybars the 
beam of Frankish forces.’27  Tyerman, on the other hand, asserted that ‘from his base in 
Cyprus, Hugh could do little to direct affairs on the mainland.’28 Edbury, who has given 
Hugh the closest examination, favourably wrote that amid the conquests of Baybars, Hugh 
‘reacted by doing what no ruler of Cyprus is known to have done since the early 1250s and 
deployed Cypriot military resources on the mainland.’29 The use of the Cypriot military in 
this way would eventually lead to their refusal to serve on the mainland, with Hugh having to 
patch things up with them before they would agree to serve on the mainland for four months 
a year.
30
 The point must be made that Hugh was, in fact, doing what he could to help the 
Latin East, but being based in Cyprus, his rule of the kingdom of Jerusalem was not strong.  
The king of Jerusalem was not all-powerful. It certainly never helped matters that, 
from the time that Emperor Frederick II married Isabella II of Jerusalem and then left the 
kingdom in 1229, until the death of their grandson Conradin in 1268, the legitimate ruler of 
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the kingdom resided in the West. This vacuum of regal authority provided ample opportunity 
for conflict among the indigenous leadership during the king’s absence, which would not 
have been easy for Hugh to fix from Cyprus. The barons had become very powerful, and they 
jockeyed for position. The internal divisions in the Latin East were serious. René Grousset 
aptly called these divisions ‘the politics of suicide.’31 Acre and the Venetians had been 
feuding with Tyre and the Genoese since 1258.
32
 Philip of Montfort, a very powerful baron in 
the Holy Land, and at one time in the service of Charles of Anjou, had been given the 
lordship of Tyre by King Henry I, though the claim was tenuous, since Henry was only 
serving as regent at that time. Hugh assured the support of the Montfort family by securing 
their claim, and marrying his sister to the son of Philip, John of Montfort, who would succeed 
his father in the lordship when Philip was assassinated.
33
 These internal divisions and the 
absence of a strong central governing authority provided an ideal opportunity for Baybars to 
make further incursions into the crusader territories. 
   
Charles’ Dealings with the Holy Land Immediately before Gregory’s Papal Tenure 
 
 Charles of Anjou’s chancery records show that even before the time Gregory had 
taken the papal throne and could have had any influence on Charles’ policy, Charles already 
had a strong interest in the Holy Land; thus, Gregory need not have encouraged Charles, as 
Schein argued, to take a more active interest. Norman Housley has noted that the Holy Land 
was dependant on Sicily for food supplies in the 1280s during the Sicilian Vespers, but this 
dependence can actually be placed even earlier.
34
 Dunbabin wrote that Charles helped supply 
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grain to the Hospitallers in Acre, but this does not nearly tell the whole story.
35
 As the 
following sections will demonstrate through a detailed presentation of Charles’ dealings with 
the Holy Land and the military orders, his kingdom was a major supplier of food and other 
supplies for the Latin East. Likely due to the absence of a strong central governing authority, 
his contact there was almost exclusively not with the permanent secular leadership, but rather 
the military orders.  
Sicily had been the breadbasket of the Hohenstaufen Empire, and it remained so for 
the Angevins. Given its geographical position, these resources were also useful for the Latin 
kingdom in the Holy Land, especially considering that, on land, the crusader territories and 
their eastern Christian allies were surrounded by Muslim territories. In earlier times, the Latin 
East had actually been self-sufficient enough that they had been able to export food to their 
Muslim neighbours.
36
 Baybars’ conquests, and the destruction that had gone along with it 
(both by Baybars, and by the retreating Christians), had made for less prosperous times, and 
as William of Beaujeu noted to Rudolph of Habsburg in 1275, there was widespread 
starvation.
37
 Around the time that Gregory was pope, Charles’ chancery records show that the 
Latin East had instead become a major importer of food. 
The records indicate that Charles began to send supplies regularly to Acre, especially 
wheat and barley, in 1269, coinciding with the planned launch of Louis IX’s crusade, of 
which Charles was to be a part. But even after Louis’ death, during the papal interregnum, as 
well as during Gregory’s pontificate, Charles continued to supply the Latins in the Holy Land 
with foodstuffs and military supplies, with no indications that he was profiting directing from 
this supply, but rather out of genuine devotion or to secure his position in the Holy Land. 
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Ultimately, as will be discussed below, the Holy Land had become so dependent upon 
Charles’ aid that when he withheld some supplies, as it seems he did in late 1274 and 1275, 
starvation ensued. This is clear if one compares Charles’ supply of the Holy Land in that time 
with William of Beaujeu’s letter in 1275 that told of widespread starvation (although Muslim 
raids and conquest would also have been a strong factor). Thus Charles of Anjou not only had 
an interest in the Holy Land, but a clear influence there as well. 
 As noted, some of the first instances of Charles’ supply of the Holy Land came in the 
lead up to Louis IX’s second crusade. Charles was in contact with the military orders: in 1268 
he ordered that Brother Philip of Eglis, a Hospitaller, along with his brothers and other 
mercenaries, be paid expenses for spending time in service to Charles.
38
 Earlier, in October 
1267, Pope Clement IV had ordered the Hospitallers of Sicily to aid Charles, newly appointed 
king of Sicily, in combating his enemies there.
39
 Thus, Charles’ ties with the Hospitallers 
were made even before he began supplying the Holy Land. Starting in 1268, Charles also 
noted ties to a Templar named Arnulf many times, who was the ‘beloved treasurer of his 
court.’40 In more direct relation to the Holy Land itself, in April 1269, Charles allowed an 
unnamed Templar to extract 100 packloads (salmas)
41
 of wheat from Bari with the stipulation 
that it only be used by Templars.
42
 Later in June, a mace-bearer of the Templars was 
permitted to extract 1,500 packloads of wheat and 1,000 packloads of barley to take to Acre, 
with no stipulations.
43
 Also, the Hospitallers were exempted from tax on olives and olive oil 
from Sicily, and then from all royalty and tax.
44
 This likely had something to do with their aid 
in Charles’ conquest of Sicily, but Charles also noted that the Hospitallers had always been 
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under the protection of the kings of Sicily – thus also linking himself implicitly with the 
previous Hohenstaufen and Norman kings of Sicily.
45
 It is clear that Charles had close 
relations with the Hospitallers in this time. 
 It was not only foodstuffs that Charles was sending to the Holy Land; he sent military 
support as well. In July 1269 he was busy. One of the most notable figures involved was the 
Hospitaller John of Villiers, future grand master of his order.
46
 Charles ordered that John be 
permitted to go back to Outremer with five horses and mules.
47
 He allowed Francis of 
Flanders, a knight, to take ship from Bari or Brindisi with his two squires, three mercenaries 
[garzionibus], two horses, and a great magnitude of provisions in aid of the Holy Land.
48
 To 
be clear, this aid was not necessarily from Charles himself, but as the ruler of these ports, 
Charles’ influence meant that he could either make it easy, or difficult, for goods to be 
exchanged. In the same month, he allowed Brother Aymonis, of the knights of St. Thomas of 
Acre, to extract supplies from Bari of wheat which had been given in alms, and to take those 
supplies to Acre.
49
 Also in July, a prior of the Hospitallers in Bari by the name of Peter of 
Neocastro was given licence by Charles to extract 2,000 packloads of wheat, 1,000 packloads 
of barley, and 100 packloads of pulses, with the stipulation that the supplies be given for 
distribution not only by the Hospitallers, but also the Templars, the Teutonic Knights, the 
patriarch of Jerusalem, and Geoffrey of Sargines, the seneschal in the kingdom, close ally of 
King Louis IX, and commander of the troops that Louis had left in the Holy Land.
50
 
However, Geoffrey had died in April of 1269, so he could no longer manage distribution.
51
 
There were four other shipments to Acre in 1269,
52
 and Charles even provided for his brother 
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Louis IX’s carpenter Honorius to be sent to the Holy Land with a supply of wood so that he 
could construct instruments and machines of war.
53
 That Charles provided for Honorius to 
travel to the Holy Land for such purposes, and not Tunis, may be indicative of a genuine 
intention on Charles’ part to take the crusade there, after the mission to Tunis.  
 In two of the very few cases that named permanent secular leaders, or at least knights 
from the Holy Land, Charles allowed Philip of Montfort, lord of Tyre, to extract supplies for 
the defence of Acre.
54
 But though Philip was among the permanent nobility in the Holy Land, 
he had only come into the lordship of Tyre in 1246, and he still had lands in France near 
Toulouse, which had been won by the Montfort family during the Albigensian Crusade.
55
 
Philip had also been married to Eleanor de Courtenay, daughter of Peter II de Courtenay, and 
thus was the brother of Baldwin II, the Latin Emperor of Constantinople. Charles would no 
doubt have given particular attention to such people, since he was himself interested in Greek 
territory. In December 1266, Charles had made an agreement with Philip and his knights, 
shield bearers, and servants in return for their service – a service whose end-date was 
whenever Philip chose to return to his country, or else the Lord’s resurrection.56 This 
assistance was no doubt useful for Charles’ conquest of Sicily, and for Louis IX’s crusade to 
Tunis. This close relationship between the Montforts and Charles adds complication to the 
allegiances of the Holy Land, since, as mentioned above, the Montforts also allied themselves 
to Hugh of Lusignan through marriage, and after Charles had taken his foothold in Acre, John 
of Montfort still allowed Hugh to have a base of operations in Tyre.
57
 It is complicated even 
more since the Montforts of Tyre, along with the Genoese, had no love for the Venetians, 
who were based in Acre, and were close to Charles. Hugh of Lusignan had made efforts to 
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patch things up between them. Yet, it had been Philip of Montfort who had served Charles, so 
his son John might not have had the same policy. It is possible, nevertheless, that the 
Montforts were not as firmly rooted in the Lusignan camp as it would at first seem. Perhaps 
the Montforts looked to place themselves in the best possible position for whatever the 
outcome would be in the struggle between Charles and Hugh. 
 In the other case when someone outside of the military orders was mentioned, Charles 
made provision in Acre for Philip and Bartholomew Mainebeuf, knights and brothers of 
Acre, contra Raymond Boniface, former consul of Charles’ lands in Marseilles.58 At least 
Bartholomew, if not Philip, was associated with Julian of Sidon in the 1250s.
59
 Julian had, 
himself, joined the Templars after he sold his rights to Sidon to the order in 1260.
60
 It is 
possible that Bartholomew had followed Julian in joining the order, but Philip likely did not, 
because a ‘Philip Mainebeuf’ appeared in the Templar of Tyre in the 1290s on a diplomatic 
mission, since he had ‘a high understanding of Arabic,’ without being named a Templar.61 
The abovementioned dispute was perhaps what had precipitated a letter in October 1270, in 
which there was some disagreement between the vicar of Marseilles and the Templar Peter 
Carbonello over the delivery of goods to Acre, but Charles ordered that Peter not be bothered, 
since the shipping guarantee at Acre was confirmed to be valid.
62
 The fact that this case 
involved a Templar may lend some credence to one of the Mainebeufs belonging to that 
order, but if neither were, then this would be one of the very few cases where Charles had 
contact outside of the military orders. 
 Charles’ aid to the Holy Land continued into 1270, at the same time that Louis IX’s 
second crusade was directed to Tunis. In January 1270, Hugh Bertrand of the Templars was 
allowed to extract from Bari and Brindisi 500 packloads of wheat, which was to be shared 
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with the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers in Acre. Following that, in February 1270, the 
master of the Hospitallers, Hugh Revel, received from Charles 300 packloads of wheat, 200 
packloads of barley, as well as 16 horses, mules, and she-mules in aid of the Holy Land.
63
 
Again, this aid had to be shared with the Templars, and the Teutonic Knights, with no others 
being mentioned. In March 1270, the Teutonic Order was allowed to extract 400 packloads of 
wheat to take to Acre, with no indication of how it was to be distributed. 
64
 In April, Charles 
sent aid for the faithful in Acre, and specifically to the Hospitallers. He noted that the ship 
was not allowed to give any aid to the Greeks, Saracens, Pisans, or any enemies of the 
Christian faithful.
65
 Another shipment was sent to supply the Templars and Hospitallers in the 
Holy Land with wheat and barley, with a warning that none of the supplies were to go to the 
land of Michael Palaeologus.
66
 There was some confusion over another shipment to the 
Templars in Acre managed by Brother Stephen of the Templars, when the ship carrying the 
goods was blown off course and turned back instead of arriving at its destination. But there 
was no blame to be had, and no penalties applied.
67
 
 In January 1271, Charles gave permission for John II of Brittany, earl of Richmond, 
and husband of Edward I of England’s sister Beatrice, to take wheat from any port in Sicily 
and transport it to Acre, doubtless in aid of Lord Edward’s crusade.68 It was thus probably 
this John, and not John of Grailly, who served as Edward’s major-domo, and who had arrived 
in the Holy Land before Edward, as Makrizi mentioned.
69
 Following in March 1271, the 
Templars were given permission to take wheat and barley from Apulia and transport it to 
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Acre.
70
 On several other occasions in this year the Templars, Hospitallers, or Teutonic 
Knights were allowed to take provisions to Acre, including a ballista.
71
 An entry in March 
1271 noted a suspicion that the goods (barley, wheat, oil, fruit, wood, and wine) of three 
Lucchese merchants,
72
 which were supposed to be taken to Acre, might instead have been 
taken to the prince of Achaea to be sold there at his invitation, but the merchants were said to 
have declined the invitation, and the matter was closed.
73
 These goods could be the ones 
named in another entry dated earlier in the same month, directed to the Hospitallers.
74
 It is 
surprising that this would have been seen as a problem, since Charles and the prince of 
Achaea, William II of Villehardouin, were allies, and Charles was later to receive the 
principality upon William’s death in 1278.75 Charles’ interest in the matter could indicate 
how vitally needed the supplies were for the Holy Land in his mind.  
Charles’ interest and influence in the Holy land is shown very clearly in records from 
April 1271, just before Edward of England arrived in the Holy Land. The Angevin chancery 
records noted that a messenger from the ‘sultan of Babylon’ (Baybars) was to leave a port in 
Sicily and sail either to Alexandria or Acre. He was to be allowed to depart and expenses and 
necessities were to be supplied to him.
76
 This delegation had been in Sicily as early as 
December 1270, when it was noted that the expenses of the messengers were to be paid.
77
 In 
January, the messenger was given gifts of a scarlet robe, and a blue robe for his son.
78
 Charles 
also made provision for his own messengers, the Dominican Peter de Beania and Brother 
Berengar to be sent to the sultan, also in April 1271.
79
 Even when Charles was not crusading 
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himself, he was still involving himself in the future of the crusader territories. This could be 
an indication of his building interest in a claim to the throne. Most importantly, all of the 
records fall before Gregory came to the papal throne, and before he would have been able to 
influence Charles’ position towards the Holy Land. Thus, they show that Charles had a pre-
existing interest there. 
 
Charles’ Dealings with the Holy Land during Gregory’s Papal Tenure 
 
 Charles’ pre-existing interest in the Holy Land, his geographical position, and his 
situation as a papal vassal made him the obvious choice to send word of Tedaldo Visconti’s 
papal election in 1271. Likewise, the steady stream of shipments that were already being 
made between southern Italy and Acre probably made it more likely than not that messages 
from Rome (or in the case of Gregory’s election, from Viterbo), would follow along the same 
lines. Charles’ relationship with the Holy Land was already established, and it was only 
natural that this would continue during Gregory’s reign without having to be directed by the 
pope. Thus, in late 1271 and early 1272 Charles went to significant length to accommodate 
the arrival of the new pope, Gregory X, from Acre to Brindisi, and first to help the cardinals 
to send word of his election.
80
 In January 1272, Charles ordered that ships, for which he had 
paid to be armed and outfitted, should go to meet the new pope.
81
 He also ordered that money 
should be sent for the happy arrival of the new pontiff from the Holy Land, although he noted 
that it would be difficult for his money distributors to do so, on account of their extreme 
poverty.
82
 It was also Charles who paid to send various messengers, including the Templar 
Stephen of Syse, Fulk of Podio Riccardi, Peter of Hucemagna, and Gerard of Bassilion, to 
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Acre to meet the new pope.
83
 Charles hired the Genoese merchants John the Chancellor, 
Pellegrino del Gallo, and Balian Larcaro to send two of his clerics (the aforementioned Peter 
and Gerard) to pay homage to the pope in the Holy Land.
84
 Following in August 1272, it was 
Charles to whom Gregory turned when he needed to deliver the new patriarch of Jerusalem, 
Thomas Agni of Lentini, to Acre. Charles noted that he had three well-equipped galleys at 
Messina that would be used to transport the patriarch.
85
 The Eracles recorded that he arrived 
in Acre in October 1272.
86
  
The only entry that mentions correspondence between Charles and Hugh of Lusignan 
fell near the beginning of Gregory’s papal tenure, in May 1272. In it, Hugh was actually 
named king of Cyprus and Jerusalem.
87
 Charles sent letters of recommendation for some 
unnamed merchants from Ancona, who also had letters from their commune, and who had to 
travel to Hugh’s territory. It does not specify if that territory were Cyprus, or, in fact, the 
mainland. Given the other cases in which merchants travelled to Acre without an apparent 
letter of recommendation, and that trade in supplies with Cyprus did not figure largely into 
the Angevin chancery records, it may be that these merchants were going to Cyprus. If this 
destination were seen as unusual, then the letter of recommendation might have been 
necessary. Generally, Charles was supplying the mainland territories, not Cyprus. Cyprus, by 
and large, did not suffer the same lack of supplies that the mainland did, and so provisioning 
as a matter of course would go to Acre, where the Latin Christians were more hard-pressed, 
and where the western Christians would have taken more interest for the sake of its 
preservation. If the theory of these merchants going to Cyprus is correct, then it shows that 
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while Charles respected Hugh’s rule in Cyprus, he did not feel it necessary to contact Hugh 
with letters of recommendation for shipments to the mainland territories – evidence of 
Hugh’s weak position there.  
 While there is only one piece of evidence remaining in the Angevin chancery records 
for exchange between Charles and Hugh, there are two that detail exchange between Charles 
and the king of Armenia. The first, from February 1272, merely noted messengers from the 
king of Armenia, Leo II.
88
 Leo was the son of Isabella of Armenia and King Hethum I, who 
had gone to the Mongol court of Karakorum. In something that has been glossed over in 
history, because the claim was not pursued, Leo II himself actually had a claim to the throne 
of Jerusalem, which, if based on the admittedly unfavoured primogeniture, was actually 
better than Maria of Antioch’s. Through his mother, Leo was descended from the older sister 
of Maria of Antioch’s mother Melissande. This sister, Sibylla, had married King Leo I of 
Armenia. Leo II was of the same generation as Hugh of Brienne and Hugh of Lusignan, 
though he was descended from a younger branch of Isabella I of Jerusalem’s progeny. The 
second entry in the chancery records, dated in 1272, ordered the vice-admiral of Sicily to 
requisition a ship to take the messengers, now named Archdeacon Varani and William, a 
knight, to sail from Brindisi to Acre.
89
 Unfortunately, no indications were given about why 
this exchange took place. 
 In 1272 Charles again permitted the Hospitallers to take wheat, barley, and pulses, as 
well as seven horses and seven mules from Apulia to Acre.
90
 In June 1272, Charles 
confirmed to Hospitaller Brother Jacob of Tassi that the Hospitallers had the right to pasture 
and water their horses in crown lands.
91
 Ties between Charles and the Hospitallers, or at least 
with Jacob of Tassi, continued to be tight, and Charles sent Jacob to Tunis to collect payment 
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from the king of Tunis in September 1272.
92
 While Jacob was doing this, Charles also 
ordered him to return the wood from the war machines which had been left in Tunis after that 
disastrous crusade.
93
 Later, in January 1273, there is an indication that three galleys and one 
ship under Oliver of Termes were being prepared to sail in aid of the Holy Land from 
Charles’ lands, although the Eracles noted that Oliver arrived in April 1273 with 25 
horsemen and 100 crossbowmen from the king of France, with no mention of support from 
Charles.
94
 In March 1273, 2,000 packloads of wheat were directed to the Hospitallers at Acre 
through merchants.
95
 These supplies were not allowed to be taken to the lands of Michael 
Palaeologus.  
In April 1273, Charles showed his interest once again in the Holy Land by calling on 
the Hospitaller Jacob of Tassi to come to him in Foggia to confer about news from the Holy 
Land that he had heard from the patriarch of Jerusalem, leaving some of Jacob’s associates to 
guard his treasury in his absence.
96
 Unfortunately, there is no indication of the content of this 
news. There were also merchants, one named Simon of St Stephen and another only ‘de 
Barcholam,’ who took supplies to and from Acre beyond the usual wheat and barley. Their 
stock included precious stones, lathes, swords, ballistae, linen, frankincense, cassia, sedge 
(presumably for thatching), hooks, wine, garlic, saws, and an old veil.
97
 In May, supplies, 
which included ballistae for defence, were sent to the Templars in Acre.
98
 The records also 
indicate exchange in August 1273, which included six separate shipments: one to the 
Hospitallers, four to the Templars, and one to the Teutonic Knights.
99
 Though Gregory 
certainly would have welcomed all of this provisioning of the Holy Land, Charles’ supply 
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there during the first part of Gregory’s pontificate did not significantly increase with Gregory 
coming to the papal throne. Rather, Charles essentially maintained the significant levels that 
already existed before Gregory’s papal tenure. 
 
Charles’ Relationship with the Templars and the Proof of His Power in the Holy 
Land 
 
 It is important to note that Charles’ supply of the Holy Land seemed to diminish in 
1274, coinciding with his dealings with Maria of Antioch at the Second Council of Lyons. 
The sources in 1274 are limited to an August 1274 document in which Charles ordered that 
help be provided to the Templar preceptor of Bari to find his two escaped Muslim slaves that 
had been brought from Outremer.
100
 They had taken flight near Lucera, a city in Italy with a 
largely Muslim population. In June 1274 (still during the general council), more merchants 
from Sicily took grain to Acre to the Hospitallers, with orders from Charles not to take any to 
the Genoese, Muslims, or to the land of Michael Palaeologus (who, by this time, had actually 
healed the schism).
101
 Of even less evident use for the Holy Land itself, in August 1274, 
Charles gave the right to Raymond, a Hospitaller, and John, a goldsmith from Longobucco, to 
search his realm for minerals, including silver, lead, iron, and salt. They had to do so at their 
own expense, and to give Charles a tenth of anything they found.
102
 
 In 1275, direct supply to the Hospitallers seems to have stopped altogether, probably 
due to their support of Hugh of Lusignan in connection with Maria of Antioch’s claim to the 
throne of Jerusalem. In September 1275, Charles granted licence to merchants to take wheat 
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to Acre, Tyre (Sirum), or Tripoli, among other places not in the Holy Land.
103
 No indication 
in this case was given about to whom it was to be sold. In several cases in December 1275, 
however, wheat was sent from Sicily to Acre for Thomas, patriarch of Jerusalem, or the 
Templars.
104
 It was not allowed to be taken to the Genoese, Pisans, or to the lands of Michael 
Palaeologus. Even though the schism with the Greeks had been healed at the general council, 
Charles was still not open to trade with Byzantium, and did not allow any supplies to go to 
Michael Palaeologus’ lands. Also in 1275 or perhaps 1276, Charles granted the Teutonic 
Knights licence to take 12 horses and 12 mules for the defence of Acre.
105
 The important 
point here is that after the general council, when Maria and Hugh had their cases for their 
claims to the throne presented, Charles allowed merchants to take wheat and barley and other 
supplies from his land to Acre, but said they could unload and sell them to the patriarch or to 
the Templars, specifically, and no longer mentioned the Hospitallers. This is perhaps 
evidence of lines being drawn in the ongoing manoeuvrings for Charles to buy Maria’s claim 
to the throne of Jerusalem.   
The Hospitallers had been supporters of Hugh of Lusignan in the dispute for the 
throne, while the Templars, especially under their new master William of Beaujeu, were 
firmly on the side of Charles. The Eracles noted that when Hugh of Lusignan had retired to 
Tyre in 1276, the Hospitaller leaders, along with Patriarch Thomas, William of Roussillon 
(the French commander), and others (but not the Templars), had gone to convince him to 
return and to govern.
106
 The Templars had been supporting Maria of Antioch from the very 
beginning of her claims to the throne. When her claim was rejected in favour of Hugh of 
Lusignan, Maria had gone to the Templars for support before she departed for the West to 
                                                 
103
 RA, vol. 13, p. 46, n. 25. 
104
 RA, vol. 13, p. 30-1, n. 137, p. 91-2, n. 207, p. 93, n. 211, vol. 16, p. 177, n. 11. 
105
 RA, vol. 13, p. 34, n. 157. 
106
 Eracles, p. 474-5.  
158 
 
  
plead her case to the papal court.
107
 Maria’s connection to the Templars is supported by 
Marino Sanuto, who wrote at first that:  
The king of Cyprus, before he was retiring from Tyre, arranges the sending of 
messengers to the western kings and princes, in particular to the pope and cardinals, 
[telling them about those] who threatened their disobedience who stayed in Acre, 
entreating so that [the pope and cardinals] may employ a beneficial remedy for those 
[who are disobedient] and for the condition of the kingdom of Jerusalem.
108
  
The disobedient party, though unnamed, was probably the Templars, since Sanuto continued: 
‘truly the aforesaid Maria, (who was unremittingly seeking the Roman curia, just as you 
followed above in chapter XIII, pursuing a petition for obtaining the kingdom of Jerusalem) 
had become acquainted with all that had been narrated before, through messengers of the 
Temple.’109 It is hard to imagine that the Templars would have sided with Maria of Antioch 
because they wanted her on the throne of Jerusalem, unless they were looking to exploit her 
(potentially) weak rule. Thus, their support for her was more likely because they would have 
already known that she would sell her claim to Charles. Once William of Beaujeu (a man 
intimately connected with the French royal family) came to power as Templar master, this 
connection is made even more obvious. 
By the time of the general council, the Templars had become very close to Charles, 
due to William of Beaujeu having been elected as master of that order. Malcolm Barber wrote 
that William, ‘a cousin of Charles, was never fully trusted in the East, for he seemed to be so 
thoroughly a representative of his famous relative.’110 In 1273, Charles had ordered that 
William of Beaujeu, by then master of the Templars, not be disturbed in the possession of a 
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mill near Florence.
111
 In the same year, it was noted in Charles’ chancery records that 
William was ‘his blood brother’ and Charles ordered that provision be made concerning the 
illicit occupation of Templar lands.
112
 The Beaujeu family was closely associated with the 
royal house of France. Humbert, lord of Beaujeu, was the constable of France under King 
Philip III. The Gestes des Chiprois noted that William was ‘related to the king of France’ and 
both the Gestes and the Eracles noted that when he was elected master he was serving as the 
commander of the Templars in Apulia (therefore close to Charles).
113
  It is not surprising, 
then, that Pierre-Vincent Claverie wrote that the Templars, due to their involvement in 
Charles’ court, could have had something to do with the exchange of Jerusalem’s throne.114 
Given how clear it is from the Angevin chancery records that Charles was a major 
provider of supplies for the Holy Land, it is not surprising that even though the Hospitallers 
had initially sided with Hugh, they ultimately did nothing to intervene for him when Charles 
made his claim to the throne through his bailli Roger of San Severino in 1277.
115
 The 
importance of the supplies that came from Charles’ lands to the Holy Land meant that the 
Hospitallers choice had been made for them. Unless Baybars’ conquests could be stifled to 
provide time for the Christians to grow all their own supplies again, their survival depended 
in large part upon the Sicilian king. Charles knew this, and used it as leverage. In fact, as 
Gregory was preparing the general council in 1274, he sent a letter to Charles inquiring about 
rumours of unrest among the Sicilians. The source for this is Saba Malaspina, who, it must be 
noted, was writing with hindsight of the Sicilian Vespers. Still, what Saba had to say about 
the unrest of the Sicilians is not the important point here. Rather, Saba wrote that after 
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Gregory castigated Charles, the Sicilian king reacted by confiscating the grain shipments of 
the Templars and Hospitallers. This coincides with the abovementioned drop-off in supplies 
in the chancery records. Gregory wrote to King Philip for help on this, and told him that if the 
rumours of what Charles was doing were true, they struck ‘to the very core, without doubt 
since it hurts the condition of the Holy Land.’116 Clearly this embargo did not go on forever, 
as the shipments in 1275 to the patriarch of Jerusalem, Teutonic Knights, and the Templars 
attest. But supply to the Hospitallers does not seem to have resumed to previous levels 
(though Charles was using the Hospitaller Brother Raymond for mineral exploration in Italy). 
This episode shows the power that Charles had to affect the condition of the Holy Land, and 
how dependent it could be upon his will. Even the Hospitallers were brought into line in the 
end, since at that time their survival depended in large part upon the supplies that came from 
Charles. Moreover, the fact that Charles had disobeyed the will of Gregory by withholding 
supplies to the Holy Land in 1274 meant that he was not always following the pope’s lead 
there. Dunbabin’s idea that Charles was simply acquiescing to Gregory’s alleged plans is 
shown to be all the more misguided.
117
 Charles had plans of his own. 
 
 Patriarch Thomas and the Government of the Holy Land 
 
 As has been seen in chapter three, Gregory began organising relief for the Holy Land 
immediately upon his election. When he dealt with leading figures in the Holy Land, 
however, he turned not to Hugh of Lusignan, but rather to the military orders, the clergy, or 
to western Christians who were stationed only temporarily in the Latin East. This section will 
address how Gregory dealt with governmental relations in the Latin East at a time when the 
permanent secular leadership was in disarray. By the time Gregory became pope, this was a 
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long-standing problem. Indeed, Bernard Hamilton has noted that it was William of Agen, the 
former patriarch of Jerusalem (1261-70), who ‘was the real authority in the kingdom of Acre 
and indeed throughout Frankish Syria. Thus in 1267 when a Catalan knight escaped from an 
Egyptian prison and came to Acre with news of an impending Egyptian attack he was 
immediately brought before the patriarch rather than before the bailli of the kingdom.’118 In 
fact, the authority of the patriarch had been evolving in the thirteenth century seemingly in 
concert with the breakdown of permanent secular authority in the Holy Land. As Hamilton 
noted, Patriarch Thomas’ immediate predecessor had been the real authority in the Holy 
Land. Pope Urban IV had made this clear with William’s appointment, noting that he was to 
govern both spiritual and temporal matters in the churches of Acre and Jerusalem.
119
 This 
was the first direct reference in the later thirteenth century in which the patriarch would be 
‘governing,’ especially temporally. William’s own predecessor as patriarch, James Pantaléon 
(1255-61), had been placed there by Pope Alexander IV with the more vague instructions to 
‘rule rightly and guide indirectly.’120 Before James’ tenure, Pope Gregory IX and Innocent IV 
had noted that Robert of Nantes, patriarch of Jerusalem (1240-54), was there as papal legate 
for the province of Jerusalem and the Christian army. Gregory IX noted Robert’s ‘rule’ as a 
shepherd of the church, but there is no sense that he was there to govern more widely in this 
time.
121
 
For Gregory X, however, it is clear that the patriarch would have a strong governing 
role, even though by that time the throne of the kingdom had been handed to Hugh of 
Lusignan by Patriarch William. But though Gregory relied on his patriarch for government in 
the Holy Land, this does not mean that he wished to supplant Hugh for Charles. The new 
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patriarch, the Sicilian Thomas Agni of Lentini (1272-77), had visited the Holy Land before. 
He had arrived in Acre in 1259 as papal legate and newly-appointed bishop of Bethlehem, 
and acted as a papal representative to try to reconcile the Italian communes.
122
 He had also 
acted as an intermediary in a dispute between the Templars and the Hospitallers in the 1260s 
after Julian of Sidon had sold his land to the Templars – a sale which led to Julian being 
summoned before Hugh of Lusignan when he took the throne of Jerusalem.
123
 He then 
returned to the West and became archbishop of Cosenza, in southern Italy. His credentials 
were clear, and as early as 10 March 1272, Gregory wrote to Thomas of his appointment both 
as patriarch of Jerusalem and bishop of Acre.
124
 He had been given both positions until 
Jerusalem was recovered.
125
 Gregory also made Thomas his full papal legate in the whole of 
the Orient.
126
 It was Charles who arranged for Thomas to be sent to the Holy Land with aid, 
as Gregory wrote in a letter to King Philip.
127
 Gregory also wanted Charles to coordinate with 
the patriarch to send aid from the king of France to the Holy Land.
128
 The pope wrote that 
Charles was aware of the necessity for aid to the Holy Land to be expedited (no doubt 
through the Sicilian king’s own pre-existing interest in the Holy Land), and that Charles’ 
famous ancestors had answered the call to that land. Thus, Gregory wanted Charles, in 
concert with the patriarch, not to delay the departure of mercenaries and aid to the Holy Land 
that would be travelling through his land.
 129 
 
In what may well be the best indication that Gregory perceived that there was a lack 
of a strong governing figure in the Holy Land, he wrote to Edward (then still in Acre) that 
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Thomas was to be a governor [gubernator] in the Holy Land. Gregory had written near the 
beginning of his letter to Edward that ‘to this [business of the Holy Land] alone we have 
turned our devotion with vigilant contemplation, so that the aid of defence and of government 
would come forth to the land which we have left behind placed in a time of extreme 
necessity.’130 Gregory went on to tell Edward in the same letter ‘that a new athlete of the 
faithful has arisen, a shepherd and a very useful governor certainly keeping watch of the flock 
entrusted to him, namely, our venerable brother the patriarch of Jerusalem.’131 He let Edward 
know that through Thomas’ control of the church of Jerusalem, ‘we hope and we believe not 
less usefully to provide for the condition of the [Holy] Land.’132 The placing of Thomas in 
the Holy Land, and Gregory’s subsequent close contact with him, is an indication that the 
pope wanted to have close ties to the administration there. Thomas would become his key 
contact in the Holy Land for all matter of business – in terms of ecclesiastical appointments, 
supply of the Christian territories, and organisation of the crusade – until Simon of Brie was 
to come to supplant Thomas as the new full papal legate with King Philip of France (though, 
as it turned out, that never occurred).
133
 
 The evidence that remains of Thomas’ leadership role in the Holy Land does not 
indicate that he was placed to supplant Hugh, but rather to fill a governing role in Acre, no 
doubt because Hugh spent so much time in Cyprus. For example, in an August 1273 letter in 
which Thomas gave the Hospitallers two houses in Acre, he wrote that another man named 
Thomas, treasurer of the Hospitallers, had bought the two houses ‘for the utility and evident 
necessity of the whole city of Acre, according to prayers and our petitions, and [those of] 
Lord Hugh of Lusignan, king by grace of God of Cyprus and Jerusalem, [and others].’134 
Clearly Patriarch Thomas, Gregory’s own legate, recognized the authority of King Hugh in 
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Jerusalem. Likewise, in 1275, Thomas and the masters of the Templars and the Hospitallers 
acted as arbiters in the ongoing conflict between the Venetians and John of Montfort, lord of 
Tyre. The letter is long and full of legal language, but Thomas clearly wrote with 
consideration of the king still in mind: ‘if, however, the king does not give [consent], or puts 
off giving, within three weeks or a month, let it not be, on account of this, a prejudice to the 
king of Jerusalem.’135 Thomas was sent to the Holy Land as Gregory’s legate, so he would 
have been well-briefed in Gregory’s policy. The fact that Thomas respected the rule of King 
Hugh – however absent that rule may have been in practice – is surely evidence that Gregory 
respected it as well, even though he was not working closely with the king for provisioning 
the Holy Land with mercenaries. 
 Thomas must not have been able to solve all the problems in Acre himself, since 
Gregory had to write to the Hospitallers in July 1275 so that they would put an end to discord 
between themselves and the other religious orders in Acre.
136
 The letter does not make it clear 
whether Gregory was referring to conflict with the other religious military orders, or non-
military religious orders. Nor is nature of the conflict made clear. Gregory was only 
interested in ensuring that the Hospitallers made peace so that the conflict would not cause 
harm to the condition of the Holy Land. The only clue that might indicate that this was a 
conflict with a non-military order is that fact that Gregory says that the conflict was ‘between 
you [the Hospitallers] and other religious of Acre.’137 If it had been a conflict with another of 
the military orders, who had a presence throughout the Holy Land and Europe, then perhaps 
Gregory would not have pinpointed the religious of Acre specifically. In any case, this 
episode shows that Gregory was making attempts to keep the peace among the Christians in 
the Holy Land (and thus obviously, that there was a need to take action on keeping the peace 
at all). At the same time, Gregory was more than busy enough in Europe trying to keep peace 
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among the major political players there, as will be discussed in chapters five and six. But on 
this point, William of Beaujeu lamented that dissension among princes in the West was 
harming the Holy Land.
138
 If the pope wanted to keep what remained of the Holy Land 
together in time for his general passage, then he had his work cut out for him, since even the 
Hospitallers, who were meant to be safeguarding the Holy Land, were indulging in petty 
conflict in Acre. 
 Even before Thomas arrived in Acre, Gregory was in communication with him about 
the provision of appropriate aid. An especially interesting case related to potential crusaders. 
While the patriarchate of Jerusalem had been vacant after the death of William of Agen in 
1270 (during which time, of course, there was also a papal vacancy), the Templars and 
Hospitallers had been accepting the redemption of crusader vows in various places outside of 
the realm of Germany, with the Templars accepting up to 10,000 marks of silver, and the 
Hospitallers 2,000.
139
 Popes Innocent III and Alexander III had given permission to do this 
long before. Gregory particularly pointed out to Thomas that:  
With the pretext of the indulgence [from Innocent III], the same master and brothers of 
the Knights Templar in this way hitherto began to accept redemptions and bequests in 
the kingdom of Jerusalem, with the see of Jerusalem vacant, and you fear, as you assert, 
lest the said brothers of the Hospital wish to accept [redemptions and bequests] in the 
same kingdom to your prejudice and annoyance.
140
 
Thomas pointed out to Gregory that the patriarchs of Jerusalem had been accustomed to 
accept the money from the redemptions and bequests when the apostolic legate was not in the 
Holy Land.
141
 In fact, Thomas was both patriarch and legate. As a result, Gregory wrote to 
the Templars on 13 April 1272, telling them ‘that by no means may you presume to receive 
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the same redemptions and bequests in the kingdom [of Jerusalem].’142 Perhaps this was an 
honest mistake; after all, before Thomas arrived, there had been neither legate nor patriarch in 
the Holy Land to collect the money. Some of the money might have gone to the military 
orders anyway to pay for the defence of the Holy Land. Nevertheless, the Templars’ illicit 
collection of this money might also be one of the reasons that Gregory told Thomas: ‘for 
when once 60,000 livres tournois were assigned in funding for the [Holy] Land by King 
Louis of France of famous memory, the carelessness
143
 of the ministers turned it not to the 
advantage of the [Holy] Land but as it were entirely ruined it,’ as was discussed in chapter 
three.
144
 This was all the more reason to have a strong governing presence in the Holy Land; 
and for Gregory, it would not hurt to have someone he could keep a close eye on, since the 
pope was the one arranging for the new funds that were going to supply the Holy Land. 
 
 Gregory’s Addresses to Hugh of Lusignan 
 
Gregory did not work closely with Hugh, nor with any of the other permanent secular 
magnates of the Latin East; nevertheless, this does not indicate that Gregory wished to 
overthrow Hugh’s rule. As will be shown, Gregory addressed Hugh of Lusignan as both king 
of Cyprus and Jerusalem throughout his papal tenure, with little exception. Certainly, the 
naming of a title does not necessarily indicate Gregory’s policy towards Hugh’s regime in 
Jerusalem; nevertheless, Gregory’s addresses to Hugh should not be dismissed as simply 
copying a form of address which he had received (that is to say, that he was simply 
addressing Hugh in a form which Hugh had given himself in a letter addressed to Gregory). 
Gregory’s letters to Maria of Antioch and to the archbishop of Nazareth made it clear that the 
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form of address that the pope used for Hugh was very much on his mind.
145
 It is thus 
extremely unlikely that he would have been so absentminded as to use the title ‘king of 
Jerusalem’ without conscious intention. Firstly, on 19 March 1272, Gregory announced 
Thomas’ appointment as patriarch of Jerusalem and bishop of Acre to the Hospitallers and 
the Templars.
146
 He let it be known that Thomas had full legatine power. Following on 17 
April, Gregory wrote to the clergy in Cyprus, Armenia, and the mainland crusader territories, 
as well as to the king of Armenia and the prince of Antioch that Thomas was the legate and 
patriarch.
147
 Importantly, Gregory also wrote to Hugh of Lusignan at this time to tell him the 
same, and addressed him as king of Cyprus and Jerusalem.
148
 This was one of four extant 
cases in which Gregory addressed Hugh as king of Jerusalem, and not just of Cyprus.
149
 
One can only assume that Hugh of Lusignan received word from Gregory of the 
general council, although the surviving letters of invitation are limited, as noted in chapter 
two. It is clear that Gregory wrote in late March and early April to leading ecclesiastical and 
secular figures in the West.
150
 Gregory wrote to Thomas, patriarch of Jerusalem, as well as to 
all the other ecclesiastical figures in the Holy Land to invite them to the general council.
151
 
With some delay from the earliest invitations, on 24 October 1272, Gregory invited Michael 
Palaeologus, the Byzantine emperor, to the council.
152
 Following these up in the next year, on 
11 March 1273, Gregory sent another invitation to the council (with the location of Lyons 
set), which he directed to all the ecclesiastical figures in the West, as well as to the patriarch 
of Jerusalem, the patriarch of the Greeks, the Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Teutonic 
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Knights.
153
 There are no indications that Gregory sent word to the secular leaders of the Latin 
East, with the exception of the king of Armenia, whom he entreated to send any letters that 
may concern previous councils, especially Nicaea.
154
 Nevertheless, though no letters exist 
about it, the other secular leaders in the Holy Land (including Hugh) could not but have 
known of the council. Realistically, however, the Holy Land could not be emptied of its 
leadership when it faced such a dire threat. 
 Though Gregory was not addressing Hugh directly, it is still useful to understanding 
his conception of him to note the cases in which Gregory spoke of Hugh. After Thomas’ 
arrival in Outremer, the pope urged him to take council with the king of Cyprus and 
Jerusalem, as well as the bishop of Tortosa, the masters of the Hospitallers, Templars, and 
Teutonic Knights, and the captains of the pilgrims, about how to use the resources assigned to 
him.
155
 This is the only case in which Gregory gives any indication that someone from among 
the permanent secular leadership in the Holy Land should be included in organisation. 
However, when Gregory wanted King Philip to send aid to the Holy Land, as was seen in 
chapter three, he told him to send the aid to Oliver of Termes.
156
 There is no indication that 
he wanted Philip to coordinate this aid with any other figure in the Holy Land. When Oliver 
had arrived in the Holy Land, Gregory sent to the patriarch to tell him to put the mercenaries 
under his command.
157
 There was not even a hint of possibility that the mercenaries would 
serve Hugh, or even his constable, marshal, or seneschal, since they were not mentioned at 
all.  
Not long after Oliver’s arrival, probably shortly after May 1273, Gregory wrote to the 
patriarch instructing him to give suitable funding to John of Grailly, the seneschal of the 
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kingdom, who had crusaded with Lord Edward.
158
 It is at this same time that Gregory wrote 
his only other letter addressed directly to Hugh of Lusignan as king of Jerusalem.
159
 In this 
case, too, he named him king of Cyprus and Jerusalem. Gregory congratulated Hugh on 
restoring peace between himself and his barons. Hugh had urged Gregory to send the new 
master of the Templars quickly to the Holy Land, and also to give funding to John of Grailly. 
Gregory assured Hugh that the aid to the Holy Land was coming from the king of France, and 
that the patriarch would be able to supply John of Grailly with the necessary funding (as was 
also made clear in Gregory’s letter to Thomas). Gregory then urged Hugh, together with his 
magnates, the patriarch, and the other inhabitants to do all that they could to guard the Holy 
Land. This was before Maria of Antioch had made her plea at the Second Council of Lyons, 
but shows that in 1273, as in 1272, Gregory considered Hugh to be the king of Jerusalem. 
 When Gregory was at the Second Council of Lyons, his address to Hugh of Lusignan 
changed. Gregory wrote to Hugh, calling him only king of Cyprus, to inform him that the 
Pisans were no longer under excommunication, and that he had restored their privileges in the 
kingdom of Jerusalem.
160
 While Gregory did not call Hugh ‘king of Jerusalem,’ he was still 
giving him directions concerning that realm. In this case and at this time (20 June 1274), 
Gregory was at least acknowledging that Hugh was in power in the kingdom, even though he 
had no longer addressed him with the title of king of Jerusalem. Clearly there was something 
provoking this move, and it was most certainly the presence of Maria of Antioch at the 
Second Council of Lyons. More on this matter will be discussed in the next section, but even 
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in 1274 Gregory was still acknowledging that Hugh held de facto control of the kingdom of 
Jerusalem.  
Crucially, on 11 July 1275, Gregory wrote his last surviving letter which named Hugh 
of Lusignan.
161
 Guiraud’s edited volume of Gregory’s registers noted that Hugh was named 
only the king of Cyprus, but in the original document it is clear that Gregory actually named 
Hugh ‘illustrious king of Jerusalem and Cyprus.’162 This is the strongest evidence yet that 
Gregory, even after Maria had approached the Second Council of Lyons, still considered 
Hugh to be the king of Jerusalem. After the council, and presumably after Maria was no 
longer on his very doorstep, Gregory resumed naming Hugh king of Jerusalem. In the 1275 
letter to Patriarch Thomas, Gregory asked him to help Cardinal-deacon Ottobono of Fieschi’s 
chaplain, Bertholino, to find a vacant position in a cathedral in the realm of Cyprus (Guiraud 
wrote ‘a cathedral of the kingdoms of Cyprus and Jerusalem,’ but it is clear from the original 
source that it was only ‘in any cathedral church of the kingdom of Cyprus’).163 The 
connections here are diverse. When he was an archdeacon, Gregory had served with 
Ottobono during his mission to England, although Gregory and Ottobono (the future Pope 
Hadrian V) might not have been completely likeminded. When Ottobono became pope, he 
annulled Gregory’s decree on elections that imposed increasingly severe deprivations on the 
cardinals until they chose a new pope.
164
 Ottobono was a close ally of Charles of Anjou, the 
man who helped urge his election after the death of Gregory’s successor, Pope Innocent V.165 
In another twist of connections, Ottobono’s chaplain, Bertholino, was the son of one of King 
Hugh’s knights, Henry of Sora, as was noted in Gregory’s letter. The letter was written to the 
                                                 
161
 RGX, n. 619 (RV37, f. 231v-232r). 
162
 ‘Jerusalem et Cipri Regis Illustris.’ Ibid. 
163
 Guiraud’s interpretation: ‘Cathedrali regnorum Cypri et Jerosolimitani.’ The correct form: ‘In aliqua 
ecclesia Regni Cipri Cathedrali.’ Ibid. 
164
 Eracles, p. 477. 
165
 Charles calls Ottobono ‘our dearest compatriot and friend’ (‘karissimi compatris et amici nostri’) in a letter 
which also mentioned that Ottobono’s brother, Percival, was working as a chaplain for Pope Gregory. RA, vol. 
10, p. 91, n. 364. See also Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the 
Later Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1958), p. 172-3. 
171 
 
  
patriarch of Jerusalem, and thus did not necessarily have to stick to the conventional niceties 
and name Hugh the king of Jerusalem. Hugh might never see the letter. Nevertheless, 
Gregory did call Hugh the king of Jerusalem, and he called him this to the official papal 
representative in the Holy Land – the man who it is reasonable to believe was well-versed in 
papal policy. It is clear, then, that as Gregory was in the final year of his papacy, approaching 
his death in January 1276, that he still considered Hugh to be the king of Jerusalem. 
Gregory’s treatment of Hugh as king of Jerusalem was thus consistent throughout his papal 
tenure. 
 
 Maria of Antioch’s Claim to the Throne of Jerusalem 
 
The evidence from Gregory’s papal registers demonstrates that he never stopped 
treating Hugh as king of Jerusalem, and though Gregory placed Thomas in Acre to fill a 
governing role, it was not meant as a threat to Hugh’s own rule. For his part, Charles’ 
chancery records demonstrate an interest in the Holy Land both before and during Gregory’s 
pontificate. More than an interest in the Holy Land, Charles also had an influence there. It 
was Charles who stood to gain from taking the throne of Jerusalem, since it was his prestige 
that would increase, and it had been supplies from his own kingdom of Sicily that were the 
lifeblood for the Latin inhabitants of the Holy Land. Moreover, it was Charles who arranged 
to buy Maria of Antioch’s claim to the throne after Gregory had died. Gregory’s alleged role 
in the matter must therefore be re-examined, and the impetus for the deal placed on Charles’ 
shoulders.  
 Maria based her claim upon her closer degree of relationship with Isabella I of 
Jerusalem, who was the common link (though through no less than three of her daughters) for 
Maria, Hugh of Brienne, and Hugh of Lusignan, to Conradin, the legitimate king of 
172 
 
  
Jerusalem until his execution by Charles of Anjou. Conradin was descended from Isabella I’s 
marriage to Conrad of Montferrat, and their daughter Maria of Jerusalem. Conradin was thus 
Isabella I’s great-great grandson. Maria of Antioch was Isabella I’s granddaughter through 
her daughter Melissande, the youngest from her fourth marriage to Amaury II of Cyprus and 
Jerusalem. Hugh of Lusignan and Hugh of Brienne were both great-grandsons of Isabella, 
through Isabella’s daughter Alice, her second daughter from her third marriage with Henry of 
Champagne. Hugh of Brienne was the son of Alice’s eldest daughter, Marie, and Hugh of 
Lusignan was the son of her second daughter, Isabella. Maria was therefore closer to Isabella 
I of Jerusalem generationally, which, according to Riley-Smith, ‘made good law.’ He 
continued that that her claims ‘were obviously based on the precedent established by Hugh 
[of Lusignan] himself and the high court in 1264 and confirmed in 1268: that primogeniture 
did not apply to the inheritance of the crown, the only relevant criterion being that of 
consanguinity.’166 Both Hugh of Brienne and Hugh of Lusignan were descended from an 
older offspring, and as Riley-Smith also noted (perhaps confusingly) ‘primogeniture was 
recognised for the transmission of the crown.’167 Primogeniture would only have been 
recognised under ideal circumstances, such as that which gave Conradin himself the title 
through his father Conrad, and his grandmother, Isabella II. If it had been primogeniture that 
applied after Hugh’s death (which, admittedly, it did not), then Hugh of Brienne would have 
the throne of Cyprus and Jerusalem, and Maria of Antioch’s claim would have followed not 
only Hugh of Lusignan, but also the descendants of Alice’s younger sister Philippa, who had 
married Erard of Brienne. After Philippa’s descendants, Maria would still follow, it is 
interesting to note, the descendants of the marriage of her mother’s older sister, Sibylla, to the 
king of Armenia. King Leo II, as noted above, had been in contact with both Charles of 
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Anjou and Pope Gregory X, though for unspecified reasons. There is no evidence that he 
pursued the crown. 
 On Hugh of Lusignan’s gaining of the throne of Jerusalem, Riley-Smith wrote: ‘so 
false was his position that in 1324 his grandson could only suggest that the high court had 
decided in his favour because he was male.’168 Nevertheless, Hugh of Lusignan was given the 
crown of Jerusalem based on his nearer relationship to the person last in the position of 
regent, Hugh II of Cyprus. It certainly did not help Maria’s case that she was over forty years 
old, unmarried, and childless, and that Hugh of Lusignan was in the prime of his years, and 
already holding the de facto power of the kingship of Jerusalem. What then did Maria 
actually hope to gain from her claim? Did she actually wish to rule, given that she was very 
likely in no position to produce an heir, or were there already plans to sell her claim to 
Charles, as Riley-Smith tentatively suggested?
169
 
 Charles was no stranger to the dispute over the throne of Jerusalem even before he 
became overtly involved, since it cannot be forgotten that it was through him that the last 
direct claimant – Conradin – was executed. An entry in the Angevin chancery records in June 
1271 noted that the Hospitallers were free from taxation from the time before Emperor 
Frederick II’s deposition up to the ‘happy times’ of Charles’ own rule. They were also owed 
three ballistae, which were to be provided to them for shipment to Acre.
170
 By mentioning 
Frederick’s rule in Sicily and dealings with the Hospitallers in the Holy Land, and then 
connecting this to his own rule and relationship with the Hospitallers, Charles was drawing a 
link with Frederick’s rule and his own. Charles was fulfilling the same obligations to the 
Hospitallers and the Holy Land that Frederick had before. The question that arises, then, was 
how far did Charles go in comparing his position with that of Frederick in the past? Did this 
comparison go as far as his rule in the Holy Land, especially considering that not only was 
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Charles ruling Frederick’s former Sicilian territory, but that it was he who executed 
Frederick’s grandson Conradin, heir to the throne of Sicily and Jerusalem? No definite 
answer can be given, but the links are suggestive, and led Grousset to write that as ‘successor 
of Frederick II in the kingdom of Sicily, the Angevin monarch intended to succeed him also 
in the kingdom of Jerusalem.’171 Charles’ personal ideas in connection with Frederick’s rule 
are impossible to discover. What can be reconstructed, however, is the practical side of 
Charles’ dealings with the Latin East, and what they reveal about his interest and influence in 
the Latin East. Only through this kind of evidence can one link Charles to the kingdom of 
Jerusalem.  
No one has been able to demonstrate a connection between Charles of Anjou and 
Maria of Antioch before Gregory’s reign and the final sale of her claim in 1277, but it is clear 
from the Angevin chancery records that Charles and Maria knew each other, even before he 
purchased her claim to the throne of Jerusalem. The link can be dated even before the Second 
Council of Lyons – as early, in fact, as 1270, when a ship carrying the goods of Maria, 
‘daughter of the late prince of Antioch,’ was sunk. Maria had certain objects in a box, but that 
box had been found opened and emptied. Charles ordered anything that could be found of the 
stolen property to be tracked down and that the guilty be arrested.
172
 It is not clear what the 
stolen items were. Soon after, Maria entered again into the chancery records, when Charles 
ordered a payment of some money to her.
173
 There is no indication of the reason behind this 
payment, but the letter is dated 1271 – the year before Gregory returned to the West to 
assume the papacy, and thus before Gregory could have had anything to do with linking 
Charles and Maria together for any reason. Charles had no familial relation to Maria, and no 
reason to pay her any money at this time unless some of her stolen money had finally been 
found. It is possible that he gave this money out of the goodness of his heart, since there is 
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evidence in 1276 that Maria was poor (perhaps due to the shipwreck), but equally possible 
that the money was given in prelude to the eventual exchange of Maria’s claim to the 
throne.
174
 
 Maria had come to the West to make her claim known to the Roman Curia, although 
of course there was no pope present until Gregory’s arrival in the beginning of 1272. Maria 
complained to the new pope that he had written to Hugh of Lusignan as the king of 
Jerusalem. This had to have been a non-extant letter written before the abovementioned one 
that Gregory had sent on 17 April 1272
175
 to announce that Thomas was the new patriarch of 
Jerusalem and apostolic legate in the Holy Land, since Gregory’s letter in response to Maria’s 
complaint was dated 13 April 1272.
176
 Gregory assured Maria that in calling Hugh the king of 
Jerusalem: 
It was not our intention, just as neither it ought to be nor appear, that by this form of 
address or denomination in our letter hitherto placed, or in the future perhaps placed, that 
a prejudice should be produced for you, whither to the realm of Jerusalem, that you 
claim to consider for yourself.
177
  
Clearly it was prudent of Gregory to warn Maria that the term ‘king of Jerusalem’ might be 
applied to Hugh again in the future, since he did so only four days after his letter to her! 
Gregory took his time to investigate Maria’s claim, which may indicate the delicacy of the 
situation, or that he did not take it particularly seriously; given Gregory’s fastidiousness, it 
was probably the former. He did not write to the archbishop of Nazareth, and the bishops of 
Bethlehem and Baniyas, until 24 October 1272.
178
 In his letter, he deputed them to investigate 
the claims of Maria and Hugh. It is interesting that this letter did not include the newly 
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elected patriarch of Jerusalem, who arrived in Acre in October 1272, but Gregory had ample 
opportunity to discuss the situation with Thomas before he left for Acre. 
 The archbishop and bishops were told that the former patriarch of Jerusalem, William 
of Agen, had enjoined the bishop of Lydda to crown Hugh, and when Maria told the bishop 
of her claim, the bishop scornfully dismissed it, or considered it worthless. Then, ‘according 
to his own pleasure,’ the bishop ‘was alleged’ to have crowned Hugh the king of Jerusalem 
de facto, since he was not able to crown him de jure.
179
 Clearly Gregory was laying out the 
facts as Maria would have presented them to him in person. On William’s choice, Bernard 
Hamilton wrote that: 
In giving his support to Hugh rather than to the lady Mary, the patriarch was acting in a 
disinterested way, since the presence of a king would undoubtedly diminish his own 
power in temporal affairs. Yet it was a course of action which the peril of the kingdom 
made necessary, since what Acre needed above all was a strong military leader and 
somebody who could co-ordinate Frankish resistance to the Mamluks, which the king of 
Jerusalem and Cyprus must have seemed capable of doing.
180
 
As has been demonstrated, it does not seem that Hugh was actually able to take as strong a 
position as leader as William perhaps hoped he would, and Patriarch Thomas continued to act 
in a governing role with Hugh on the throne. At any rate, to sort out the claimants’ dispute, 
Gregory instructed the archbishop and the bishops to investigate the two claims to see which 
one was valid. They were also told to encourage the king of Cyprus (in this case, not called 
king of Jerusalem) to represent himself to the papacy, and to lay out his case according to the 
dictates of reason. They were to report back to him within nine months. Unfortunately, no 
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record remains of their report if they made one at all, and it seems that it was not these 
officials who came to the general council.
181
  
Maria presented her claim again at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, and 
representatives from Hugh of Lusignan came from the East to make the case for him as well. 
Technically, the papal court did not actually have the power to make a decision on this case, 
which the Eracles noted the cardinal-bishop of Albano, Bonaventure himself, pointed out at 
the general council. Thus the case was judged to appertain to the barons of the kingdom of 
Jerusalem.
182
 Beyond this, if any sort of judgement were made by the papal court, then it had 
to have been in favour of Hugh of Lusignan, since Gregory continued to treat him as king of 
Jerusalem after the council. Hugh’s representatives at the council were named in the Eracles 
as the archbishop of Tyre, the bishop of Paphos, John of Grailly (the seneschal of the 
kingdom), William of Corceles (a Hospitaller), James Vidal, and Enguerrand of Jorni.
183
 
Tantalizingly, to this list one might also add a Templar brother named Arnulf, whom the 
Eracles neglected to mention, but who was included in a list of those given secure conduct by 
Charles of Anjou to go to the Second Council of Lyons.
184
 Arnulf is listed in the Angevin 
chancery records alongside the abovementioned William, James and Enguerrand.
185
 The fact 
that Charles gave the four men secure conduct together seems to indicate that they were 
travelling together, but since Arnulf was not mentioned in the Eracles as having been sent by 
Hugh to represent him, it is likely that Arnulf was not travelling to the council to plead on 
behalf of Hugh. Instead, he could have been placed there by Charles in support of Maria, who 
of course had already been in contact with the Templars. Indeed, the Eracles also noted that:  
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Lady Maria (who had always been pursuing the court because she had always put debate 
to the kingdom of Jerusalem and demanded it as her very own inheritance) had already 
very well fully [taken] this step through Templar messengers, who had come to King 
Charles in order to hasten him to do it, and who for a long time had been speaking of 
making a gift to the said King Charles of the right that she had to the said kingdom.
186
  
Thus, the relationship between Maria, the Templars, and Charles is made even clearer, with 
no evidence that Gregory was involved. 
 
 The Relationship between Gregory and Charles 
 
The relationship between Gregory and Charles has been a point of contention, and 
must be addressed in order to understand to what degree they could have worked together, 
considering that they are alleged to have colluded to gain the throne for Charles. Runciman 
wrote without explanation that Gregory did not seem to like Charles very much, although 
Gregory’s nephew, whom he later raised to cardinal, ‘had worked as a judge for Charles in 
Provence and had been raised by him to be archbishop of Aix.’187 The only indication that 
Gregory had a problem with Charles came from the contemporary Saba Malaspina, who 
wrote that the pope had written to Charles before the general council about unrest in Sicily, 
but he did so ‘with fatherly affection.’188 Afterwards, Gregory was grieved by Charles’ 
detaining of the Templar and Hospitaller shipments, but this stoppage did not last at least for 
the Templars, and there is no reason to think that Gregory’s grief did either. Gregory’s 
alleged aversion to Charles does not seem to be true, and in fact the connections between 
Gregory’s family and Charles ran even deeper than just Gregory’s nephew, Visconte 
Visconti, the archbishop of Aix-en-Provence and later cardinal-bishop of Palestrina. But in 
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any case, just because Gregory and Charles did get along does not mean that Gregory would 
have risked the peace of Christendom to put Charles on the throne of Jerusalem. 
Although Gregory frustrated Charles’ plans to attack the Byzantines, this did not 
prevent Charles from making use of Gregory’s relatives in various roles. The chancery 
records indicate that Charles employed William and Henry Visconti, nephews of the pope, in 
several different positions as soon as the pope had been elected, and perhaps even before. He 
prevailed on them in 1271 or 1272 to help protect the goods of Henry Contardi, a citizen of 
Genoa.
189
 At the same time, Charles gave Henry Visconti over 480 livres for unspecified 
reasons, although perhaps this was in compensation for the protection of Henry Contardi’s 
goods.
190
 Charles also conceded to Henry and William Visconti an annual provision of 40 
ingots of gold for the possession of a land fief, and later gave ‘a certain amount of money’ to 
Henry.
191
 The fief in question was that which Charles conceded to Henry and William 
Visconti, and their heirs: the castle of Mistretta and manor of Tripi in Sicily. They were to 
keep them so long as they acted to their improvement.
192
 In 1272 or 1273, Charles then asked 
William Visconti, ‘nephew of the lord pope,’ to be rector of the duchy of Spoleto in order to 
defend it from rebellion against the Church.
193
 In September 1275, Charles ordered William 
to receive the rebels back into the realm, because their ban had been lifted by the Church.
194
 
Following in March 1276, Charles sent William, ‘knight and blood brother,’ to Lombardy 
‘for carrying out certain difficult tasks of his.’195 This was after Pope Gregory had died, and 
Charles had no need to curry his favour for the throne. 
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 One of the more interesting connections between Gregory and Charles was a certain 
‘Gregory Visconti,’ a knight from Piacenza, who was in Charles’ service. As early as 1270, 
Charles had written to Provence so that this Gregory, a knight, could get his pay.
196
 After 
1274, he served as Charles’ vicar of Marseilles,197 as well as vicar of Tarascon (northwest of 
Marseilles),
198
 and vicar of Grasse (northeast of Marseilles).
199
 This young Gregory Visconti 
was never linked directly to Pope Gregory, as Visconte, William, and Henry had been. He 
was, however, mentioned concurrently with the archbishop of Aix-en-Provence, Visconte 
Visconti, so they were almost certainly related. Perhaps decorum linked to illegitimacy 
prevented the outright naming of Gregory Visconti as related to Pope Gregory. Charles also 
ordered this Gregory, vicar of Marseilles, to prevent the sale of goods to the Muslims, 
because Pope Gregory had ordered this for the good of the crusade movement.
200
  
 As Jean Dunbabin wrote, ‘Charles was always willing to give jobs to the relatives of 
those from whom he had already obtained good service.’201 This was certainly true, and there 
is a complex web of relationships connecting Pope Gregory, Charles, and many of the major 
players in this period. Like Charles, Gregory rewarded those close to him, and this included 
those close to Charles. Gregory put Fulk of Podio Riccardi, whom Charles and the cardinals 
had sent to tell Gregory of his election, in charge of the march of Ancona in May 1272, very 
soon after Gregory was made pope.
202
 The other election messenger, the Templar Stephen of 
Syse, later acted as a messenger for Gregory.
203
 One of the brothers of Thomas, the patriarch 
of Jerusalem, was Giovanni of Lentini, who served Charles as vice-admiral of Sicily and 
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Calabria.
204
 For Charles, the patriarch himself had, according to Dunbabin, ‘played a valuable 
role in the defeat of Conradin and subsequently regularly witnessed royal charters. Gregory 
X’s decision in 1272 to translate [Thomas] to the patriarchate of Jerusalem must have been a 
serious blow to Charles.’205 It may not have been so serious a blow as Dunbabin believed. If 
Thomas were so close to Charles, perhaps it was quite useful for him to have someone in the 
Holy Land whom he could trust. Indeed, as mentioned above, the patriarch had been in 
contact with Charles to give information about the Holy Land. Another of Thomas’ brothers, 
Raymond, was archbishop of Messina under Charles.
206
 A potential association between 
Charles and Thomas should not be taken too far, especially in the case of Charles taking the 
throne of Jerusalem. Thomas had actually tried to convince Hugh of Lusignan to come back 
to Acre when he abandoned the city in 1276.
207
 If Thomas were really working with Charles, 
or at least in support of him, he probably would not have minded Hugh’s departure.  
 
 Gregory’s Role in the Exchange of the Throne of Jerusalem 
  
One of the most overlooked pieces of the puzzle in the debate over Gregory’s role in 
the exchange of the throne of Jerusalem is a letter dated at the end of 1275, which Gregory 
sent to Charles.
208
 It shows that Gregory placed peace in Christendom above all else so that 
his crusade could move forward. Since unseating Hugh of Lusignan would have caused 
conflict, Gregory was against it. Gregory’s opinion on unseating Hugh in Cyprus is thus a 
good indication of how he likely felt about unseating him in Jerusalem, since Gregory 
himself connected them in his letter. It is clear that at the end of 1275, just before Gregory 
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died, he still upheld the view that Hugh of Lusignan was the king of Jerusalem, and there is 
no indication that Gregory was planning to take his throne away. 
In the letter, Gregory explicitly warned Charles of Anjou not to help Hugh of Brienne 
(who was in service to Charles) invade the kingdom of Cyprus to unseat Hugh of Lusignan. 
Gregory’s address to Charles is here included in detail not only because Gregory’s own 
words explain things clearly, but because the letter was very well-written, with particular 
passion. He wrote to Charles that: 
It is abundantly clear that that modest bit of the Holy Land which Christianity still holds 
lies open to huge dangers principally because, drained of wealth and bereft of the 
assistance of soldiers, it not only falls short of the defence of what it has when the forces 
of its inhabitants are brought together by the unity of reconciliation, but there is still a 
shortfall even through reliance on others. So what if it were to be exposed to the rifts of 
feuds?  Once riches fall away through them, surely they will not accumulate from their 
drained condition? When strong things are weakened, surely in their weak state they will 
not recover their health? Surely it seems in every way to be more an assumption than a 
potential concern that it will not stay standing under a mass of internal feuding, since 
faced with claims from outside Cyprus it will be hard pressed to remain firm in its 
security of internal harmony.
209
  
Therefore, Gregory told Charles that it was ‘not without cause’ that the plan of Hugh of 
Brienne to invade the kingdom of Cyprus ‘disturbs our mind with great anxiety.’ Gregory 
was worried:  
Lest this very count, by laying the aforesaid kingdom open to the dividing force of 
massive disruption by invading it like this, is exposing to the hands of its enemies that 
state of Christian brotherhood of the past reconstituted in that region, as is our current 
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hope through God’s almighty power. When two parties are in contention, a third who is 
hostile to both will fish in the troubled waters.
210
 
Gregory had just healed the schism with the Greeks, although it was still very tenuous, since 
the Greek emperor had only agreed to the union to prevent Charles from attacking 
Byzantium. Cyprus was largely Greek, and would have been a good staging point for an 
attack on Byzantine territory. Gregory therefore warned Charles against the plan, and wanted 
the king to use his own influence with Hugh of Brienne to stop the plan from happening:  
In respect of winning back Hugh of Brienne’s right to the throne, the count himself 
should cut off all hope of recovering that right which, as he claims, the judicial system is 
proceeding to restore to him. So we sincerely beseech your highness, and we urge you 
laying this injunction upon you for the remission of your sins, that you absolutely block 
this plan of the said count, and do not allow it to be put into effect in any degree, for fear 
that through the dissensions within Christendom itself the forces of the enemies of the 
cross  may gather strength at such great confusion over the name of “Christian”, and the 
route to liberating the land in question through the pious decisions of the council would 
be completely cut short.
211
 
Gregory’s impassioned plea gives every indication that he had no intention of supporting the 
removal of Hugh from the kingdom of Cyprus, and even more, that he had no desire for the 
peace of Christendom to be disturbed by internal wars. Therefore, any notion that it was 
Gregory who encouraged Charles to buy Maria’s claim to the throne of Jerusalem must be 
discounted once and for all.  
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 Conclusion 
 
 It is clear that Charles’ interest in the Holy Land existed even before Gregory became 
pope, and it continued under Gregory’s pontificate. Charles’ supply of the Holy Land had 
become a crucial part of the survival of the Latin East, and meant that he had significant 
influence there, which he did not hesitate to use. For his part, Gregory acknowledged that the 
Latin East was lacking a strong government, but he never gave any indication that he wanted 
to remove Hugh from the throne in favour of Charles. Throughout his papal reign, Gregory 
and his papal legate Thomas consistently treated Hugh as king of Jerusalem. There is no 
proof that Gregory even believed Maria of Antioch’s claim was better than Hugh’s, let alone 
proof that the pope wanted Charles to buy that claim. Gregory gave every indication that 
peace in Christendom was of the utmost importance, thus it is a near certainty that he would 
have wanted nothing to do with Charles’ plan to take the throne of Jerusalem. 
In March 1277, more than a year after Pope Gregory X had died, Charles purchased 
Maria’s rights to the throne of Jerusalem for 4,000 livres tournois a year, plus 10,000 Saracen 
bezants a year from Acre.
212
 Charles then sent Roger of San Severino to govern the kingdom 
for him.
213
 Giving up for the time being in the face of opposition from the Templars, 
Venetians, and Charles, Hugh of Lusignan had left for Cyprus. Bernard Hamilton wrote that 
‘this change of government was, on the whole, beneficial to Frankish Syria, for Sicily was the 
nearest great western power to the Holy Land, her ruler was on friendly terms with the 
Mamluk sultan of Egypt, and his rule afforded the best protection for which the Franks could 
hope in the absence of a new crusade.’214 Given Charles’ extensive furnishing of the Holy 
Land with supplies from his own kingdom of Sicily, this may have some credence, but the 
                                                 
212
 Riley-Smith, Feudal, p. 223. 
213
 According to the Gestes, Roger came with letters from the pope, who would have been John XXI, but on this 
point, Crawford has rightly noted that the idea that the papal court had given Charles the throne was a 
fabrication spread by Charles’ agents. Gestes, p. 783. ‘Templar,’ p. 74.  
214
 Hamilton, Latin Church, p. 277. 
185 
 
  
fact that Charles himself was yet another absentee king meant that the Holy Land still lacked 
a strong central governing force on the ground, which had been Gregory’s concern from the 
very time he took the papal office. 
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POLITICAL EXIGENCIES AND GREGORY’S CRUSADE 
 
Chapter Five 
 
 
 
Introduction: Gregory’s Crusading Priorities 
 
There is no way of knowing with absolute certainty what Gregory’s crusading 
priorities would have been had he been forced to deal with, say, the Cathar heresy, or a 
hostile Holy Roman emperor, as other popes had before him. These conflicts had taken equal 
footing with the Holy Land in the past, and had more than once absorbed the efforts of the 
papacy. But they were a non-issue in Gregory’s time. However, there had been other 
substantial theatres for crusade that had taken up significant resources and time: crusades 
against the Byzantines, crusades against ‘pagans,’ and the Iberian reconquest. These 
continued to confront the papacy during Gregory’s time. At least in these cases, one may see 
how Gregory aligned his crusading priorities. The traditional position on this in the 
historiography has been that Gregory was wholly devoted to the Holy Land crusade. This has 
been endorsed by Burkhard Roberg, who wrote that ‘the pilgrim’s spirituality pointed him to 
the Terra Sancta and so Tedaldo/Gregory later tried to give that direction back to the whole 
crusade movement.’1 Likewise, Palmer Throop has noted that ‘the astute pope could not be 
easily turned aside from his supreme aim: the recovery of the Holy Land.’2 Gatto accepted 
‘chronicle evidence’ that ‘Gregory X identified the cause of the Holy Land with the very 
purpose of his life.’3 Schein added that ‘until his death he preserved a vivid recollection of 
Jerusalem and worked for its recovery. His genuine devotion to the cause of the Holy Land 
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became the basis of this whole policy. [...] Indeed Gregory X’s obsession with sending a 
crusade there is unequalled in any pope save Innocent III.’4 
Gregory devoted so much energy to organising aid for the Holy Land during his 
papacy that it would seem at first glance that he had neither the interest nor the time for 
crusading anywhere else. Indeed, when pressed by Bruno of Olomouc to direct the crusade 
towards the pagans of north-eastern Europe (ostensibly because it would benefit his patron, 
King Ottokar of Bohemia), Gregory responded unfavourably. Direct evidence is lacking on 
the pope’s response, but given the direction of Gregory’s crusading efforts, it seems 
reasonable for Throop to point out that Bruno’s motives behind his recommendation for 
crusading in the northeast ‘must have left Gregory X unmoved in his determination to put the 
welfare of the Holy Land above all other considerations.’5 Gregory was also not in favour of 
a new crusade against the Byzantines, given his work at reconciliation with Emperor Michael 
Palaeologus and the Greek Church. Deno Geanakoplos’ Emperor Michael Palaeologus and 
the West remains a valuable text on this aspect of Gregory’s papacy, and he wrote that ‘while 
desisting therefore from an outright demand for Angevin disarmament, and, in particular, 
permitting Charles to maintain his offensive positions in Epirus and Achaia, Gregory 
nonetheless insisted to Charles on the absolute pre-eminence of negotiations for union.’6 
With the denial of crusade in the northeast, and the negotiations with the Greeks taking 
priority over Charles’ crusading hopes, Gregory had limited the crusading options in favour 
of that to the Holy Land. 
On the surface, it would also seem that Gregory did not have much time or interest for 
the crusade in Iberia. This notion is supported by the fact that there are no extant letters from 
the early part of his reign in which he even mentioned crusading in Iberia. Gregory had also 
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modelled his crusading decree Constitutiones pro Zelo fidei in part on the work of Pope 
Innocent III, who, as Powell has noted, had actually:  
Revoked the indulgences previously accorded to those who aided the Reconquista in 
Spain and the ongoing war against the Albigensian heretics in southern France on the 
grounds that recent successes on both fronts made them unnecessary, but he hastened to 
add that he was willing to reassess his position whenever a change might require it.
7
 
On this part, however, Gregory differed from Innocent. As will be demonstrated, Gregory 
was open to crusading in Iberia even before the Marinid invasion of 1275 would have forced 
him to reassess any position against it. In point of fact, Gregory was not so single-minded that 
he would not bend his plans for the Holy Land when necessity arose. Throop has written that 
‘to secure Alfonso’s renunciation to his [imperial] claims, Gregory promised him the six 
years crusade tithe of his kingdom to be used in a crusade against the Saracens of Spain. This 
was Gregory’s one capitulation to the policy of diverting crusading force from the Holy 
Land.’8 This was an important exception, since, as Schein has rightly pointed out, Gregory 
had been taking pains to prevent the commutation of vows to the Holy Land.
9
 Beyond 
Throop’s passing remarks, this important crusade policy point for Gregory’s papacy has been 
left unexamined. Given the extremely fragile nature of the Holy Land in this time – which 
was acknowledged by Gregory, and is not merely known through the hindsight of the 
historian – the ‘diversion’ of crusading force, to use Throop’s terminology, needs 
explanation.  
In fact, Gregory saw crusading efforts in Iberia as part of the greater effort to support 
the Holy Land. He gave the same indulgence for crusading in Iberia as he gave to crusaders 
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to the Holy Land.
10
 Ultimately, Gregory had made the crusades in the Holy Land and against 
the Muslims of Iberia and North Africa of equal importance. They were equal, in fact, 
because in his opinion they were connected to the same ultimate goal: to rescue the Holy 
Land itself. Though Gregory differed somewhat from Innocent III, his own policy was not 
without precedent. Charles Bishko has pointed out: 
From Urban II’s time on, innumerable bulls of indulgence [...] equated in importance and 
spiritual privileges anti-Moorish combat in Spain with that against the Saracens of 
Palestine, while they prohibited (not always successfully) Spaniards and Portuguese 
from enlisting in eastern expeditions, on the grounds of prior need for their services at 
home; and the popes, not infrequently under royal pressure, conceded peninsular 
monarchs tenths or other fractions of their kingdoms’ ecclesiastical revenues as 
reconquest subsidies.
11
 
More recent work by William Purkis and Patrick O’Banion on the crusade in Iberia in the 
twelfth century has even put forward the idea that an Iberian route to the Holy Land was 
conceived.
12
 However, none of Gregory X’s letters conflating the importance of crusade in 
Iberia and the Holy Land give any indication that Iberian crusaders were to form part of a 
pincer movement on the Holy Land in concert with other crusade leaders. It appears that the 
Iberian crusade, though considered equal in importance, as well as beneficial for the Holy 
Land (as will be discussed), was not seen as a way to reach the Holy Land in Gregory’s time. 
Gregory took partial hold of the reins to direct the crusade in Iberia by channelling 
money raised from the tenth levied at Lyons to King Alfonso X of Castile and Archbishop 
Sancho in Iberia, and by redirecting Prince Emmanuel, brother of Alfonso, from his intended 
crusade to the Holy Land. Although it must be noted that Gregory’s Iberian crusade policy 
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was given impetus by the need to stop the invasion of Castile by the North African Marinids, 
allied with the Iberian kingdom of Granada, Gregory’s own letters indicate that he was open 
to a crusade against the Marinids even before this invasion became a reality. In this respect, it 
is clear that Gregory was not simply sending the crusade to Iberia because he had to react to 
an invasion. However, Alfonso’s claim to the empire cannot be removed from the equation. 
Throop has oversimplified the matter by arguing that Gregory promised Alfonso the tenth of 
Lyons for his kingdoms as a way of securing his renunciation of the empire. It certainly acted 
in this way, but this was not the only reason. The pope was not so cynical or lacking in 
devotion to the Holy Land that he ever placed its rescue in anything but the premier position. 
Gregory believed that by fighting the Muslims in Iberia, he was helping the Holy Land 
itself.
13
 Thus, giving Alfonso some of the tenth from Lyons should not simply be seen as a 
bribe, although satisfying Alfonso over the empire was crucial to establishing the necessary 
peaceful conditions for a crusade. Indeed, this chapter will argue that the election of an 
emperor was tied closely with the crusade, and that Gregory’s obsession with launching a 
crusade was having an effect on internal European politics. 
 
Historiographical Background 
  
Gregory’s Iberian crusade cannot be discussed without reference to the imperial 
succession, since the matters were interlinked in the figure of Alfonso. This chapter, 
therefore, first seeks to set the context in Iberia and the empire in which Gregory’s decisions 
on the crusade and the imperial succession would be made. Surprisingly little work has been 
done on the imperial succession during Gregory’s papacy by scholars not more narrowly 
focused on Iberia, and Alfonso in particular. Studying this question from such a one-sided 
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perspective has led at least one scholar, Cayetano J. Soccaras, to take a clearly nationalistic 
view. He has not attempted to balance Gregory’s denial of the throne to Alfonso with the 
historical context, and rather has fallen clearly on the side of the disappointed Castilian 
king.
14
 Joseph F. O’Callaghan’s more recent study was more balanced, and did not seek to 
blame Gregory for Alfonso’s disappointment.15 Nevertheless, O’Callaghan was producing a 
biography of Alfonso, and was not interested in analysing the implications of the Iberian 
crusade on the larger crusading movement. Thus, he did not set out to analyse Gregory’s 
policy decisions within the framework of a Holy Land crusade, which was always at the top 
of Gregory’s list of priorities. The same can be said for Peter Linehan, who gave Gregory’s 
motivations a very brief treatment, basing his analysis simply on Alfonso’s own perception of 
the case. Thus he repeated Alfonso’s notion of ‘how little consideration Gregory had given to 
the merits of the case and the deserts of him and his ancestors.’16 Given that this struggle 
lasted from the time of Richard of Cornwall’s death in April 1272 to Alfonso’s renunciation 
of his claim in mid-1275, and that Gregory was involved with all competing parties in that 
time, it can hardly be said that Gregory did not give the case due consideration, even if he did 
not favour Alfonso in particular. Lastly, the most recent Spanish biography on Alfonso, by 
Salvador Martínez, made an attempt at a balanced approach, first writing that ‘neither of the 
two chosen as "king of the Romans", Alfonso of Castile and Richard of Cornwall, deserved 
papal support.’17 But after the death of Richard, Martínez depicted Gregory as an active force 
in the selection of Rudolph of Habsburg, wrongly writing that the pope gave his immediate 
approval to the election.
18
 In fact, his approval had to wait almost a year. Again, Gregory was 
depicted as not giving due consideration to the election, when quite the opposite was true. 
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The Iberian perspective aside, there is very little scholarship on the life of Rudolph of 
Habsburg, Alfonso’s rival to the throne of king of the Romans after the death of Richard of 
Cornwall and Rudolph’s subsequent election at the end of September 1273. Rudolph no 
doubt has fallen victim to the greater fame of the imperial successors to his dynasty, but it is 
clear that more work needs to be done to bring the father of the Habsburg dynasty to life. 
Unfortunately, that is outside of the purview of this thesis. Burkhard Roberg gave a short 
treatment on the discussion of Rudolph’s election at the general council.19 Given that he was 
focused on what happened at the council alone, there is no discussion of Gregory’s 
negotiations with Alfonso and Rudolph in 1275 – the year in which Alfonso renounced his 
claim and returned to fight the Muslims in Iberia, and in which Rudolph was crowned by 
Gregory and took up the cross. More depth on Rudolph himself, however, can be found in the 
most recent monograph on him by Karl-Friedrich Krieger – though he borrowed from 
Roberg’s work for his discussion of Gregory’s pontificate.20  
Ludovico Gatto devoted an excellent chapter to the coronation of Rudolph and the 
imperial question in his Italian work on Gregory’s pontificate.21 Gatto has given the most 
detailed study of the imperial question to date, but has gone to the opposite extreme of the 
historians of Iberia by not fleshing out the political situation in Iberia at all, though he did 
give a full treatment of Alfonso’s direct involvement in the empire. The exclusion of a 
discussion of the political situation in Iberia is an all-too-common problem among medieval 
historians of the Crusades. Of course, admirable work has been done on the Iberian 
reconquest, but these studies are often done in isolation of other crusades, even though the 
popular ‘pluralist’ school in crusade studies would have the struggles outside of the Holy 
Land included under the umbrella of ‘crusades.’ To be fair, Gatto’s investigation of the 
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German element to the imperial question, and that of the papal curia, is very thorough. But a 
study of Gregory’s position on the imperial question cannot be separated from his crusading 
plans in both the Holy Land and Iberia.  
To gain a fuller picture, one must not ignore the peripheries of Europe by looking 
narrowly at the politics surrounding northern Italy, as Gatto has done. To this end, this 
chapter will attempt first to draw a sketch of the political situation in the empire and 
especially Iberia during Gregory’s pontificate. With this established, it argues that the 
potential for trouble in Iberia from the kingdom of Granada or the North African Marinids 
was very likely known by Gregory even before the 1275 invasion, and thus his crusading 
plans in Iberia and North Africa were not simply the result of a reaction to invasion. Instead, 
Gregory saw the crusade in Iberia as connected to that in the Holy Land, and took active steps 
to advance the crusade in Iberia during his pontificate. Although Gregory gave the election to 
the kingship of the Romans due consideration, Alfonso could not have been an appropriate 
candidate in his eyes for the imperial title or for participating in the crusade to the Holy Land, 
since the fight against the Muslims in Iberia was not over, and Alfonso would be needed 
there. 
 
 Iberia and Empire at the Beginning of Gregory’s Papacy 
 
In the first years of his papal tenure, Gregory set about securing immediate interim aid 
for the Holy Land, with an aim to launching a general passage there in the near future, as has 
been discussed in chapter three. In none of the correspondence from the early years of his 
papacy does Gregory give any indication of support for a crusade in Iberia. But this does not 
mean that he was closed to the idea. It is debatable whether there was, in fact, a pressing need 
for a crusade in Iberia at the beginning of Gregory’s reign at all, which would easily explain 
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its absence in Gregory’s early letters. The efforts at reconquest had been going well in King 
Alfonso’s reign in Castile. There had been an uprising in 1264 of Muslims living under his 
rule, but this had been suppressed.
22
 Alfonso had also secured a treaty with the kingdom of 
Granada in 1267, in which the king of Granada would renew his vassalage to Castile (though 
this treaty would be relatively short-lived).
23
 The situation appeared so secure in Iberia that 
Alfonso had actually mused in a letter to his eldest son Fernando in May or June 1273 that he 
believed the Marinid emir of Morocco, Abu Yusuf, to be unable to cross over to Iberia. 
Alfonso noted that the emir ‘has many wars with Morocco, where they claim he is not their 
lord, and another with Gomarazán, who wages war against him in the land, and another 
because he is very despised.’24 Alfonso believed that Abu Yusuf would not be able to muster 
the naval and food sources for a significant campaign.
25
 There had been rumours that the 
Marinids were indeed able to do this, but Alfonso (quite wrongly) dismissed them, since ‘it is 
a custom among the Moors to write skilful and false letters and to send them to each other in 
order to obtain some advantages for themselves.’26 Even when Alfonso’s rebellious noblemen 
told him that the Moors were preparing themselves for an attack, Alfonso dismissed them as 
‘false things.’27 In any case, Alfonso believed that Fernando’s troops were more numerous, 
and of better quality than those of the Muslims, so he thought that he need not worry about an 
attack from them.
28
 
Alfonso was blinding himself about his problems in Iberia for the sake of pursuing his 
imperial ambitions. For Gregory’s part, even though he was aware by the end of 1272 that not 
all was well in Iberia, as will be shown below, it was not possible to turn Alfonso’s mind 
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away from the empire. Alfonso’s obsession with the empire provides the source of Gregory’s 
only extant letters to him in the earlier part of his papacy. The empire was, after all, named by 
Alfonso himself to be ‘the greatest,’ and was said by his chronicler to be ‘something he 
coveted very much.’29 To set the context: Alfonso gained his claim after the death of the anti-
emperor William of Holland in 1256. Alfonso, of Hohenstaufen lineage through his mother, 
who was a child of Philip of Swabia, was then elected as king of the Romans. But, Richard of 
Cornwall had also been elected by another faction. Richard actually made the trip to 
Germany and was crowned, while Alfonso never did, though he maintained his claim even 
until the era of Pope Gregory X. Thus, Gregory wrote to Alfonso in September 1272 to 
respond to his requests that the pope name the day on which Alfonso would receive the 
crown, and that the pope prevent the electors from electing anyone else, since Richard of 
Cornwall had died in April 1272, and Alfonso thought himself now unopposed.
30
 Showing a 
balanced approach, Gregory told Alfonso that, as pope, he would not be able to disallow any 
new election without causing a serious scandal.
31
 He also reminded Alfonso that an injustice 
would be done to Charles of Anjou, vicar of Tuscany, if Alfonso’s petitions were granted, 
since Charles would have to be removed from that position.
32
  
Clearly, Gregory was not interested in disrupting relations with Charles, who, as 
discussed in chapter four, had been assisting the pope in providing transportation to the Holy 
Land for Patriarch Thomas, and was frequently sending food supplies there. Giving into 
Alfonso’s demands would certainly have made a mess of Gregory’s relations with the 
Sicilian king, since Charles would need to be removed from his positions in the north of Italy. 
Those positions were, after all, imperial holdings. Even though in both of Gregory’s letters to 
Alfonso in 1272 he did give him the title ‘elect’ king of the Romans, it is clear that the pope 
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was not in favour in Alfonso’s claim to that title, nor to the imperial title after that, since he 
was not going to do anything to prevent the election of a new king of the Romans. This is not 
to say that Gregory treated Alfonso unfairly, as Soccaras claimed, but in the long-term, a new 
election had the potential to produce a more suitable candidate for ruling northern Italy and 
joining the crusade to the Holy Land than a king based in Castile, even if in the short-term 
Gregory would have to deal with Alfonso’s disappointment and potential wrath.  
Although Gregory looked foremost to the French for commitment to the Holy Land at 
the beginning of his papacy, he still had been casting a wide net by writing not only to the 
kings of France and Sicily, but also to Lord Edward and the maritime powers of Italy and 
Marseilles. It is significant that there are no such letters directed to Alfonso in this time.
33
 
Instead, in his dealings with Alfonso, Gregory was forced to focus on the imperial question, 
at the expense of crusade planning and the security of Alfonso’s own kingdom. Indeed, 
Gregory told Alfonso in his second extant letter, dated in October 1272, that he was delaying 
a response to his petitions, and that he was, in fact, ‘fearing the dangers of your kingdom.’34 
Alfonso persisted in his claims. Gregory’s fears were founded on what were in fact the most 
pressing problems confronting Alfonso at the time. The real problems in Iberia in the first 
couple of years of Gregory’s reign actually came from Alfonso’s very own barons, not least 
one of Alfonso’s lifelong friends, Nuño González of Lara.35 In general, increasing 
monarchical authority had led some leading nobles, including Nuño, into rebellion in 1272, 
the year that Gregory came to the papal throne. During the revolt, Nuño and some of the 
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other barons had allied themselves with the Muslim kingdom of Granada.
36
 This does not, 
however, seem to have become anything more than a local problem, and there are no letters 
from the papacy indicating any more concern about the issue than that noted above in 
Gregory’s October 1272 letter. Alfonso’s father-in-law, King James of Aragon, held talks 
with Alfonso and sent an army, but peace was made within a year. The rebels and Alfonso 
reconciled in mid-1273, and the king of Granada had to pay a two-year tribute to Alfonso for 
the peace treaty.
37
 Robert Ignatius Burns has gone so far as to call an incursion from Morocco 
at this same time ‘a small countercrusade,’ but the brief nature of the conflict in 1272-3 
meant that the papacy never became involved.
38
 
Based on the surviving evidence, it is not possible to discern how much Gregory 
knew about the condition of Iberia in his first couple of years as pope, beyond his 
aforementioned fear of dangers in Alfonso’s kingdom. Nevertheless, it should have been 
clear at least to Alfonso during the rebellion that the Muslims of North Africa were, in fact, 
capable of launching an assault. Thus, his abovementioned May or June 1273 letter to Prince 
Fernando seems incongruous with the course of later events. Just a few months later in 
August 1273 Alfonso wrote to James that he had been told that Abu Yusuf ‘was crossing 
from overseas with great Moorish might, and that if he crossed he could not avoid to fight 
with him; for this he had need of King James’ assistance.’39 There is no evidence that 
Alfonso sought papal assistance for this problem at the time, lending more support to the idea 
that this was still seen as a local problem in 1273. Alfonso also might have hesitated to look 
for help from Gregory because he could lose valuable leverage by showing such weakness 
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and dependence. But Alfonso actually did have plans in this time to take a proactive approach 
to what might have been called a crusade, given the language employed by his chronicler.  
The Chronicle of Alfonso X stated that even if Abu Yusuf did not cross over, Alfonso 
wanted to invade Moorish lands to destroy their agricultural base.
40
 This was also not to be a 
one-off attack, but rather a sustained war of ‘six or seven’ invasions, ‘in winter as in 
summer.’41 If James lent his support ‘for two years, they would serve God and would make 
the king of Granada deliver the land to them, or it would become unprotected.’42 James is 
said to have responded that if Abu Yusuf crossed and Alfonso had to do battle, he would aid 
him, although the chronicler did not go so far as to say that James endorsed Alfonso’s 
proactive approach.
43
 Given that James was a participant in Gregory’s crusade plans at the 
Second Council of Lyons, whose invitation had already sent, perhaps James did not want to 
make a decision on something which was supposed to be decided later at the council. Here, it 
may very well have been the delay and centralisation of crusade planning under papal power 
that held back this ‘crusade’ from happening, but more likely it was Alfonso’s obsession with 
organising his trip to obtain the empire. Given that Alfonso did, in fact, travel to try to gain 
the empire instead of attacking the Muslims as he suggested to James, it is clear that the 
empire took priority over this crusade in his mind. 
 
The Election of a New King of the Romans 
 
By the time the general council convened in 1274, Alfonso’s trouble with the 
rebellion had long since been settled, but in the meantime, Rudolph of Habsburg had been 
elected as the new king of the Romans. A discussion of this election is important for 
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understanding Gregory’s crusading plans, because the pope himself connected the problems 
that came from the empire to a delay in the business of the Holy Land.
44
 Rudolph’s election 
meant that Gregory’s notice to Alfonso that any new election would not be prevented had not 
been without cause. Goswin von der Ropp has gone so far as to argue that Gregory 
encouraged the German electors to have a new election. He convincingly posited the 
existence of a papal letter to the imperial electors encouraging them to make a new election.
45
 
Leopold and Richard have also supported this notion.
46
 Gatto agreed, and added that 
‘certainly, the Cistercian Tebaldo from Ceccano, abbot of Fossanova, sent to the electors by 
Gregory, was very likely to be the bearer of a message written by the pope to encourage them 
to elect a new king of the Romans.’47 Gatto’s evidence is more circumstantial. The source 
that he cited for Tebaldo’s trip to the electors is an early eighteenth century history of the 
cardinals, which gave no indication of any direct sources for Tebaldo’s trip.48 The source 
indicates that Gregory sent Tebaldo to the electors after he had arrived in Lyons, and that 
Gregory wanted the electors to choose an able king.
49
 Gregory’s arrival at Lyons was no later 
than 4 September 1273, which is the date of his first extant letter from there.
50
 His last extant 
letter before he reached Lyons was from 28 August 1273, in Saint-Croix.
51
 Rudolph was 
elected in Frankfurt on 29 September 1273. Therefore, Gregory’s messenger would have had 
to travel the approximately 640km between Lyons and Frankfurt with a start date of probably 
no earlier than 4 September to get there in time to make Gregory’s wishes known for the 
election. This certainly seems possible, although it must remain based on von der Ropp’s 
theory of a letter sent by Gregory in the first place. 
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 At the very least, while it is not possible to determine with absolute certainty if 
Gregory actively sought a new election, it does seems likely. Even before the new election 
occurred there had been new candidates being offered. Thus, the position must have been 
seen to be vacant, even with Alfonso still putting his own claims forward. Gregory’s lack of 
support for Alfonso would have helped to make this possible, but it does not appear that 
Gregory tried to influence who, exactly, was chosen in his place. Even so, potential 
candidates were being put forward to Gregory himself before the election occurred. Charles 
of Anjou had proposed his nephew King Philip to Gregory for the position.
52
 Langlois has 
argued that it was Simon of Brie and Ottobono Fieschi who proposed Philip’s candidacy.53 
Surviving evidence from a meeting between Philip’s messengers and Gregory, Simon, 
Ottobono, and Charles in Florence at Simon’s house noted that ‘the church has counselled 
Philip to take the empire.’54 This must have led Langlois to assume Simon and Ottobono’s 
support for Philip, but it is clear that at least Gregory had not taken a firm side; indeed, 
Langlois rightly noted that ‘Gregory X gave the messengers an evasive response.’55 Martínez 
wrote that Gregory did not support the candidacy of Philip (and also of Alfonso, Louis of 
Bavaria, and Ottokar of Bohemia) because he did not believe they were genuinely interested 
in crusading.
56
 This cannot be the case, since Philip’s interest in crusading was evident from 
very early in Gregory’s reign. Nevertheless, the pope seems to have done his best politely to 
ignore Philip’s interest in the empire, in the hope that the matter would go away without 
having to cause offence. He told Philip that although he held him in the highest regard, and 
would like him to have the position, it was God’s will. Consistent with a hands-off approach 
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over who would get the crown, Gregory also told Philip that he would hesitate to tell anyone 
to take the empire when Alfonso was still claiming the title for himself.
57
 Furthermore, Simon 
of Brie’s very own letter to Ottokar of Bohemia in September 1273 showed the cardinal’s 
support for Ottokar’s candidacy, not Philip’s.58 Given Simon’s close association with Philip, 
Simon’s support of Ottokar likely indicates that King Philip never took his own nomination 
very seriously. Charles’ hopes for his nephew on the throne were likely just futile optimism 
on his part for a friendly king or emperor – one who would maintain Charles in his positions 
of power in northern Italy.  
Since the pope was taking pains with Alfonso not to be seen to be involved in the 
election process, he was not likely to make any preference he may have had public 
knowledge. Gatto, however, noted that as early as February 1273 Gregory was said to have 
wanted someone influential.
59
 He cited an article by Harry Bresslau, which reproduced a 
fragment from the Genoese state archives.
60
 Yet Gatto has taken this source a bit too far. The 
writer of the fragment was only confident in saying that a high ranking Church official had 
told him: ‘you may write back in reply to your captains securely that the lord pope and the 
Roman Church want that the emperor be elected and be appointed, but yet he does not want 
Frederick of Stuffa or anyone excommunicated to be emperor.’61 Gregory’s apparent desire 
not to have this Frederick
62
 as emperor could just as easily have had as much to do with his 
Hohenstaufen lineage as with his insignificant status, as Krieger has posited.
63
 It was hard to 
avoid connections to the Hohenstaufen in Germany though, and even Rudolph of Habsburg 
was the godson of Emperor Frederick II. But at the very least, there is no indication from this 
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fragment that Gregory was seeking someone ‘influential,’ as Gatto had suggested. 
Nevertheless, the same source did indicate that Ottokar’s men took this as a sign that his 
candidature was looked upon favourably. After hearing the above, ‘the messengers of the 
king of Bohemia withdrew from the curia briskly, among whom is Jacob of Roba de 
Cremona, who said to us that he was not displeased by the Church, that the king of Bohemia 
would be elected as king of the Romans by the princes of Germany.’64 This fragment, unlike 
George Egg’s history, is more clearly reliable, since it referenced direct knowledge on the 
part of the writer.
65
 He also understood the limits of his knowledge, since after noting that he 
heard that the Genoese might expect to receive freer treatment under the new king, he said 
that ‘concerning this other thing, we do not know for certain.’66 
Given the indications of several contenders for the crown of king of the Romans 
before the election, Gregory must not have been surprised when a new election was 
announced to him. That the one elected was the relatively middling-powered Rudolph, and 
not the mighty Ottokar, might have been more of a surprise, if Simon’s letter and the 
fragment from the Genoese article are any indication of the general expectation that Ottokar 
would, in fact, prevail. It is likely that Rudolph was chosen by the electoral princes for the 
very reason that he was a middling power, and thus would be easier to control than the rich 
and powerful Ottokar of Bohemia. But whoever the candidate was to be, it is clear that he 
would have to be open to crusading if he wanted to secure the favour of the pope – on this 
point at least, Martínez had been right. Charles’ letter that put Philip forth for the position is 
an indication that this was true, since Charles wrote the letter with an attempt to convince 
Gregory of Philip’s merits. He would not intentionally have written something that Gregory 
would not have wanted. Since the two had been working together to aid the Holy Land, 
Charles likely had a reasonable grasp of what Gregory was looking for. Charles wrote that a 
                                                 
64
 Bresslau, ‘Zur Vorgeschichte,’ p. 60. See Appendix A, 5:64. 
65
 Ibid, p. 60. 
66
 ‘De hoc aliud pro certo nescimus.’ Ibid, p. 60-1. 
203 
 
  
new king of the Romans must not be able to excuse himself from service to God.
67
 He 
pointed to Philip’s crusading pedigree as proof that he came from a family that served God, 
since his father St Louis had died on crusade, and Philip Augustus had crusaded with Richard 
the Lionheart.
68
 Charles wrote that after Philip took up the empire to make service to God, he 
would be able to assemble the strongest knights against the enemies of the faith.
69
 Gatto has 
discussed these passages, but he did not see the real significance.
70
  
The importance of Charles’ letter lies in that fact that contenders for the election of 
the king of the Romans were supporting their candidacies by promising aid to the Holy 
Land.
71
 Indeed, Rudolph of Habsburg and Alfonso of Castile did the same. After Rudolph 
was elected in September 1273, he wrote for Gregory’s blessing. In order to entice the pope 
to support him, Rudolph wrote that he was: 
Carrying with a fervent spirit in the desire of the mind [...] to run to the aid of the Holy 
Land as much powerfully as patiently, so that the people of God, afflicted and equally 
compressed for a long time by the enemies of the cross of Christ, may, to the glory of 
Christ, prevail to visit the sepulchre of the Lord.
72
 
Marino Sanuto also wrote that Alfonso had promised greater aid to the Holy Land to support 
his candidacy.
73
 Like the election of Frederick II Hohenstaufen, where he promised on his 
own initiative to go on crusade, the election to the empire in the 1270s was being linked from 
its very beginning to the crusade, which must have pleased Gregory very much.
74
 It meant 
that his crusade agenda was having an effect on the politics of the West. 
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Gregory did not officially recognise the election of Rudolph until September 1274, 
when he did so in a meticulous manner consistent with the way he was preparing his crusade, 
and which probably was intended to show Alfonso that due consideration was being given to 
the whole process. Using phrasing very similar to his 1272 letter to King Philip about 
preparation for the business of the Holy Land, on 26 September 1274, Gregory wrote to 
Rudolph: 
Thus long preparation of war habitually produces swift victory; thus the path is hastened 
urgently while it is prepared with anxious care. This consideration has detained us thus 
far in the advancement of the imperial business; this has urged us, in the consummation 
of your high position, to make use of full ripeness; this has suggested various ways to 
seek out, and diverse remedies to consider, so that, with God supporting, we may as 
much safely deduce as carefully prepare that which presses. It is permitted not without 
cause therefore that we have postponed until now. We ascribe the royal title to you, 
nevertheless, with recent deliberation held with our brothers. We have named you king 
of the Romans from their counsel.’
75
  
Gregory was careful to wash his hands of the potential problems coming from this decision 
by ascribing it to the advice of the cardinals; after all, he still had to deal with Alfonso. In 
addition, he did not give the imperial title, which would have to wait until Alfonso was 
placated. Also, the title itself was a useful bargaining tool to ensure that Rudolph went on 
crusade.
76
 In the meantime, the pope still ascribed Alfonso with the title of ‘elect’ king of the 
Romans.  
With the election of Rudolph – even before Gregory actually approved it – Gregory 
began to take a harder line on Alfonso. During the council in 1274, the pope sent letters 
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asking Alfonso to give up his ambition for the empire, thus the matter must have been settled 
in the pope’s mind a few months before he officially recognised Rudolph. On 11 June, 
Gregory told Alfonso to do ‘not what you want, but what you ought to want’ – namely, to 
give up his quest for the empire.
77
 Considering the election of Rudolph, Alfonso had become 
a lame duck, but Gregory more importantly pointed out to Alfonso that he wanted him to give 
up his imperial ambitions because ‘great and useful services of God (for which we have 
convened the council) and chiefly the miserable condition of the Holy Land, in their 
postponement, deplore the clear and dangerous impediments’ that came from Alfonso’s 
continuing struggle.
78
 Gregory did not want to allow political problems in Europe to delay 
launching his crusade, and indeed, as was seen with the election to the empire, some of the 
big political decisions that were being made in the West were linked to the aid of the Holy 
Land. Gregory’s task was to carry this momentum through to the fulfillment of his crusade, 
and guarantee the necessary peaceful conditions.  
 
The Awareness of Oncoming Crisis in Iberia 
 
At the general council, Gregory began actively encouraging Alfonso to crusade, and 
to give up the empire. He also began to use the benefits of the crusade to help convince him. 
Alfonso refused to give up. It is, therefore, Alfonso who must shoulder the blame for inaction 
leading up to the Marinid invasion in 1275, since he devoted his energy to pursuing the 
empire and not to guarding his kingdom. During the general council in June 1274, Gregory 
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sent his chaplain, Master Frederick, to Alfonso. The pope gave his chaplain full power to deal 
with Alfonso:  
So that afterwards the king will concede to you the said letters patent, signed by his own 
seal, through which he himself entirely confesses to desist from the said business of the 
empire, or freely to place in our hands his disposition to relinquish [it] to the liberty of 
our arbitration, and to take up the fight of the Saracens in parts of Africa.
79
 
Nevertheless, it is safe to believe that Gregory’s arbitration even in 1274 would still have 
been in favour of the newly elected Rudolph of Habsburg, whom Gregory later confirmed as 
king. With respect to Gregory’s crusade policy, the more important consideration in 
Gregory’s letter to Master Frederick was that the pope was allowing, and even encouraging, 
crusading efforts in ‘parts of Africa’ while he was at the general council, which, it must be 
remembered, was to plan the crusade to the Holy Land. At this time, William of Tripoli had 
actually written in his advice treatise about how small the distance between Africa and Iberia 
was, and how the Muslims of Morocco sail to Iberia with large armies.
80
 William, as well as 
Humbert of Romans, pointed out the reconquests that James of Aragon and Alfonso of 
Castile had made in Iberia.
81
  It seems that even William’s advice treatise brought to the 
pope’s notice the potential for continuing trouble in Iberia. 
Put into the context of Gregory’s desire for crusade vows to the Holy Land to be 
strictly observed, the redirection of crusading force may seem surprising. Gregory wrote to 
Simon of Brie in the same year as Master Frederick, telling Simon to take a hard line on 
shirking responsibilities to the Holy Land. He told Simon:  
Therefore, wanting to provide for the health of the souls and for the loss of the [Holy] 
Land concerning these [people who have not fulfilled their vow], we urge you through 
apostolic letters that all and every man and woman, of whatever rank, status and 
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condition may rise up, who, in the same kingdom and other lands of your legation, 
happen to be discovered so to have taken up the sign of the cross, and afterwards not at 
all to have passed over the sea; (may they rise up) to the consummation of the vow, 
announcing publically, and making it to be announced through other obligations, even 
though they approached Tunis, may you compel them to carry out the outstanding vow 
personally in aid of the [Holy] Land.
82
 
Gregory did make room in this letter for those who had a legitimate excuse to be excused 
from going to the Holy Land personally, but otherwise, his firm intention to compel people to 
go to the Holy Land is clear, even if they had gone to Tunis. Why then, did Gregory make an 
exception with Alfonso of Castile, when he did not make an exception for others, including 
even James, king of the other Iberian kingdom, Aragon?
83
 
 It seems clear that Gregory’s offer to Alfonso acted in part as a bribe to give up the 
empire by redirecting him to the crusade, through which he would receive generous funding. 
Gregory had told his chaplain, Master Frederick:  
You may (with authority in this place) concede to [Alfonso] the tenth of all the returns of 
the churches of his kingdoms and lands up to six years, assigned for aid of the [Holy] 
Land in the present sacred council for the same six years, just as has been conceded for 
the [Holy] Land by apostolic commission, as aforesaid to you, so that he may pursue the 
fight which he will take up against the Saracens with a smaller trouble of expenses.
84
 
It must have been a tempting offer, since Alfonso was generally short of funds.
85
 That 
Gregory’s offer was in fact a bribe is very likely, since the offer of funds for the crusade in 
Africa came in the same letter that Gregory asked Alfonso to give up his imperial claims. But 
this does not mean that Gregory was willing to ignore his devotion to save the Holy Land for 
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political exigencies in Europe. Gregory was not manufacturing a need for crusade in Africa to 
appease Alfonso, and thus the pope’s dedication to the crusade to the Holy Land need not fall 
into question in this case. Indeed, the need for crusading action in Africa would have been 
apparent to Gregory before he made the offer to Alfonso. 
 Evidence from King James of Aragon’s autobiography points to the Aragonese king’s 
awareness of the increasingly dangerous situation in southern Iberia. It is reasonable to 
assume that this information was passed on to Gregory at the general council, since James 
arrived in Lyons at the beginning of May 1274, and Gregory’s messenger to Alfonso was not 
sent until June, after there would have been time enough for discussions between James and 
the pope. Discussing the crusade was, after all, why James had come to the council in the first 
place. Before arriving at the council, James had spent time in January and February 1274 
surveying Murcia, a border realm with the kingdom of Granada. In his autobiography, James 
asserted that he ‘had gone there to see how the town was populated.’86 Robert Burns, 
however, has labelled this as a clever ruse ‘to assess, behind a facade of gala diversion, the 
stability and defenses of this buffer realm.’87  
Alfonso had earlier in 1272 told James of worries over noblemen from both their 
kingdoms having allied with the king of Granada against them.
88
 This danger must have been 
reinforced by the aforementioned meeting between Alfonso and James in 1273, in which 
Alfonso had asked James for support in an attack against the Muslims.
89
 Upon his return from 
the council, James even advised Alfonso at Christmas 1274 that he should not go to see the 
pope about the matter of the empire ‘because it would not be fitting for him to go to a land so 
far away.’90 James probably had already heard from the pope that Alfonso would gain 
nothing from such a trip, but James’ notion that it would not be fitting for Alfonso to go so 
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far away from his kingdom is an interesting one, given that he had just done the very same 
thing. It is thus likely that James feared the potential threat of attack, which would certainly 
become more grave with the absence of the king. James would be the one to know this, since 
it was his own commercially motivated assistance of the Marinids that led to their taking of 
the port of Ceuta, which gave them a useful staging ground in the attack on Iberia.
91
 Given 
that the Marinid invasion would come to James’ own territory, he must have regretted this 
decision. 
Since it is reasonable to assume that Gregory heard James’ earlier concerns while he 
was at the council, the pope was thus taking a proactive approach to this problem by trying to 
enlist Alfonso to crusade in Africa in his letter from June 1274. By naming ‘Africa’ here, 
Gregory would certainly having been referring neither to Egypt nor probably even Tunis, but 
rather the Marinids in Morocco, across the strait from Castile. It was this group that was 
already threatening Iberia, and it would not have made sense to send a crusade further afield 
in Africa when the Marinids could dash across the strait into Iberia. Gregory also wrote in 
August 1274 to the knights of Calatrava and of St James, military orders in Iberia, 
referencing their ongoing ‘defense of the Christian faith against the Saracens of Africa.’92  
Gregory told them: ‘we, therefore, paying attention to the crises which you sustain 
continuously in parts of Africa for the defense of Christendom, and wanting, on account of 
that, to pursue this with special grace and favour to you, we have indulged you that you are 
by no means held to pay such a tenth from your proceeds.’93 This was a significant move, 
since Gregory had been adamant at the Second Council of Lyons that everyone had to pay the 
tax ‘irrespective of their standing, rank or order, or the status of their [religious] order. We 
wish that no privileges or indulgences assist anybody [to evade the tax], no matter what forms 
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of words or mode of expression is used in them; indeed, on this matter we revoke them.’94 
Thus, he must have believed strongly in the utility of the crusade in Iberia and North Africa if 
he were actually to divert funds. Furthermore, the funding was not just a bribe to Alfonso, 
since Gregory had channelled money to the military orders in Iberia as well, which was 
unconnected to Alfonso’s claim to the empire. Both of these cases occurred before the 
Marinid invasion would have made it a necessity. 
It is clear, then, that 1274 saw a significant and proactive move by Gregory to channel 
funding and commitment into the crusade efforts in Iberia and the neighbouring parts of 
North Africa. That this kind of commitment did not arrive sooner was due to Alfonso’s 
preoccupation with settling his claim to the empire. Indeed, in a June 1274 letter, Gregory 
told Alfonso very directly that his continuing pursuit of the crown was getting in the way of 
other business:  
Since the business of the rule of the imperial summit is impending, [and] the necessities 
of the world are greatly urging, manifest justice recommends that it be expedited without 
further expense of delay. Great and useful services of God (for which we have convened 
the council) and chiefly the miserable condition of the Holy Land, (which, in postponing, 
deplores the clear and dangerous impediments) require continual concentration, and we 
are trying to accelerate its advancement in every possible way.
95
 
If this were not enough (and it evidently was not, since Alfonso persisted), Gregory’s position 
was made even clearer in December 1274. For his part, the decision had been made about the 
empire, since the electors themselves had made their choice and Gregory had acknowledged 
Rudolph in September 1274. Gregory did not name Alfonso ‘elect’ king of the Romans in the 
December letter, even though he had done so before. Instead, Rudolph was given this title for 
the first time in a letter to Alfonso, and the Castilian king was told that ‘the necessities of the 
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world, and especially of the empire itself and the Holy Land greatly demand the advancement 
of the business [of the imperial rule].’96 Alfonso’s persistence on this issue led him to 
Beaucaire in 1275, at the very time that the Marinids launched an invasion of Iberia. 
 
Double Crisis: the Empire and the Invasion of Iberia in 1275 
 
 The invasion of southern Iberia by the allied forces of the kingdom of Granada and 
the Marinids of Morocco left Christendom looking very flatfooted, despite the apparent 
premonitions of James of Aragon, warnings from Alfonso’s noblemen, and Gregory’s 
soliciting of Alfonso in 1274 to take up the crusade in Africa. Siberry’s thesis that internal 
political issues were getting in the way of the crusade in the later thirteenth century certainly 
applied in this case, although at least Gregory had been making efforts in 1274 to overcome 
the issue.
97
 The course of events in 1275 demonstrates Gregory’s flexibility in his crusade 
planning, and his willingness to integrate crusading in Iberia or North Africa with that of the 
Holy Land. For Alfonso’s part, it is clear that his desire for power had placed his kingdom in 
a precarious position. Even though Gregory had been working to deter Alfonso from his 
quest for the empire and turn him towards the crusade, he had thus far failed on this point. 
Gregory’s crusading plans could have been ruined even before he died, since imminent war 
between Alfonso and Rudolph over Italy would have engulfed almost the whole of the West. 
Charles of Anjou could not but have become involved, given his vested interests in Italy. This 
likely would have brought the involvement of King Philip, who by this time had cool 
relations with both Alfonso over the succession to Navarre (since King Henry of Navarre 
died in 1274), and with Rudolph over land disputes also involving Count Philip of Savoy.
98
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Edward potentially could have become involved in support of his brother-in-law Alfonso, 
since he had been writing to the pope in Alfonso’s favour in May 1275, and he was closely 
connected with the count of Savoy.
99
 Lastly, the disappointment of King Ottokar over his 
failure to secure the kingship of the Romans cannot be forgotten, especially considering that 
he and Rudolph ended up going to war after Gregory’s death.100 Gregory himself must have 
been unsure at this time of his ability to keep the peace, since he was preparing for potential 
diplomatic failure in his talks with Alfonso by calling on Rudolph to send soldiers into 
Lombardy to place under the command of Gerard of Grandison, bishop of Verdun.
101
 
Gregory faced the greatest test of his ability to keep the peace in Europe during 1275, and 
ironically it seems that he would have failed were it not for the Muslim invasion of Iberia 
drawing Alfonso back to Castile and forcing him to give up his claim to the kingship of the 
Romans. 
At the time that Marinid troops began arriving in Iberia, Alfonso was already in 
Beaucaire for his meeting with Gregory, having begun his journey in March.
102
 To add insult 
to injury, by his own admission, he had only made the trip ‘so that through [Gregory’s 
harshness and failure to end dissension], the world may understand and everybody may see 
that he who ought to be the source of justice in the land, denies justice to us.’103 He had no 
real expectation of ever securing Gregory’s support, but in the meantime, the invasion force 
was ploughing through Alfonso’s frontier defenses, which the king had left under the control 
of the rehabilitated Nuño González of Lara. While the enemy was already crashing through 
the gates, as it were, the bitter and vengeful Alfonso was wasting his time arguing with 
Gregory over something which was actually a fait accompli. It seems clear that Alfonso and 
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Gregory’s first discussions in May 1275 were not going well. In a 21 May letter to his ally, 
the commune of Pavia and its podestà, Lanfranco Pignatario, Alfonso painted a very hostile 
picture of Gregory. In a deeply wounded tone, Alfonso wrote:  
All our days we have fought for the exaltation of the mother church for the Catholic 
faith. We demand not but that which is right from him, justice alone, not for a special 
benefit – God knows! – but for the honour of God especially and for the peaceful 
condition of the Christian people. We have discovered, however, all harshness in him, 
not as in a pious father but just as in a worldly lord.
104
  
Alfonso’s perspective was certainly coloured by his disappointment, but Gregory probably 
was harsh with him, since he had already committed himself to Rudolph. 
Since there are so few records of Gregory’s meeting with Alfonso at Beaucaire, 
Alfonso’s very one-sided letter must suffice to draw out what was under discussion at the 
meeting. Gregory probably did not have very many new offers to give Alfonso that he had 
not already written to him before – namely, that he was prepared to give him money from the 
tenth of Lyons to carry out the crusade in Iberia and North Africa. It was at these discussions, 
though, that Gregory agreed to write to Rudolph about Alfonso’s claim to the duchy of 
Swabia, which he asserted through his mother, the daughter of Philip of Swabia. On 27 June 
1275, Gregory asked Rudolph to satisfy Alfonso over this claim, in order to keep the 
peace.
105
 Gaining the duchy was certainly a longshot, but Gregory could give the 
disappointed Alfonso so little recompense, that such a gesture (however futile) could not be 
denied. Alfonso had also written in his letter to the Pavians that Gregory was ‘not feeling 
compassion for the shipwrecks of the Christians, who continuously destroy and kill 
themselves, since he is not one who prevents their inequalities and puts an end to 
dissensions.’106 This seems to be an echo of Gregory’s earlier letters, in which he had accused 
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Alfonso of delaying the business of the Holy Land and other necessities of the world by 
continuing his struggle for the empire.
107
 Gregory probably told him the same thing in their 
meeting. Most worryingly, though, Alfonso was still using the title ‘king of the Romans,’ and 
wrote that ‘we want by all means to pursue the imperial business as much de jure as de facto, 
[and] deep within to come personally and powerfully into Lombardy without any delay.’108 
He was planning to take the empire by force. 
Alfonso’s threat to enter Italy was not an empty one, since he had already been 
sending troops there for the past year to show his strength and to aid his son-in-law, William 
of Montferrat. In a marriage alliance designed to solidify his power in northern Italy, Alfonso 
had wed his daughter to William, and the new couple had returned to Lombardy in January 
1272.
109
 In April 1274, no doubt to add pressure against Rudolph’s bid for Gregory’s 
acceptance of his election at the general council, Alfonso had sent 200-300 knights into 
Lombardy on the ships of another of his allies, Genoa.
110
 The knights were then sent to join 
the service of William, who was opposed to Charles of Anjou.
111
 This first band of troops 
was followed in November 1274 by 800-900 more mounted knights, this time likely in 
response to Gregory’s acceptance of Rudolph’s election, and in preparation for Alfonso’s 
arrival in Italy.
112
 Thus, even before Alfonso left for his talks with Gregory, he was already 
making contingencies for their failure. But Alfonso’s threat in May 1275 showed either a lack 
of understanding of the severity of the situation in Iberia, or else complete recklessness. A 
letter from Edward to Alfonso on 4 May indicated that both kings already knew of the 
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‘business and war of the Saracens.’113 Edward regretted that he could do nothing to help at 
the moment, but he would allow any of his people, who wanted to help Alfonso in his 
struggle against the Muslims, to do so.
114
 It is not completely clear if this ‘business and war 
of the Saracens’ was the invasion, which had only begun, or in fact hints that Alfonso still 
planned to make his own attack on North Africa. However, given that Alfonso was devoting 
his energy to the empire, and sending troops to Italy, it was not likely to be the latter. Instead, 
Edward’s letter may indicate that the Muslims of North Africa were starting their attack even 
before O’Callaghan had placed their arrival (May 1275), which would make Alfonso’s 
departure from Castile seem even more wrong-headed.
115
 
 Negotiations between Gregory and Alfonso dragged on from May, through June 
(where, as has been seen, they turned to the duchy of Swabia), and finally to a resolution of 
sorts only at the end of July. This was a waste of precious time, especially for Alfonso, 
because in the meantime his eldest son Prince Fernando had fallen ill and died on his way to 
repel the invasion.
116
 This happened on 24 July, just days before there is evidence that 
Alfonso was beginning his return to Iberia to fight the invaders, and thus before it could have 
influenced his rapprochement with Gregory. But to what degree Alfonso and Gregory 
actually came to an agreement is difficult to determine now, and seemed equally so at the 
time, given that the Genoese annals wrote that it was uncertain what the result was, even 
though rumours told that Alfonso had given up the empire. The annals noted, nevertheless, 
that he continued to use the title ‘king of the Romans.’117 The Genoese may have been among 
the better-informed, since at least some of them had come to Beaucaire at the time to do 
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honour to Alfonso.
118
 But if any of them learned of the details of the negotiation, they 
neglected to pass on that information to the Genoese chronicler. The anonymous biographer 
of Gregory X wrote that official bulls had actually been given by Alfonso to Gregory, but 
unfortunately these are not extant.
119
 
Some indication that Alfonso and Gregory’s negotiations had come to an end comes 
from two letters in Gregory’s papal registers dated 28 July 1275.120 These indicate that 
Gregory had given Alfonso the tenth of Lyons for his kingdoms to be used in fighting against 
the Muslims of Iberia and Africa.
121
 Alfonso was to secure a loan in the first instance, to be 
paid back within a certain time (presumably after the windfall from the tenth of Lyons had 
been received).
122
 This would certainly have acted as a bribe for Alfonso to give up his 
claims, but there was more to it than that. Gregory was not selling out the Holy Land to deal 
with political problems in the West. He was actually responding to current events by allowing 
some flexibility in the use of the crusade tithe. Crucially, Gregory wrote to Alfonso that he 
was giving him this money because ‘an assault against the Saracens [coming into Iberia from 
Africa] results in great and vast favour to Christ and the aid of the [Holy] Land, since those 
who confound the [Holy] Land by various disturbances, without stop, are very often favoured 
by their support.’123 This did not mean that Alfonso was to fight in Iberia for the purpose of 
opening a new land route to crusading in the Holy Land. Nevertheless, it still gives some 
support to O’Banion’s idea of an attempt to ‘unite two of the great crusading arenas into a 
single Mediterranean-wide struggle against Islam,’ which would ‘resolv[e] the tension 
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between the Spanish impulse to crusade in Jerusalem and the obligation to battle the Moors at 
home.’124 
The connections between the Muslims of North Africa and those of the Holy Land are 
borne out by evidence from Ibn al-Furāt. When St Louis’ second crusade landed in Tunis, it 
prompted Baybars to start organising a relief force there from Egypt.
125
 However, 
connections in the direction to which Gregory was referring – namely, from North Africa to 
the Holy Land – are less clear. In his advice treatise to Gregory, William of Tripoli had 
marked out Morocco as the seat of one of the three caliphs (the others being in Baghdad and 
Egypt), but he gave no indication that Morocco was working closely with the Muslims of the 
East.
126
 Ibn al-Furāt, however, noted that the ruler of Tunis had sent Baybars 25 horses in 
1271 or 1272. Whether this acted as a one-time gift to assuage Baybars’ anger over the 
Tunisian treaty with the Franks, or it formed part of an ongoing exchange cannot be known 
for certain.
127
 Baybars must have been unhappy enough with Tunis at the time that ‘he 
threatened them with his forces.’128 Yet, more support for a connection between Baybars and 
the North African Muslims comes later, in 1276, though it is circumstantial. At the very same 
time that Alfonso was trying to make peace with the Marinids and the kingdom of Granada, 
he was said by Makrizi to have messengers in the court of Sultan Baybars.
129
 Perhaps a 
connection between eastern and western Muslims meant that Alfonso was trying to secure 
Baybars' aid in forming the treaty, although Makrizi gave no details about the nature of the 
embassy. 
  Gregory conceived of his crusade target as encompassing not only the Muslims 
holding the Holy Land, but also those in North Africa. With the invasion of Iberia, the North 
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African crusade that Gregory had been advocating since his letter to Alfonso in June 1274 
could now get off the ground. Although Alfonso himself had considered an attack on North 
Africa, it was not any initiative on his part that led to the war in Iberia being met. Gregory’s 
letters from 28 July, when Alfonso was leaving for Iberia, made no mention at all of the 
empire, and simply focused on funding for the crusade in Iberia and Africa. However, later 
letters to the archbishop of Seville in September 1275 clarify Gregory’s thoughts on the 
matter: ‘the king of Castile and Leon has acquiesced to our wishes on the business [of the 
empire].’130 But he noted that ‘we have heard from the assertions of many faithful people that 
the king titles himself king of the Romans in his letters, just as before.’131 Worryingly, ‘the 
king has sent various letters to very many magnates of Germany, and indeed communities of 
Italy, affirming neither to have desisted in the business of the empire, nor to want to 
desist.’132 So, Gregory told the archbishop: ‘may you urge the king and may you effectively 
strive to induce him, so that he may altogether desist from these and similar things, not 
making use of the aforesaid sign and title of another.’133 Alfonso never did, and Gregory 
knew it. Thus, he sent another letter to the archbishop along the same lines later in 
September.
134
 More importantly, at least some of the Iberian troops that Alfonso had sent to 
Italy were still fighting alongside Alfonso’s allies the Pavians in September, even though 
Iberia itself was still under attack and Alfonso had promised Gregory to give up on his 
imperial ambitions.
135
 It was thus fortunate for Gregory that the war in Iberia kept Alfonso 
from disrupting Italy even more, and delaying the pope’s crusade indefinitely. 
What, then, made Alfonso change his mind, or at the very least, back down for the 
time being, since it seems that the war in Iberia had at least not immediately sent him home? 
                                                 
130
 RGX, n. 650 (RV37, f. 245r). See Appendix A, 5:130. 
131
 Ibid. See Appendix A, 5:131. 
132
 Ibid. See Appendix A, 5:132. 
133
 Ibid. See Appendix A, 5:133. 
134
 RGX, n. 651 (RV37, f. 245r). 
135
 Annales Placentini Gibellini, p. 561. 
219 
 
  
The Chronicle of Alfonso X would have one believe that Alfonso was still in Beaucaire when 
he learned of the deaths of his eldest son, Prince Fernando, and of Archbishop Sancho and 
Don Nuño.
136
 Alfonso was said to have thought that his younger son, Sancho, would not try 
to defend the kingdom.
137
 Thus, ‘for this reason, and also because he had learned that 
concerning the matter of the empire they were mocking him, and that he had wasted a very 
large fortune on this journey, he departed Beaucaire and set out for Castile.’138 It could not 
have happened this way. Even the chronicler himself pointed out on more than one occasion 
that his knowledge of what happened to Alfonso when he left Iberia to go to the empire was 
practically non-existent.
139
 There would not have been enough time for news of Fernando’s 
death to reach Alfonso in Beaucaire before Gregory’s 28 July letters which indicated some 
sort of agreement between the pope and Alfonso. Alfonso certainly could not have heard of 
the deaths of Don Nuño and Archbishop Sancho, since they did not die until September and 
October 1275, respectively, though the chronicle mistakenly put Nuño’s death in May, and 
Sancho’s before that of Fernando.140 Alfonso must have been making plans to return to 
Castile even before he heard of these deaths; thus, Alfonso and Gregory must have been able 
to come to some sort of an agreement even without Alfonso having the added pressure of so 
many significant deaths in his kingdom to push him to a conclusion. It seems likely that 
Alfonso could only stay away from his kingdom for so long while it was being invaded, but it 
also seems that Alfonso recognised that Gregory was never going to change his mind. For 
Gregory, it was victory by attrition, with plenty of help from a Muslim invasion. 
Gregory may have had some sort of success with Alfonso, but the deaths of Don 
Nuño and the archbishop of Toledo were a significant loss for Gregory’s crusading efforts, 
since both had shown themselves as eager participants in the crusade. Gregory had started to 
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coordinate funding with Sancho, allowing him ‘to receive a quarter portion of the same 
remaining profits of the clerical and lay tenth for aid of the said business,’ before the 
untimely demise of the archbishop cut planning short.
141
 Nuño had even sent a crusading 
proposal to Gregory, making it evident that Gregory’s request for advice for a new crusade to 
the Holy Land was widely known. Sadly, the proposal is not extant, and the only evidence for 
it – a letter from Gregory to Nuño – is lacking in detail.142 Gregory excused himself for not 
being able to give a firm response to Nuño because some business was occupying him at the 
moment. But once that was finished, he planned to answer him fully.
143
 In the end, Nuño had 
died before Gregory had the opportunity to answer him. The letter can be reasonably dated to 
early-to-mid 1275, since Gregory was occupied at the time with Nuño’s own lord, King 
Alfonso.
144
 Likely, Gregory wanted to know where he stood with Alfonso before he started 
accepting the crusade proposals of the king’s barons. It is conceivable that Nuño had offered 
himself for the crusade to the Holy Land to get out of Iberia altogether, given his still-recent 
rebellion against Alfonso. Interestingly, it is clear at least that Nuño’s proposal was for a 
crusade in the Holy Land, not for crusading in Iberia. Gregory had written: ‘we have 
commended the praiseworthy affection in the Lord which you carry towards the business of 
the Holy Land. You have conceived a proposal to the advancement of that [business].’145 
While it is true that Gregory had linked the crusade in Iberia with advancing the business of 
the Holy Land, the language here does not indicate that Nuño’s proposal would aid the Holy 
Land through the crusade in Iberia. In all likelihood, Nuño had a plan for the crusade in the 
Holy Land itself.  
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Even with the ongoing reconquest in Iberia, interest among the Iberians for crusading 
in the Holy Land was still present. James of Aragon’s offer to help Gregory has already been 
discussed in chapter three, but to this can be added Nuño. Nuño’s son Juan Nunez also had a 
crusade pedigree, since he had taken part in St Louis’ disastrous second crusade.146 When 
Gregory wrote to Nuño about his proposal, he also wrote to Juan to encourage him to support 
and imitate his father.
147
 An even more significant Iberian to offer himself for the crusade 
was Prince Emmanuel, brother of King Alfonso. Gregory wrote to Emmanuel in September 
1275 (while Iberia was under attack) about the prince’s request to receive the tenth from 
Portugal because he was taking up the cross ‘to proceed personally in aid of the Holy Land 
with an appropriate escort of warriors.’148 But Gregory, again showing that he had a 
flexibility in his crusading plans (as well as simple commonsense) told Emmanuel: ‘we want 
you to know that it would not be fitting to the king to transfer you away from the persecution 
of the Saracens threatening the tranquil state of the kingdoms.’149 But he told Emmanuel that 
‘[when] the means will have appeared to you for aid of the [Holy] Land, so much as when we 
will be able, we will grant your aforesaid supplication willingly.’150 One might argue that 
Gregory was stymieing participation in his own crusade, and that if he had let Emmanuel 
proceed instead of holding him back, then his crusade might have actually launched. But this 
is seen only with retrospect. Iberia needed reinforcing, and Gregory made what seemed like 
the best decision under the circumstances in which he found himself.  
The Iberians who offered to crusade were few in number, but they were of high status. 
Had Emmanuel or James, or even Nuño been able to fulfill their wish to crusade to the Holy 
Land, their high positions would no doubt have meant that they would bring a substantial 
retinue. Indeed, Nuño had earlier wanted to take 1,000 knights with Alfonso on his trip to the 
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empire, though the king would have had to provide funding.
151
 Emmanuel had offered to 
bring an ‘appropriate escort of warriors’ on his crusade.152 Finally, James had offered to 
furnish 1,000 knights, and perhaps ten ships.
153
  The offers to crusade show that even though 
the powerful king of Castile was at odds with Gregory, the pope’s crusading message was 
still striking a chord in Iberia with Alfonso’s vassals and his father-in-law. And indeed, 
Gregory’s need to redirect Emmanuel to Iberia away from the Holy Land shows that even 
with an ongoing invasion in Iberia, the crusade to the Holy Land took precedence for at least 
Emmanuel, and thus perhaps more. Siberry has done much to disprove Throop’s thesis about 
hostility to the crusade in the later thirteenth century, but here too is further proof of enduring 
interest in crusading. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 At the time of the Marinid invasion of Iberia, Alfonso was on the cusp of using 
military force to have his claim to the empire recognised. This would have been a disaster for 
Gregory’s crusading plans. Without peace in Europe, Gregory would not have been able to 
muster the force that he needed to launch his crusade. Gregory had been failing in his 
struggle to have Alfonso give up on his claim to the empire. Given that the pope had decided 
to acknowledge the selection of Rudolph of Habsburg as king of the Romans, it would have 
been impossible to turn back on this decision without causing even further war. In the end, 
the avoidance of war must boil down partly to Alfonso’s recognition that Gregory was never 
going to change his mind, but most of all to the invasion of Iberia forcing Alfonso to return to 
his kingdom. It is clear that the political situation in Europe, once again in the old 
battleground of Italy, could play a large role in Gregory’s ability to launch a crusade. Yet in 
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one aspect, instead of hindering his ability to launch a crusade, Gregory was able to use the 
struggle for the kingship of the Romans to gain support for his crusade, since candidates were 
putting forward crusading interest. Though Gregory had being failing diplomatically with 
Alfonso until the end of their talks in Beaucaire, at the end of his papal reign the course of 
events in Iberia meant that the pope did still have the peaceful conditions in the rest of 
Europe necessary to launch his crusade. 
If a full picture of the nature of the crusades is to be gained, then historians must not 
treat the crusades in Iberia and North Africa separately from those in the Holy Land (or 
indeed anywhere else). It is clear that crusading in these areas formed a complementary part 
of Gregory’s crusade organisation. St Louis’ crusade to Tunis had, from Gregory’s 
perspective, very recently connected this general area to the realm of thirteenth century 
crusading in a very real way. Even though Louis’ crusade to North Africa had ended in 
disaster, Gregory still encouraged Alfonso to crusade there. Far from being set in his ways 
about his crusade, Gregory’s support for crusading in North Africa and his direction of 
funding to the Iberian military orders for the same crusade in 1274 shows that his vision of 
the crusade, like that of past popes, included a fight against the Muslims of North Africa and 
Iberia – far from the Holy Land – and he was willing to take concrete steps to facilitate this. 
He was thus not wholly focused on sending a crusade only to the Holy Land. The invasion of 
Iberia in 1275 merely made what Gregory had already wanted become an unavoidable reality, 
and Alfonso could not but agree. But far from ignoring the Holy Land, Gregory was able to 
direct funding to Iberia because, in his mind, this helped the Holy Land itself. In this sense, it 
was not a ‘diversion’ of crusading force at all. 
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IMAGINING GREGORY’S CRUSADE 
 
Chapter Six 
 
 
 
Introduction: the Crusade that Never Was 
 
 Norman Housley has written that ‘the demise of any pope at such a critical point in 
crusade planning presents the historian with an insuperable problem of interpretation.’1 
Interpreting Gregory’s crusade is especially interesting for the historian, since he was the last 
pope to come close to launching a major crusade to rescue the Holy Land. Gregory stands 
alone as the pope able to gain the participation of virtually all of Europe’s major rulers: 
Germany and the Empire, France, Sicily, Aragon, Portugal, Sweden, and (in a way) Castile.
2
 
To this list, England and Bohemia could also potentially be added. Even more, with the 
success of the ecclesiastical union at Lyons, Gregory had Greek support for his crusade as 
well. With strong potential for an alliance with the Mongols, this crusade could have been 
staggeringly large. The fact that the crusade came to nothing after Gregory’s death need not 
prevent an analysis of its organisation and aims. An examination of Gregory’s plans for his 
general passage can demonstrate the changes the crusading movement was undergoing at the 
end of its classical period in the thirteenth century. This was not only in the dual crusade 
policy that Gregory adopted, but also in the direction of the general passage.  
This chapter will first discuss the unprecedented participation of effectively all of the 
major leaders of Europe in the crusade to the Holy Land and Iberia, which demonstrates 
Gregory’s impressive ability as a crusade organiser. The wide participation of kings in this 
                                                 
1
 Housley, Later Crusades, p. 14. 
2
 King Alfonso III of Portugal likely joined the crusade very soon after Gregory’s death. This is discussed 
below. Proof that King Magnus III of Sweden planned to crusade comes from his 1285 will, in which he 
bequeathed 400 marks for the fulfillment of his crusade vow to the Holy Land. It is not clear if he took the cross 
for Gregory’s crusade while Gregory was still alive, or after he died. Diplomatarium Suecanum, ed. J.G. 
Liljegren, vol. 1 (Stockholm, 1829), p. 657. 
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crusade would have presented a problem of leadership, thus this chapter will address this 
question, and argue that secular leadership of the crusade army would have turned away from 
France, and towards a new emperor, Rudolph of Habsburg. Gregory’s own participation in 
his crusade would also have been a key element in leadership. It will then offer a solution to 
the debate over the timing of Gregory’s general passage, which has been widely disputed by 
disparate groups, with Throop, Tyerman, and Riley-Smith placing it in 1277; Housley 
divided between 1277 and 1280; Schein at 1280; Richard and Asbridge at 1278; and finally, 
Leopold at 1276.
3
 This chapter will argue that even Gregory’s general passage (like the 
interim aid) would have been launched quickly based on the perceived need for a rapid 
response to the Holy Land’s problems: it would have been in June 1276.  
Finally, it will argue that Gregory’s failed crusade was very significant to 
understanding the course of crusading history, because it showed that a new general passage 
would no longer choose Egypt as its destination, even though this had been the recurring 
objective of thirteenth-century crusades. Indeed, the previous trend of Egypt has even 
understandably led Dunbabin to assume that it would have been the destination of Gregory’s 
crusade as well.
4
 Building on the work of Schein (who noted that the target of Egypt was 
‘conspicuously absent’ from crusade planning after 1270, but who never addressed the target 
of Gregory’s crusade), this chapter will demonstrate that it was during the reign of Pope 
Gregory X – when the Latin East was in its worst state since Saladin’s conquests – that the 
destination of the crusade would have returned to the Holy Land proper, by the land route 
through Turkey and northern Syria, to Palestine.
5
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Throop, Criticism, p. 272. Tyerman, God’s War, p. 816. Riley-Smith, Crusades, p. 213. Housley, Later 
Crusades, p. 13-14. Schein, Fideles, p. 44. Richard, Crusades, p. 437. Asbridge, Crusades, p. 649. Leopold, 
How to Recover, p. 177. 
4
 Dunbabin, Charles, p. 94. 
5
 Schein, Fideles, p. 50. 
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The Participation of Philip of France 
 
King Philip III of France was supposed to be one of the cornerstones of Gregory’s 
crusade. All indications from Gregory’s dealings with Philip point to the pope’s desire for 
this. As has been discussed in chapters two and three, Gregory had been working more 
closely with Philip for the interim crusading preparations than with any other monarch, save 
for Charles of Anjou’s supply of food. Besides the Church itself, it was only Philip who had 
been making investments in mercenaries to defend the Holy Land. Thus, his interests there 
were at stake. Although James of Aragon was the first monarch to give Gregory a firm signal 
that he would take up the cross, it was Philip that actually first took up the cross, which he 
did at his wedding to Maria of Brabant on the feast of St John the Baptist, 24 June 1275.
6
 
Philip had promised Gregory shortly after the general council in 1274 that he would do so, 
though technically he still had not completed the vow that he had made for his father’s 
second crusade.
7
 After the debacle at Tunis, Philip had returned to France without reaching 
the Holy Land. Even with this stain on his reputation, Charles-Victor Langlois (one of the 
few historians to tackle the reign of Philip III) painted a glowing picture of him. Langlois 
believed that the young king ‘seemed a worthy heir of his father, and showed himself as 
ardent as him for the expeditions to Outremer.’8  
                                                 
6
 The specific time that Philip took up the cross comes from only one source: Peter Coral, Majus Chronicon 
Lemovicense, ed. Guigniaut & de Wailly, RHGF, vol. 21 (Paris, 1855), p. 786. However, many other sources 
confirm that Philip had taken up the cross for Gregory’s crusade: Salimbene de Adam, Chronicle, trans. Joseph 
L. Baird, Guiseppe Baglivi, & John Robert Kane (Binghampton, 1986), p. 499; Martin of Opava, Chronicon 
Pontificum et Imperatorum, MGH, Scriptorum, vol. 22 (Hannover, 1872), p. 442; RV29A, f. 198v-199r; Bernard 
Gui, E Floribus Chronicorum, seu Catalogo Romanorum Pontificum, necnon e Chronico Regum Francorum, 
ed. Guigniaut & de Wailly, RHGF, vol. 21 (Paris, 1855), p. 703; Bartholomew of Lucca, Historia Ecclesiastica 
Nova, p. 585. His taking of the cross is also confirmed in Sur les annates et les dimes jusqu’en M.CCC.VII, ed. 
Guigniaut & de Wailly, RHGF, vol. 21 (Paris, 1855), p. 530, although it wrongly placed it at the general 
council. 
7
 Gregory’s 1 August 1274 letter to his legate, Simon of Brie, indicates that Philip had already resolved to take 
up the cross by this time. RGX, n. 498 (RV37, f. 185v-186r).  
8
 Langlois, Règne de Philippe III, p. 64. The lack of scholarship on Philip III is due to the scarcity of sources. As 
Langlois noted, the official registers of Philip II, Louis IX, and Philip IV are still extant, but Philip III’s have 
been lost. Ibid, p. i-ii. 
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Ardent he may have been – his work with Gregory goes some way to proving this – 
but ultimately, the only crusade Philip went on was the disastrous one to claim the kingdom 
of Aragon, which ended ignominiously in his own death in 1285. Langlois’ glowing picture 
must be tempered somewhat by the fact that Gregory had reminded Philip of the possibility 
of excommunication in 1273 to help persuade him to complete this vow.
9
 But this should not 
be taken too far. As has been seen in chapter three, Philip had offered to crusade the year 
before. Thus in 1273, Gregory was likely just using this threat to encourage Philip to take part 
in the pope’s own plans. Gregory’s letter was by no means harsh, and simply encouraged 
Philip to imitate the example of his famous ancestors.
10
 Gregory only reminded Philip that he 
could be excommunicated if he did not fulfill his vow, but this would not be done without 
express papal mandate.
11
 This probably was not even necessary, since by the time Gregory 
wrote this letter, Philip had already taken steps to show himself useful by supplying the pope 
with a loan for the Holy Land of 25,000 marks.
12
 
Philip took up the cross in 1275 with his wife Maria, as well as his two brothers, 
Robert, count of Clermont, and Peter, count of Perche and Alençon.
13
 As princes of France, 
his brothers could have fielded significant contingents. In addition, Philip’s new marriage 
with Maria was likely what led her brother, John I, duke of Brabant and Lotharingia, to take 
up the cross at the wedding.
14
 According to Gregory’s letters in July 1275, John was going to 
crusade ‘with a number of decent warriors’ numbering around ‘50 knights.’15 Robert II, duke 
of Burgundy (who later married Philip’s sister Agnes in 1279) took up the cross along with 
many barons of France at the wedding as well.
16
 Among the many barons of France who had 
                                                 
9
 For the threat of excommunication, see: RGX, n. 227 & 228 (RV37, f. 79v-80r).   
10
 RGX, n. 227 (RV37, f. 79v).   
11
 Ibid.   
12
 RGX, n. 789 (RV29A, f. 157v-158r). 
13
 Coral, Majus Chronicon Lemovicense, p. 786. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 ‘Cum decenti bellatorum numero.’ RGX, n. 837 (RV29A, f. 171r). ‘Cum quinquaginta militibus.’ RGX, n. 831 
(RV29A, f. 169v). 
16
 Coral, Majus Chronicon Lemovicense, p. 786. 
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taken up the cross could also be found the perennial crusader Erard of Valery, chamberlain of 
France, who was given 2,000 marks Stirling out of the tenth of Lyons from Navarre.
17
 This 
money was to go to Simon of Brie if Erard were unable to go to the Holy Land.
18
 It was Erard 
who had attended the Second Council of Lyons as Philip’s representative, and (according to 
James of Aragon himself, who certainly liked to exaggerate), who had remained shamefully 
silent after James’ boastful offer of help for the Holy Land.19 Clearly the participation of 
Erard’s lord, Philip, had helped to bring Erard to the crusade. Erard’s unrivalled experience 
on both of St Louis’ crusades, as well as with Odo of Burgundy in 1265 would have made 
him a very desirable participant in the new crusade.  
Humbert of Beaujeu, constable of France, should be counted among Philip’s group of 
crusaders as well. Langlois has noted that Humbert was one of the forces driving Philip to go 
to the Holy Land.
20
 A letter in which Gregory expressed his understanding that Humbert was 
aflame with zeal for the business of the Holy Land likely points to the constable having taken 
up the cross with the others.
21
 Finally, one last, and lesser-known baron of France may also 
be added: Gaucher, the castellan of Noyon and Thourotte, had taken up the cross and was 
going to the Holy Land with ten knights.
22
 Gaucher certainly did not have the standing of 
Erard or Humbert, but Gregory’s personal interest in convincing King Philip to relax 
Gaucher’s debts must indicate that he was a man of some significance.23 Ten knights was not 
an insignificant number, since the duke of Brabant himself was said to be bringing only 50. 
                                                 
17
 RGX, n. 648 (RV29A, f. 244r-244v). Duplicated in RGX, n. 836 (RV29A, f. 170v-171r). Guiraud had noted for 
register letter 648 that, given Gregory’s movements, the dating of 27 October 1275 in Vienne was incorrect, but 
he himself gave an incorrect substitution of 27 September 1275 in Vienne. The duplicate register letter 836 
solves the issue by giving the correct dating: 27 October 1275 in Sion. 
18
 RGX, n. 648 (RV29A, f. 244r-244v). Duplicated in RGX, n. 836 (RV29A, f. 170v-171r). 
19
 James of Aragon, Book, p. 363. 
20
 ‘Humbert of Beaujeu sought to induce the king to a new crusade; this pious person, despite the disaster at 
Tunis, never stopped dreaming of the expedition to Outremer.’ Langlois, Règne de Philippe III, p. 43. 
21
 RGX, n. 807 (RV29A, f. 162v). 
22
 RGX, n. 883. See also RGX, n. 884. 
23
 Gaucher owed 1,000 pounds, and had an annual revenue not exceeding 3,000 pounds. RGX, n. 883. 
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 News that Philip and others were taking up the cross at the king’s wedding is likely 
what precipitated Gregory’s letter to Simon of Brie a few days later on 29 June 1275. The 
letter is one of Gregory’s most enigmatic. He wrote:  
It is typical that moving forward difficult tasks incites an increase in the stimulations of 
anxiety, so that around those things which are pressing, nothing may pass undiscussed, 
lest by chance it makes them sorry to have neglected anything unexpected that 
afterwards they may reflect ought to have been foreseen. Therefore, we incite our dearest 
son in Christ the illustrious king of the Franks, you, and your counsellors (when he is 
free from such anxiety), to pursue the business of the Holy Land. As, nevertheless, 
anxiety is increased by worrisome things, we send to you the necessities, which we 
entrust to the aforesaid land, through the beloved son, Master William of Mâcon, our 
chaplain, under the seal of a fisherman
24
 somehow, so that concerning those things 
which the king, you, and the aforesaid counsellors have foreseen around the business of 
the Holy Land, those things may proceed, which have seemed useful to the king and to 
you after holding deliberation.
25
 
The letter is deliberately vague, because the ‘necessities’ that William was carrying to the 
king probably needed to be kept secret, lest William’s legation be intercepted by thieves. It is 
supposition, but it seems likely that now that Philip had finally taken up the cross, Gregory 
was sending him some of the money that was being raised for the Holy Land. If so, Philip 
would be the first king to receive money from Gregory’s crusade fundraising efforts, and thus 
Rudolph was neither the first, nor the only recipient of funds, as Throop believed.
26
 This 
seems even more likely given the fact that William of Roussillon was sent by the king of 
France and the Church to the Holy Land later in the same year with a contingent of troops. 
This close association between Gregory and Philip makes it appear that, although Philip 
would never have been the secular leader of Gregory’s crusade, in the absence of a king of 
                                                 
24
 According to Du Cange’s Glossa, ‘sigillum piscatoris’ was used by the pope for matters requiring secrecy.  
25
 RGX, n. 835 (RV29A, f. 170v). See Appendix A, 6:25. 
26
 Throop, Criticism, p. 272. 
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the Romans or an emperor, he had been filling this role, as his father had before him. This 
question of leadership will be discussed in full below. 
 
The Participation of Charles of Anjou and Michael Palaeologus 
 
 Charles of Anjou’s kingdom had been steadily sending supplies to the Holy Land, as 
has been seen in chapter four. He was also a former crusader himself, having participated in 
both of his brother Louis’ crusades. The problem for Gregory’s crusading plans was that 
Charles was much more interested in an attack on Byzantine territory than on the Muslims 
holding the Holy Land. Clearly, this was a problem for Michael Palaeologus as well. It is no 
secret that Michael’s own interest in church union at the Second Council of Lyons was 
fuelled by his desire to prevent Charles from attacking him. The church union and relations 
between the Greeks and Charles of Anjou have been well documented, thus this chapter will 
not dwell on them. Instead, it will focus on the participation or non-participation of Charles 
and Michael in Gregory’s crusade. Though Charles had been working closely with Gregory 
to aid the Holy Land in the interim, his participation in the crusade was by no means a 
certainty. In addition, Michael’s promise of Greek participation in the planned crusade – 
almost unprecedented after the Fourth Crusade – was a coup for Gregory, though the impetus 
for this participation came not from the pope, but from Michael himself.  
Just as with the other European monarchs, Gregory certainly wanted to secure Charles 
of Anjou’s participation in the Holy Land crusade; however, it appears that in this case, 
Gregory would have been satisfied if Charles’ son and heir, Charles of Salerno, participated 
in his stead. This stands in contrast most obviously to Charles’ nephew Philip of France, for 
whom a proxy was never discussed. Yet Charles, just like Philip, had not completed his vow 
from Louis’ second crusade after it broke up in Tunis. Gregory had been sure to remind 
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Philip of the consequences of failing to complete his vow, but no extant letters give any 
indication that Charles was similarly pressed. Charles had been one of the first people to meet 
with Gregory when the new pope returned from the East.
27
 Their close contact was probably 
what has led to so few documents being exchanged between the two. It is possible that 
Gregory did not pressure Charles to fulfill his vow in letters, because Charles had already 
discussed his participation in the new crusade with the pope in person. At any rate, the only 
documentary evidence that proves Charles took up the cross again was not written until 13 
October 1275, after Philip had already done so, and just before Rudolph of Habsburg did as 
well.
28
 Even in this case, one must reconstruct the scenario based on Gregory’s response to 
the news, and not on any remaining information from Charles himself, or even from chronicle 
evidence. As discussed in this chapter, there are many chronicles which have noted the cross-
taking of Philip of France and Rudolph of Habsburg, but none remain to indicate that of 
Charles of Anjou. 
Gregory wrote a letter to Charles and his son, in which both were said to have taken 
up the cross for the crusade to the Holy Land.
29
 Yet, unlike the pressure that Gregory had 
placed on Philip for his participation, Gregory wrote to Charles (to whom he had given the 
Lyons tenth for Sicily, Anjou, and Provence):  
If you, the aforesaid king, personally are unable or unwilling to proceed there, we want 
that you, the foremost son, may have the same tenth in a similar way through the said 
time, if nevertheless by passing over the sea you may pursue the business of the [Holy] 
Land in your very own person in the general passage, on par with the same plan.
30
 
Whether Charles had promised to take up the cross earlier or not, it was not until this year 
that he actually did so, but with the unique difference that his son, Charles of Salerno, might 
                                                 
27
 After Gregory had put to port at Brindisi in January 1272, Charles had met Gregory in Benevento, en route to 
Viterbo. Vita Gregorii, p. 345. 
28
 RGX, n. 636 (RV37, f. 239r). 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 This ‘plan’ was noted in the same letter simply to be Gregory’s plan for carrying out the crusade, which 
included giving money to crusaders from the Lyons tenth. Ibid. See Appendix A, 6:30. 
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go in his place. More importantly, this was a caveat that Gregory seemed perfectly willing to 
accept, although he gave no other such exemptions to other kings. Of course, Philip did not 
actually have a son of age who could crusade in his place, but he did have two brothers. 
They, like Edward’s brother Edmund, could theoretically have filled in for the king.31  
Dunbabin has argued that Charles had a ‘thirst for crusading.’32 Why then, does he 
seem to be the one monarch whose participation was not so actively sought by Gregory, at 
least as far as the records indicate? Unfortunately, one can only make suppositions: it seems 
most likely that Gregory would have been happy for Charles to stay in Italy so that any 
potential problems there from Alfonso of Castile while the crusade was underway could be 
dealt with by someone close in the pope’s confidence. In addition, the participation of 
Michael Palaeologus may have made for a troubled crusader camp if Charles were to be 
among its ranks. It is not very likely that Charles wanted to stay behind in order to take 
advantage of the situation by an attack on Byzantium; indeed, if Gregory had remained in 
Europe, he would have acted to put a stop to this, and with the new church union, Charles’ 
legal ability to attack Byzantium had been severely curtailed. Charles had not shown himself 
willing to cross Gregory, so he would not likely have launched an attack on Byzantium 
without papal permission. In the absence of evidence, one can only assume the likeliest 
course that, if Charles had remained behind, it would have been in order to keep Italy under 
control. 
The confirmation that Charles of Anjou would indeed be staying behind comes after 
Gregory’s death, though Sicilian commitment to the crusade was still clear with the later 
participation of the constable of Sicily, John Britaud, who took up the cross presumably to go 
                                                 
31
 As will be discussed below, when Edward agreed to take the cross, he stipulated that his brother might go in 
his stead. Foedera, vol. 1, part 2, p. 537. 
32
 Dunbabin, Charles, p. 197. 
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with Charles of Salerno.
33
 Pope Innocent V’s letter to Michael Palaeologus in May 1276 
noted that Charles of Salerno was going on crusade along with Philip, Rudolph, and Alfonso 
III of Portugal.
34
 According to Innocent’s letter, Michael had been interested in:  
Especially whether [Pope Gregory X] and the kings were disposed personally to cross 
over the sea or to support the [Holy] Land by a relief mission, [as well as] at which time 
the general passage would be in the future, which kings, and how many, have taken up 
the cross, or how much aid [Gregory] and the kings would send if they happen not to 
pass over the sea, and whether they were intending to have the advance peacefully, or 
through war.
35
  
Of course, even with the church union, Michael would still not have let his guard down to his 
archrival Charles of Anjou. Thus, Michael’s interest in who would be participating in the 
crusade was chiefly an interest in the movements of Charles himself. 
Michael’s own offer of Greek participation in the crusade was a huge coup for 
Gregory, but not quite without precedent in the thirteenth century. Michael himself had made 
a similar offer to both Pope Urban IV and Pope Clement IV when he had been in union 
negotiations with them in the 1260s.
36
 The key difference in Gregory’s case was that the 
union was actually brought to fruition, and thus what had been a useful tool in showing good 
faith to the pope could now actually be put into practice. Michael’s offer to Gregory had 
already been in discussion at the general council. A July 1274 letter from Michael’s 
ambassadors to Gregory indicates: 
Concerning the assistance that our lord emperor declares to give in the Holy Land, we 
declare this, and affirm that his whole intention and promptitude is entirely for giving 
assistance in the Holy Land, through providing an army, money, and supplies, and 
through other foreseen things of any sort, but only if he will have peace with his Latin 
                                                 
33
 By November 1276, John Britaud, lord of Nangis, constable of Sicily, and panetier of France, had taken up 
the vow to crusade in the Holy Land with an appropriate escort. Reg. John XXI, n. 11. 
34
 RV29A, f. 198v-199r. 
35
 Ibid. See Appendix A, 6:35. 
36
 Geanakoplos, Emperor, p. 176 & 204. 
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neighbours. [...] And we are prepared to proclaim these things in the streets and cities, 
and in the pulpits, when it will be commanded to us by our most holy lord pope.
37
 
Crusade participation was, of course, a useful bargaining chip for gaining peace. Vitalien 
Laurent has argued that ‘the principle of participation in the [crusade] league was imposed on 
[Michael] by necessity; a crusade, conducted without him, would come to its end against 
him.’38 Laurent has poorly understood Gregory’s desire for peace, which had led to the 
church union at Lyons. Gregory was focused on rescuing the Holy Land, not taking back 
Constantinople. Even though Gregory had threatened Michael in his earliest letter that unless 
the union were affected quickly, he might use other options (in other words, he might 
condone Charles’ invasion), it was probably only a scare tactic.39 Indeed, as Nikolaos 
Chrissis has noted on this point, ‘Gregory’s actual policy and personal view were more 
positive towards Union than these reservations would allow.’40 Nevertheless, one can 
scarcely imagine that Michael would have offered his services for the crusade had he not felt 
threatened by Charles of Anjou. 
Gregory’s letters to Michael give no indication that he coerced him into joining the 
crusade. Although Michael did use participation in the crusade as a way to keep invasion at 
bay, it was still his own idea. Indeed, in Gregory’s earliest letters to Michael, when he invited 
him to the general council, he made no call for him to join the crusade. Michael’s 
participation in the crusade was not a condition set by Gregory to gain his good favour. The 
first suggestion that Michael would add Greek support to the crusade came from Michael’s 
embassy at the council itself, not from Gregory. The fact that Michael followed his offer up 
one year later proves that he was serious about the crusade, and not just making promises to 
                                                 
37
 RV29A, f. 194v-195r. See Appendix A, 6:37. This letter was missed by Guiraud, but has been included here: 
Notice sur cinq manuscrits de la bibliothèque nationale et sur un manuscrit de la bibliothèque de Bordeaux, 
contenant des recueils épistolaires de Bérard de Naples, ed. Léopold Delisle (Paris, 1877), p. 82. 
38
 Vitalien Laurent, ‘Le rapport de Georges le Métochite, apocrisiaire de Michel VIII Paléologue auprès du Pape 
Gregoire X,’ Revue historique du sud-est européen, 23 (1946), p. 233.  
39
 RGX, n. 194 (RV29A, f. 58v-61r). 
40
 Chrissis, Crusading in Romania, p. 209. 
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Gregory to gain his favour, that he then would not keep. In 1275, Michael sent George 
Metochites as a messenger with full negotiating power, and the Grand Intendant Theodore as 
translator.
41
 They met Gregory at Rudolph’s coronation in Lausanne in October 1275. There, 
George was charged by Michael to discuss the practical elements of the crusade, including 
transportation and supplies.  
The biggest stumbling block to Michael’s participation would have been his 
friendship with Baybars. In fact, Michael had formed a new treaty with Baybars in late 1275 
or early in 1276 – at the very same time that he was offering help for Gregory’s crusade. 
Evidence of Michael’s new negotiations with Baybars comes from Makrizi. He noted that 
Baybars had returned to Cairo on 17 January 1276.
42
 There, ‘the ambassadors of Emperor 
Lascaris, those of Alfonso, and those of the city of Genoa received their farewell audience 
[with Baybars].’43 Evidently, they had arrived some time before this date. There is reason for 
pause at the mention of ‘Emperor Lascaris.’ Emperor John Lascaris IV had been deposed and 
blinded by Michael Palaeologus in 1261. Although Deno Geanakoplos noted that Charles of 
Anjou was said to have tried to bring Lascaris to his court, he added that stronger evidence 
pointed to Lascaris having been sent to a monastery after he was blinded.
44
 If Lascaris had 
been with Charles of Anjou (which is not likely), then his representative would probably not 
be travelling with Alfonso and the Genoese, who had very poor relations with the Sicilian 
king. Instead, Makrizi’s text might finally give further clarification to Geanakoplos’ mystery 
surrounding relations between Alfonso of Castile and Michael Palaeologus. Geanakoplos 
wrote:  
                                                 
41
 Geanakoplos, in what was probably simply a mistake rather than a genuine misinterpretation of the sources, 
placed the embassy to Gregory in summer 1276 in Beaucaire. Gregory was dead by then, and George was clear 
to say that he met Gregory in autumn, at the crowning of the king of the Romans. This was in Lausanne in 1275. 
Geanakoplos, Emperor, p. 287. For evidence of George’s position, and the dating of the embassy, see: Giannelli, 
‘Récit,’ p. 436-7 & 439. 
42
 The 28
th
 day of Rajab, 674. Makrizi, Histoire, vol. 1, part 2, p. 127. 
43
 Makrizi, Histoire, vol. 1, part 2, p. 127. See also Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 
565-1453, vol. 3, Regesten von 1204-1282, ed. Franz Dölger, Corpus  der griechischen Urkunden des 
Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, Reihe A: Regesten (Munich, 1932), p. 66. 
44
 Geanakoplos, Emperor, p. 217-8. 
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In view of the anti-Angevin alliance between Genoa and the Lombard Ghibellines on the 
one hand, and Genoa and Palaeologus on the other, diplomatic relations between the 
Ghibellines, especially their patron Alfonso X of Castile, and Michael would seem only 
natural. Yet so far as I have been able to discover, only a single source, Annales 
Placentini Gibellini, explicitly couples the names of the two rulers at this time. Under the 
year 1271 it states that Alfonso contemplated a Byzantine alliance through the marriage 
of one of his daughters to a son of Michael.
45
 
Geanakoplos added that Alfonso had sent William, count of Ventimiglia to treat with the 
north Italian Ghibellines in 1271; this William had been given a daughter of Emperor 
Theodore II Lascaris in marriage by Michael Palaeologus; finally, Michael himself had sent 
William to Genoa in 1273 or 1274 as his own personal envoy.
46
 Thus, it seems possible that 
Makrizi’s messenger from ‘Emperor Lascaris’ was actually William, and the presence of the 
three embassies together at the sultan’s court was then not a coincidence, since they had close 
relations with each other. 
Laurent has seen Michael’s new treaty with the Mamluks as proof that he was not 
intending to break relations with Baybars any time soon.
47
 It seems more likely that, in true 
Byzantine fashion, he was simply hedging his bets. If the crusade failed to launch, Michael 
would have the safety of renewed relations with Baybars. But if the crusade did end up going 
ahead in force, he could take up a papal offer to ignore his treaty with Baybars. Indeed, in 
May 1276 Pope Innocent V noted that the emperor’s messengers had informed him that 
Michael had a sworn friendship with Baybars.
48
 For the sake of the crusade, Innocent gave 
Michael his blessing to ignore any treaties of friendship with the sultan.
49
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The Participation of Rudolph of Habsburg and Ottokar of Bohemia 
 
 Unlike King Philip, Charles of Anjou, and King Edward, Rudolph of Habsburg had 
never crusaded before. His participation in the crusade was not tied to any previously 
unfulfilled vow, advantageous geographical location, or any particular expertise as a warrior 
in the Holy Land, although his father, Albert IV, count of Habsburg, had died on crusade in 
the Holy Land in 1239.
50
 Rather, Rudolph showed himself willing to crusade in order to 
secure Gregory’s support for his election to the kingship of the Romans. There is no direct 
evidence that Gregory tied Rudolph’s imperial title to the fulfillment of his crusading vow, 
but as will be demonstrated, the course of events around the imperial coronation and the 
launching of the crusade make it seem that Gregory did connect the two. It appears that the 
pope wanted to make sure that Rudolph would not renege on his promise, so he shrewdly 
withheld the imperial title until they were both in Rome, when it was only a few months until 
the crusade would have launched. In this way, the disruptive political circumstances in the 
West which resulted from the conflict for the kingship of the Romans and the imperial title 
were actually used by Gregory in favour of the crusade. There is some precedent for this in 
Emperor Frederick II, but the parallel should not be taken too far. In contrast to Rudolph of 
Habsburg, when Frederick was crowned king of the Romans in 1215, he took the cross at his 
own initiative against the will of Pope Innocent III (indeed without the pope’s knowledge).51 
Eventually the papacy came around strongly to endorse Frederick’s vow, and at the imperial 
coronation in 1220 the papal curia ‘saw the crusade as Frederick’s first major act as 
emperor.’52 In this earlier case, although the imperial coronation was tied to the crusade vow, 
it was done by Frederick himself, who had ‘seized the chance of the coronation to affirm 
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again his crusading vows.’53 Thus, Gregory X’s apparent initiative linking the coronation and 
crusade went a step further than his predecessors. Finally, it is also with the case of Rudolph 
that the clearest details emerge about the scale of Gregory’s crusade, since chronicle evidence 
has survived which give some specifics on the size of Rudolph’s contingent. Rudolph (like 
Edward) was also actively encouraged to aid the Holy Land by its residents.  
 After Rudolph had been officially recognised as king of the Romans by Gregory in 
September 1274, and after Alfonso of Castile had been (seemingly) pacified at Beaucaire in 
July 1275, Gregory met with Rudolph in Lausanne to crown him. As discussed in chapter 
five, Rudolph had used an offer to crusade in the Holy Land as a way of securing Gregory’s 
support for his election as king of the Romans. Thus it was at Lausanne, where Rudolph was 
crowned by Gregory in October 1275, that he took up the cross. He did this with his wife, 
Gertrude of Hohenburg, who had been crowned queen of the Romans by Gregory as well. At 
the same time, Frederick III, duke of Lorraine, as well as Louis II, duke of Upper Bavaria and 
count-palatine of the Rhine, and his wife Matilda of Habsburg, took up the cross.
54
 Ties of 
kinship no doubt influenced these barons to join Rudolph in his crusading venture. Matilda, 
wife of Louis II, was the daughter of Rudolph. Frederick III was the uncle (by marriage) of 
John II of Brittany, who had taken up the cross in 1275 as well.
55
 By ensuring that Rudolph’s 
crowning was done at the same time as he took up the cross, Gregory had secured quite a 
coup for his crusade. One of the great political problems of his reign had been turned to the 
advantage of the crusade. 
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 Rudolph’s crowning as king of the Romans put him in a powerful position. Since he 
had also taken up the cross, the residents of the Holy Land saw the opportunity that had been 
afforded to them for great aid. Balian, the constable of Jerusalem, as well as Patriarch 
Thomas and King Hugh all wrote to Rudolph to inform him of the condition of the Holy 
Land, and to tell him what was needed there, as has been discussed in chapter two. King 
Hugh said that he was eagerly awaiting Rudolph’s vowed arrival.56 But with the agreement of 
Gregory and Rudolph, that arrival would have to wait until after a still greater prize had been 
won by Rudolph – the imperial title. The annals of Basel noted that the date for the 
coronation in Rome was set for Pentecost in 1276, which would have been 24 May.
57
 The 
annals of Basel are one of the more reliable sources for these events, since the bishop of 
Basel had been ordained at Lausanne by Gregory at the same time that Rudolph was there.
58
  
Given that these annals have some of the closest detail of these events, it is reasonable to 
assume that the chronicler had either been present, or had been well-informed by those who 
were there. Nevertheless, the annalist has made what seems like a mistake by confusing the 
date of the imperial coronation with the date from which the launching of the crusade was set. 
The annals of Basel had noted that the pope and the emperor would be crossing over the sea 
after the feast of the purification, which was 2 February 1276.
59
 Instead, it seems more likely 
that 2 February 1276 was the date for the coronation, and 24 May the date from which the 
crusade was set. This seems even more possible given that in this same work, on the very 
same page, the editor noted that the manuscript had confused the date that Rudolph held court 
in Würzburg, placing it at the feast of the purification at one point, and Pentecost at another.
60
 
Solid corroboration can be gained in the annals of St Rupert of Salzburg, which, after telling 
of Gregory’s crowning of Rudolph at Lausanne, noted that they had delayed the imperial 
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consecration and coronation until the feast of the purification.
61
 It seems then that Gregory 
was to crown Rudolph as emperor in February 1276, since the pope died in Arezzo while he 
was travelling back to Rome in January 1276 to do this. 
 Had Rudolph gone on crusade, he might have brought a sizable contingent. The 
chronicle of St Peter of Erfurt noted that 500 knights had taken the cross with Rudolph at 
Lausanne.
62
 The Continuatio Vindobonensis noted that Gregory promised to cross overseas 
with Rudolph with 1,000 knights.
63
 Finally, the annals of Basel noted that the pope had asked 
Rudolph to arrive in Rome for his coronation with 2,000 knights.
64
 It is not certain if these 
2,000 would have been those who had taken up the cross, but since the same annals noted 
that after the coronation Gregory and Rudolph would be going overseas, it seems likely. 
Whatever the precise number, Gregory was already starting to channel funding to Rudolph to 
help his expenses. Pope Clement IV had given funding to King Louis IX in the lead up to his 
crusade as well: a tenth of all ecclesiastical revenues in France, and a twentieth from 
elsewhere.
65
 Gregory gave Rudolph 12,000 marks from the Lyons tenth in 1275, and Rudolph 
was already requesting more by the end of the year.
66
 No doubt this was ultimately to be for 
crusading expenses, but first it was to help in the pacification of Italy. As discussed in chapter 
five, William of Montferrat, aided by King Alfonso, was still causing trouble there. Gregory 
had asked Rudolph to send troops to Lombardy, and the king himself had gone to settle the 
region and to make his presence as king of the Romans felt.
67
 It was perhaps this conflict, and 
that between Rudolph and Ottokar, which led William of Beaujeu to lament that ‘[the 
inhabitants of the Holy Land] are hindered from the discords of the kings and princes in 
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places west of the Babylonians; the arrogance shakes us and wickedness troubles us, and they 
strain Christendom on this side of the sea with newly introduced occasions to trample down 
strength.’68 
 In the end, Rudolph never received the imperial title, and never went on crusade. 
Gregory’s death put an end to them both, but even while he was dying, Gregory was still 
trying to get Rudolph to fulfill his vow. One of Gregory’s last and most poignant letters was 
written to Rudolph in January 1276. He encouraged him to support the Church, and to do 
good works. Gregory wrote:  
Whether God rescues us from the toil of this sickness, or leads us out from the prison of 
bodily frailty, may you always respect and have special regard for his Church, and may 
you busy yourself to confer peace and calm to it, just as a most pious prince and most 
Christian emperor, so that, whether we live or we die, we may glorify your good works 
in his presence, whom indeed we have assisted in the present life on behalf of the debt of 
our servitude. And presupposing his mercy, if he will have wished to summon us, we 
would proceed with confidence.
69
  
Even Gregory’s heartfelt letter to Rudolph was not enough to prevent what happened after the 
pope’s death. War between Rudolph and Ottokar erupted, and effectively prevented Rudolph 
from going to the Holy Land. Of course it is impossible to say with absolute certainty if war 
between the two kings could have been averted had Gregory lived, but some indication of 
Ottokar’s frame of mind can perhaps be gained from the fact that he was in contact with 
Sultan Baybars at some time in 1275 to seek his friendship.
70
 The letter contained no concrete 
offer in terms of working together, and gave away no information about the upcoming 
crusade. The most likely reason for the letter was simply to try to convince Baybars to send a 
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relic of St Catherine or of the True Cross.
71
 There is no evidence that a reply was ever made, 
or that the letter was ever followed up; thus, Ottokar was probably not seriously considering 
an alliance with Baybars.  
Ottokar, for his part, had sought to end the tensions between himself and Rudolph, but 
only on terms very favourable to himself. He wanted to keep possession of all his territories 
that Rudolph had ordered must revert to the crown.
72
 To sweeten the deal, Ottokar had 
promised Gregory in 1274 that he would go on crusade personally. This might seem like an 
ideal situation, but in fact Ottokar added the stipulation that the crusade would have to be 
delayed for four years.
73
 Furthermore, he never explicitly said that he would recognise 
Rudolph’s title, only that he was submitting to the pope.74 Gatto has written that Ottokar 
offered to recognise Rudolph’s title after they came back from crusade, but this is 
supposition.
75
 Ottokar wrote, in fact, that he did not recognise Rudolph’s election.76 He 
referred to restoring harmony between himself and Rudolph, but this does not mean that he 
would recognise Rudolph as king of the Romans. Nevertheless, Gatto was right to believe 
that ‘Gregory had been placed in an unpleasant situation: either accept the request for Ottokar 
and seriously damage the rights of Rudolph and the empire, or reject it and risk incurring the 
reproach of neglecting the interests of the Holy Land.’77 
 Ottokar had been showing deference to the pope, but the year 1275 saw increasing 
tension between them. Ottokar’s offer to crusade (under the above stipulations) had been 
made in 1274, and Gregory had been delighted at the time to think that Ottokar was finally 
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easing tensions.
78
 But Ottokar’s letter to Gregory on 9 March 1275, in which the details of his 
original offer to crusade are extant, made no progress.
79
 Gregory told him as much in his 
response on 2 May 1275. Gregory’s increasing exasperation with Ottokar started to become 
clear when he wrote that Ottokar’s letters were ‘not containing anything new,’ and they were 
‘repeating what you had written hitherto in different words.’80 Thus, it is clear that Gregory 
had rejected Ottokar’s crusade-delaying proposal even before March 1275. Gregory reiterated 
that ‘we do not intend to change the laws of the empire or to disparage its customs; on 
account of that, it is neither expedient, nor becoming for us to forbid duty to the king of the 
Romans.’81 Nevertheless, Gregory reassured Ottokar that the money being collected in his 
land for the Lyons tax was going ‘neither to Rudolph nor to any other,’ but it was established 
that ‘whichever king personally took up the business of the Holy Land may obtain the tenth 
in his lands for carrying out the business of the Holy Land. We propose to deny neither 
Rudolph nor you.’82  
Later, on 22 July 1275, Gregory’s tone became quite obviously one of annoyance. He 
phrased the letter as a series of exasperated questions, such as: ‘what has so carried off your 
royal consideration from the path of reason, that you would rush forth into things, which you 
have sent to us by your letters?’83 The named letters are no longer extant, so it is not clear 
what Ottokar had planned at that time, but clearly it was not as Gregory wanted. Given that 
this is the last extant letter between Gregory and Ottokar, it might indicate a final breakdown 
in their relations. There is, however, no corroborating evidence that this occurred. For his 
part, Gregory told Ottokar that ‘we will not desist from the undertaking, but effectually with 
the author of peace leading the way we will insist on a treaty of peace between you and the 
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king of the Romans.’84 Peace was essential in Gregory’s mind for the successful launching of 
his crusade, but perhaps Gregory was being too optimistic about his chances of keeping the 
peace.
85
 Indeed, Gatto has alleged that Ottokar was not genuine in his search for peace, and 
he ‘really just wanted to pass the time necessary to complete his armament [for war against 
Rudolph].’86 The onset of war after Gregory’s death would seem to bear out the truth of this. 
However, Gregory clearly did have confidence that he could see his plans through despite the 
tensions with Ottokar, since he went ahead with the coronation of Rudolph as king of the 
Romans later in the year, and he was going to Rome at the time of his death in preparation for 
Rudolph’s imperial coronation and their departure on crusade without any apparent change of 
plans.
87
 
 
The Participation of Edward of England 
 
 King Edward I of England had only just returned from the Holy Land near the 
beginning of Gregory’s pontificate. Thus, among the western crusade leaders, he was 
arguably the best informed of the situation on the ground from his personal experience. 
Charles of Anjou was frequently sending supplies to the Holy Land, through which he could 
gain information, but Edward had actually been there recently, and had engaged the enemy. 
For this reason, Edward’s participation in the crusade would have been coveted by Gregory. 
But for the very reason that Edward had shown himself a willing crusader by going to the 
Holy Land, it was less easy for Gregory to convince him to return there again so soon. 
Edward had completed his vow, and moreover, he had just become king of England after the 
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death of his father on 16 November 1272. He had affairs to set in order in England. Philip of 
France had recently taken up his crown as well, and had decided to join Gregory’s crusade, 
but Philip came to the throne of a country that was left in excellent order by his father, 
whereas England had only recently been through civil war.  
Though Edward certainly had good reasons for not participating in Gregory’s crusade, 
that did not stop the pope from asking him. Norman Housley has argued that Edward 
‘regarded a new crusade as the ultimate objective of his reign and maintained a consistent 
interest in the Holy Land.’88 The existence of an ‘interest’ in crusade seems to be the case 
during Gregory’s reign itself, and Simon Lloyd and Sylvia Schein have taken a step too far 
by asserting that Edward had promised to take the cross by November 1275.
89
 They cited two 
letters from Gregory to the bishop of Verdun in November 1275 in which the pope allowed 
the bishop to assign the Lyons tax to Edward from his kingdom if he assumed the cross.
90
 
Even in the later letter, dated 24 November, it is clear that the ‘if’ still stood.91 Edward had 
not promised to take up the cross; if he had, then he would certainly have been mentioned 
among the list of great participants in Pope Innocent V’s May 1276 letter to Emperor Michael 
Palaeologus.
92
 As this section will show, sources from during Gregory’s papacy show that 
Edward was genuinely interested in joining the new crusade, and had not ruled out answering 
Gregory’s call. Nevertheless, by the time of Gregory’s death, Edward could not be counted 
among its participants. This was not because he was uninterested in the crusade or opposed to 
Gregory – far from it – but rather because he had a legitimate need as a new king to stay to 
govern his country amid its difficulties. 
 Given that Edward had just returned from the crusade, Gregory did not immediately 
try to convince him to take up the cross again. He did, however, still receive advice on the 
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condition of the Holy Land from the recent crusader in April 1273, before the general 
council, as has been discussed chapter two.
93
 The presence of Edward at the general council 
would have been invaluable, since his reputation as a crusader was high.
94
 Nevertheless, 
Edward, like all the other kings save James of Aragon, decided not to attend the council. In 
all fairness, Edward had only just returned to England. He would barely have had time to set 
his affairs in order before having to leave for the council, which was to begin in late spring 
1274. Officially, Edward was not able to attend the council because his coronation was 
scheduled then, but this seems very convenient timing. One cannot but suspect that Edward 
had picked this time so that he would have a better excuse to avoid the council, and thus to 
avoid pressure to take up the cross again so soon. Gregory must have suspected so as well, 
since he wrote to Edward in December 1273 urging him to either move the date of his 
coronation forward, or else delay it until after the council, so that he could attend.
95
 No 
response is extant from Edward, but at any rate, he did not change his mind. This need not be 
taken as complete unwillingness on Edward’s part for taking up the crusade. It was still early 
days in the crusade planning. 
Crusading was an expensive endeavour, and Edward had only just returned home. An 
argument could be made that it would be far too expensive for Edward to take up the cross 
again so soon, and that this was what made him hesitate. After all, as has been discussed in 
chapter three, Edward had been trying to ease his debt concerns even while he was still in the 
Holy Land.
96
 On 30 September 1272, Gregory had written to the clergy in England so that 
they would give Edward and Edmund money from ecclesiastical returns for their crusade 
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expenses.
97
 However, by August 1274, Edward’s debt had already been paid-off in full, so 
this could no longer serve as a potential excuse.
98
 Moreover, the money being raised by 
Gregory’s six-year tenth tax on all the churches was for the very purpose of ensuring that the 
crusaders would be well-funded. 
 Even though Edward did not attend the general council, he still kept himself up-to-
date on the condition of the Holy Land throughout Gregory’s reign. This demonstrates that he 
did, as Housley suggested, maintain a consistent interest in it. If Edward had no intention of 
taking up the cross again, he would hardly have needed to stay well-informed about the Holy 
Land. Indeed, sources from 1274 and 1275, while Gregory was planning his crusade, show 
that Edward was staying in very close contact with the Holy Land. Gregory had sent the 
archbishop of Tyre to King Edward in 1274 so that he could tell him first-hand about what 
the archbishop ‘has considered putting forth to the advantage of the Holy Land.’99 In January 
1275, the Mongol Ilkhan Abagha had been in contact with Edward to try to get information 
about the upcoming crusade (which Edward was not able to give at that time).
100
 In 
September and October 1275, Edward had also received letters from both the master of the 
Hospital and of the Temple about the condition of the Holy Land. Hugh Revel wrote because 
he apparently believed that Edward wanted news of the Holy Land.
101
 William of Beaujeu 
wrote to Edward because the business of the Holy Land ‘rests (as we hope) upon the royal 
heart.’102 Edward’s continuing interest in the Holy Land gives strong indication that he was 
seriously considering returning there, perhaps on Gregory’s crusade. 
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 Edward’s thoughts about crusading are made most clearly in his May 1275 letter to 
his brother-in-law King Alfonso. Edward wrote:  
One may see, because the lord high pontiff asked us recently with urgent needs whether 
we wish to proceed or not in aid of the Holy Land, to which thus far we have not been 
able to respond because we have not yet deliberated what we ought to do about it, 
namely, to proceed, or indeed to remain. Afterwards, however, having held deliberation 
about the aforesaid things, we will have answered the aforesaid high pontiff.
103
 
Edward must never have given Gregory a firm ‘no’ about his crusade participation. This 
ambivalence is likely what led Gregory write to the bishop of Verdun in November 1275 to 
tell him that the money from the Lyons tax could be given to Edward if he took up the 
cross.
104
 This was a good incentive for any crusader, and Gregory made clear use of it in this 
case to try to entice Edward to join the crusade, just as the pope had done with Alfonso in 
Iberia. In this same letter, there is proof that John II of Brittany, earl of Richmond, had taken 
up the cross.
105
 John had been on crusade with Edward, and was married to Edward’s sister 
Beatrice, who had died earlier in 1275. It is supposition, but perhaps her death, and a feeling 
of unfinished business in the Holy Land, led John to take up the cross for a second time. As a 
close associate of Edward, John’s participation must have made Gregory all the more hopeful 
that Edward, too, would soon be taking up the cross. 
Had Gregory lived, it is surely likely that Edward would have joined his crusade. The 
only participants from Britain and Ireland who had been confirmed by the time of Gregory’s 
death were the earl of Richmond and the archbishop of Cushel.
106
 But to stay behind when 
the kings of France and of the Romans were going would have been an embarrassment for 
Edward. Proof that Edward would have taken up the cross comes after Gregory’s death. 
                                                 
103
 Foedera, vol. 1, part 2, p. 522. See Appendix A, 6:103. 
104
 RGX, n. 945 & 960. 
105
 Not to be mistaken for John I, duke of Brittany, who was still alive. The elder John had ceded his claim as 
earl of Richmond to his son John II of Brittany in 1268.  
106
 Gregory had written to Edward in October 1274 about David MacCerbaill, archbishop of Cashel, taking up 
the cross. Foedera, vol. 1, part 2, p. 517. 
249 
 
  
During his brief papal tenure, Pope Innocent V had written to Edward with strong 
encouragement to take up the cross, which, he said, would encourage other people to do the 
same.
107
 He noted that many other princes had already taken up the cross, and the Church was 
supporting the burden of the crusade.
108
 Although Edward’s response to Innocent encouraged 
the pope in the business of the Holy Land, and he showed interest in its welfare, Edward still 
made no commitment.
109
 But Edward’s concern for the Holy Land still showed clearly in 
November 1276, when he wrote to King Philip that his conflict with King Alfonso, at a time 
when ‘Christendom lies exposed to dangers, would produce an obstacle to the business of the 
Holy Land and threaten an overthrow to Christians.’110 Edward said he himself was busy with 
struggles in Ireland and Wales, but he would make time to meet with Philip.
111
 However, it 
was in the next month, December 1276, that the surest sign came of Edward’s favourable 
disposition to crusading. Edward wrote to Pope John XXI (formerly Gregory X’s physician) 
that he was giving full power to two of his clerks, ‘so that in the next general passage to the 
Holy Land, we may depart personally to the same land, or our dearest brother, Edmund, 
count of Lancaster, will go there for us.’112 Schein has interpreted this letter as a show of 
further hesitation on Edward’s part, but this is not giving Edward enough credit, and besides 
the stipulation that Edmund may go in his place, Edward was clearly committing his forces to 
the crusade.
113
 Schein also asserted that Edward tried to make John XXI count his Tunis 
crusade as a fulfillment of his crusade vow, but she has very seriously misinterpreted the 
source here.
114
 Edward was the only leader actually to have completed his vow, so there was 
no need to do it again. Indeed, the source that Schein cited claimed something completely 
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different. Edward wrote to one of his representatives that he was trying to get John XXI to 
delay the sheriff of Ventodoro’s vow, not his own!115 Ultimately, Edward’s letter to John 
XXI gives a good indication that he would have taken up Gregory’s crusade, but with 
Gregory dead, this never came to fruition. 
 
Iberian and Genoese Participation 
 
Participation from the Iberian Peninsula in Gregory’s crusade would have had great 
appeal, given that its residents had longstanding and ongoing experience in fighting against 
the Muslims in Iberia and North African. Yet, as has been discussed in chapter five, this 
conflict invariably meant that some of the potential participants in Gregory’s crusade to the 
Holy Land would have to remain in Iberia. Archbishop Sancho, Prince Emmanuel, and Nuño 
González of Lara can be counted among this group, though James of Aragon had promised 
his presence in the Holy Land, and there is evidence from Pope Innocent V that King Alfonso 
III of Portugal, too, had taken up the cross for the Holy Land crusade.
116
 It does not seem, 
however, that King Alfonso X of Castile ever took up the cross when he returned to his 
kingdom to fight off the invaders. Gregory’s letters about Alfonso of Castile in connection to 
the invasion of Iberia, and to receiving money from the Lyons tenth, made no mention of him 
as a crusader. For all intents and purposes, however, one may count Alfonso of Castile among 
the participants, since he did indeed receive funding for it, and he was carrying out the 
crusade in Iberia, as has been discussed in chapter five.  
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Alfonso of Castile’s long-term commitment to Gregory’s crusade plans is much less 
certain. Even though he had secured money from Gregory to carry out the crusade, his 
chronicler noted that the king returned to Iberia and saw that his son Prince Sancho had 
reinforced the kingdom, and ‘because King Alfonso was not prepared to make war, nor did 
he know anything about the state of the affairs of his kingdoms, he looked for a way to have a 
truce with Abu Yusuf and the king of Granada.’117 A truce was then signed for two years.118 
This does not seem to have happened as quickly as the chronicler implied. The chronicler 
noted that Alfonso had returned to Iberia in 1276, but O’Callaghan has made it clear that the 
king had arrived in Aragon by November 1275, and thence to Alcala on 2 December 1275.
119
 
In addition, there is evidence from 7 January 1276 that King Edward was still trying to help 
his brother-in-law Alfonso in his fight against the Marinids.
120
 Edward had written to his 
people in Bayonne that the Muslim invasion of Alfonso’s lands was a threat to all 
Christendom.
121
 Edward urged them to direct their ships in aid of Alfonso on the sea, lest the 
Muslim army advance into Alfonso’s land, or into that of other Christians.122 Given this, 
Alfonso must still have been making some preparations for a longer war, even while he was 
looking for peace.  
At the same time that Edward was arranging help for his brother-in-law, Alfonso had 
messengers at the court of Sultan Baybars. Makrizi noted that Baybars had returned to Cairo 
on 17 January 1276.
123
 There, as aforementioned, ‘the ambassadors of Emperor Lascaris, 
those of Alfonso, and those of the city of Genoa received their farewell audience [with 
Baybars].’124 Unfortunately, there is no direct indication of the reason for this embassy, but 
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this was not the first exchange of embassies between Alfonso and Baybars. O’Callaghan 
noted that in 1261 the sultan had sent an embassy with gifts to Alfonso in the hope of 
developing trade relations.
125
 Alfonso had sent a messenger to Baybars in 1265.
126
 He had 
repeated this in 1268 with a messenger carrying a letter ‘in which he expressed his friendship 
and presented his services,’ to which Baybars was said to have ‘responded with 
acceptance.’127 It is not very likely that Alfonso was offering any more ‘services’ than 
increased trade relations. Ibn al-Furāt was probably embellishing the situation to make 
Baybars seem more powerful. But given that Alfonso was looking for peace with the 
Marinids in 1276, his embassy to Baybars at that time likely had something to do with 
forming peace. It would also make sense for Alfonso’s messengers to be travelling with the 
Genoese, since they were close allies.  
 What, then, did the presence of these messengers mean for Gregory’s crusading 
plans? It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that Alfonso, having been disappointed by 
Gregory in his desire for the kingship of the Romans, was now throwing the new crusade into 
danger through an alliance with Baybars, but this was probably not the case. The presence of 
the Genoese with the messengers of Alfonso and Michael reinforces the notion that the 
embassy was commercially motivated (in addition to Alfonso’s need for a peace treaty). The 
Genoese had ties with Michael Palaeologus, which would have made it much easier for their 
merchants to ship military slaves from the Black Sea to Egypt. Bratianu wrote that this 
relationship had been briefly disrupted in 1275, but had been patched up in the same year.
128
 
The Genoese also had long maintained a trading relationship with Egypt.
129
 Eliyahu Ashtor 
has attributed the January 1276 embassy to forming a new trade treaty, although he wrongly 
set the date at 1275, since he seemingly used the inaccurate western date that the editor of 
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Makrizi’s text had provided.130 Ashtor noted that ‘both Genoa and the Mamluks were 
interested in remaining on good terms with one another, and the dependence of the sultans of 
Cairo on the supply of the military slaves was so great that the Genoese could hold their 
position in Alexandria despite the expeditions of their war fleets, which supported the 
crusaders against the sultan.’131  
Echoing the prohibitions of Pope Innocent III, trade in military supplies with the 
Muslims had been strictly forbidden by Gregory X from the outset of his reign. On 31 March 
1272, Gregory had written to the Genoese, Marseillais, Venetians, and Pisans that Christians 
in name only ‘are strengthening the enemies of Christ with victuals, arms, naval equipment, 
and other necessities.’132 He thus decreed that:  
The apostolic see, [...] wishing to apply a remedy for those false and impious Christians 
who would presume to deliver arms, iron, and the timber of galleys to the Saracens, 
those indeed who would sell galleys to them, or whoever would exercise the 
responsibility of piloting the ships in the piratical navies of the Saracens, or [who] would 
devote any aid or counsel to them in siege weapons or whatever else, has tied them with 
the bond of anathema and excommunication, to be punished by the deprivation of their 
things, and they are to become the slaves of their captors.
133
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Gregory’s letter reproduced the language from a decree on the Holy Land from the Fourth 
Lateran Council in 1215. Clearly, it was a long-standing problem. Gregory tried to shame the 
guilty merchants, telling them:  
[When] the false Christians transacting trade there in those places complain this way 
about some burdens, the Muslims berate them with the shameful rejoinder: “if we ripped 
out one of your eyes you would find your way back to us with the remaining one, just 
like those same merchants who quickly returned to us when we were staying at that 
time in the Holy Land.”
134
  
The trade must have been so lucrative for the Latin merchants that even heavy burdens placed 
on them did not stop them from coming back, even with the pope’s prohibition.  
Gregory solicited Charles of Anjou in 1273 to help prevent trade with the Muslims, 
explaining the problem to him much as he had done to the naval powers.
135
 He encouraged 
Charles to work with the Hospitallers and Templars, so that ‘on their return from Outremer, 
the transporters will present the testimonial letters of our venerable brother, the patriarch of 
Jerusalem, and beloved sons, the masters or the men of the Hospital and the Temple in those 
places.’136 This was obviously to ensure that the supplies meant for the Holy Land were 
actually going where they were supposed to go. Finally, Gregory asked Charles to: 
Promulgate a general edict against those who, through those things which they deliver to 
the Saracens against the Christians, strengthen those Saracens, so that everyone engaging 
in such things from your lands or those adjacent to your jurisdiction may be deprived of 
all their goods, which must be applied irrevocably by the state treasury, and against such 
things, may you investigate frequently, just as seems expedient to you, so that the edict 
may assume the enforcement that you consider establishing against the guilty parties of 
such a crime.
137
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Ecclesiastical censure was one thing, but it would be even better if it were reinforced by the 
secular arm, which is clearly what Gregory was trying to achieve with the help of Charles of 
Anjou.  
It seems that Charles had already been making an unsuccessful attempt to prevent 
trade with the Muslims. In a letter from the Angevin chancery records dated around 1271, 
Charles ordered that two merchants of Florence, delivering supplies to Acre, not sail to the 
Greeks, Saracens, or Pisans, or any other enemies of the Christian faith.
138
 Charles’ 
prohibition must not have been working very well if Gregory had to remind him of it again a 
few years later. Nevertheless, it is clear that Charles did obey Gregory, since he told the vicar 
of Marseilles in August 1273 or 1274 to publish that arms and supplies should not be sent to 
the Muslims, under penalty.
139
 Given the ongoing Genoese relationship with Baybars, it is 
difficult to believe that Gregory had very much success in preventing trade at all. Indeed, 
even while Edward was actually fighting the Muslims on his crusade in 1271-2, the 
Venetians had been trading with Alexandria.
140
 If Alfonso of Castile’s embassy to Baybars in 
January 1276 were not just connected to his desire for peace with the Marinids, but also to 
furthering trade relations with the sultan along with the Genoese, then Gregory’s problems 
ran even deeper than the naval powers of Italy and southern France. Given the canonical 
illegality of this trade, any potential sources that would confirm this are limited. Ultimately, 
Ashtor’s assertion that the Genoese were able to take both sides in the Crusades would likely 
have applied to participation in Gregory’s own crusade, since it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to prevent trade with the Muslims. 
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The Leadership of Gregory’s Crusade 
 
Gregory wanted to assemble as many of the leaders of Europe onboard his crusade as 
possible, and as discussed, he was very successful in this. But out of this success would have 
come the question of leadership. With so many high ranking people participating (who no 
doubt had suitably large egos), just who would lead this crusade? Norman Housley has 
written that ‘the problems in the 1270s was that a number of rulers were genuinely interested 
in a crusade to the Holy Land, but none would assume the overall leadership as Louis IX had 
done, probably because they were afraid of financial implications.’141 Gregory gave no direct 
word on the leadership of his crusade, and in general, he was markedly guarded about 
disclosing information about his crusade. However, Krieger has argued that ‘such a crusade 
promised in the eyes of the new pope to succeed only if it were conducted under the guidance 
and authority of a universally accepted Roman emperor. Here Gregory and his advisers were 
realistic enough to realize that King Alfonso of Castile would scarcely meet such 
expectations.’142 Krieger has taken the case a bit too far. Certainly Gregory would have 
desired imperial leadership, but the pope gave no indication that this was an essential element 
to his crusade’s success. Housley thought it unfortunate that Charles of Anjou, given his 
wealth, location, and reputation as a commander, was not more interested in taking the 
lead.
143
 Who, then, would be at the head of the army?  
Housley’s favoured candidate, Charles of Anjou (if he were to go instead of his son) 
had two crusades with his brother Louis under his belt already, and at just under 50 years old, 
he was now one of the elder statesmen of Europe. He also was in the midst of gaining the 
throne of the kingdom of Jerusalem, with the deal with Maria of Antioch being finalised in 
1277. Charles had been making personal investment in the Holy Land through the ongoing 
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shipping of supplies. Yet he should be ruled out, because it seems that his son would be going 
in his stead. Another candidate, Edward of England, was in his late thirties at the time. He 
also had a crusade pedigree, and moreover, he had just been to the Holy Land. He was the 
only participating western king to have fought against Baybars’ forces himself. He was also 
in contact with the Mongol Ilkhan Abagha, who wanted to coordinate the fight against 
Baybars with him. But Edward had not fully committed to the crusade yet. No real case can 
be made for James of Aragon, who, in his late sixties, was neither experienced in crusading in 
the Holy Land, nor powerful enough to be a leadership hopeful. In his late fifties, Rudolph of 
Habsburg was the eldest of the serious leadership candidates. As the crowned king of the 
Romans and soon-to-be emperor, there could not realistically be any other leader if he 
participated, and indeed, Jean Richard was written that the pope was relying on Rudolph for 
the crusade.
144
 With such great conflict between the papacy and the emperor while the 
Hohenstaufen had held the title, imperial leadership had not been possible in the later 
thirteenth century after Frederick II’s crusade. The devout Louis IX had filled this gap. But 
for Gregory’s crusade, secular leadership would have broken with the recent French trend and 
returned to an emperor who had the confidence of the pope. 
The crusade had been spearheaded for the last 25 years by the king of France, Louis 
IX. A good case can be made for the leadership of his son, Philip, but in the end, it does not 
seem that Gregory wanted him to lead the crusade. Philip, who was only in his early thirties 
at the time of Gregory’s death, was the youngest of the kings to take up the cross. Even so, 
Gregory (who it must be remembered was very close with the French royal family) had been 
coordinating with Philip more than any other king from the very beginning of his papacy. 
Together with the Church, Philip had sent several hundred mercenaries to the Holy Land to 
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safeguard it until the general passage.
145
 These mercenaries were being led by Philip’s own 
liegemen – first Oliver of Termes, and after his death, William of Roussillon. This strong 
French mercenary force already in place would have been greatly enlarged by Philip’s forces 
in the general passage. His very large contingent would have given him ample means to make 
his authority felt, even if he were not to be the leader of the crusade. It would seem to be a bit 
unfair to consign Philip to a secondary role, given that it was only he who had been helping 
the Church to send reinforcements to the Holy Land in the interim. At the least, Philip’s 
strong contribution would have meant that he would have taken some sort of central role in 
the crusade. 
Even though Gregory had been coordinating closely with Philip, he had reined the 
young king back in 1272, when Philip had evidently shown himself willing to take on the 
business of the Holy Land personally. Gregory was pleased that Philip was showing 
eagerness to help the Holy Land by crusading again, but he told him: 
For, dearest son, it would not become us or our brothers to allow so great a business 
(strengthened by everything) to be undertaken less than prudently, nor (as much as it is 
in us) undoubtedly would we personally allow you especially to leap forward to such 
great things particularly in the auspices of your control and youth, in any other way than 
becomes Your Royal Excellency.
146
 
In this case, Gregory did not want Philip to go on crusade because the pope wanted an even 
larger crusade to be planned at the general council. However, it is worth noting here that 
Gregory pointed especially to being unwilling to allow Philip, in his youth, to get ahead of 
himself by taking control of the crusade. At this stage, Rudolph had yet to be elected king of 
the Romans, and Gregory was still very much in the early planning stages of his crusade. But 
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this letter is perhaps an early indication that Gregory did not foresee Philip leading his 
crusade, even though there were not any solid alternatives at the time. 
French leadership still had a strong supporter in Simon of Brie. Gregory had placed 
him as the official legate on the crusade after he had taken up the cross.
147
 Presumably Simon 
would fill this role only if Gregory were unable to go himself. As legate in France, Simon 
was intimately associated with the French royal family, and would later be an exceptionally 
strong supporter of the French and Angevins when he became Pope Martin IV in 1281; 
indeed, as pope, Simon bowed to Charles’ desire to excommunicate Michael Palaeologus, 
and he called a crusade against Aragon, which Philip took up. It seems likely that Charles or 
Philip would have had Simon’s ear on the crusade. Had the crusade been able to launch, this 
could have led to problems if Simon had favoured Philip and Charles in his decision making 
over Rudolph. 
After Rudolph had secured Gregory’s support as king of the Romans in September 
1274, the king started to receive letters from the Holy Land asking for help, as has been 
discussed in chapters two and three. He must have been seen to be taking some sort of 
leadership position to receive these letters. Although Edward also received such letters, one 
of Patriarch Thomas’ letters to Rudolph actually indicated that the king of the Romans was 
thinking about leading the crusade. Thomas wrote: ‘seeing that (just as the indisputable 
credulity of all firmly holds) you are happily considering directing the business of the [Holy] 
Land, and you gasp, therefore, to be informed at the present time more frequently concerning 
its condition.’148 The letter can only be reasonably dated to 1275, but it probably fell before 
Rudolph had taken the cross in October of that year, which would explain why Rudolph was 
only ‘considering directing’ the crusade at this time, and not fully committed.  
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The Greek ambassador George Metochites does give some indication that Gregory 
envisioned Rudolph, when he became emperor, leading the crusade. But George 
extraordinarily associated Michael Palaeologus himself with leadership as well. Of Gregory, 
he noted:  
Indeed, the strong promoter of this expedition, as much in our private counsel as on the 
occasion of his public speech, had affirmed several times that the crusade rested on the 
two arms of the Church, meaning there the two emperors, ours of Constantinople, and 
the Roman emperor, elected by himself and who, according to accepted usage among 
them, had taken the cross in our presence.
149
 
Granted, this does not directly state that the emperors would lead the crusade, only that the 
crusade depended upon them. With the church union in place, Gregory’s crusade had the 
potential to be all-encompassing. Thus, George makes it clear that Gregory saw Michael as 
another arm of the Church, which could be directed to a common purpose. It is, however, 
very difficult to imagine any of the western kings, especially Charles of Anjou, serving under 
Michael Palaeologus. Gregory knew better than anyone after all his negotiations for peace 
between Charles and Michael that Charles would never have served under him. Thus, if 
George Metochites were talking about the crusade leadership directly, and not simply general 
dependence of the crusade on secular arms, then he was overinflating Michael’s role.  
 Conflict among the leaders of the crusade had arisen in the past, with serious 
consequences for the crusade. For the historian, it is not difficult to recall the conflict 
between Philip II of France and Richard I of England during the Third Crusade, when, after 
the death of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, there was no clear leader of the crusade. 
Nevertheless, such comparisons were not made in any of Gregory’s letters or in the relevant 
chronicles, other than the general lament in the Collectio about contention among princes.
150
 
If one were to look at the launch of Gregory’s crusade hypothetically, with kings Philip, 
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James, Alfonso (of Portugal), and probably Edward all onboard, and possibly even Charles of 
Anjou, in addition to emperors Rudolph and Michael, there would be a recipe for disaster if 
clear leadership were not there. Although Rudolph was to be the secular leader of the crusade 
as emperor, it is nearly impossible to imagine that his control would have been unquestioned 
by the other kings. Rudolph and Philip of France had not been getting along even before the 
crusade would have started.
151
 Rudolph was also at war with Philip of Savoy, who had close 
ties to Edward of England.
152
 With so much potential for discord, it is little wonder that 
Gregory hoped to go on the crusade with them, if only to keep the peace! 
 
 Pope Gregory X’s Participation in His Crusade 
 
Gregory’s desire to join the crusade himself is one of the most notable parts of his 
reign. Whether it was a good idea or not is another question, which this section will address. 
But it should not be taken for granted that he would definitely have gone had he lived. 
Gregory had written to Philip soon after the end of the general council: 
We believe Your Excellency to have become acquainted how in the first session of the 
council recently congregated at Lyons, publicly and openly we proclaimed that if, with 
divine grace granting our desires, the condition of the world and the fall of emerging 
circumstance were allowing, we hold out to pass over the sea in the general passage with 
the Christian army, so that what we beneficially furnish for the liberation of the Holy 
Land by word to others, indeed we may also preach by deed; to this purpose, 
nevertheless, we bind ourselves by no vow, because we consider it neither to be 
expedient, nor becoming.
153
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The tentative nature of Gregory’s personal participation in the crusade is clear in his letter to 
Philip. In addition, when Gregory had made Simon of Brie legate for the crusade in 
September 1274, he gave no indication in the letter that he would be going himself.
154
 There 
was no caveat, for example, that Simon would be legate only if the pope himself did not go to 
the Holy Land. There is evidence in 1273 that Gregory had been suffering from poor health, 
thus it is possible that the pope had an inkling that he would not live long enough to go on his 
crusade.
155
 
Gregory had made it clear at the general council, just like Innocent III had done 
before, that the Church would be setting a good example by taking on part of the burden of 
crusade financing.
156
 But Gregory was going to take the sharing of the crusade burden to a 
much higher level with his own participation. He wanted to practice what he preached. Never 
before had a pope actually led a crusade to the Holy Land, although Gregory VII had long 
ago offered to lead a crusade himself. Asbridge has posited that Gregory VII’s 
pronouncement of his own leadership for the crusade could have been a factor in its poor 
recruitment.
157
 This may be, but Gregory VII and Gregory X were very different popes. 
Gregory X elicited none of the divisiveness of his namesake. Indeed, it seems that James of 
Aragon was going on crusade because Gregory X was going as well, since he wrote in his 
autobiography: ‘If as you have said you will go to Outremer, we will go there with you with 
1,000 knights on the condition that you help us with the tithe from our land.’158 Gregory X’s 
own participation was probably meant to reassure participants of the seriousness of his 
intention to launch this crusade. His moral authority could have helped to reassure 
participants that this crusade would not end up straying from its intended goal: to rescue the 
Holy Land. 
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 Gregory’s desire to go on crusade was also confirmed in several chronicles. 
Bartholomew of Lucca, Milioli, Martin of Opava, Sanuto, Salimbene, Pipinus, and Dandolo 
all said that Gregory wanted to go on crusade to the Holy Land again.
159
 Bernard Gui also 
wrote that Gregory was intending to go on crusade personally, but even more, he wrote that 
Gregory was going to spend the rest of his life in the Holy Land.
160
 Given no corroborating 
evidence, this seems hard to believe. Perhaps because Bernard was writing after the fact, with 
the knowledge that Gregory’s life had ended too soon, he simply made a leap and assumed 
that had Gregory gone on crusade, his age and poor health would have made it his last act. It 
is inconceivable to think that Gregory would have abandoned his duties in the papal curia to 
remain permanently in the Holy Land. 
 Given the overall leadership that Gregory himself had assumed, his untimely death 
helped put an end to his crusade. After Gregory’s death, it was the cardinals’ letter to 
Rudolph that put it best: 
They mourn and howl about the loss of the faithful father over all the tribes of the land, 
but especially those who, having taken up the victorious sign of the cross under the 
secure leadership of the same father, were eager to rise up powerfully against the 
blasphemous enemies of the Christian name.
161
  
The past tense is interesting here. Without Gregory’s ‘secure leadership,’ through which the 
crusade was being funded, major recruitment was being gained, and the necessary 
preparations were being made in the Holy Land, everything fell apart. The crusaders ‘were’ 
eager to rise up against the enemies of Christ, but without Gregory, the organisation just was 
not there. When Philip had tried to take on more of the organisation of the crusade, Gregory 
had turned him back. In retrospect, this was a mistake. Rudolph had only recently become 
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king of the Romans, and was not yet emperor, so he had yet to take a firmer hold on the reins 
of the crusade.  
Gregory’s personal leadership was a strength in his crusade planning, since it is clear 
that it led James of Aragon to participate, and thus it seems possible that it was a factor in 
gaining the participation of others. Yet this was a double-edged sword, since this strength 
depended on Gregory’s survival. Thus, it was ironically too much papal control and influence 
on the crusade during Gregory’s papal tenure that helped bring his crusade to nothing. Since 
Gregory was doing practically everything himself, his death left a huge hole in the entire 
operation. If Gregory did indeed know as early as 1273 that his health was failing, and that he 
might not survive long, then it was perhaps unwise for him to commit personally to the 
crusade even tentatively. But he should not be criticised for this too harshly. He could not 
have known that after his death, the papacy would experience such serious instability through 
the rapid succession of three more popes in such a short time. This chain of events obviously 
was no help in launching the crusade, and the necessary leadership was not found in any 
secular figure, since without Gregory’s firm hand on the rudder, the peaceful conditions for a 
crusade were lost, and the secular leaders had to turn to managing their own affairs in the 
West, which were again in disarray. 
 
The Timing of Gregory’s Crusade 
 
Just when Gregory wanted to launch his crusade has been a topic of some debate 
among historians. Roberg has rightly noted that ‘the beginning of the passagium generale 
was never formally announced.’162 Yet this need not prevent an investigation of clues to 
when the crusade would have been launched. Norman Housley wrote that ‘it seems that the 
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pope allocated a six-year preparation period’ set from the general council ‘because the truce 
with the Mamluks would only expire in 1283, and partly because of the organizational 
problems which he foresaw.’163 However, he also noted that ‘it is possible that the pope was 
so encouraged by [strong recruitment] that he brought forward the departure date of the 
general passage to spring 1277.’164 Palmer Throop believed that the departure date was April 
1277, which he based on a false reading of the date of Rudolph’s imperial coronation.165 
Sylvia Schein criticised Throop’s dating as not being verified by the sources, and then 
strongly asserted without any sources herself that the crusade was planned for 1280, based, 
like Housley, on what she saw as a six-year preparation period.
166
 She believed that Gregory 
wanted to keep the date secret to retain the element of surprise against the enemy, which may 
have some merit, since Gregory told Simon of Brie in September 1274: ‘may you by no 
means allow the passage to the [Holy] Land to be established or the time of the passage to be 
fixed without our special mandate of the apostolic see, but may you desire to hinder this kind 
of set up and fixing with constant prohibition.’167 This could indicate that Gregory wanted to 
keep the crusade as much of a surprise as possible; however, it is also clear in this letter that 
the most important element to the date of launching his crusade was that all of Christendom 
would be united. Crucially, Gregory wrote: 
[The Holy Land] ought to be supported by the common cooperation of all the faithful of 
Christ. On account of that, we have provided for a useful entranceway to direct the 
consideration of great attention and to invite the devotion of full providence, so that the 
aid of everyone may be joined into one for the redemption of the [Holy] Land, and in 
that very place the strength of the whole army of Christ may assemble in the same time. 
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And therefore, let the frail strength of Christianity not be divided, but how much more 
powerful it will be by a union, as it may receive happier auspices with God in the 
front.
168
  
One cannot help but believe that, in placing so much emphasis on papal control of the date, 
which would enforce the crusade to depart as a whole, Gregory was thinking of the problems 
that had arisen in past crusades. The Fifth Crusade had ultimately failed when Emperor 
Frederick II’s forces did not arrive on time. Moreover, Lord Edward’s crusade could have 
served as an even more recent example, since the paucity of his army – unaided by the arrival 
of other crusaders – meant that he could do very little in the Holy Land. Nevertheless, no 
parallels were actually drawn to past crusades that would explain this desire for tight unity 
and papal control. 
Schein also asserted, like Housley, that a six-year preparation period was set by 
Gregory, and she noted that this followed a model set by Gregory’s predecessors.169 Her 
evidence is not clear, since not even Gregory’s immediate predecessor, Clement IV, had done 
this, nor King Louis IX, who had seen Clement’s crusade to it unhappy conclusion. If one 
looks back to Innocent III, whose Fourth Lateran Council crusade decrees had formed the 
basis for Gregory’s own, one finds that ‘Innocent had a fairly definite idea about the 
timetable to be followed in the period after the council. At his behest, King John of Jerusalem 
had arranged a truce with al-
cĀdil that was not due to expire until July 1217. He had, 
therefore, allowed a period of four years for the preparation of the crusade prior to its 
scheduled departure.’170 Schein’s theory, therefore, lacks foundation. 
Housley and Schein’s notion that Gregory set a six-year preparation period for his 
crusade needs to be revised. Just because Gregory decreed that church revenues would be 
taxed for six years to fund the crusade does not mean that the crusade would have to wait 
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until all revenue had been collected.
171
 As noted in chapter five, Alfonso had received a loan 
to carry out his crusade in Iberia, which would then have been paid back after the Lyons tax 
had been collected. As has been seen as well, Edward had taken out loans to pay for his 
earlier crusade, which were paid back afterwards in part through an ecclesiastical levy. There 
is no reason why Gregory’s crusade would have had to wait the full six years before it was 
launched. Through the potential use of loans, along with whatever of the Lyons tax had 
already been collected, Gregory’s crusade could have got underway. As discussed above, 
Gregory had already been able to give Rudolph 12,000 marks in 1275 for crusade 
preparation. Secondly, Housley’s belief that the truce in the Holy Land (which would have 
expired on 3 or 4 March 1283) had an effect on Gregory’s planning also needs to be revised. 
To be fair, Housley only indicated what ‘seemed’ to be the case, but his six-year preparation 
period still would not have put the timing of the crusade after the truce had expired, so it was 
not likely to have had a great influence. Moreover, as has been seen in chapter two, it is 
possible that western crusaders need not have concerned themselves with the truce at all. 
Edward had been against it from the beginning, and Charles’ Marseillais sailors had seen fit 
to ignore it when they captured Baybars’ ship.  
 There is reasonably strong evidence from a variety of sources that Gregory was 
aiming, if all went to plan, to launch his crusade in mid-1276. Leopold was the only historian 
to place Gregory’s crusade in 1276, though he did not actually reveal how he came to this 
conclusion.
172
 At any rate, Gregory’s death in January 1276 is made all the more untimely if 
his crusade would have launched in mid-1276. First of all, evidence of an early date comes 
from that fact that Gregory had rejected Ottokar of Bohemia’s 1274 proposal to join the 
crusade if it were delayed by four years (thus placing it in 1278 if the delay were set from the 
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time of the letter, which admittedly is not clear).
173
 Clearly, if Ottokar had been suggesting 
that the crusade wait until 1278, Gregory was not prepared to do this. This offer may have led 
Jean Richard and Thomas Asbridge to place Gregory’s crusade date in 1278.174 Additional 
proof for a 1276 date comes from the general council. There, James of Aragon had 
recommended that the general passage be launched ‘two years after the next feast of St 
John.’175 In other words, it should be launched in June 1276. Giving some support to Schein’s 
idea that Gregory wanted to launch a surprise attack, James said that ‘you should hurry, 
because if the Moors know that you wished to send forces there, they would look to them, 
and the Christians would be unable to withstand them.’176 The chronicle of St Peter of Erfurt 
and the Cronica Reinhardsbrunnensis both give some support to James of Aragon by noting 
that Gregory ordered at the general council that the cross be preached for two years.
177
 The 
Erfurt chronicle even went a step further by writing that Gregory decreed that the crusade 
would launch in two years.
178
 Thus, these chronicles point to June 1276 as well. 
 Throop was almost right about the date for Gregory’s crusade, except that he had 
misread the sources about Rudolph’s coronation. Rudolph was to come to Rome in February 
1276 for his coronation, not 1277. This is confirmed directly in the annals of St Rupert of 
Salzburg.
179
 It can also be understood from the Annales Basileenses. As noted earlier, it 
seems that these annals mistakenly switched the date of Rudolph’s coronation with the date 
of the launching of the crusade.
180
 There is a lacuna in this text in the worst possible place. 
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To be clear, a reading of the original manuscript makes it clear that this was a genuine blank 
gap in the text, and not simply an illegible word.
181
 The gap appears after the ‘two’ units of 
time that would pass before the launching of the crusade. This lacuna was interpreted by the 
text’s editor in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica as ‘annos,’ but it seems more likely to 
be ‘menses.’182 The argument for this lacuna being menses instead of annos is supported by 
the timing of the crusade given by James, and the Erfurt and Reinhardsbrunnensis chronicles. 
However, it is supported perhaps even better by George Metochites.  
After Michael Palaeologus made his second offer to aid the crusade in 1275 through 
his messenger George Metochites, Gregory had told George to wait for him in Rome, where 
they would meet later to discuss things further. Of course he died along the way, but some 
further plans had already been made. George noted that Gregory and Michael were supposed 
to meet in Easter 1276 in Brindisi or (if the situation were not secure for Michael to come 
there) they would meet across the short stretch of the Adriatic Sea in Vlorë.
183
 Thus, this 
Easter meeting would roughly coincide with the two menses after Rudolph’s coronation. 
There Gregory and Michael would have discussed the crusade.
184
 Given that Gregory had 
asked Rudolph to bring 2,000 knights with him to his coronation, it seems possible that 
Gregory’s discussion with Michael at Easter 1276 was meant to be followed up in the next 
couple of months by the launching of his crusade. Indeed, George himself said, after noting 
the timing of his embassy as autumn 1275, that ‘in order to begin the operations with the aid 
of God, we would await the end of the year there, and the following spring.’185 There is a 
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chance that this meant 1277, after the end of the year that Gregory and Michael met in 
person, but with the sum of the rest of the evidence, it is more likely to be June 1276. 
 There are some detracting elements to the idea that the crusade would launch in June 
1276 that need to be mentioned. Edward, for one, seemed wholly unaware of when the 
crusade would be launched. He told the Ilkhan Abagha in January 1275 that he did not know 
when the Christian army would arrive, because the pope had not yet set the time.
186
 Yet 
Edward had not attended the general council, and Gregory’s letter to Simon of Brie had 
indicated that the timing of the crusade was being kept quiet. Edward had also not yet taken 
up the cross, so he certainly would not know when he himself would be arriving. But after 
Gregory’s death, there is also potentially some indication that the crusade timing had not 
been set. Pope Innocent V wrote letters to both Edward and Simon of Brie about it. In a letter 
that Guiraud wrongly attributed to Gregory X, Innocent V wrote to Simon of Brie in March 
1276 that Philip’s messengers had told him that the king had set June 1278 (also using the 
date of the feast of St John) as the limit for going on crusade, which Innocent had accepted.
187
 
This was only a ‘limit’ though, and does not necessarily indicate that the crusade could not 
happen before this. In addition, its use of the feast of St John as the basis is reminiscent of 
Gregory’s own plans, and thus any prolongation that Philip made might have been based on a 
dating of the crusade at the feast of St John in 1276. In the other case that may detract from a 
1276 date, Innocent wrote to Edward to ask advice on when the crusade should be 
launched.
188
 However, Innocent’s letters need not be taken as an indication that Gregory had 
not already fixed the date. Gregory’s death had thrown his plans into the air, so it is not 
surprising that a new date would have to be set. More importantly, the most troubling 
evidence against the setting of June 1276 as the date for Gregory’s crusade is the very lack of 
sources that indicate that he had made the necessary preparations. There is no evidence that 
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Gregory had been commissioning ships or supplies to send the crusaders to the Holy Land. 
This is not an insurmountable problem. Indeed, a discussion of the destination of Gregory’s 
crusade, to which this chapter now turns, will clear up this issue. Ultimately, the balance of 
the evidence still indicates that Gregory hoped to launch his crusade around June 1276, and 
thus the pace of sending his crusade, after holding the general council in 1274, was faster 
than the four-year delay under Pope Innocent III, and much faster than the six-year delay 
posited by Housley and Schein. It seems, then, that Gregory’s desire for swift action – 
discussed extensively in chapter three for the interim crusade – was also meant to be put into 
practice for the general passage. 
 
The Destination of Gregory’s Crusade 
 
 Jean Dunbabin seems to have taken the destination of Gregory’s crusade for granted. 
She noted that Charles of Anjou had taken up the cross for Gregory’s crusade to Egypt.189 
One can hardly blame her for this assumption, since Egypt had been the intended destination 
for all three of the previous large crusades in the thirteenth century. It seems that it was also 
what Baybars feared at least earlier on in Gregory’s reign, since Ibn al-Furāt reported that in 
1272 or 1273 ‘news kept coming in that the Franks were intending to attack the frontiers of 
Egypt.’190 Schein, however, has rightly pointed out that ‘conspicuously absent from crusade-
planning after 1270 was also the thesis of the conquest or utter weakening of Egypt as the key 
to the reconquest of the Holy Land.’191 She thought that ‘this was, possibly, the reaction to 
the disastrous crusade of St Louis to Tunis, the last made in the thirteenth century to conquer 
Egypt.’192 In his study of recovery proposals written after Gregory’s death, Leopold noted 
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that ‘only three writers, Henry II, Marino Sanuto, and Roger of Stanegrave suggested that the 
general passage should be directed to Egypt rather than the Holy Land.’193 This trend was not 
surprising when the crusade plans in Gregory X’s time are revealed. Gregory’s plans, in fact, 
act as a precedent for turning the crusade away from Egypt, and towards northern Syria and 
Palestine. 
Gregory never mentioned that he was taking his crusade to Egypt. Indeed, other than 
the occasional reference to Baybars as the sultan of Egypt, or as the Egyptian enemy, there is 
no reference to Egypt at all in the sources that discuss Gregory’s crusade. That said, the fact 
that all of the sources noted that the crusade was to rescue ‘the Holy Land’ cannot, in itself, 
be taken as an indication that the crusade was destined there, since even the crusades to Egypt 
had been meant to rescue the Holy Land. On this point, Caroline Smith has noted:  
Despite the fact that Louis IX’s first crusade was initially directed to Egypt, Matthew 
Paris emphasized the ultimate rather than immediate goal of this project when he wrote 
of the king’s departure from France in 1248 and that of William Longsword from 
England in the summer of 1249 as the beginning of their journeys to Jerusalem. 
Similarly, Primat’s chronicle described Louis’ departure on his second crusade as the 
start of the “holy voyage of Jerusalem.”
194
 
Based on this, one cannot determine the destination of Gregory X’s crusade with absolute 
certainty by looking at the language used in his letters. Nevertheless, it will be argued that 
Egypt was not the destination of Gregory’s crusade based on additional evidence: the 
practical limitations that using the land route would place on travel to Egypt, and the 
prevalence of conflict in northern Syria (and recognition of it) in the years leading up to 
Gregory’s planned crusade. In addition, since the Mongols and Byzantines were to play a part 
in this crusade, then the preliminary destination of their lands in northern Syria, with an 
ultimate destination of Palestine, makes more sense logistically. One cannot help but notice 
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the parallels to the route taken by the first and second crusaders and Frederick Barbarossa. 
Nevertheless, there is no reference in extant evidence that shows comparisons made in 
Gregory’s time to the route of these previous crusades. It does not seem, at least on the 
evidence, that Gregory was purposefully considering using a ‘traditional’ method. 
 The most lively discussion in the historiography about the destination of Gregory’s 
crusade centres on Michael Palaeologus’ astonishing offer for the crusade army to take the 
land route through Byzantine territory. Kenneth Setton basically dismissed the whole notion: 
‘It is not easy to take all this seriously (Pachymeres and Gregoras know nothing of it), and 
unless Metochites was grossly misrepresenting the facts, one wonders what the Emperor 
Michael’s purpose was.’195 Schein, too, has not thought that this plan would come to fruition. 
She wrote that ‘it is doubtful if Gregory X planned to choose the land route for his crusade,’ 
and she justifiably pointed out that ‘his efforts to secure for his project the navies of Europe 
rather point out that he had the sea route on his mind. Sicily, Genoa, Marseilles, Pisa, Venice, 
and Aragon were all requested more than once to furnish galleys for the coming 
expedition.’196 Housley avoided the problem altogether by not discussing the destination. Yet, 
Setton and Schein have been too quick to dismiss Michael’s proposal. 
The notion that Gregory would have considered, and in fact intended to take the land 
passage is seen more favourably by historians of Byzantium. Geanakoplos took Michael’s 
offer at face value, and even interpreted George Metochites’ report as demonstrating that 
‘Pope Gregory was favourable to the plan.’197 Vitalien Laurent, too, has noted that ‘it was 
undoubtedly the safest solution, and Gregory himself seems to have agreed.’198 Interestingly, 
Laurent has posited that there would have been two convergent crusades with two 
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destinations: Egypt and Syria-Palestine.
199
 He said that the first necessarily meant that ships 
would be needed for a voyage by the sea, but the second (which he believed could not have 
been conducted by Michael alone) could have used the land route, although a supply chain 
would have been needed by land or sea.
200
 This idea of two convergent crusades was not 
entirely new. When Michael had offered his aid to Pope Clement IV before, Clement had 
responded to him: ‘the illustrious king of France, ... has assumed the cross ... and if he wars 
on the Agarenes from one side and you from the other, the enemies of the cross and the faith 
may expect the ruin of their destructive sect.’201 Of course, nothing had ever come of this 
before, because negotiations between Michael and Clement never reached the level that they 
later did under Gregory’s pontificate. If Gregory’s aforementioned desire for the timing of the 
general passage to be set so that all the crusaders would be united also meant that he wanted 
the army itself to be united (which, admittedly, cannot be known for sure), then this pincer 
movement could not have been part of the plan. Yet, it cannot be dismissed out of hand, since 
it seems obvious that James of Aragon, at the very least, would not have been taking the land 
route. He had promised ten ships, and the distance by land would have been especially long 
for him from Aragon. On balance, however, the evidence that is available points not towards 
Egypt as the preliminary destination, as will become clear. 
It seems that whether the crusade had gone by land or by sea, it would not have been 
to Egypt. Even George Metochites noted when he suggested the land route that the 
destination of the crusade was ‘Palestine.’202 It is evident that Gregory had perhaps at first 
been planning a general passage only by sea; thus, Schein was right to point out Gregory’s 
work to secure ships for his crusaders for a sea passage. At the general council, Gregory had 
forbidden Christians ‘to send or sail their ships for six years in the lands of the Saracens who 
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live in the eastern regions. By this means a greater supply of shipping will be made ready for 
those wishing to cross over in aid of the Holy Land’ [my italics].203 Gregory had tried to 
secure three ships each from the naval powers early in his reign.
204
 However, with the 
exception of Charles of Anjou’s provision of ships to transport Patriarch Thomas, and James 
of Aragon’s promise of ten ships for the general passage, there is no evidence to confirm that 
the Genoese, Venetians, Pisans, and Marseillais ever agreed to provide Gregory with the 
ships he wanted. Moreover, there is no evidence leading up to the time of Gregory’s death 
that he was making further provision for ships for what would have been the imminent 
general passage. Of course, it did not have to be Gregory that arranged the transportation for 
crusaders. As has been seen in chapter three, Charles, for example, helped Philip arrange 
ships for Oliver of Termes’ passage to the Holy Land. In addition, there was six months from 
the time of Gregory’s death until the time that his crusade would have launched. This would 
have given him some time for working out further logistics. Nevertheless, stronger evidence 
points to Gregory’s decision to use the land passage for his crusade, which would have 
alleviated any potential problems of securing shipping. 
 The course of events in northern Syria (whose attack by Baybars was well-known in 
the West, as discussed in chapter two), and the offer by Michael seems to have led Gregory to 
take up the land route. It is interesting to note that on top of the problems that occurred in 
northern Syria in 1275, William of Tripoli’s advice treatise (which he wrote in 1273 and 
presented to the general council) had argued that Muslim astrologers predicted Baybars’ 
death in 1273 and the subsequent rise of a new Turkish sultan. At this time, Christ would rise 
again and raise his banner ‘through all Syria and up to Caesarea Cappadocia.’205 It is 
noteworthy that William had not mentioned Jerusalem specifically, although if one takes a 
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wide view of ‘Syria’ then perhaps this would have included Jerusalem. At any rate, the 
presence of Caesarea is more noteworthy. George Metochites wrote in his memoir that when 
Gregory had asked about Turkey, he had replied to the pope, bringing particular notice to the 
episcopal sees of Caesarea and Iconium.
206
 These cities were currently held by the Seljuk 
Turks, who in turn were subject to the Ilkhanate Mongols. The Eracles, though admittedly 
not an advice treaty for Gregory, also drew attention to Caesarea and conflict in the general 
area of northern Syria during the time that Gregory was on crusade with Edward, when it 
seems that the Mongols were actually having some success: 
My Lord Tedaldo, valiant cleric born in Piacenza, was elected as pope of Rome. The 
messengers that my Lord Edward and the Christians had sent to the Tartars to acquire aid 
returned to Acre. They understood very well the need that brought the Tartars and that 
coursed through all the land of Antioch and Aleppo, Hama and Homs, up to Greater 
Caesarea. And [the Tartars] killed the Saracens that they found, and from there, they 
turned themselves to the marsh-grounds which are at the entrance to Turkey for great 
gains of slaves and beasts. And there they pastured and rested after the great work that 
they had endured on the great road that they had taken, and for the grass, and for the 
great plenty of water that they found in the land for the great beasts that they carried.
207
   
Perhaps this bit of success that the Mongols had, while Gregory was still in the Holy Land, 
contributed to the pope directing his crusade there.  
The prevalence of conflict in northern Syria was also reinforced by Patriarch Thomas 
in 1275. Taking the land route would have led the crusaders through the area of eastern 
Christendom that had been suffering the most recently: Armenia and Antioch. Patriarch 
Thomas had written to Rudolph in 1275 about how Baybars:  
Wretchedly rages without control for the space of 20 days around the massacre of the 
living, the arson of villages and cities, and the final laying to waste of everything of the 
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kingdom of Armenia, which he has been able to achieve impetuously. In that very place, 
unmercifully, he has satiated the madness by a formerly devised fury, and with the 
kingdom having been scattered in this way, and totally desolated, he has arrived in the 
region of Antioch, and there (as is told), he lingers with his whole powerful army.
208
 
Also in this year, the master of the Hospital, Hugh Revel, had written Edward: ‘When the 
sultan issued forth from Babylon and did what he came to do in Armenia, he turned back into 
Babylon for pasture and to refresh his men, because the sultan had made a very great war in 
Armenia.’209 When Michael had suggested through his messenger that the crusaders take up 
the land route to Palestine, he could not but have hoped to secure western military aid in Asia 
Minor along the way. Of course this would have been a boon for the Byzantines, but it would 
also have helped the Armenians, who were even more closely allied with the Latin Christians. 
Furthermore, it would have placed the crusader army in the area controlled by the Ilkhanate 
Mongols, who had attempted to work with Lord Edward on his crusade, and who continued 
to look for an alliance with the Christians. 
Jean Richard wrote that in Gregory’s time ‘the success of an enterprise to recover the 
Holy Land was now assumed to depend on the Mongol alliance.’210 A Mongol alliance would 
seem to have been a necessity. How could the Christians expect to attack the Mamluks, and 
possibly succeed, without having dealt with the powerful Mongol presence in the region? 
After all, the Mongols of the Ilkhanate were enemies of the Mamluks as well, and they were 
interested in territorial expansion like any other group. Surely the Christians could not expect 
to succeed against the Mamluks, and then simply live peacefully without considering what 
the Mongols would do afterwards. The Mongols would have to be a part of the crusade, even 
if it were only by agreeing to neutrality or right of passage, but in point of fact, the Mongols 
of the Ilkhanate themselves had been proposing alliance. The Ilkhan Abagha has sent 
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messengers to the general council in 1274, and they had also visited Edward in England (or at 
least sent letters).
211
 This is what had led Edward to send his aforementioned letter back to 
Abagha in 1275. Unfortunately, the purpose of the Mongol embassy is not clearly 
documented, but given their interest in the upcoming crusade, the embassy was in all 
likelihood looking for an alliance of some sort. Gregory replied to Abagha: 
Concerning these things which Your Munificence told through the messengers and 
aforesaid letters, before the arrival of the Christian army overseas, we are arranging to 
send our legates to your presence, as opportunity allows, and they may answer about 
those things fully to Your Magnitude.
212
 
The Mongols were based in northern Syria, and when Michael Palaeologus had offered the 
land route to Gregory, he had assured the pope that he would secure help from his son-in-law, 
the Ilkhan Abagha.
213
 Laurent seems to have interpreted this as an emergency arrangement 
for a landing in Armenia or Antioch by accompanying vessels, since there is no other 
explanation for his belief that there was an emergency landing place at all.
214
 Instead, it 
seems that this was an excellent example of the cooperation between the Mongols, 
Byzantines, and Latin Christians for a land passage, and the crusade in general. 
 Even more convincingly, the advice treatise of Fidenzio of Padua suggested that 
northern Syria was a more preferable destination for the general passage than Egypt, since 
Egypt had become too strong. The former staging ground of Damietta was destroyed by the 
time of Gregory’s pontificate, and the other option for landing in Egypt, Alexandria, was 
even better fortified than before.
215
 Though Fidenzio’s treatise was written long after 
Gregory’s death, Fidenzio noted in his preface that ‘Pope Gregory [...] ordered me in the 
council of Lyons to put in writing how the Holy Land could be acquired from the hands of 
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the infidels, and how it could be conserved by the Christian faithful.’216 It seems very 
plausible that some of the advice that Fidenzio later wrote down would already have been 
presented to Gregory in person at the council, or was actually that which was being discussed 
at the council generally. Leopold has summarised Fidenzio’s advice well: ‘Egypt was far 
from any potential sources of help for crusaders since both the Mongols and Armenians were 
very distant. Hence it made greater sense to attack in northern Syria where the situation was 
reversed.’217 Furthermore, Fidenzio also echoed what seems to have been part of Gregory’s 
strategy when he noted that ‘there ought to be two armies of Christians, namely one which 
fights by sea, and the other which fights by land.’218 This fits well with Gregory’s keen 
interest in maintaining naval supremacy, and his request for naval aid from James of Aragon 
and the other naval powers. 
When George Metochites had explained to Gregory about Turkey, Gregory was said 
to have responded:  
And how could we bear to see in the hands of the impious such a Christian heritage that 
illustrious fathers and pastors have filled with divinely inspired brilliance? Is it not with 
all our strength that we must try to render this country as soon as possible to the power of 
earlier times and re-establish the old Christian situation (whether before the deliverance 
of the Holy Land or after), if God deigns to lead our company to a successful 
outcome?
219
 
Gregory’s notion that this could be done after the Holy Land was delivered would have been 
difficult. He could not have hoped to take the land route through Turkey and northern Syria 
easily, and then only come back to liberate it afterwards. Pointing to the problems with this, 
Marie-Hyacinthe Laurent has noted that ‘Gregory X – presumably because he ignored the 
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difficulties of it – had agreed to take on the plan [of Michael] for the future crusade.’220 With 
the cooperation of the Byzantines and the Mongols, however, facilitating the land route 
would have been easier. Nevertheless, the utilisation of the land route provides, in itself, 
further evidence that Egypt was not the destination of this crusade, unless there were to be a 
separate sea passage to Egypt (for which there is no actual evidence). If the crusaders were to 
take the land passage, the obstacles along the way in northern Syria and Palestine would have 
meant that the army would have been exhausted by the time it reached Egypt. It simply 
would not have been possible. 
 Finally, Gatto has written fairly enough that ‘it is difficult to determine what was the 
exact thought of Gregory.’221 With quite incredible inaccuracy though, he also noted that ‘the 
eastern empire was still considered the natural way that the crusaders had to travel.’222 There 
is no evidence of this, and the sea-faring way the crusades had run in the thirteenth century 
completely discounts his assertion. From a thirteenth-century perspective, Gregory’s decision 
to use the land route was in fact very innovative. Gatto did believe that Gregory intended to 
take the land route, and that ‘in this respect, this agreement constitutes a true change of the 
initial Gregorian program essentially aimed to conquer the heart of the Christian East: 
Palestine.’223 This was not the case. As is clear from George Metochites’ report, Gregory did 
not see the land route as a diversion from Palestine at all, since that was to be his ultimate 
destination. In fact, he believed (wrong though he likely was) that a conquest of Palestine 
could have come before the conquest of northern Syria.  
Ultimately, it seems that by the end of his reign Gregory had incorporated the land 
route into his crusade plans. Gregory was thus planning for Rudolph, newly crowned 
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emperor, to cross overland with Michael in June 1276. Laurent was right to point out that this 
need not have removed maritime action as well, and it is almost a certainty that the sea route 
would have been used by James of Aragon and his fleet. It is also possible, though 
supposition, that Philip of France would also have taken the sea route. As for the ultimate 
destination: it was Palestine. Though the land route would have necessitated conflict in 
Turkey and northern Syria, Gregory was making his way to Palestine. Egypt was no longer 
the preliminary goal of the crusade. Gregory was never able to reach Jerusalem on his first 
crusade, and before he left Acre to take up the papacy, he had promised not to forget 
Jerusalem.
224
 Given the failure of three major crusades to keep or hold Egypt, and that the 
kingdom of Jerusalem itself was barely hanging on by a thread, it seems that the target of 
Gregory’s crusade would have been Jerusalem itself, reached, like during the First Crusade, 
by the land route through Turkey and northern Syria. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
  
 It has been the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate that, while crusade planning did 
undergo important changes during the papal reign of Gregory X, historians should not place 
so much emphasis on the general council of 1274. Instead, Gregory’s reign should be looked 
at as a whole to show the changing nature of crusade planning, since a crucial element in that 
change – the passagium particulare – was taken up by Gregory himself from the very 
beginning of his tenure. Certainly, the general council demonstrated that this approach was 
endorsed by the Templars, Erard of Valery, and James of Aragon, but the strong element of 
papal control to crusade planning during Gregory’s time means that the endorsement of this 
idea by the pope himself, which he put into practice in 1272 with the aid of the king of 
France, should carry more weight. At the same time, this thesis has shown that the passagium 
generale, though it never came to happen, was still widely endorsed in Gregory’s time, and 
thus this era, as Housley first alluded, was one in which the crusade was seen to require two 
stages – an era of a dual crusading policy. 
 As has been made clear, when Gregory took the papal throne, he began a concerted 
effort to rescue the Holy Land, focusing on this task as no pope had since Innocent III. To 
achieve his goals, Gregory undertook a systematic investigation into the needs of the Holy 
Land, which was aided by the fact that Gregory himself had been in Acre when he was 
elected as pope. Such an investigation revealed that the Latin East was hanging on by the 
slimmest of threads. The peace treaty between King Hugh and Sultan Baybars gave some 
respite, but there was no way of ensuring that it would be adhered to. It was clear that there 
was not a moment to lose; thus, the fragile condition in the Holy Land necessitated the 
adoption of the dual crusading policy, and Gregory recognised this from the beginning. This 
283 
 
  
meant that interim troops had to be sent to the Holy Land while the general passage was 
being prepared, since Baybars’ impressive conquests had demonstrated clearly that the 
inhabitants of the Latin East were in no position to look after themselves, nor hold out until 
the general passage. At the same time, interim troops, on their own, would be unable to do 
any more than hold onto the remaining Latin possessions on the littoral. A general passage 
was the only way that the Latin East could regain its former size. 
 To realise his goal of restoring Latin power in the Holy Land, Gregory had to ensure 
the right conditions for a crusade. This meant that conflict over the kingship of the Romans 
had to be settled, so that there would be no internal issues preventing the western kings from 
going to the Holy Land. Accordingly, Gregory worked to turn Alfonso X of Castile from his 
struggle to assert his claim to the title. A key component to Gregory’s success on this issue 
was the invasion of Iberia by the Marinids of Morocco, allied to the kingdom of Granada. 
Had it not been for this, it is unclear if even Gregory – able diplomat though he was – could 
have turned Alfonso away from an invasion of Italy, or at the least, further disruption of the 
peace. It has been shown that the invasion of Iberia, instead of having wholly negative 
consequences for the crusade to the Holy Land, actually aided it. The invasion helped to 
bring Alfonso to give up his rights in favour of Rudolph of Habsburg, and to go back to 
Iberia. Given that Gregory completely rejected a crusade against Byzantium, the crusade in 
Iberia is the only example during Gregory’s reign which demonstrates how the pope 
envisioned the crusade outside of the Holy Land. Far from the depiction of Gregory as 
someone narrowly focused on the Holy Land itself, the Iberian crusade demonstrated that 
Gregory’s vision of the crusade was a flexible one, where he not only reacted to the 
circumstances in which he found himself, but actually took proactive steps to include Iberia 
in his crusade plans. This was because, for Gregory, the crusade in Iberia was as meritorious 
as the crusade to the Holy Land, since success in Iberia helped the defense of the Holy Land. 
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 In addition, part of setting the right conditions for the crusade to launch meant that 
Gregory did not endorse Charles of Anjou’s plan to buy Maria of Antioch’s claim to the 
throne of Jerusalem. Certainly, Gregory did not depend upon the local secular government in 
the Holy Land for his crusading preparations – instead relying on the military orders, the 
patriarch of Jerusalem, and western captains – yet he did not want to unseat King Hugh from 
the throne of Jerusalem. There would simply have been too much risk for disrupting the 
peace in Christendom for this to have been a viable option, thus this thesis has demonstrated 
that the popular theory of Gregory’s involvement in the scheme must be rejected. It was only 
after Gregory had died that Charles made the deal for a claim to the throne. Under Gregory’s 
leadership, it seems that the peaceful conditions necessary for launching the crusade could 
have been maintained on this front. As a friend of the French royal family, but without being 
part of the Angevin faction, Gregory was actually the ablest pope at keeping Charles’ 
ambitions in check. Not only was Gregory’s rejection of Charles’ claim to the throne of 
Jerusalem an example of this, but a still greater one was that Charles did nothing during 
Gregory’s papal tenure to disrupt the union of the Roman and Greek churches. Indeed, 
Emperor Michael Palaeologus was even going to take part in Gregory’s crusade.  Given that 
reconquering Constantinople and asserting his presence in Byzantine territory was one of 
Charles’ dearest ambitions, this shows the impressive level of respect and authority that Pope 
Gregory X elicited. 
 Through papal stewardship, the conditions for a crusade were still right at the time 
that Gregory died. This thesis has demonstrated that what Gregory planned to do with this 
crusade was a radical departure from thirteenth-century crusading history. Instead of 
throwing the forces of Christendom once more upon the shores of Egypt, which had proven 
unsuccessful twice before, under Gregory’s leadership, the crusade was going to turn back to 
the land route through Turkey, and into northern Syria, with an ultimate goal of Palestine. 
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Gregory’s crusade would have had the landmark aid of the Greeks and the Ilkhanate 
Mongols, so this route would have made the most sense, since they were both based in these 
areas. Moreover, news from the Holy Land highlighted the fact that the former territory of 
Antioch, as well as that of Armenia, was under heavy attack by Baybars during this time, 
while, for the moment, the truces with the remaining Latin territories seemed to be holding. 
The interim troops were stationed there to guarantee this remained the case. Of course, it will 
never be know how successful such a change in direction would have been, but it set the 
precedent for later advice treatises in the fourteenth century that recommended the same 
change. The possibilities for success of this new strategy – given the massive scale of this 
crusade, with Mongol and Greek aid – were arguably very strong. Tantalizingly, had this 
crusade launched, it would have been the first time that Muslim forces under Mamluk 
leadership met the forces of a general passage. Perhaps it would have been the supreme test 
for Sultan Baybars’ reputation as a leader and a general. But it was not to be. 
On the night in May 1277 when Pope John XXI’s new chamber came crashing down 
on top of him, killing him within a few days, the Eracles noted that a sword brother dreamed 
of Pope Gregory X carrying a pickaxe in his hand, followed by a large crowd of people. The 
brother asked him what he was doing, and Gregory replied that he was going to fell a bad 
stone which was at the foundation of the Holy Church.
1
 John XXI’s name before becoming 
pope was Peter Julian, or Peter of Spain, thus there was a play on words for the ‘bad stone.’ 
John XXI’s short papal tenure, like that of Hadrian V and Innocent V before him in 1276, had 
not given him the time needed to see Gregory’s crusade through, even though all three of 
these popes had been making efforts. None of them had the stability of a long reign, like 
Gregory had, which would have helped them to establish the necessary conditions for a 
crusade, since war had broken out after Gregory’s death. This dubious story from the Eracles 
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is thus not very fair, but it does give an indication of a perception that Gregory’s crusade plan 
was not being carried out. After John XXI died, a six-month papal vacancy led to the election 
of Nicholas III, who had almost a three-year papal tenure, but this pope was most closely 
interested in Italian politics, and did not have good relations with Charles of Anjou. Throop 
has argued that Rudolph would not agree to go on crusade under Nicholas III’s reign until he 
received his long-promised imperial coronation, which had eluded him after Gregory’s death, 
but there is no solid evidence to back up this direct connection.
2
 All that can be said for sure 
is that Rudolph, Charles, and Nicholas became absorbed in Italian politics. After Nicholas’ 
death and yet another six month vacancy, Charles of Anjou’s favoured candidate, Simon of 
Brie, became pope as Martin IV. He had the stability of a four-year papal tenure, and had 
been a key figure in Gregory X’s crusade organisation as papal legate. But the crusade was 
well and truly put to rest under his reign when he remade the schism with the Greeks by 
excommunicating Michael Palaeologus, and when he called a crusade against the Christian 
kingdom of Aragon. The opportunity for a crusade had been ripest in the year and a half after 
Gregory’s death, especially considering (with retrospect) that Sultan Baybars himself died in 
1277. However, the unforeseen circumstances of the death of the three crusade-minded popes 
after Gregory, coupled with the fact that Gregory had made this crusade dependent upon the 
papacy, meant that the opportunity was lost. Even though the western princes were still 
interested in crusading, the right conditions that Gregory had been able to create for the 
crusade were simply no longer there. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Large Quotations: Original Text 
 
 
(Chapter number : footnote number) 
 
1:7 
 
‘Hic papa fuit mire experientie in secularibus, quamvis modice litterature, nec intendebat 
pecuniarum lucris sed pauperum elemosinis.’ 
 
1:13 
 
‘Quo interim tempore Viterbium ad Romanam Curiam venerant Philippus Francorum, & 
Carolus Neapolis Reges, qui Collegium pro celeri, & matura Pontificis creatione rogantes, 
parum profecerunt, & rebus infectis discessere.’ 
 
1:19  
 
‘Absens Thedaldus suadente, ut narrat aliqui, S.Bonav.ordinis S. Francisci Generali 
Antistite, renunciatus est Romanus Pontifex, incertum tamen, coram ne, an absens 
D.Bonavent.Cardinalibus auctor fuerit, ut Thedaldum post tam diuturna ferè triennij Comitia 
Pontificem renunciarent.’ 
 
1:22 
 
‘De quo obstupuerunt quam plures, quod hominem peregrinum, hominem quibusdam ex ipsis 
cardinalibus prorsus ignotum; & de cuius morte, vel vita veritas erat incerta, taliter 
elegissent, non attendentes, quod spiritus, ubi vult, spirat, & nescitur, unde veniat, aut quo 
vadat.’ 
 
1:28 
 
‘Divae Fidei breve hoc Sacellum per magnificos Vicecomites ex Placentia a fundamentis 
dicatum et dotatum.’ 
 
1:46 
 
‘O bene Iesu, gratias tibi ago, quia misisti ad me virum secundum cor meum, per cuius 
prouidentia, qualiter cum Papa, & Cardinalibus ad celebrandum Concilium hic venturis, me 
gerere debeam, potero informari.’ 
 
1:48 
 
‘Per cuius directionis consilium tota Curia tam in capite, quam in membris statum pacificum, 
& quietum obtinuit.’ 
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1:52 
 
‘Ne homo meritis tot insignis, gratus Deo, & acceptus hominibus, Ecclesiasticae careret 
titulo dignitatis, Archidiaconatum tunc in Ecclesia Leodiensi vacantem sibi liberaliter 
contulit, ipsumque de eo investire curavit.’ 
 
1:67 
 
‘Illo quoque tempore Lodoycus Rex Francorum, Princeps Christianissimus, virtutum vas, 
Fidei speculum, & elegans totius bonae operationis exemplar, ipsum Archidiaconum adeo 
diligebat, ac venerabatur eundem, ut mirarentur quamplures, quod tam Excellentissimus Rex 
uni Clerico, in magna non posito dignitate, tantum honorem impenderet, tantamque 
reuerentiam exhiberet.’ 
 
1:70 
 
‘De archidyaconis autem dicimus quod nec in choro nec in capitulo locum teneant debitum 
dignitati donec in dyaconos fuerint ordinati.’ 
 
1:71 
 
‘Per medietatem anni in ecclesia residentiam facient, et hanc iurent, nisi forte de episcopi 
licentia sint absentes.’ 
 
1:72 
 
‘Si vero eos peregrinari vel ad scolas velle ire contigerit, episcopus eis licentiam non poterit 
denegare.’ 
 
1:74 
 
‘Graviter irritasset aliquos Leodiensis nobili genere natos, qui magna fide hactenus Episcopo 
adhaeferant, in publico Canonicorum conventu pudendi facinoris accusatus est.’ 
 
1:75 
 
‘Qui praesentem Principem minime veritus, in publico consessu Episcopi vitia, gravi, 
intrepidaque oratione ausus est castigare.’ 
 
1:82 
 
‘In tantum enim erat Archidiaconus ipse pacis amator, & concordiae promotor, ut si inter 
dissides, & discordes sperabat posse proficere, non invitatus, nec etiam requisitus, pro bono 
quietis, & pacis, se ultroneus offerebat.’ 
 
1:83 
 
‘Ut dictum Archidiaconum, virum utique sani consilii, & eisdem Regi, & Comiti, nec non 
Praelatis, atque Baronibus eiusdem Regni dilectum, cuiusque verbis fides suae merito 
probitatis non dubia fuerat adhibenda, secum haberet, eiusque consiliis uteretur.’ 
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1:105 
 
‘Historia Placentina, Palatii Pontificii Ephemerides, omnes antiqui Codices, ac passim 
scriptores, imo series ipsa historiae contradicit.’ 
 
1:113 
 
‘Si oblitus fuero tui, Hierusalem, oblivioni detur dextera mea. Adhaereat lingua mea faucibus 
meis, si non meminero tui; si non proposuero Hierusalem in principio laetitiae meae.’ 
 
1:115 
 
‘Plures ex Cardinalibus, qui sibi occurrerant, ibidem invenit: quibus ipsum concomitantibus, 
accessit Viterbium.’ 
 
2:3 
 
‘Verum te qui terre necessitates illius propriis oculis inspexisti propter quod ad 
subveniendum eidem [...] debes.’ 
 
2:34 
 
‘A .M. .CC. .LXXII., a .XXII. jors d’avril, fu faite la trive du roi de Jherusalem et de Chipre, 
Hugue de Liseignen et du Soudan Bandocdar, et n’avoit en la trive que le plain d’Acre sans 
plus et le chemin de Nazareth.’ 
 
2:48 
 
‘Ideoque magnitudinem tuam rogamus et hortamur attente quatinus iugum honeris domini 
pro sui nominis amore supportans circa custodiam et defensionem eiusdem terre sollicite 
vigiles et labores.’ 
 
2:70 
 
‘Exeat igitur, exeat ad fratres et filios, ut scientes incommodum ipsum, prudentius extimantes, 
cooperationis remedio efficacius pro viribus relevent, et planctum pie compassionis officio 
dulcius consolentur.’ 
 
2:71 
 
‘Lugendum et iterum, ac amare dolendum, quod, sicut in partibus transmarinis non tantum 
audivimus, sed et oculis nostris vidimus, et manus nostre contrectaverunt, proh dolor! 
detestabilius solito blasphematur in gentibus nomen Christi.’ 
 
2:72 
 
‘Ecce non est adbreviata manus Domini ut salvare nequeat neque adgravata est auris eius ut 
non exaudiat sed iniquitates vestrae diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum et peccata vestra 
absconderunt faciem eius a vobis ne exaudiret.’ 
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2:73 
 
‘Propter hoc elongatum est iudicium a nobis et non adprehendet nos iustitia expectavimus 
lucem et ecce tenebrae splendorem et in tenebris ambulavimus palpavimus sicut caeci 
parietem et quasi absque oculis adtrectavimus inpegimus meridie quasi in tenebris in 
caligosis quasi mortui.’ 
 
2:75 
 
‘Diras et intolerabiles Terre Sancte pressuras quas olim corporeis vidimus oculis et propria 
manu palpavimus in minori officio constituti.’ 
 
2:78 
 
‘Contulimus cum ducibus exercitus Christiani necnon cum Templariis et Hospitalariis 
aliisque magnatibus illarum partium quando presentialiter inibi morabamur.’ 
 
2:83 
 
‘Sed dum sentimus quod hostium invalescente perfidia terra ipsa magis ac magis dispendio 
vastitatis exponitur.’ 
 
2:96 
 
‘Quod de terra ipsa Christianitati remansit imminere discrimen nisi ad ipsum 
manutendendum subsidium aliquod navale precipue [...] celeriter mitteretur.’ 
 
2:97 
 
‘Prout de consilio incolentium partes easdem processerat.’ 
 
2:107 
 
‘Interfuerunt quoque illi concilio nuntii pro Principibus, & aliis habitatoribus Terrae Sanctae 
diligenti ratione exponentes statum & negotia dictae Terrae.’ 
 
2:109 
 
‘Venerabilem fratrem nostrum Tirensis Archiepiscopam unum ex nunciis ab illius terre 
incolis novissime destinatis ad regiam presentiam venientem serenitati regie fiducialiter 
commendamus ex affectu rogantes ut ea que tibi ad eiusdem terre utilitatem duxit exponenda 
favorabiliter audias.’ 
 
2:119 
 
‘Dicit, quod non vult christianos affligere, quantum posset, licet sint digni.’ 
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2:148 
 
‘Quod Hostis Aegyptius, cum ingenti exercitu suo, exiit novissime de Babiloniae finibus, & 
usque ad loca vicina nobis progrediens, ac sua solita calliditate nunc versus Armeniam, nunc 
versus Tripolim, sed & nunc circa Tyrum, & Accon, & alia nostrorum loca discurrens.’ 
 
2:150 
 
‘Sed quid futura dies parturiat, in quos arcum suae pravitatis intendat, quisve futurus sit 
rerum praemissarum exitus, ignorantes.’ 
 
2:160 
 
‘Car le sodans en tient ce qu’il veaut et non plus.’ 
 
2:161 
 
‘Qui, cum ingenti suo exercitu, circa fines Damasci moratur, per quem cismarini Christicole 
cernunt sibi pericula majora prioribus denuo apparere.’ 
 
2:164 
 
‘Nam licet de adventu Tartarorum alias invaluit crebrus rumor, nunc actore, ut dicitur, 
soldano predicto, major viget rumor ille non tamen ut adventum eorum desideret dictus 
hostis, sed ut forte ex precogitata malicia in locis que remanserunt dampnum aliquod inferat 
christianis, maxime cum ad presens super eorum adventu a multis credatur haberi grandior 
certitudo.’ 
 
2:171 
 
‘Ex vastitate terre per potenciam paganorum et quia in hoc atmo prohibite sunt stille 
pluviarum, totam terram premit inedia.’ 
 
2:172 
 
‘Novit praeterea extremas Patriarchae Hierosolymitani praedicti, ac religiosorum omnium 
paupertates.’ 
 
2:174 
 
‘Novit ac haec, quantis munitionibus murorum, machinarum, garridarum, galearum, ac 
bellicorum instrumentorum copia, S. Terrae nostrae muniendae indigeant.’ 
 
2:180 
 
‘Nobis ultramarini redditus non sufficiant ad vivendum, et nos sumptus innumerabiles 
oporteat facere in Terre Sancte defensione et castrorum municionibus que cismarinis 
Christicolis remanserunt.’ 
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2:181 
 
‘Timemus ne nos oporteat deficere, et Terram Sanctam relinquere desolatam; et idcirco in 
excusationem nostram defectum hujusmodi majestati regie referimus ut per ipsam aliquod 
salubre remedium apponatur, ne, si quod propter hujusmodi defectum sinistrum contingeret 
evenire, nobis non possit in posterum imputari.’ 
 
3:19 
 
‘Possemus una cum fratribus nostris dicte terre statui providere.’ 
 
3:20 
 
‘Ad hoc solum studia nostra vigili meditatione convertimus ut eidem terre quam in extreme 
reliqueramus necessitatis articulo constitutam defensionis et gubernationis auxilium 
proveniret.’ 
 
3:22 
 
‘Verum quia non adveniebatur plena satisfactio votis nostris nisi procuraremus apponi 
consilium de perpetuo ipsi terre ministrando subsidio indiximus cum alias commode fieri non 
posset concilium generale certo termino divina coadivuante clementia celebrandum.’ 
 
3:25 
 
‘Vias et modos quibus iuvare valeat vigilanter exquirimus cum timeatur et quasi evidenter 
appareat quod vix subsistere poterit quin totaliter decidat status eius nisi ei celeritur 
succurrat.’ 
 
3:28 
 
‘Per dictos enim milites ipsa terra in hostium fronteria constituta manuteneri medio tempore 
poterit et per galeas alia que consistit in maritimis defensari.’ 
 
3:29 
 
‘Si forsan quod non credimus idem Rex ad hoc exequendum non adeo liberaliter sicut negotii 
qualitas et urgens necessitas exiget se promptum paratum et facilem exhibeat. Vos ad 
vitandum exterminium ipsius terre tota mente ut tenemini consurgentes mutuum usque ad 
quantitatem viginti quinque milium marcarum argenti per quod in militibus et galeis 
promptus possit haberi succursus ad terram eandem sine tarditatis dispendio destinandus 
comiter contrahere curetis.’ 
 
3:36 
 
‘Ex suspensione namque hujusmodi utilius preparandi negotium et utilem ipsius executionem, 
juxta nostrum desiderium, modis variis muniendi facultatem querimus.’ 
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3:37 
 
‘Cum soleat longa belli preparatio celerem afferre victoriam.’ 
 
3:39 
 
‘Nec enim, fili karissime, nos vel fratres nostros  pati deceret, nec quantum in nobis est, 
procul dubio pateremur te maxime personaliter, tantum aggredi minus consulte negotium, vel 
in tui presertim regiminis et juventutis auspiciis ad talia prosilire aliter quam deceret 
excellentiam regiam, per omnia communitum.’ 
 
3:45 
 
‘Et les deniers que le seignor roy de France manda au seignor pape por la soustenance dou 
pais sont ausi come perdus.’ 
 
3:46 
 
‘A rege Tunicii recepta pecunia, certa lege seu modo in Terre Sancte subsidium deputata, 
apud quosdam nobiles deposita dicitur, ab eisdem nobilibus de ipsis lege seu modo 
inviolabiliter observandis corporali prestito juramento.’ 
 
3:51 
 
‘Ecce quantum procuratio succursus eiusdem in terram prefatam cum memorato patriarcha 
transmissi dictam quantitatem exhauserit quantumve de illa supersit disputatio expensarum 
factarum circa succursum eiusdem quam tibi per memoratum capellanum mittimus apertius 
indicabit.’ 
 
3:62 
 
‘Hinc te attentione debita considerare supponimus quantum expediat terre predicte residuum 
quod christianitati remansit ad promptiorem totius recuperationem deo preduce 
promovendam manu tenere sollicite ac omnia que inimicos crucis terre illius occupatores 
infestos et detentores inmundos potentiores efficiunt pervigili studio et studiosa vigilantia 
impedire.’ 
 
3:63 
 
‘Novit autem excellentia regia quod predictum residuum absque victualium copia que 
defensoribus eius sufficiat defensari non potest non ad altius recuperationem intendi.’ 
 
3:66 
 
‘Ita ut, perditis (wrongly, ‘predictis’ in Guiraud’s edition) fere civitatibus et munitionibus 
universis ac fidelibus ipsarum populis pene omnibus in ore gladii trucidatis, paucis 
eorundem fidelium reliquiis vix alius quam supradicte terre extremus locus, civitas videlicet 
Acconensis, et due alie potuerint ad vite presidium conservari, reliquiis ipsis pre sui 
exiguitate nequaquam sufficientibus defensare civitates easdem, nec valentibus protractum 
diutius expectare subsidium, et quibus etiam ad tempus vix conceditur respirare.’ 
304 
 
  
3:88 
 
‘In se onus presertim gentis illuc mittende susciperet et predicti navalis subsidii preparandi 
forsan remitteret curam nobis.’ ‘Si ei ad hoc propter occupationes aliquas oportunitas non 
adesset, saltem nobis certam quantitatem de pecunia Tunicii.’ 
 
3:98 
 
‘Afferre poterat in illis partibus mora tua, oraculo tibi vive vocis injunxit, ut ibidem pro Terre 
Sancte tuitione atque custodia remaneres, ipsius promissione secuta, quod tibi suo loco et 
tempore in expensis necessariis provideret.’ 
 
3:133 
 
‘Non horres adulterii facinus horribile matrimonialis coniunctionis actori horrendum 
hominibus quorum seperat caritatem? Sunt ne ista preparatoria vie tue peregrinationis quam 
in terram illam tam laudabiliter tam publice obtulisti. Num te latet quod maculas criminum 
oportet abstergere ut deo acceptabiliter serviatur?’ 
 
3:136 
 
‘Ignoremus quot iam stipendiarios et quales admiseris quotque admittendi supersint.’ 
 
3:137 
 
‘Aptos et utiles, non voluptuosos nec pomposos aut immoderatos in sumptibus.’ 
 
3:141 
 
‘Monuimus ut in expensis faciendis in illo et specialiter quoad stipendiarios assumendos in 
subsidium dicte terre, illa diligentia utereris quod non pateret detractionibus aditus sed 
laudabilis tue prosecutionis evidentia ora detrahentium clauderentur. Verum in contarium 
res lapsa non solum murmuratur ab aliquibus sed a multis quasi publice affirmatur. Non 
enim desunt qui murmurent, qui detrahant, non qui calumpnientur actus tuos, asserentes 
quod inhabiles, immo multos prorsus inutiles et viles, aliquorum, ut creditur, devictus 
precibus vel circumventus fallaciis, in stipendiarios recepisti. Quod si consonent facta 
relatibus non dubium non solum in fame tue opprobrium sed in ejusdem terre grave 
dispendium redundare.’ 
 
3:145 
 
‘Cum enim olim LX milia librarum turonensium in subventionem ipsius terre per clare 
memorie L., regem Francorum deputata, incuria ministrorum non in utilitatem terre predicte 
conversa sed quasi omnino deperdita, multorum ad defensionem ejusdem terre alias 
intendencium debilitaverint animos et a prosecutione hujusmodi defensionis averterint, non 
est dubium quod, si commissa tibi eiusdem terre subventio similis, quod absit, negligencie 
continuatione depereat, non solum debilitabuntur corda defensioni terre prefate insistentium 
et aspirantium ad eandem, sed forsan penitus desperabunt.’ 
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3:156 
 
‘Desideremus admodum et decreverimus firmo proposito quod ad terram ipsam accedas 
personaliter cum comitiva decenti, quam predicte quantitatis residuum patietur.’ 
 
3:160 
 
‘Omnesque crucesignatos et crucesignandos pro dicte terre subsidio, quos sub nostra et dicte 
sedis protectione suscipimus, non permittas contra immunitates et privilegia crucesignatis a 
predicta sede concessa, ab aliquibus indebite molestari.’ 
 
3:163 
 
‘Et illis similiter, qui licet in alienis expensis, in propriis tamen personis accesserint, plenam 
suorum concedimus veniam peccatorum.’ 
 
4:108 
 
‘Rex Cypri, antequam de Tyro recederet, de nuntiis ordinat transmittendis, ad Occidentales 
Reges & Principes, maxime ad Papam & Cardinales, qui inobedientiam denuntient eorum, 
qui Ptolomaydae commorantur: orans ut de eis ac regni Ierosolymitani statu adhibeant 
salubre remedium. Maria vero praedicta, quae Romanam curiam continue sequebatur, supra 
cap.XIII. velut haeres, petitionem de obtinendo regno Ierusalem assidue prosequens, per 
Templi nuntios superius narrata cuncta cognouerat.’ 
 
4:109 
 
‘Maria vero praedicta, quae Romanam curiam continue sequebatur, supra cap.XIII. velut 
haeres, petitionem de obtinendo regno Ierusalem assidue prosequens, per Templi nuntios 
superius narrata cuncta cognouerat.’ 
 
4:116 
 
‘Si vera sint, ledit viscera, nimirum cum statum illius terre sancte Christi sanguine 
consecrate iaculo verisimilis lesionis offendat.’ 
 
4:130 
 
‘Ad hoc solum studia nostra vigili meditatione convertimus ut eidem terre quam in extreme 
reliqueramus necessitatis articulo constitutam defensionis et gubernationis auxilium 
proveniret.’ 
 
4:131 
 
‘Nova athleta fidelis accrevit pastor utique pervigil et gregis sibi commissi perutilis 
gubernator videlicet venerabilis frater noster Jerosolimitanus patriarcha.’ 
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4:132 
 
‘Non minus utiliter statui dicte terre quam eiusdem ecclesie regimini cum existat [...] 
speramus et credimus providisse.’ 
 
4:134 
 
‘Pro utilitate et evidenti necessitate tocius civitatis Accon, ad preces et petitionem nostram et 
domini Hugonis de Lezanico, Dei gratia illustris regis Cypri et Jerusalem, et fratrum 
Minorum ac aliorum quamplurium, vir religiosus frater Thomas, thesaurarius sancte domus 
Hospitalis sancti Joannis Hierosolimitanti, nomine ejusdem domus et pro ipsa domo, emisset 
a Richardo Anglico, cive Acconensi, duas domos, sitas in ruga Tanerie Accon, censuales 
episcopo et ecclesie Ebronensi.’ 
 
4:135 
 
‘Si autem Rex non daret, vel dare differret infra tres septimanas, vel mensem, non sit propter 
hoc praejudicium Regi Hierosolymitano.’ 
 
4:137 
 
‘Inter vos et religiosos ceteros Acconenses mutua viget affectio.’ 
 
4:140 
 
‘Cujus indulgentie pretextu iidem magister et fratres militie Templi hujusmodi redemptiones 
et legata in regno Jerosolimitano, sede Jerosolomitana vacante, hactenus recipere 
inciperunt, et times, ut asseris, ne, et fratres dicti hospitalis in eodem regno velint recipere in 
tuum prejudicium et gravamen.’ 
 
4:142 
 
‘Quatenus redemptiones et legata eadem in ispo Regno recipere nullatenus presumatis.’ 
 
4:144 
 
‘Cum enim olim LX milia librarum turonensium in subventionem ipsius terre per clare 
memorie L., regem Francorum deputata, incuria ministrorum non in utilitatem terre predicte 
conversa sed quasi omnino deperdita.’ 
 
4:177 
 
‘Quod nostre intentionis non exstitit, sicut nec esse debuit nec existit, quod per intitulationem 
hujusmodi seu denominationem in nostris litteris appositam hactenus, vel in futurum forsitan 
apponendam, tibi quo ad regnum  Jerosolimitanum, quod ad te spectare asseris, prejudicium 
generetur.’ 
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4:179 
 
‘Episcopus, hujusmodi appellationibus vilipensis, predictum Hugonem in Jerosolimitanum 
regem de facto, cum de jure non posset, pro sue voluntatis libito asseritur coronasse.’ 
 
4:186 
 
‘Damoisele Marie, qui tous jors sivoit la court, por ce qu’ele avoit touz jors mis debat au 
reaume de Jerusalem et le demandoit come son propre heritage, avoit ja moult bien seu ceste 
besoigne par les messages dou Temple, qui au roi Charle et a li estoient venus por haster le 
fait, qui longuement avoit este porparlez de faire dou au dit roy Charle de la raison qu’ele 
avoit au dit reaume.’ 
 
4:208 
 
‘Regi Siciliae illustri. Patet liquido illud modicum Terrae sanctae residuum, quod 
Christianitas obtinet, ex eo maxime immensis patere periculis, quod exinanitum opibus, 
bellatorum ope desertum, incolarum suorum viribus etiam per unitatem concordiae collatis 
in unum, non solum in sui defensione deficit; sed & aliorum subsidium non sufficit expectare. 
Quid igitur si guerrarum diffidiis exponatur? Cum per eas opulenta decidant, numquid 
exinanita consurgent? Cum debilitentur fortia, numquid debilia convalescent? Profecto non 
tam verendum quam supponendum videtur omnimodis, quod sub intestinarum guerrarum 
mole non stabit; cum contra impetitiones extrinsecas Cypri, in intrinsecae pacis tranquillitate 
vix duret. Non immerito itaque relatum nobis dilecti filii nobilis viri comitis Brenensis 
propositum, quo disponere dicitur, ut regnum Cypri cum armatis invadat, animum nostrum 
multa solicitudine inquietat, ne idem comes ante Christianitatis statum, prout in proximo de 
omnipotentia divina speratur, in illis partibus reformatum, per invasionem hujusmodi regnum 
praedictum nimiae turbationis exponendo discrimini, non sine grandi ejusdem Christianitatis 
gravamine, manibus illud inimicorum exponat; & duobus contendentibus, utriusque tertius 
inimicus in mari turbato piscabitur; comes ipse ad recuperandum jus suum, quod in regno 
praedicto eidem, ut asserit, justitia repromittit intendens, recuperationis spem sibi omnino 
praecidat. Ideoque serenitatem regiam rogamus attentius, & hortamur, in remissionem tibi 
peccaminum injungentes, quatenus praemissum comitis memorati propositum prorsus 
impedias, nec in effectum deduci aliquatenus patiaris; ne per ipsius Christianitatis discordias 
vires inimicorum crucis in tantam confusionem Christiani nominis augeantur, & ad 
liberationem terrae praedictae piis ordinationibus concilii via quasi totaliter praecludatur. 
Hujusmodi autem nostras preces & monita sic efficaciter sedulus exequaris, quod aeternae 
retributionis apud Dominum assequaris exinde praemium, & apud homines praeconii 
memorabilis incrementum.’ 
 
5:54 
 
‘La secunde, de ce que se l’esglise li consiloit que le prenist, et requiroit que l’esglise le 
monstrat le raisons.’ 
 
5:61 
 
‘Securiter rescribatis capitaneis vestris, quod dominus papa et ecclesia Romana volunt, quod 
imperator eligatur et fiat, verumtamen non vult, quod Fredericus de Stuffa vel excomunicatus 
aliquis sit imperator.’ 
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5:64 
 
‘Nuncii regis Boemie recesserunt de curia alacriter, inter quos est Iacobus de Roba de 
Cremona, qui nobis dixit, quod non displicebat ecclesie, quod rex Boemie per principes 
Alemanie eligeretur in regem Romanorum.’ 
 
5:68 
 
‘Li rois Loys mes pères fu an Aubigois et an revenant fu mors croisez d’outremer. Li rois 
Philippes fu avec le roi Richart.’ 
 
5:69 
 
‘Après, li rois ne prent mie l’ampire que por faire le servise Deu, que il plus fort chevalerie 
puisse assembler contre les annemis de la foi.’ 
 
5:72 
 
‘Gerentes ferventi spiritu in mentis desiderio, illi terrae sanctae […] tam potenter quam 
patienter succurrere, quod Dei populus, per multa tempora ab hostibus crucis Christi 
afflictus, pariter et constrictus, ad Christi gloriam, sepulchrum Domini intrepide valeat 
visitare.’ 
 
5:75 
 
‘Solent ardua, precipue propensis digesta consiliis, sentire potius celeritatis ex directione 
compendium, quam pati dispendium tarditatis; sic longa belli preparatio celerem consuevit 
afferre victoriam, sic iter festinantur instanter dum sollicite preparatur. Hec nos consideratio 
in imperialis negotii prosecutione hucusque detinuit, hec in tui consummatione fastigii multa 
uti maturitate suasit, hec varias vias suggessit exquirere diversaque remedia cogitare ut deo 
auspice tanto illa que instant deducamus securius quanto accuratius preparamus. Licet 
itaque non sine causa distulerimus hactenus regiam tibi denominationem ascribimus, cum 
fratribus tamen nostris nuper deliberatione prehabita te regem romanorum de ipsorum 
consilio nominamus.’ 
 
5:78 
 
‘Magna et utilia dei servia pro quibus concilium congregavimus et precipue status 
miserabilis terre sancte que in illius prorogatione aperta et periculosa impedimenta 
deplorant.’ 
 
5:79 
 
‘Ut postquam dictos Rex patentes litteras tibi concesserit suo sigillo signatas per quas se 
omnino a dicto negotio Imperii desistere vel ipsius dispositionem libere in manibus nostris 
ponere nostrique arbitrii relinquere liberari ac in partibus Africe impugnationem 
Sarracenorum assumere fateatur.’ 
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5:82 
 
‘Nos itaque volentes circa hec animarum saluti et terre predicte dispendio providere, 
discretioni tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatenus universos et singulos viros et 
mulieres, cujuscumque ordinis, status et conditionis existant, quos in eodem regno et aliis tue 
legationis terris, contigerit inveniri signum Crucis taliter assumpsisse, ac postmodum minime 
transfretasse, ad consummationem voti, publice fore denuntians ac per alios  denuntiari 
facians obligatos, non obstante quod Tunicium accesserunt, ipsos emissum votum 
personaliter in ejusdem terre subsidium, […] adimplere compellas.’ 
 
5:84 
 
‘Tu illi decimam omnium ecclesiasticorum reddituum suorum regnorum et terrarum usque ad 
sex annos ad idem terre predicte subsidium in presenti sacro concilio deputatam per eosdem 
sex annos sicut eidem terre concessa est apostolica commissa tibi ut premittitur inhac parte 
auctoritate concedas ut impugnationem quam contra eosdem Sarracenos assumpserit cum 
minori sumptuum gravamine prosequatur.’ 
 
5:92 
 
‘Pro defensione fidei christiane contra Sarracenos Africe.’ 
 
5:93 
 
‘Nos igitur attendentes discrimina que pro defensione christianitatis continue sustinetis in 
partibus Africanis, ac volentes vos propter hoc speciali gratia prosequi et favore, vobis quod 
de proventibus vestris decimam hujusmodi solvere minime teneamini, [...] indulgemus.’ 
 
5:94 
 
‘Cuiuscunque pre(e)minentie, conditionis vel ordinis aut status religionis vel ordinis, quibus 
et eorum alicui nulla priviligia vel indulgentias sub quacunque verborum forma vel 
expressione concessa volumus suffragari set ea, que ad hoc penitus revocamus.’ 
 
5:95 
 
‘Cum negotium quod de imperialis fastigii regimine iminet sine ulterioris more dispendio 
expediri iustitia manifesta suadeat innumere mundi neccessitates exigant. Magna et utilia dei 
servia pro quibus concilium congregavimus et precipue status miserabilis terre sancte que in 
illius prorogatione aperta et periculosa impedimenta deplorant  instantie continuatione 
requirant et ad eius expeditionem accelerandam omnimodis [...] curaverimus.’ 
 
5:96 
 
‘Et licet dicti negotii expeditionem innumere orbis et precipue ipsius imperii ac terre sancte 
neccessitates exposcerent.’ 
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5:103 
 
‘Ut per hoc mundus cognoscat et videant universi, quod ille qui fons iusticie debetur esse in 
terra, iustitiam nobis denegat.’ 
 
5:104 
 
‘Cunctis diebus nostris ad exaltandam matrem ecclesiam pro catholica fide pugnavimus. Qui 
non nisi iustum ab eo et solam iusticiam postulamus, non pro speciali commodo, Deus novit, 
set ad honorem Dei specialiter et pro statu pacifico populi christiani. Invenimus autem 
omnem austeritatem in eo, non velut in pio patre set sicut in domino carnali.’ 
 
5:106 
 
‘Nec compaciens christianorum naufragii, qui se ipsos continue distruunt et occidunt, cum 
non sit qui eorum iniquitatibus obviet et disenssionibus ponat finem.’ 
 
5:108 
 
‘Imperiale negocium tam de iure quam de facto prosequi volumus modis omnibus, 
personaliter et potenter in Lombardiam venire penitus absque dilatione aliqua.’ 
 
5:123 
 
‘Sarracenorum impugnatio predictorum in grandem favorem magnumque cedit auxilium 
dicte terre cum illi qui terram ipsam vexationibus variis absque intermissone conturbant 
horum persepe suffragiis foveantur.’ 
 
5:130 
 
‘Rex Castelle ac Legionis illustris, super eodem negotio nostris beneplacitis acquievit.’ 
 
5:131 
 
‘Sed, sicut multorum fidedignorum assertione didicimus, dictus rex in suis litteris se regem 
Romanorum intitulat, sicut prius.’ 
 
5:132 
 
‘Rex varias litteras quampluribus magnatibus Alemanie necnon et comunitatibus Italie 
destinavit, affirmans in illis se a dicto imperii negotio nec destitisse nec velle desistere.’ 
 
5:133 
 
‘Regem moneas ac efficaciter inducere studeas ut ab hiis et dimilibus omnino desistat, sigillo 
ac intitulatione premissis de cetero non usurus.’ 
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5:141 
 
‘Quartam recipere pro ipsius negotii subsidio portionem decimique clerici et laici residuum 
fructuum  earumdem.’ 
 
5:145 
 
‘Laudabilem quem ad Terre Sancte negocium geris affectum in Domino commendamus; 
propositum quod ad illius promotionem, [...] concepisti.’ 
 
5:148 
 
‘In terre sancte subsidium cum decenti bellatorum comitiva personaliter proficisci tibi.’ 
 
5:149 
 
‘Scire te volumus quod [...] ab imminenti Sarracenorum persecutione in qua te regem ipsum 
deferere non deceret tranquillato statu.’ 
 
5:150 
 
‘Dicto subsidio terre predicte tibi facultas affuerit premisse supplicationi tue libenter 
quantum cum poterimus annuemus.’ 
 
6:25 
 
‘Solent quos ardua promovenda sollicitant eos sibi stimulos sollicitationis adicere ut circa 
illa que incumbunt nichil transeat indiscussum ne ipsos forte peniteat preterisse aliquid 
inprovisum quod postmodum fuisse reputent previdendum. Licet itaque carissimum in Christo 
filium nostrum Regem Francorum Illustrem te ac ipsius et tuos consiliarios cum vacat 
huiusmodi sollicitudinem prosequi circa terre sancte negotium extimemus ut tamen addatur 
sollicitudo sollicitis distinctione tue per dilectum filium magistrum Guillelmem de 
Matisconem capellanum nostrum sub sigillo piscatoris aliqua que terre predicte credimus 
necessaria destinamus quatenus illius et que idem Rex tu ac predicti consiliarii circa idem 
negotium previdistis inspectis ea que post deliberationem habitam ipsi Regi et tibi insa 
fuerint utiliora procedant.’ 
 
6:30 
 
‘Si vero tu, rex predicte, personaliter illuc proficisci  nequiveris vel nolueris, volumus quod 
tu, fili princeps, decimam eandem simili modo per dictum tempus habeas, si tamen ipsius 
terre negotium transfretando, juxta dispositionem eandem, in generali passagio in persona 
propria prosequaris.’ 
 
6:35 
 
‘Specialiter utrum ipse predecessor ac reges personaliter transfretare disponerent vel eidem 
terre per missionem subsidii subvenire. Quo tempore generale passagium sit futurum. Qui et 
quot reges crucis assumpsere signaculum. Quantumve subsidium iidem predecessor et reges 
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si eos non transfretare contingent destinarent. Et an pacifice vel per guerram intenderent 
habere processum.’ 
 
6:37 
 
‘De adiutorio quod dicit dominus noster imperator facere in terra sancta hoc dicimus nos, et 
affirmamus quod tota intentio sua et promptitudo est ad faciendum totaliter adjutorium in 
terra sancta, et per exercitum, et per pecuniam, et per victualia, et per omnimodam aliam 
providentiam, solum modo si habuerit pacem cum vicinis suis Latinis. [...] Et hec parati 
sumus predicare in plateis et in civitatibus et super pulpita, cum a sanctissimo domino nostro 
papa nobis fuerit imperatum.’ 
 
6:68 
 
‘Prohibite sunt [...] ex discordia regum et principum in partibus occidentis Babyloniorum nos 
concutit superbia et vexat malicia et novis occasionibus interiectis cismarinam 
Christianitatem intendunt pro viribus conculcare.’ 
 
6:69 
 
‘Sive nos Deus de labore hujus infirmitatis eripiat, sive de ergastulo corporalis fragilitatis 
educat, Ecclesiam eius semper diligas & honores, eique sicut Princeps piissimus, & 
Christianissimus Imperator, pacem conferre satagas & quietem, ut, sive vivimus, sive 
morimur, in eius praesentia de tuis bonis operibus gloriemur, cui etiam in praesenti vita pro 
debito nostrae servitutis assistimus, & ad quem de sua misericordia praesumentes, si nos 
evocare voluerit, cum fiducia procedemus.’ 
 
6:80 
 
‘Non continentes novi aliquid, sed licet sub diversitate verborum, quod hactenus scripseras 
repetentes.’ 
 
6:81 
 
‘Sed nec imperii leges immutare intendimus aut ipsius consuetudinibus derogare; propter 
quod nec expedit nec nostrum deceret officium regi eidem interdicere.’ 
 
6:82 
 
‘Nec memorato regi, nec cuiquam alii concessisse sed […] rex quilibet personaliter negotium 
praedictum assumens hujusmodi decimam in terris suis ad ipsius negotii prosecutionem 
obtineat, nec memorato regi nec tibi denegare proponimus.’ 
 
6:83 
 
‘Quid circumspectionem regiam sic a semitis rationis abduxit, ut in ea prorumperes, quae 
nobis per tuas literas destinasti.’ 
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6:84 
 
‘Non desistemus a coeptis sed tractatui concordiae inter te ac regem praedictum pacis 
auctore praevio sic efficaciter insistemus.’ 
 
6:102 
 
‘Cujus negotium cordi regis specialiter insidet, ut speramus.’ 
 
6:103 
 
‘Videlicet, quia, dominus summus Pontifex nos duxit nuper cum instantia requirendos utrum 
proficisci vellemus necne in subsidium Terrae Sanctae cui adhuc respondere nequivimus pro 
eo quod nondum deliberavimus, quod illorum agere debeamus, proficisci, videlicet, seu etiam 
remanere. Postquam autem super praedictis deliberatione praehabita, summo Pontifici 
responderimus supradicto.’ 
 
6:110 
 
‘Christianitas subjaceat periculis, quam nocivum Terre Sancte negocio paretur obstaculum, 
quanta strages christicolis immineat.’ 
 
6:112 
 
‘Ut, in generali ad Terram Sanctam passagio proximo, personaliter ad eandem terram 
proficiscamur, vel charissimum fratrem nostrum, Edmundum Lancastriae comitem, pro nobis 
transmittamus ibidem.’ 
 
6:132 
 
‘Victualibus armis vasis navalibus et aliis necessariis causa dampnati questus Christi 
muniunt inimicos.’ 
 
6:133 
 
‘Sedis apostolice [...] volens adhibere circa premissa remedium illos falsos et impios 
Christianos qui Sarracenis deferre presumerent arma ferrum et lignamina galearum eos 
etiam qui galeas venderent illis aut naves quique gubernationis curam in piraticis 
Sarracenorum navibus exercerent vel in machinis aut quibuslibet aliis aliquod auxilium vel 
consilium eisdem impenderent anathematis et excommunicationis vinculo innodavit ipsos que 
rerum suarum privatione mulctari et capientium servos fore decrevit.’ 
 
6:134 
 
‘In partibus illis pseudo Christiani recipiunt illuc mercimonia deferentes si de aliquibus 
gravaminibus conquerantur hac eos probrosa responsione Sarraceni confundunt si 
erueremus vobis alterum oculorum ad nos cum reliquo rediretis prout iidem mercatores 
nobis eo tempore in regione terre sancte morantibus expressius retulerunt.’ 
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6:136 
 
‘In suo redditu de partibus transmarinis super hoc venerabili fratris nostri patriarche 
Jerosolimitani ac dilectorum filiorum...Hospitalis et...Templi magistrorum vel ipsorum in 
partibus illis vires gerentium testimoniales litteras exhibebunt.’ 
 
6:137 
 
‘Contra illos vero qui ut premittitur adversus Christianos per ea que Sarracenis deferunt 
ipsos muniunt Sarracenos generale promulges edictum ut omnes de predictis terris tuis seu 
tue iurisdictioni subiectis talia comittentes sint ipso facto privati omnibus bonis suis fisco 
irrevocabiliter applicandis et contra tales facias prout expedire videris frequenter inquiri ut 
executionem recipiat quod contra reos tanti criminis duxeris statuendum.’ 
 
6:146 
 
‘Nec enim, fili karissime, nos vel fratres nostros  pati deceret, nec quantum in nobis est, 
procul dubio pateremur te maxime personaliter, tantum aggredi minus consulte negotium, vel 
in tui presertim regiminis et juventutis auspiciis ad talia prosilire aliter quam deceret 
excellentiam regiam, per omnia communitum.’ 
 
6:148 
 
‘Et quoniam, prout omnium tenet firmiter indubitata credulitas, de dirigendo negotio terrae 
hujus feliciter cogitatis, & anhelatis, propterea de statu ejus frequentius informari, 
praesentia.’ 
 
6:153 
 
‘Ad excellentiam tuam credimus pervenisse qualiter in prima sessione concilii nuper 
congregati Lugduni, publice ac patenter ediximus quod, si, divina gratia nostris desideriis 
annuente, status mundi et casuum emergentium circumstantie paterentur, intendebamus in 
generali passagio cum christiano exercitu transfretare, ut quod salubriter aliis pro Terre 
Sancte liberatione verbo suggerimus, etiam opere predicemus; ad hoc tamen nullo nos voto 
astrinximus, quia nec expedire putavimus nec decere.’ 
 
6:161 
 
‘Plangant, & ululent super se insuper omnes tribus terrae de Patris subtractione fidelis, sed 
illi potissime, qui assumpto vivificae crucis victorioso signaculo, sub ejusdem Patris securo 
ducatu, contra blasphemos nominis Christiani hostes potenter insurgere gestiebant.’ 
 
6:167 
 
‘Sine nostro et apostolice sedis speciali mandato, ad terram ipsam passagium statui aut 
tempus passagii diffiniri nullatenus patiaris, sed statutum et diffinitionem hujusmodi 
constanti prohibitione studeas impedire.’ 
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6:168 
 
‘Communi et omnium Christi fidelium debet cooperatione fulciri. Propter quod, utile fore 
prospeximus ad id convertere majoris attentionis intuitum et in eo adhibere studium 
providentie plenioris, ut ad redemptionem terre prefate cunctorum in unum confletur 
auxilium, et in eodem tempore concurrat ibidem totius Christi exercitus fortitudo. Ideoque, ne 
sit christianitatis virtus divisa debilior, sed quanto erit unione potentior tanto felicioribus, 
Deo preduce, auspiciis potiatur.’ 
 
6:203 
 
‘Prohibemus insuper omnibus Christianis et sub anathemate interdicimus, ne in terris 
Sarracenorum, qui partes orientales inhabitant, usque ad VI annos transmeant aut 
transvehant naves suas, ut per hoc volentibus transfretare in subsidium Terre Sancte maior 
copia navigii preparetur.’ 
 
6:207 
 
‘Et fu esleu a pape de Rome mi sire Thealz .i. vaillant clerc né de Plaisance. Et revindrent en 
Acre li message que mi sire Odouart et la Crestienté avoient envoies as Tartars por querre 
secors; et firent si bien la besoigne qu’il amenerent les Tartars et corurent toute la terre 
d’Antioche et de Halape, de Haman et de La Chamele jusques a Cesaire la Grant. Et tuerent 
ce qu’il trouverent de Sarrazins, et de la s’en retornerent es mares qui sont a l’entrée de 
Turquie a tot grant gaaing d’esclas et grant bestiail. Et la se herbergierent por reposer apres 
les grans travaus qu’il avoient soffert du grant chemin qu’il avoient fait, et por l’erbage, et 
por la grant plene des eves qu’il trouverent en la terre, por le grant bestiail qu’il menoient.’ 
 
6:208 
 
‘Quam immaniter idem manibus madescens, & gladio in sanguine Christi fidelium 
miserabiliter regni Armeniae per dierum viginti spatium circa stragem viventium incendia 
villarum, & urbium, & finalem depopulationem omnium, quae potuit impetuose attingere, 
debachatur, ibidem immisericorditer rabiem ab olim concepto furore explevit, & regno 
dissipato hujus, & totaliter desolato, in regionem Antiochenam pervenit, ibique (ut fertur) 
cum toto potenti suo exercitu immoratur.’ 
 
6:209 
 
‘Quant li sodans fu issu de Babiloine et ot fait ce que il deveit faire en Hermenie, il 
s'entornerent arriers en Babiloine a l'orbage et refreichia о ses gens, car li sodans avoit fait 
mot grant guahan en Hermenie.’ 
 
6:212 
 
‘Ceterum, super hiis que per nuntios et litteras predictas tua magnificentia intimavit, ante 
Christiani exercitus ad transmarinas partes adventum, disponimus ad tuam presentiam 
legatos nostros, prout opportunitas permiserit, destinare, qui et magnitudini tue ad illa plene 
respondeant.’ 
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6:216 
 
‘Papa Gregorius […] michi mandavit in concilio Lugnunensi ut in scriptis ponerem qualiter 
Terra Sancta acquiri posset de manibus infidelium, et qualiter acquisita possit a Xpisti 
fidelibus conservari.’ 
 
6:218 
 
‘Duo debent esse exercitus Xpistianorum, scilicet unus qui pugnet per mare et alius qui 
pugnet per terram.’ 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Family Tree of Henry of Guelders, Bishop of Liège 
 
 
Source: Alain Marchandisse, La fonction épiscopale à Liège aux XIIIe et XIVe siécles: étude 
de politologie historique (Geneva, 1998), p. 507. 
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APPENDIX C 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
Charles of Anjou’s Dealings with the Holy Land and the Military Orders  
Immediately before and during Gregory X’s Papal Reign, 
from the Angevin Chancery Records 
 
WHAT WHEN WHO WHERE SOURCE 
(Volume:Page:Number) 
Agreement of service to 
Charles 
1266 Philip of Montfort, 
lord of Tyre, with 
his knights, shield-
bearers, and servants 
 1:54-5:119 
Expenses paid for 
service to Charles 
1268 Hospitaller Brother 
Philip of Eglis, with 
other Hospitallers 
and mercenaries 
 1:124:46 
Treasurer in Charles’ 
court 
1268- Templar Arnulf  1:171:270&271 
1:172:272 
1:181:30 
1:183:314, et al 
Permission to take 100 
packloads of wheat for 
Templar use only 
April 
1269 
Templars From Bari 2:58:206 
Permission to take 500 
packloads of wheat and 
1,000 packloads of 
barley, no stipulations 
June 1269 Templar Mace-
bearer 
To Acre 2:124:473 
Permission to ship five 
horses and mules 
July 1269 Hospitaller Brother 
John of Villiers 
To 
Outremer 
3:286:2 
5:277:5 
Permission to ship two 
horses and a great 
magnitude of provisions 
‘in aid of the Holy 
Land’ 
July 1269 Francis of Flanders, 
knight, with two 
squires and three 
mercenaries 
From Bari 
or Brindisi 
1:290:393 
Permission to take 
supplies of wheat given 
in alms 
July 1269 Brother Aymonis of 
the knights of St. 
Thomas of Acre 
To Acre 1:292:398 
2:134:516 
Permission to take 2,000 
packloads of wheat, 
1,000 packloads of 
barley, and 1,000 
packloads of pulses to 
be distributed by 
Hospitallers, Templars, 
Teutonic Knights, the 
patriarch of Jerusalem, 
and Geoffrey of 
Sargines 
July 1269 Peter of Neocastro, 
prior of the 
Hospitallers 
To Acre 1:293:402 
1:295:410 
Concerning the 
possession of the castle 
of Ricarcari 
July 1269 Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi 
 1:293:403 
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Permission to send 
goods overseas 
August 
1269 
Hospitallers To 
Outremer 
1:299:428&429 
Provision for travel with 
a supply of wood, in 
order to build 
instruments and 
machines of war 
November 
1269 
Honorius, carpenter 
of King Louis IX 
To the 
Holy Land 
5:180:317 
Permission to sail 1269 Roger Amatoni of 
Barletta 
To Acre 4:90:588 
Permission to sail, 
provided that they go to 
the Hospitaller master at 
Acre 
1269 Homodeo Flidoni of 
Lucca and Conrad 
Salvacossa de Iscla 
To Acre 4:129:853 
Permission to take 
merchandise to Acre 
1269 Bono the Accursed 
Malafaytato, Henry 
Arnolfini, 
Bartholomew 
Santos, Johannes 
Mellosus, and 
Bonaiuncta 
Salvacossa de Iscla 
To Acre 4:129:854 
Permission to take 
supplies for the defence 
of Acre 
1269 Philip of Montfort, 
lord of Tyre 
To Acre 4:100:661 
Provision in Acre contra 
Raymond Boniface 
1269 Philip and 
Bartholomew 
Mainebeuf, and 
Raymond Boniface, 
former consul of 
Marseilles 
Acre 4:136:901 
Provision for Hospitaller 
brothers and sisters 
1269 Hospitaller brothers 
and sisters 
 4:58:371 
Permission to take 500 
packloads of wheat to be 
shared with the Teutonic 
knights and the 
Hospitallers 
January 
1270 
Templar Brother 
Hugh Bertrand 
From Bari 
or 
Brindisi, 
to Acre 
3:278:911 
3:239:715 
 
300 packloads of wheat, 
200 packloads of barley, 
and 16 horses, mules, 
and she-mules ‘in aid of 
the Holy Land,’ to be 
shared with the 
Templars and the 
Teutonic Knights  
February 
1270 
Hospitaller Master 
Hugh Revel 
Holy Land 3:189:474 
400 packloads of wheat, 
no stipulations 
March 
1270 
Teutonic Knights To Acre 3:192:489 
Aid for the faithful in 
Acre, not allowed to be 
given to the Greeks, 
Muslims, Pisans, or any 
enemies 
 
 
April 
1270 
Hospitallers To Acre 5:27:124 
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Disagreement between 
vicar of Marseilles and 
Templars over delivery 
of goods to Acre 
October 
1270 
Templar Brother 
Peter Carbonello 
Acre 6:42:147 
Expenses for 
messengers from 
Baybars 
December 
1270 
Messengers from 
Baybars 
 6:159:819 
Protection for the goods 
and people of Cohemis, 
who are going to the 
Holy Land 
December 
1270 
People of Cohemis To Holy 
Land 
6:267:1447 
Shipment of wheat and 
barley, not for the lands 
of Michael Palaeologus 
1270 Templars and 
Hospitallers 
Acre 6:238-9:1270 
Shipment to the 
Templars in Acre blown 
off course, returned to 
Italy 
1270 Templar Brother 
Stephen 
Acre/Italy 7:17-8:43 
Charles orders Maria’s 
goods from a shipwreck 
to be tracked down and 
given to her 
1270 or 
1271 
Maria of Antioch Milazzo 6:189:982 
Permission to take 
wheat from Sicily 
January 
1271 
John II of Brittany, 
earl of Richmond 
To Acre 6:192:1003 
Messenger from 
Baybars is given a robe 
of scarlet, and a blue 
robe for his son 
January 
1271 
Messenger from 
Baybars 
 6:165:853 
An appeal by Arnulf 
Guinea because of Otto 
de Vrazigniis’ failure to 
go to the Holy Land 
with him as promised 
January 
1271 
Count Arnulf 
Guinea, and the 
knight Otto de 
Vrazigniis 
 6:194:1019 
Distributing goods in 
Sicily 
February 
1271 
Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi 
Sicily 6:201:1067 
6:202:1075 
Permission to take 
wheat and Barley from 
Apulia 
March 
1271 
Templars To Acre 6:140:706 
Suspicion that supplies 
of barley, wheat, oil, 
fruit, wood, and wine 
had been taken to the 
prince of Achaea rather 
than to Acre, but the 
merchants did not do 
this, so that case was 
closed 
March 
1271 
Risona of Marra, 
master of the port of 
Apulia, and three 
Lucan merchants: 
Guido Panici, 
Bommocino 
Trentini, and 
Bandino of Fundora 
 6:205:1091 
2,000 packloads of 
wheat and barley, 100 
packloads of pulses 
from Apulia for the 
Hospitallers 
 
 
March 
1271 
Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi  
To Acre 7:62:44 
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Expenses and 
necessities for a 
messenger from Baybars 
to leave port in Sicily 
for Alexandria or Acre 
April 
1271 
Messenger from 
Baybars 
To 
Alexandria 
or Acre 
6:175:911 
Provision for sending 
messengers to Baybars 
April 
1271 
Messengers of 
Charles: Dominican 
Peter de Beania and 
Brother Berengar 
To 
Baybars 
6:176:913 
6:217:1162 
Hospitallers free from 
taxation in Charles’ 
kingdom; they are owed 
three ballistae by 
Charles’ court for 
shipment to Acre 
June 1271 Hospitallers To Acre 6:248-9:1328 
Charles is happy about 
the papal election 
because Tedaldo will 
send aid to the Holy 
Land 
September 
1271 
Tedaldo Visconti Acre, Holy 
Land 
7:248:196 
Messengers have been 
sent to the new pope in 
Acre 
November 
1271 
The pope Acre 5:219:19 
Money for the reception 
of the new pope from 
Acre 
December 
1271 
The pope Acre 7:95:19&21 
Payment of money to 
Maria 
1271 Maria of Antioch  7:130:127 
Templars transferring 
supplies to Acre; they 
are owed a ballista by 
Charles’ court 
1271 Sabinus, master of 
the Templars at Bari 
To Acre 7:45:198 
Permission to take 
supplies from Apulia 
1271 Templar Brother 
Arnulf of Ursemali 
To Acre 7:199:99 
Hugh sends Jacob to 
serve Charles 
1271 Hospitaller Master 
Hugh Revel, 
Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi 
 7:233:142 
Barley ordered to be 
restored to Hospitallers 
1271 Hospitaller 
Preceptor Simon of 
Letto 
Aversa 7:197:76 
Permission for the 
Hospitallers to take 
supplies with no 
stipulations 
1271 Hospitallers From Bari 
to Acre 
7:200:104 
Permission for the 
Teutonic Knights to take 
supplies for their own 
use 
1271 Teutonic Knights From 
Apulia to 
Acre 
7:200:107 
Immunity for the 
Hospitallers taking 
supplies 
 
 
1271 Hospitallers From Bari 
to Acre 
8:48:81 
323 
 
  
Order not to molest the 
Hospitallers who are 
taking things for Acre 
1271 Hospitallers From Bari 
to Acre 
8:52:112 
Concerning a house that 
Jacob possesses 
1271 Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi 
Messina 8:61:174 
Provision for the 
necessary vessels to 
send word to Acre from 
the cardinals of the 
papal election 
1271 College of 
Cardinals, and the 
pope 
To Acre 7:232:133 
Money should be sent 
for the arrival of the new 
pope 
1271 The pope From Acre 5:236:110 
Money for Sergius’ ship 
to carry messengers to 
the new pope 
1271 Sergius the Bull of 
Salerno, Fulk of 
Podio Riccardi, and 
Templar Brother 
Stephen of Syse 
To Acre 5:234:99 
Aid to Charles’ 
messengers to the new 
pope, Tedaldo 
1271 Tedaldo, Gerard of 
Bassilion, and Peter 
Hucemagna 
To 
Outremer 
7:233:139 
7:110:94 
Money to Genoese 
merchants for 
transporting Charles’ 
messengers 
1271 Merchants: John the 
Chancellor, 
Pellegrino del Gallo, 
and Balian Larcaro; 
Messengers: Gerard 
of Bassilion and 
Peter de Blamagne 
To Acre 5:250:195 
Ships fitted out by 
Charles should go to 
meet the pope 
January 
1272 
The pope  5:219-20:22 
Money for meeting the 
new pope on his way to 
Italy 
January 
1272 
Peter Hucemagna, 
and the pope 
 7:244:171 
Messengers from the 
king of Armenia 
February 
1272 
King Leo II of 
Armenia 
 8:95:40 
Salted meats, cheese, 
and oil for Hospitaller 
use 
April 
1272 
Hospitallers From Bari 
to 
Brindisi, 
and thence 
to Acre 
10:39:134 
Merchants can take 
20,000 packloads of 
wheat from Sicily, with 
none for the Genoese, or 
Michael Palaeologus; if 
some is taken to the 
Hospitallers at Acre, it is 
to be measured; Charles 
wants whoever is going 
to Acre who has two 
holds in his ship to take 
three ballistae there 
from him 
April 
1272 
Hospitallers To Acre, 
et al. 
10:25:95 
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Letters of 
recommendation for 
merchants 
May 1272 King Hugh of 
Cyprus and 
Jerusalem 
To 
Cyprus? 
8:109-10:104 
Concerning pasture and 
water rights for the 
Hospitallers 
June 1272 Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi 
Messina 8:138-9:199 
Permission for 
Hospitallers to take 
1,000 packloads of 
wheat and 1,000 
packloads of barley 
July 1272 Hospitallers From 
Apulia to 
Acre 
8:202:564 
Permission for 
Hospitallers to take 100 
packloads of pulses, 
seven horses, and seven 
mules 
August 
1272 
Hospitallers From 
Apulia to 
Acre 
8:202:565 
Passage for messengers 
of Pope Gregory X to 
Romania 
October 
1272 
Pope Gregory X To 
Romania 
9:294-5:24 
Provision to 
commemorate the queen 
consort of Sicily, 
Beatrice 
November 
1272 
Hospitallers Aix-en-
Provence 
10:25:95 
Charles has three well-
equipped galleys to 
transport the new 
patriarch to Acre 
1272 Thomas Agni of 
Lentini, patriarch of 
Jerusalem 
To Acre 5:223:36 
8:74:282 
Order to requisition a 
ship to return the king of 
Armenia’s messengers 
1272 Archdeacon Varani, 
and the knight 
William 
From 
Brindisi to 
Acre 
8:97-8:51 
Expenses for the pope 
returning with Fulk from 
the Holy Land 
1272 Fulk of Podio 
Riccardi, and the 
pope 
To 
Brindisi 
from Acre 
8:115:5 
8:289-90:15 
Permission to take 30 
packloads of supplies 
1272 Hospitaller Brother 
Guido 
To Achaea 9:30:47 
Provision for Jacob 
against Conrad, 
concerning Casalis Novi 
1272 Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi, 
Conrad of Amicis, a 
knight 
Messina 9:270:326 
Gold for Peter, who 
lives in Acre 
1272 or 
1273 
Peter Deco of 
Venice 
Acre 10:267-8:24 
Three galleys and one 
ship proceeding with 
Oliver of Termes in aid 
the Holy Land  
January 
1273 
Oliver of Termes To Holy 
Land 
9:44:133 
2,000 packloads of 
wheat, not for the lands 
of Michael Palaeologus 
March 
1273 
Hospitallers To Acre 9:52-3:183 
Charles calls Jacob to 
hear news from the 
patriarch of Jerusalem 
April 
1273 
Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi, and 
the patriarch of 
Jerusalem 
Foggia 10:30:108&109&110 
Supplies, including 
ballistae 
May 1273 Templars To Acre 9:215:98 
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A Hospitaller among the 
messengers going to 
Hungary on behalf of 
Charles and the 
Hungarian king 
June 1273 
or 1274 
Hospitallers Hungary 11:120:139 
John requests Charles to 
revoke Julian’s 
requirement to go to the 
Holy Land to atone for 
murder 
July 1273 John II of Brittany, 
and Julian of Faneto 
 10:140-1:552 
Charles heard that some 
of his officials had 
imposed a penalty on 
Jacob; Charles wanted it 
remitted 
July 1273 Hospitaller Brother 
Jacob of Tassi 
Lombardy 10:131:528 
Supplies to the 
Hospitallers, Templars, 
and Teutonic Knights 
August 
1273 
Hospitallers, 
Templars, and 
Teutonic Knights 
To 
Outremer 
9:293-4:22 
For the business of the 
Holy Land, Charles 
orders the vicar to 
publish that arms and 
supplies are not allowed 
to be sent to the 
Muslims, under penalty 
August 
1273 or 
1274 
Vicar of Marseilles Marseilles 11:315:223 
William should not be 
disturbed in possession 
of a mill near Florence 
1273 Templar Master 
William of Beaujeu 
Florence 9:261:258 
William is named as 
Charles’ blood brother; 
provision made 
concerning the illicit 
occupation of Templar 
lands by some men 
1273 Templar Master 
William of Beaujeu; 
occupiers of the 
land: Loysium 
Beaujeu, lord of 
Gravine, John of 
Confluencia, lord of 
St Nicandri, and 
Raynald of Culant, 
lord of Rubi 
 9:264-5:288 
Supplies to Acre of 
precious stones, lathes, 
swords, ballistae, linen, 
frankincense, cassia, 
sedge, hooks, wine, 
garlic, saws, and an old 
veil, with no provisions 
1273 Merchants Simon of 
St Stephen and 
another ‘de 
Barcholam’ 
To Acre 10:14:52 
Secure conduct for 
messengers from the 
Holy Land 
January 
1274 
Hospitaller Brother 
William of Corceles, 
James Vidal, 
Enguerrand of Jorni, 
and Templar Brother 
Arnulf 
 
 
 
 11:136:224 
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Grain for the 
Hospitallers, and not for 
the Genoese, Muslims, 
or the lands of Michael 
Palaeologus 
June 1274 Hospitallers To Acre 11:89:1 
Help for the Templars to 
find two escaped 
Muslim slaves that had 
been brought from 
Outremer 
August 
1274 
Templar preceptor 
of Bari 
Lucera 11:55:143 
Permission to look for 
minerals in the kingdom 
of Sicily 
August 
1274 
Hospitaller Brother 
Raymond, and John, 
a goldsmith from 
Longobucco 
Sicily 11:96:36 
Licence to look for 
minerals expires in April 
1275, and Charles gets 
one-third of the find 
August 
1274 
Hospitallers  11:245:216 
People sent to 
superintend minerals in 
Calabria 
November 
1274 
Hospitaller Brother 
Raymond, Simon of 
Lungro, Charles’ 
valet 
Calabria 12:170-1:34 
Raymond is supposed to 
take a special interest in 
the minerals in Calabria 
December 
1274 
Hospitaller Brother 
Raymond, Simon of 
Lungro, Charles’ 
valet 
Calabria 12:260-1:364 
Licence to take wheat to 
Acre, Tyre, or Tripoli 
September 
1275 
Merchants To Acre, 
Tyre, or 
Tripoli 
13:46:25 
Permission for 
merchants to take wheat 
to Tunis, Acre, or 
Marseilles, but not to the 
Genoese or Pisans or 
other western lands; if 
supplies are taken to 
Acre, then it should be 
to the patriarch or the 
Templars 
December 
1275 
Templars, and 
patriarch of 
Jerusalem 
To Acre, 
et al 
13:30-1:137 
 
Permission for 
merchants to take wheat 
to Venice, Tunis, Acre, 
et al, but not to Genoese 
or Pisans or other 
western lands, or 
Michael Palaeologus; if 
supplies are taken to 
Acre, then it should be 
to the patriarch or the 
Templars 
December 
1275 
Templars, and 
patriarch of 
Jerusalem 
To Acre, 
et al 
13:91-2:207 
Provision for wheat and 
barley for Acre, but not 
for Genoa, Pisa, or 
Michael Palaeologus 
December 
1275 
Merchants To Acre 13:93:211 
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Permission for 
merchants to take wheat 
and barley to Venice, 
Tunis, Acre, et al, but 
not to Genoese or Pisans 
or other western lands, 
or Michael Palaeologus; 
if supplies are taken to 
Acre, then it should be 
to the patriarch or the 
Templars 
December 
1275 
Templars, and 
patriarch of 
Jerusalem 
To Acre, 
et al 
16:177:11 
Licence for the Teutonic 
Knights to take 12 
horses and 12 mules for 
the defence of Acre 
1275 or 
1276 
Teutonic Knights To Acre 13:34:157 
A merchant from Lucca 
has asked Charles for 
permission to exit the 
kingdom to take 
supplies to Acre 
1268-
1281 
Baldinotus, 
merchant of Lucca 
To Acre 2:58:209 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
Participants in Gregory’s Crusade 
 
 
*Defacto participant 
**Participant after Gregory’s death 
 
FRENCH/SICILIAN 
King Philip III of France 
Queen Maria of France (sister of the duke of Brabant) 
Prince Robert of France, count of Clermont (brother of King Philip) 
Prince Peter of France, count of Perche and Alençon (brother of King Philip) 
John I, duke of Brabant and Lotharingia, with 50 knights 
Erard of Valery, chamberlain of France 
Humbert of Beaujeu, constable of France 
Gaucher, castellan of Noyon and Thourotte, with ten knights  
Simon of Brie, titular cardinal-priest of St-Cecilia (legate for the crusade) 
Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily (conditional) 
Charles of Salerno, crown-prince of Sicily 
**John Britaud, lord of Nangis, constable of Sicily, and panetier of France, with escort 
 
GERMAN 
 
Rudolph of Habsburg, king of the Romans with 500, 1,000 or 2,000 knights 
Gertrude of Hohenburg, queen of the Romans 
Frederick III, duke of Lorraine 
Louis II, duke of Upper Bavaria and count-palatine of the Rhine 
Matilda of Habsburg, duchess of Upper Bavaria (daughter of King Rudolph)  
 
BRITISH/IRISH 
David MacCerbaill, archbishop of Cashel 
John II of Brittany, earl of Richmond 
 
IBERIAN 
Prince Emmanuel of Castile and Leon with escort 
Sancho, archbishop of Toledo 
King James I of Aragon, with 1,000 knights and ten ships 
*Nuño González of Lara 
*King Alfonso X of Castile and Leon 
**King Alfonso III of Portugal 
 
OTHER 
Pope Gregory X (conditional) 
Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus (conditional) 
King Magnus III of Sweden (perhaps after Gregory’s death) 
**Guy, count of Flanders, with escort 
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Jacob of Guitto (as punishment) 
Julian of Faneto (as punishment) 
 
 
Possible Participants in Gregory’s Crusade 
 
 
King Edward I of England 
Prince Edmund of England 
King Ottokar II of Bohemia 
 
 
Participants in Gregory’s Interim Crusade 
 
 
John of Grailly, seneschal of Jerusalem 
Three galleys from Charles of Anjou, with 30 suitable men 
Thomas Agni of Lentini, patriarch of Jerusalem, with 500 footmen and horsemen 
Oliver of Termes, captain of the pilgrims, with 25 horsemen and 100 crossbowmen 
Gilles of Santi, with 400 crossbowmen  
Peter of Amiens, with 300 crossbowmen 
William of Roussillon, with 40 knights, 60 mounted sergeants, and 400 crossbowmen  
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
Research Notes on Tedaldo Visconti’s Early Life 
 
 
1. The Origins of Tedaldo Visconti: 
There was a prominent family by the name of Visconti in Milan, but there is no doubt 
that Tedaldo Visconti belonged to the branch from Piacenza. On this point, Christine Renardy 
has not given Gatto a very close reading, though she cited his work for proof. Renardy wrote 
that Tedaldo ‘belonged to the celebrated Ghibelline family who ruled Milan and Lombardy.’1 
Gatto made it clear that the Visconti branch to which Tedaldo belonged was ‘not bound by 
ties of kinship to the older family of the Visconti of Milan.’2 Gatto drew upon Campi, a 
Piacentine historian who addressed the issue of the Milanese and Piacentine Visconti.
3
 
Renardy’s statement on the Visconti family’s Ghibelline adherence is also problematic. There 
is no evidence that Tedaldo’s family, unconnected to the Milanese Visconti, had Ghibelline 
allegiance. The fact that Tedaldo joined the entourage of James of Palestrina, who was trying 
to suppress the Ghibelline faction in Piacenza, likely points to his Guelf allegiance.  
 
2. Tedaldo’s Connection to San Antonino in Piacenza 
A 1236 letter concerning the election of the bishop of Piacenza mentioned a 
‘Thetaldo’ who was a presbyter in San Antonino, and a 1237 letter concerning James of 
Palestrina’s efforts in Piacenza mentioned an archpresbyter named ‘Thedaldus,’ also of San 
Antonino.
4
 As Gatto has indicated, however, there has been some dispute over the identity of 
                                                 
1
 Renardy, Maîtres, p. 448. 
2
 Gatto, Pontificato, p. 29-30. 
3
 Campi, Dell’Historia, vol. 2, p. 241.  
4
 Reproduced in Campi, Dell’Historia, vol. 2, p. 392 & 394. 
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this ‘Thetaldo.’5 Given that this was at the same time, and in the same place that Tedaldo 
entered into the entourage of James, it is likely, though not certain, that this was Tedaldo 
Visconti and not another man with the same name.
6
 It is speculation, but the fact that the 
anonymous biographer did not mention Tedaldo’s position of canon in Lyons may give 
support to the idea that Tedaldo held the position of canon in Piacenza: the anonymous 
biographer simply did not see either of the positions as important, so ignored both of them. 
 
3. The Confusion Over Tedaldo’s Position in Liège 
To be clear, this thesis has argued that Tedaldo became an archdeacon of Liège on 19 
November 1246, and he was never a canon of Liège (only of Lyons). The uncertainty over 
Tedaldo’s position in Liège stems from the fact that Tedaldo Visconti’s predecessor as 
archdeacon of Hainaut in Liège shared his name. This ‘Thierry,’ to add to the confusion, was 
himself a canon of St Lambert in Liège, and was given his archdeaconate in 1239 – the same 
time that Tedaldo was made a canon of Lyons.
7
 The simple fact is that there could not be two 
archdeacons of Hainaut. The position was already filled when Tedaldo was alleged to have 
received it. Thierry died in 1246, paving the way for Tedaldo Visconti to take on the 
archdeaconate of Liège. At the same time that Tedaldo Visconti was an archdeacon of Liège, 
there was yet another with the same name: ‘Thibaut’ was a canon of St Denis in Liège as 
early as 1245, and he died in 1267.
8
 It is perhaps this Thibaut who created the confusion over 
Tedaldo Visconti having a position of canon in Liège.  
                                                 
5
 The argument against this Tedaldo being the same as the man who became Gregory X centred on Tedaldo 
Visconti not mentioning being canon of San Antonino when he reflected (as pope) on being a canon of Lyons 
and archdeacon of Liège. As Gatto asserted, however, this is a weak argument e silentio, and does not hold up to 
the repeated evidence of ‘Tedaldo’ appearing in records from San Antonino, as collected in the work of Gaetano 
Tononi on Pope Gregory X and Piacenza. Gatto, Pontificato, p. 32, n. 1. 
6
 Simon Ditchfield took it as a matter of course that Tedaldo had been a canon in San Antonino in his work on 
Pietro Maria Campi. Simon Ditchfield, Liturgy, Sanctity and History in Tridentine Italy: Pietro Maria Campi 
and the Preservation of the Particular (Cambridge, 1995), p. 138 & 221. 
7
 Analectes pour servir a l’histoire ecclésiastique de la Belgique, ed. Edmund Reusens & Victor Barbier 
(Leuven, 1895), vol. 6, p. 189-90; vol. 25, p. 470-1.  
8
 Renardy, Maîtres, p. 447. 
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The anonymous biographer of Gregory X never mentioned that Tedaldo held the 
position of canon of Liège (but nor of Lyons, for that matter). When he became pope, as 
aforementioned, Tedaldo reflected on his time as canon of Lyons, but not of Liège. The 
notion that Tedaldo was also a canon at Liège surfaced in John of Hocsem. Hocsem was born 
shortly after the death of Pope Gregory X (1276), and was himself a canon of Liège in 1315, 
as well as master of the cathedral school, and later the secretary for the chapter. He died in 
1348. He wrote that Gregory X had been ‘canon and archdeacon of Liège.’9 He did not, 
however, mention Gregory’s canonry in Lyons, which may have been, instead, attributed to 
Liège. Likewise, the 1402 chronicle of Liège cited Tedaldo as canon and archdeacon of 
Liège, but made no mention of a canonry of Lyons.
10
 The alleged canonry of Liège also 
appeared in Oldoini’s additions to Ciacconio, where, speaking of Liège, the author wrote that 
Tedaldo was a canon there, and archdeacon of Hainaut. In this case, Oldoini had also 
mentioned Tedaldo’s previous canonry in Lyons.11 Renardy also asserted that Tedaldo had 
been a canon of Liège, having received the position in 1239, and his archdeaconate in 1246, 
but this error can be attributed more to an inaccurate reading of Gatto than to a close reading 
of the sources.
12
 
Gatto’s work on Tedaldo’s canonry and archdeaconate must be re-examined, since he 
too seems to have erred. He wrongly asserted that Tedaldo gained the archdeaconate through 
the manoeuvrings of James of Palestrina, who in fact had already died.
13
 Gatto cannot take all 
the blame, however, since the confusion had already arisen in the sources that he used. 
Campi’s history of Piacenza, from which Gatto drew for Tedaldo’s life, stated that not long 
after Tedaldo was made canon of Lyons, he was made archdeacon of Liège. He wrongly 
                                                 
9
 ‘Canonicus et archidyaconus Leodiensis.’ Hocsem, Chronique, p. 31. 
10
 La chronique liégeoise de 1402, ed. Eugène Bacha (Brussels, 1900), p. 212-213. 
11
 Ciacconio, Vitae, p. 185. 
12
 Renardy, Maîtres, p. 450, n. 1. 
13
 Gatto, Pontificato, p. 35. 
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dated both events in 1240.
14
 The anonymous biographer also wrongly placed the bestowal of 
the archdeaconate on Tedaldo before the First Council of Lyons, and even before the death of 
James of Palestrina.
15
 
Historians who have confused this issue can be forgiven, because to complicate 
matters still more, James had been involved in the election of the bishop of Liège when he 
was the papal legate in France and Germany. This also took place around 1239. Gaetano 
Tononi, upon whom Gatto drew for his history of Tedaldo, is one of the likely sources for 
Gatto’s errors. In his history of James of Palestrina, Tononi wrongly wrote that Tedaldo, 
already canon of Lyons, became archdeacon of Liège in 1239 – in the midst of the 1240 
election of a new bishop of Liège, whose previous bishop had died in 1239.
16
 With so many 
coincidental connections linking James, Tedaldo, and the city of Liège, it is little wonder that 
errors have arisen. 
                                                 
14
 Campi, Dell’Historia, vol. 2, p. 169. 
15
 Vita Gregorii, p. 343. 
16
 Tononi, Storia del Cardinale Giacomo Pecoraria, p. 202-4. James, as the papal legate in the region, along 
with the cathedral chapter of St Lambert in Liège, wrote to Pope Gregory IX in 1240 asking for the instalment 
of Robert of Thourotte, then bishop of Langres, as bishop of Liège. Regestes de Robert de Thourotte, vol. 15, p. 
15. 
